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ABSTRACT

The complete text of the U.S. Senate bill 969 hearings is presented in four volumes. Parts 1 and 2 cover the first day of the hearings; parts 3 and 4 cover the second day. (S. 969 would extend the maximum entitlement of educational assistance benefits for eligible Vietnam era veterans from 36 to 45 months. The bill restricts this extension to undergraduates. At issue is the removal of this restriction to extend the maximum entitlement for use in obtaining a graduate degree.) Part 3 contains the "Educational Vocational Opportunities Survey (TRADOC)" (July 1975); the "Manpower Research and Data Analysis Center (MARDAC)" preliminary results (May 1975 AFEES Survey); the "Educational Benefits Analysis," an examination of the effects of GI bill education benefits on service accessions (HUMRRO) (November 1975); "Conclusions and Implications from the Analysis of Educational Benefits" (HUMRRO) (February 1976); military publicity pamphlets; "Military Pay Muddle," excerpts from a study by the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.; "Value of Quality Soldiers to the Army," a memorandum by the Department of the Army; "Youth in Transition," (volume V, excerpts by the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan); and miscellaneous articles and statements relating to an all-volunteer military force, and other materials. (TA)

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VETERANS' EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1976

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON
READJUSTMENT, EDUCATION, AND EMPLOYMENT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

S. 969 and Related Bills

OCTOBER 1 AND 2, 1975

PART 3

Printed for the use of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs

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VETERANS' EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1976

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1975

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READJUSTMENT, EDUCATION, AND
EMPLOYMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 4200, Dirksen Office Building, the Honorable Vance Hartke (chairman of the Subcommittee on Readjustment, Education, and Employment), presiding.

Present: Chairman Vance Hartke, presiding; Senators Robert T. Stafford and Strom Thurmond.

Also present: Frank J. Brizzi, staff director and Guy H. McMichael III, general counsel.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. VANCE HARTKE, CHAIRMAN OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON READJUSTMENT, EDUCATION, AND EMPLOYMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS

Chairman HARTKE. This morning the Committee on Veterans' Affairs continues its examination of the operation and value of the GI bill and of its future.

Yesterday, we received considerable testimony which indicated that despite some problems in the operation of the GI bill, it has and continues to be one of the most valuable of our Nation's programs.

The GI bill program is one that is working. It is accomplishing its purpose by enriching the lives of young men and women in addition to benefiting the Nation as a whole.

Given the immense value of this program, Congress has a most serious obligation to examine very closely the full implications of proposals which would not only terminate the program, but also terminate prospectively this opportunity for millions of young men and women.

Today, we will receive testimony from the Department of the Army concerning the value of post-service educational benefits to the performance of its mission.

We will also hear from representatives of the higher educational community who enroll well over half of all veterans currently in such training.

I believe this testimony, together with the testimony of other witnesses will aid us in our consideration of the future of this most important program.

The first witness this morning is the most Honorable Donald G. Brotzman, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

Senator STAFFORD. Mr. Chairman, before the Secretary begins let me just welcome him here. He's an old friend of mine, a House colleague. It's very nice to have you over here for this Committee.

Secretary BROTZMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Stafford. It's a pleasure to be here.

STATEMENT OF DONALD G. BROTZMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS

Secretary BROTZMAN. I do appreciate the opportunity to be here. I know that this Committee is faced with a large responsibility. It's a difficult decision that you have to make as to whether or not to terminate a popular program, but a program whose time has come by the very nature of events.

The GI bill in its present form has been an extremely effective tool in providing an opportunity for an individual to upgrade his vocational or academic education in return for the period of his life that was interrupted by service in the Armed Forces. It has given the veteran an excellent avenue of social and economic advancement. I would assume that others in this room have had the same benefits of the GI bill as I, namely it's helped me to get a law degree and I'm confident that many of the members of the Committee have had a similar experience.

The reason for its termination, and I'm sure the reason that the President thinks it should be terminated is because it has become costly, representing a $5.4 billion expenditure in fiscal year 1976, which is a significant burden on the taxpayers of this country, and, therefore, as you know, the Department of Defense does support the President's decision to terminate the GI bill benefits for future veterans and support the view that it is time for a change.

In an all volunteer environment, the purpose of the GI bill is different. Therefore, it is quite logical that we review and terminate those programs not traditionally applicable to voluntary service in the Armed Forces during times of peace.

The Department supports the proposed legislation in concept, but also believes that it has an obligation to those individuals who are currently in service or whom we have enlisted in the Delayed Entry Program (DEP).

Through the DEP a soldier can enlist today and report for duty at a later date. The DEP is primarily a tool used by the Army to assist in management of our accession program. When we were in a draft environment we could bring people into the training base at our own discretion on a deliberate and designed basis. Our training schools have only so many seats available and we attempt to fill them to the maximum. The DEP allows us to enlist a man today and schedule him for school in the future.

If we have a soldier who desires, or an accession who desires to enlist, if we don't have a training seat right at that particular moment, or he wants to come on active duty at a later time, up to 9 months, then he enlists in the delayed entry program. He has made a binding commitment to the Army and it is merely for our convenience that he is not immediately called to active duty.

Therefore, we believe that we have an implied moral commitment to those individuals to provide the opportunity for them to avail themselves of the GI bill entitlements.

The date that the legislation becomes effective is a critical issue if we are to maintain our credibility in the recruiting area, which is one of my major responsibilities.

The administration supports the position that the effective date of the legislation should be the first day of the second month following date of enactment and that anyone in service or who has enlisted in the delayed entry program prior to that effective date would be eligible for GI bill entitlements, provided he otherwise meets the general eligibility criteria.

Very simply, if the legislation was passed this month, then under this terminology that I'm suggesting, the bill would become effective the first of December.

The Department of Defense believes that the other services will be able to maintain their desired percentages of high school graduate accessions.

I would like to discuss the Army's accessions at this point.

We have examined in some detail what the impact would be on our recruiting efforts and quality content in the event the GI bill was terminated. Research has been conducted by the Army's Training and Doctrine Command, one of our two large commands called TRADOC; our recruiting command, USAREC; and the Human Resources Research Organization (HUMRRO), an independent research firm. Their findings all point out the value of postservice education program in attracting the quality high school diploma graduate.

We believe that the number of high school diploma graduate enlistees in the Army will decrease as a result of the termination of the GI bill. The best estimate of our combined research effort, that is the three studies that I have mentioned in acronym, is that the number will be approximately 15 percent. This translates into about 22,000 to 25,000 people. It means that the Army can expect to enlist 22,000 fewer high school graduates annually, and this loss will of necessity be replaced by nonhigh school graduates of lower quality.

The impact of this to the Army will be felt in a variety of ways.

Statistically nonhigh school graduates have higher disciplinary and training loss rates and are also less likely to achieve leadership positions.

The increased annual losses will require some additional accessions to man our units, and will increase training requirements.

However, we believe these problems can be handled and that the proposed termination is appropriate. We do intend to closely monitor accessions and will reevaluate our position after we have had enough experience under the new environment, meaning that assuming the Committee, in its wisdom, determines to terminate the program. We're going to monitor it carefully and we'll, if necessary, come up with programs that will supplant this and will, obviously, bring it to the Congress.

The inservice education programs must be expanded to compensate for the loss of PREP, predischarge education program, and other inservice funded VA programs.

PREP, as you know Mr. Chairman, is the program for getting a high school diploma or an equivalency while you're in service. It's an inservice program.

During fiscal year 1975, over 28,000 soldiers received high school diplomas through the PREP program which will be terminated by the proposed legislation.

The Army will need to expand its inservice education program to offset this loss. VA expended $22.8 million for U.S. Army personnel in the PREP program last year. They also spent an additional $12.246 million to support 114,243 course enrollments for Army personnel taking college or vocational and technical courses.

The House of Representatives has already acted upon the fiscal year 1976 appropriations bill. Modification in the restrictive language will be required to allow defense to assume the high school completion and remedial training program funded under PREP.

The administration supports delaying the transfer of those programs to the Defense Department until the beginning of fiscal year 1977, which you'll recall is now October 1976, and thus supports continuation of PREP under the VA until that transfer is made.

If this is not done, the Defense Department believes in addition to the DOD budget, now being considered by the Senate Appropriations Committee, should be made to cover this program.

In summary, we support the termination legislation with these minor modifications.

Chairman HARTKE. Thank you Mr. Secretary.

Senator Thurmond has another hearing he must attend, so I will start the questioning with him.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much.

Secretary Brotzman, we're delighted to have you over here. I feel our Defense Department is fortunate to have a man of your ability, your character, and leadership in the position your're in.

I have a few questions. I won't get through with them all, so I'll ask if the rest, if you don't mind, Mr. Chairman, be answered for the record.

Chairman HARTKE. It is so ordered.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary you know the House has sharply cut the Army's recruiting request in fiscal year 1976 budget. If this is allowed to stand, how will it further complicate the Army's accession program if the GI bill is also terminated?

Secretary BROTZMAN. The House cuts us by about 15 percent in our overall recruiting budget, and roughly 35 percent in our advertising budget.

We feel that this cut is too deep and that it is going to impinge upon our recruiting effort.

We hope that the Senate, in its wisdom, will help us in this regard.

Senator THURMOND. If you want to be more specific, you can add it to your statement in the record.

Secretary BROTZMAN. I would appreciate if I could add to that. Obviously it's a problem.

Senator THURMOND. The GI bill was in effect during August and September; what was the cause of the Army's accession shortfall in August and September?

Secretary **Brotzman**. That is caused by changing our goals and our approach slightly. When we started out the GI bill, we were going for numbers. We then moved to quality. This is a further refinement, to go for a weekly goal so that we can match skills to our training seats.

Currently there are several hundreds of individuals, at times, floating about in the system not being able to get into training seats. So, we are trying to fit our recruiting effort to our training seats so there will, in fact, be no waste in the system.

May I say in conclusion to that point, we believe that it is coming along very well. It required some changes in our recruiting effort but I think we will meet our goal this month.

Senator **Thurmond**. Any question you prefer to answer for the record, if you don't have the specific information, or prefer to answer, just say so, and it will be all right.

Secretary **Brotzman**. Thank you.

Senator **Thurmond**. What are the projections for meeting your accession requirements in the fourth quarter of this year?

Secretary **Brotzman**. As I said, we may have a shortage due to this change in the system but we believe with the normal funding support, the support that we have had in the past from the Congress, that we will be able to pick up any shortages during the first part of next year, perhaps between January and June.

Senator **Thurmond**. What do you see as the accession prospects for the calendar year 1976, assuming there will be a GI bill, and assuming there won't be a GI bill? Will it be affected much either way?

Secretary **Brotzman**. It could have a significant effect, Senator. I'm not prepared to say what that effect will be. We have had some studies that show that it's going to affect, certainly the quality of our accessions, our high school graduates; however, I would deem it my responsibility if it is your choice to do this, and certainly it's the administration's position, to try to augment our recruiting effort to try to put further emphasis on inservice type of educational opportunities to take up the slack in that manner.

These are things being considered. It will be my responsibility to have to do that.

Senator **Thurmond**. On that point, do you feel you can augment your recruiting efforts to offset the loss of the GI bill if it's not reenacted?

Secretary **Brotzman**. I think we can. It will be a challenge, but I believe we can; yes, sir.

Senator **Thurmond**. That's on the assumption that the recruit cut would not stand?

Secretary **Brotzman**. Yes, sir, that is correct. I want to put it in that setting. We do have to have funds to conduct a good advertising program, to do the things we have done and have learned to do.

Senator **Thurmond**. I'd like to move on, now.

We have all noted efforts to unionize the military forces.

In your opinion would termination of the GI bill create an environment which would strengthen the unionization effort, weaken it, or have no effect?

Secretary **Brotzman**. I hope we don't unionize the Army. I haven't thought about it in that particular——

Senator **Thurmond**. Would you like to think about it, and answer it for the record?

Secretary BROTZMAN. I would like to; yes.

[Subsequently Secretary Brotzman submitted the following information:]

The termination of the GI bill should have no effect on current efforts toward unionization of the services.

Senator THURMOND. Any question you want to answer for the record—these are important questions and I don't want you to shoot from the hip if you don't want to do so.

If you're ready to fire, okay; if not, please consider it for the record.

Mr. Secretary, do you feel the Defense Department will propose legislation in the near future to meet the accession problems which will result in the termination of the GI bill?

Secretary BROTZMAN. I tremble to speak too quickly for defense, being at the Army level, but I also am part of the defense organization.

I would think that they, the Defense Department as such, would look at the affect of termination of the GI bill and then, dealing with all the services, will come up with a program, if needed.

I don't foresee that happening just immediately.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, as you know the Air Force and Navy have always had less problems in recruiting because an infantryman's job is less attractive.

It seems to me that if the GI bill is terminated, the Army should come up with some educational program to serve as an enticement sufficient to maintain Army strength. Is it not true that surveys have shown that educational enticements are at the top of the list when personnel are queried about why they enlist their services?

Secretary BROTZMAN. That is right. I mentioned these incentives in my testimony in chief that does indicate that this is the way we get quality.

Senator THURMOND. It is my hope that you and other responsible officials in the Department of Defense will take the initiative in pursuing whatever steps are necessary to develop a program to assure a continuation in the manning of our Armed Forces which already are at a minimum in size.

I have to leave now, but I want to thank you very much for your appearance here. I have some more questions that I will have a staff member give you to answer for the record if you will.

Secretary BROTZMAN. It's a pleasure to see you.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your courtesy.

Chairman HARTKE. Thank you Senator Thurmond.

[Subsequent to the hearing, Senator Thurmond submitted the following questions to Secretary Brotzman. Secretary Brotzman's response to Senator Thurmond's questions is as follows:]

RESPONSE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY DONALD G. BROTZMAN TO THE WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF HON. STROM THURMOND, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Question 1. Mr. Secretary, will you review for the Committee the probable loss of personnel to the Army next year if the GI bill is terminated on December 31, 1975?

Answer 1. The Army estimates that it will meet its manpower requirements if the GI bill is terminated. The three studies provided for the record give a range of decreases in quality accession content. The following table reflects the Army's current projected accession requirements for the period indicated. Assuming a 15 percent decrease in high school diploma accessions the table reflects the net loss anticipated as a result of the termination of the GI bill.

ARMY NONPRIOR SERVICE ACCESSION REQUIREMENTS

	January-June 1976	Fiscal year—	
		197T	1977
NPS requirements	93,700	52,700	185,800
HSDG goal (65 percent)	60,905	34,255	120,770
HSDG loss (15 percent)	14,055	7,905	27,870

The loss in HSDG and their replacement by NHSG in Mental Category IIIb and IV (lower half) will increase losses resulting in a requirement for increased accessions, and increased personnel turbulence.

Question 2. Does this loss result from a decrease in recruitment objectives only, or do you take into account early retirements?

Answer 2. Our projected accession requirements take into account the Army's losses from all sources including retirements. The Army does not anticipate that the loss of the GI bill will cause an increase in retirements in the next fiscal year.

Question 3. One proposal for terminating benefits provides that the final date for using benefits accrued under the GI bill would be January 1, 1987. Under another proposal, June 30, 1985 would be the final date beyond which no benefits could be awarded. I have several questions on the effect if such dates are enacted.

(*a*) Could a career soldier be put in the position of forfeiting either his accrued educational entitlement in order to salvage his retirement credit, or forfeiting his retirement in order to use his GI bill before the final date beyond which no benefits can be awarded? (I am talking about his eligibility for the subsistence benefit, not the right to use up GI bill credits in service by having tuition paid and drawing no subsistence pay.)

Answer 3(a). Yes. Only soldiers on duty prior to 1 January 1964 who elect to stay on active duty for 20 years could draw military retirement benefits and 36 months of VA educational entitlements if these entitlements are terminated on 1 January 1987. The date of 1 January 1964 is important as it has impact on the Vietnam veteran. This could also have an adverse effect on the quality of noncommissioned officers as it could encourage them to leave the service after a 20 year enlistment rather than serving for a longer period. The Army has made no studies as to the probability of careerists forfeiting their retirement benefits in order to utilize their GI bill benefits prior to the delimiting point of 1 January 1987. It is possible that this might have some impact on the career force but it is not possible to access this impact at this time.

Question 3(b). Is it not correct that many of the career soldiers caught in this situation could conceivably be men who were drafted into service and saw combat duty in Vietnam?

Answer 3(b). Yes. If the delimiting point is established as 1 January 1987 then all careerists who entered active duty after 1 January 1967 and elected to remain for 20 years or more in order to draw military retirement benefits would lose their GI bill entitlements.

Question 3(c). Assuming these men have served at least 18 months, is it true that they have already accrued potential maximum eligibility under the GI bill?

Answer 3(c). Yes. All individuals who serve as careerists for 20 years would have accrued full GI bill benefits by the date of their retirement.

Question 3(d). Maximum eligibility may be 45 months of schooling. Assuming the soldier is married, he could draw approximately $300 per month in subsistence pay under the GI bill. This would amount to approximately $13,500 in benefits which have accrued to him, which under the law today, he must use within 10 years after his date of discharge. If we do not provide for a certain amount of time in which to allow the career man to use his benefits after his discharge, are we not, in effect, encouraging him to retire early if he wants to use this potential $13,500 for his education?

Answer 3(d). If the soldier desired to utilize a full 36 months of GI bill education entitlements then he would be required to terminate his military career 36 months prior to the established delimiting point at a minimum. To some individuals this might act as an incentive to end their military service. To others it might have no effect. The Army has not assessed the impact of this aspect of GI bill termination.

Question 3(e). Mr. Secretary, how do you feel it would affect the morale of career soldiers who would be eligible for retirement in 1985, 1986, or 1987, and who want to go to school? Do you have any studies to show how this would affect early retirements? If so, could you provide this information to the Committee?

Answer 3(e). The career soldier will have to make the choice between GI bill education entitlements and military retirement benefits if the established delimiting point effects either. The loss of either would undoubtedly be disappointing to the soldier concerned. As stated before there are no studies on this issue. The Army can counter adverse morale implications by encouraging the careerist to utilize his GI bill benefits while in the service if he would lose all or a portion of them by serving to his retirement eligibility point.

Question 4. Another problem which concerns me is the Delayed Entry Program.

(*a*) For the record, Mr. Secretary, would you review the Delayed Entry Program, tell us how many young men are involved, and explain how long the average delay of entry into active duty lasts?

Answer 4(a). The Delayed Entry Program (DEP) has been established primarily for the convenience of the Army versus that to the individual. The DEP allows enlistment of the soldier (in an individual status in the Army Reserve) to be brought on active duty at a later date, up to 9 months later. The function of this program is to adjust the individual's reporting date to the date a training space is available in our schools system in the specialty for which he or she enlisted. During the draft period the Army could call them to active duty on the date the training space was available. A volunteer environment does not allow us to continue in that manner. Enlistments are seasonal in nature. Our replacement requirements do not follow this pattern. The DEP allows us to control the flow of accessions into our training base. There are 14,100 people in the DEP as of 15 October 1975. The average time spent in the DEP varies throughout the year for any given monthly group. The yearly average is from 3 to 4 months.

Question 4(b). What effect will termination of the GI bill have on the individual Delayed Entry participants if it is terminated effective December 31, 1975?

Answer 4(b). If the legislation passed by the House is enacted into law as it is now written no individual in the DEP will be eligible for GI bill educational entitlements if he enters active duty subsequent to December 31, 1975.

Question 4(c) What effect would it have on the Army?

Answer 4(c). The US Army Training and Doctrine Command's "Quality Soldier Study", the Human Resources Research Organization's "Educational Benefits Analysis", and the Manpower Research and Data Analysis Center's "May 1975 AFEES Survey" when taken together in context provide a detailed analysis of the attitudes of enlistees toward education programs, reasons for enlisting, and expected impact of the GI bill termination. These studies have been provided for the record at the Committee's request. Briefly, the Army expects to meet its manpower requirements without the GI bill. The Army anticipates a decrease of approximately 15 percent in high school diploma graduates.

Question 4(d) How much lead time before a cut-off date is set would you need to assure that anyone coming into the Army under the Delayed Entry Program could be apprised of his noneligibility for GI bill benefits?

Answer 4(d). The US Army Recruiting Command estimates that it would take no more than 2 weeks to fully inform the recruiting "sales force" of the termination of the GI bill benefits. Anyone entering the DEP after that time would be informed of their noneligibility. It would take a longer period to inform those in the DEP on the date of termination. The latter should take no longer than 30 days. In order to maintain our credibility and commitments we would have to permit the individual to be discharged if he so desired.

Question 4(e). How would you react to a provision in the law that anyone inducted under the Delayed Entry Program, up to the time of enactment, would be eligible for GI bill benefits if he met other eligibility requirements?

Answer 4(e). This would be desirable. It would assist the Army in maintaining credibility in the recruiting program and possibly avoid legal action on the part of those in the DEP who felt that they were entitled to GI bill benefits by virtue of enlisting in the DEP prior to their termination.

Chairman Hartke. Senator Stafford. I am sorry if Senator Thurmond has preempted some of your questions, but I'm glad to permit you to go ahead now with your comments.

Senator Stafford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm not sure what the extent of the preemption is since some of Senator Thurmond's questions are in writing.

Mr. Secretary, if you do find there's duplication, I suggest you answer Senator Thurmond's and I'll be satisfied with that.

At the risk of some repetition, and again pointing out, like Senator Thurmond, I will be satisfied if you want to answer any questions for the record, rather than here, then feel free to do so.

Would you tell this subcommittee what percentage of high school graduates the Army did induct last year?

Secretary Brotzman. It was 57.8 percent.

We have a goal this year, I might add, which is 65 percent and that is for high school graduates, not including the equivalency or the GED.

Senator Stafford. If the GI bill is terminated, although you have some comments on that in your prepared statement, what percentage of high school graduates would you expect to be able to enlist next year?

Secretary Brotzman. If I may, Senator, the best authority I have on this is a TRADOC study that I mentioned in my testimony in chief.

First, this was a study in May of 1975, concluded then. The purpose was to define and assess the impact of GI bill loss. The survey base was 70 company-sized units in FORCECOM, Forces Command.

Quality reduction: According to the results of this survey, the best estimate is about a 15-percent decrease in high school graduates.

This translates into these numbers: About 22,000 high school graduates annually.

I think we had about 90,000 male high school graduates last year.

Chairman Hartke. We will insert the TRADOC study in the record at this point.

[The study follows:]

1910

TRADOC
EDUCATIONAL VOCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES SURVEY

TEVOS

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY
TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND
FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA 23651

JULY 1975

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SECTION I

TRADOC EDUCATIONAL/VOCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES SURVEY

A. PURPOSE. To report the findings of the TRADOC Educational/Vocational Opportunity Survey (TEVOS) of enlisted personnel. The TEVOS was formed to provide the CG, TRADOC with an evaluation of the impact of educational/vocational opportunities upon motivation for enlistment and on the individual soldier's job satisfaction. Additionally, the soldier's interest in industrial accreditation for vocational skills acquired while in service was explored.

B. METHODOLOGY. The TEVOS utilized a dual approach to the gathering of information.

1. The initial phase of TEVOS encompassed a review and analysis of existing Department of Army, United States Army Recruiting Command, and TRADOC/FORSCOM surveys and research projects concerned with the impact of academic/vocational skill development opportunities as motivators for enlistment into the Army.

2. The second phase of the study involved the development of a comprehensive questionnaire survey tool which was administered to over 2600 randomly chosen enlisted personnel at ten selected installations. This questionnaire was developed to determine the responses of enlisted personnel to the following specific questions:

a. How influential are academic educational/vocational skill development opportunities as motivators for enlistment (re-enlistment) into the Army?

b. Do current Army educational/vocational opportunities impact upon the individual soldier's job satisfaction?

c. What is the soldier's attitude toward receiving industry accreditation for vocational skills attained while in service?

3. The Questionnaire. The sixteen item TEVOS questionnaire was designed to obtain specific information concerning each of the three matters of interest identified above. Questions one through six were aimed at providing data concerning the characteristics of the soldier respondent (the soldier is not asked to provide his name or social security number) while items seven through nine were developed to derive data relating to the influence of academic educational/vocational skill development opportunities upon enlistment (re-enlistment) decisions. Items ten through twelve were designed to measure the impact

of current Army educational/vocational opportunities upon the soldier's job satisfaction. The enlisted man's attitude toward receiving industrial accreditation is addressed by items thirteen through sixteen.

a. Administration of the TEVOS Questionnaire Survey. During the period 17 April to 22 May 1975, questionnaires were administered to 2681 randomly chosen enlisted personnel stationed at ten selected installations. Personnel to be surveyed were identified through a random sampling procedure which utilized the final two digits of the individual's Social Security number. Lists of such personnel were supplied to each installation by the Education Branch, Professional Development Division, ODCSPER, HQ TRADOC. Installations were selected in order to provide a demographic, mission, and cross-sectional skill area profile within TRADOC. The distribution, by installation, of these questionnaires is as follows:

*Aberdeen Proving Ground	305
*Fort Belvoir	242
Fort Benning	259
*Fort Eustis	301
Fort Jackson	317
Fort Knox	253
*Fort Lee	255
Fort Monroe	258
Fort Ord	300
Fort Sill	191
TOTAL	2681

*These installations were selected because of their ongoing efforts to obtain industrial accreditation for in-service acquired skills and experiences.

Since not every survey participant answered every question, the average item response - the average number of responses which each of the survey questions 7 through 9 and 11 through 16 received - was 2655. This figure does not reflect responses to question 10 which was a multiple response question.

b. Survey Population. Survey participants were identified by current grade level, term of enlistment, geographic area from which entered service, type of Army job (MOS/CMF), type of unit, and education level. Responses were also itemized on a participating installation basis. An analysis of these characteristics reveals the following:

	Personnel Responses	Percent of Total
(1) Grade Level		
E1 thru E4	1444	53.9%
E5 thru E6	804	30.0%
E7 thru E9	431	16.1%
(2) Term of Enlistment		
First Enlistment	1302	48.8%
Other Enlistment	1365	51.2%

	Personnel Responses	Percent of Total

(3) Regional Recruiting Command (Area from which entered service).

	Personnel Responses	Percent of Total
Northeast District	513	20.7%
Southeast District	809	32.6%
Midwest District	449	18.1%
Southwest District	375	15.1%
Western District	332	13.4%

(4) MOS/CMF Areas Covered. Every Career Management Field (CMF) was represented in the survey population with the exception of CMF 33 (Intercept Equipment Maintenance). For a detailed discussion of CMF areas covered see Section II - Item Analysis of TEVOS Questionnaire.

(5) Type of Unit.

	Personnel Responses	Percent of Total
BCT/BT (Trainee)	245	9.3%
AIT (Trainee)	226	8.6%
School (Student)	70	2.7%
School Troops	217	8.3%
TOE Unit	930	35.4%
TDA Unit	936	35.7%

(6) Education Level.

	Personnel Responses	Percent of Total
Non high School Graduate (NHSG)	428	16.0%
High School Graduate (HSG)	1965	73.3%
College Graduate (AA or Higher degree)	286	10.6%

C. MAJOR FINDINGS. Major findings are grouped below as they apply to the specific question posed by the survey. Findings outlined in paragraph 1a refer to information derived from a review and analysis of existing surveys and research projects while paragraphs 1b through 3d concern findings obtained by means of the TEVOS Questionnaire. Section II outlines in detail the responses to the TEVOS Questionnaire while Section III provides a review and analysis of existing surveys and research projects.

1. Question: How influential are academic educational/vocational skill development opportunities as motivators for enlistment (reenlistment) into the Army?

a. A review of the literature of existing surveys and research projects indicated that educational and vocational training opportunities offered by the Army are positive motivators for enlistment and also serve as favorable factors in the enlistment (reenlistment) decisions of enlisted personnel. Vocational training and/or academic education opportunities were consistently identified as the top or among the top factors influencing the enlistment (reenlistment) decision.

b. The promise that a soldier would be able to further his education while on active duty was cited as a definite factor in the enlistment (reenlistment) decision by approximately 69% of those enlisted personnel who responded to the TEVOS questionnaire. Personnel in grades E1 - E4 and first term personnel showed a proportionately greater interest (79%) in furthering education as did BCT/AIT (82%), AIT (75%), and TOE (73%) personnel and non high school graduates (77%).

c. The chance to learn a civilian-related skill was cited by 33% of all survey respondents as the most attractive education/training incentive offered at enlistment/reenlistment time with 35% favoring educational programs (24% - college credit and 11% - high school completion). Slightly over 20% of the survey respondents indicated that education/training opportunities were not a factor.

d. The desire for Army training in a civilian-related skill was cited by a combined total of nearly 70% of the respondents to the TEVOS questionnaire (most important factor - 8%, one of three most important factors - 15%, an important factor - 22%, and a factor - 24%) as a factor in the enlistment (reenlistment) decision. This desire was particularly evident in E1 - E4, first term, BCT/BT, AIT, and non high school graddate personnel.

2. Question: Do current Army educational/vocational opportunities impact upon the individual soldier's job satisfaction?

a. The opportunity to further education was ranked third overall (tied with salary) behind Army career benefits (medical, PX, retirement, etc.) and job security as the most important of eleven factors related to job satisfaction. The opportunity for training in a skill that can be utilized in civilian life ranked sixth. Among E1 - E4, first term, BCT/BT, service school students, TOE, and non high school graduate personnel the opportunity to further education was cited as the leading factor in job satisfaction.

b. In another TEVOS questionnaire item, question eleven, the impact of Army educational/vocational opportunities upon job satisfaction was considered to be favorable by 73% of the survey respondents. Of this number, 37% were favorable because such opportunities afford the chance to prepare the soldier for a civilian job while 36% favored them because they afford the opportunity to improve the soldier's military career.

Slightly over 20% indicated no particular opinion because they felt these opportunities do no impact upon job satisfaction. Approximately 7% replied that the impact of such opportunities was unfavorable.

c. The desire to simply improve one's educational level was cited by nearly 43% of the survey participants as the leading reason for a soldier to participate in Army educational/vocational programs. Over 30% selected the desire to better prepare for a civilian job as the prime motivator while 12% expressed no opinion. Nearly 6% felt that soldiers participate in such programs because their commanders look favorable upon this.

3. Question: What is the soldier's attitude toward receiving industry accreditation for vocational skills attained while in service?

a. Nearly 56% of TEVOS questionnaire respondents indicated a desire to continue to work, after leaving service, in a similar civilian skill area for which [illegible] trained. A lack of such interest was cited by 25% of those replying and 19% indicated no opinion. This desire tends to increase as grade level, time in service, and educational level increase.

b. The majority of TEVOS survey participants (64%) have not heard of any Army program aimed at promoting recognition by civilian industry of Army acquired training. Approximately 36% were aware of such a program. Knowledge of a program for industry recognition of Army training increases as grade level, time in service, and educational level increases. Approximately 53% of E7 - E9 personnel, 44% of second or subsequent enlistment personnel, and [illegible] of college level personnel indicated such an awareness. Additionally, a greater proportion (41%) of personnel stationed at those installations (Aberdeen Proving Ground, Forts Belvoir, Eustis and Lee) which are involved in industrial recognition programs were aware of such a proposal.

c. Nearly [illegible] of all survey respondents expressed a favorable attitude to a proposal that the Army assist the soldier in obtaining civilian employer acceptance of Army acquired skills and experiences. Approximately 12% indicated no particular feelings about such a proposal and less than 2% expressed an unfavorable response.

d. A majority (52%) of survey participants responded that there would be an increased degree of job satisfaction if the Army could obtain civilian employer acceptance of Army acquired skills and experiences. About 38% indicated that such a development would exert no impact upon job satisfaction.

D. CONCLUSIONS.

1. The availability of educational/vocational opportunities exerts a positive influence upon enlistment and reenlistment decisions of enlisted

personnel at the ten installations surveyed. Over 69% of the respondents to the TEVOS questionnaire cited the opportunity to further education while on active duty as a definite factor in the enlistment decision. Nearly 70% of the participants in the questionnaire survey indicated that the desire for Army training in a civilian-related skill was a factor in the enlistment decision. These findings are also supported by the review of existing surveys and research projects.

2. Army educational/vocational training opportunities impact positively upon the job satisfaction of enlisted personnel. Approximately 73% of the participants in the TEVOS questionnaire survey indicated a favorable attitude toward the influence of such opportunities upon job satisfaction. The opportunity to further education was cited as the third most important overall of eleven factors related to job satisfaction. Among E1 - E4, first term, BCT/BT, service school students, TOE, and non high school graduate personnel the opportunity to further education while on active duty is the most frequently cited factor.

3. The majority of enlisted personnel (56%) participating in the TEVOS questionnaire indicated a desire to continue, in civilian life, in a similar skill area as that for which MOS trained.

4. The majority (64%) of the respondents to the survey were unaware of any Army program aimed at developing civilian acceptance of vocational skills acquired while in service.

5. Enlisted personnel surveyed indicated a strong interest (86%) in the development of an Army program which would seek to obtain civilian employer acceptance of Army acquired skills and experiences.

6. A majority of the enlisted personnel surveyed felt that job satisfaction would be enhanced if the Army could obtain civilian employer acceptance of MOS acquired skills and experiences.

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SECTION II

TRADOC EDUCATIONAL/VOCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

ITEM ANALYSIS

TRADOC Educational/Vocational Opportunities Survey

1. Check the one in which your current grade falls.
   - a. E1 thru E4 54%
   - b. E5 thru E6 30%
   - c. E7 thru E9 16%

2. Check the category "1st enlistment" if this is your first tour of active duty in the Army. Check "other" if you are on a re-enlistment tour.
   - a. 1st Enlistment 49%
   - b. Other 51%

3. From which Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Station (AFEES) did you enter the Army? Use numerical code adjacent to the city located on the attached listing of AFEES (incl 1). See note below

NOTE: For purposes of analysis, responses to this question were grouped by location within the geographic area of the five Regional Recruiting Commands. The distribution of responses organized in this manner is:

Northeast Regional Recruiting Command	21%
Southeast Regional Recruiting Command	33%
Midwest Regional Recruiting Command	18%
Southwest Regional Recruiting Command	15%
Western Regional Recruiting Command	13%

4. What is (or will be) your primary MOS? See note below

NOTE: For purposes of analysis, MOS responses were grouped into career management fields (CMF) which were then organized into three main functional categories - Combat Specialists, Systems Technicians, and General Technicians. A description of the frequency and characteristics of these groups is as follows:

GENERAL INFORMATION

	COMBAT SPECIALISTS	SYSTEMS TECHNICIANS	GENERAL TECHNICIANS
Frequency in Survey	17%	32%	51%

	COMBAT SPECIALISTS	SYSTEMS TECHNICIANS	GENERAL TECHNICIANS
Can job be exercised in peacetime?	No	To a limited degree	Yes
Is there a civilian job equivalent?	No	To a limited degree	Yes

CMF Groupings and Frequency

Combat Specialists

CMF Area	Number	Percent
11 (Man Cbt Arms)	267	10.4%
12 (Cbt Engr)	61	2.4%
13 (Fld Arty Cannon)	75	2.9%
15 (Fld Arty Msl)	7	.3%
16 (Air Def Arty)	5	.2%
17 (Cbt Sur & Tgt Acq)	24	.9%

Systems Technicians

21 (Bal Msl Repair)	4	.2%
23 (Air Def Msl Maint)	5	.2%
26 (Non-Int Radar Mnt)	6	.2%
27 (Cbt Msl Mnt)	1	.04%
31 (Fld & Area Comm Mnt)	48	1.9%
32 (Fld Plant Comm Mnt)	13	.5%
35 (Elec Inst Mnt)	33	1.3%
36 (Wire Antenna & Cent Ofc)	40	1.6%
63 (Mech Mnt)	430	16.7%
67 (Arm Mnt)	116	4.5%
72 (Telecommo & Audiovisual)	85	3.3%
79 (Auto Data)	50	1.9%
98 (Signal Intell)	4	.2%

General Technician

51 (Gen Engr)	80	3.1%
52 (Power Production)	29	1.1%
54 (Chemical)	23	.9%
55 (Ammunition)	22	.9%
57 (Fld Svc)	9	.4%
65 (Transportation)	153	5.9%
71 (Admin)	311	12.1%

General Technician (Cont'd)	Number	Percent
76 (Supply)	242	9.4%
81 (Topo Engr)	49	1.9%
91 (Medical)	120	4.7%
92 (Petroleum)	25	1.0%
94 (Food Svc)	89	3.5%
95 (Law)	107	4.2%
96 (Mil Intell)	6	.2%
97 (Band)	30	1.2%
TOTAL	2569	

5. What is your current (or projected) type of unit assignment? (Check one)

a. 9% BCT/BT (Trainee).

b. 9% AIT (Trainee).

c. 3% School (Student)

d. 8% School troops.

e. 35% TOE Unit.

f. 36% TDA Unit

6. Which of the following best describes you NOW? (Check one)

a. 1% I have NOT completed the 8th grade.

b. 15% I have completed 8th grade but have NOT completed high school (or GED equivalent).

c. 73% I have completed high school (or GED equivalent) but have NOT completed 2 years of college or its equivalent.

d. 8% I have completed 2 years of college or its equivalent, but have NOT completed a Baccalaureate Degree.

e. 2% I have completed a Baccalaureate Degree but have NOT completed a graduate degree.

f. 1% I have completed a graduate degree.

NOTE: For purposes of analysis, responses to this question were grouped into three basic education levels:

Non high school graduates - includes responses a & b.
High school graduates - includes only response c.
College level - includes responses d, e and f.

The distribution of responses organized in this manner is:

Non high school graduates	16%
High school graduates	73%
College level	11%

7. The promise that I would be able to further my education while on active duty: (Check one)

   a. 31% Did NOT influence me at all in making my decision to enlist (re-enlist).

   b. 22% Was a factor in my decision to enlist (re-enlist) but other factors were more important.

   c. 18% Played an important part in making my decision to enlist (re-enlist).

   d. 20% Was one of the THREE most important reasons I enlisted (re-enlisted).

   e. 9% Was the MOST important reason I enlisted (re-enlisted).

GENERAL ANALYSIS

The promise that a soldier would be able to further his education while on active duty was cited as a definite factor in the enlistment (re-enlistment) decision by a total over 69% of those enlisted personnel responding to the questionnaire. This figure is composed of nearly 9% who cited this incentive as the most important factor, 20% who cited it as one of the three most important factors, 18% who cited it as an important factor, and 22% who cited it as a factor but with other factors being more important. Nearly 31% of the respondents indicated that this factor was not an influence at all.

ANALYSIS OF ITEM RESPONSE BY CHARACTERISTIC OF RESPONDENT

GRADE LEVEL	Personnel in grades E1 - E4 demonstrate a greater interest (79%) in furthering education than do E5 - E6 (63%) or E7 - E9 (45%).
TIME IN SERVICE	First term personnel (79%) are more interested in furthering education than those in second or subsequent terms of enlistment (60%).

REGIONAL RECRUITING COMMANDS	**No appreciable variation in responses from the five Regional Recruiting Commands.**
TYPE OF ARMY JOB (MOS/CMF)	**All three categories - Combat Specialists (72%), Systems Technicians (65%), General Technicians (70%) indicate an interest in furthering education.**
TYPE OF UNIT	**BCT/AIT (82%), AIT (75%), and TOE (73%) troops show greater interest in educational opportunities than do service school students (69%), school troops (62%) or TDA personnel (61%).**
EDUCATION LEVEL	**Non high school graduates (77%) are more interested in educational opportunities than are college level students (69%) or high school graduates (67%).**

8. The most attractive education/training incentive offered me when I enlisted (re-enlisted) was: (Check one)

a. 11% The chance to learn an Army skill (i.e., infantryman, tanker, etc.).

b. 33% The chance to learn a civilian-related skill.

c. 11% The chance to get a high school diploma or certificate of equivalency.

d. 24% The chance to earn credit toward a college/junior college degree.

e. 20% None of the above. Education was not an incentive to me.

GENERAL ANALYSIS

The chance to learn a civilian-related skill was cited by 33% of all survey respondents as the most attractive education/training incentive offered at enlistment/re-enlistment time. Over 24% favored the chance to earn college credit, 11% preferred the opportunity to obtain a high school diploma or certificate, and another 11% selected the chance to learn an Army skill (infantryman, tanker, etc). Slightly over 20% of the survey respondents indicated education/training was not a factor in the enlistment (re-enlistment) decision.

ANALYSIS OF ITEM RESPONSE BY CHARACTERISTIC OF RESPONDENT

GRADE LEVEL	The most frequently cited education/training enlistment incentive cited by E1-E4 personnel (39%) was the chance to learn a civilian-related skill, E5-E6 personnel (29%) favored the chance to earn college level credit and E7-E9 personnel (24%) preferred the chance to learn a civilian-related skill. A large percentage (42%) of E7-E9 respondents indicated that education was not an incentive.
TIME IN SERVICE	Responses by time in service paralleled those of grade level.
REGIONAL RECRUITING COMMANDS	The chance to learn a civilian-related skill was the most frequently cited incentive of personnel from each Regional Recruiting Command. The opportunity to pursue high school or college education was also heavily favored in all areas.
TYPE OF ARMY JOB (MOS/CMF)	Combat specialists (30%) favored the opportunity to obtain college credit while both Systems Technicians (43%) and General Technicians (33%) preferred the chance to learn a civilian skill. Only 18% of the Combat Specialists cited the chance to learn a civilian skill.
TYPE OF UNIT	The chance to learn a civilian skill was selected by all categories as the single most favored response. A combination of either high school or college education was also a frequent selection of all groups.
EDUCATION LEVEL	Non high school graduates (41%) favored the chance to obtain a high school education, high school graduates (35%) preferred the chance to learn a civilian skill, and college level personnel (40%) chose the opportunity to earn college credits.

9. The desire for Army training in a civilian-related skill: (Check one)

   a. 30% Did NOT influence me at all in making my decision to enlist (re-enlist).

   b. 24% Was a factor in my decision to enlist (re-enlist) but other factors were more important.

   c. 22% Played an important part in making my decision to enlist (re-enlist).

   d. 16% Was one of the THREE most important reasons I enlisted (re-enlisted).

   e. 8% Was the MOST important reason I enlisted (re-enlisted).

GENERAL ANALYSIS

The desire for Army training in a civilian-related skill was cited by a combined total of nearly 70% of the survey participants as a factor in the enlistment (re-enlistment) decision. This factor was chosen as the most important reason by 8%, as one of the three most important factors by 16%, as an important factor by 22%, and as a factor in the enlistment (re-enlistment) decision by over 24%. Over 30% of the survey participants indicated that the desire for Army training in a civilian-related skill did not influence the enlistment (re-enlistment) decision.

ANALYSIS OF ITEM RESPONSE BY CHARACTERISTIC OF RESPONDENT

GRADE LEVEL	More personnel in grades E1-E4 (79%) cite Army training in a civilian related skill as a factor in the enlistment (re-enlistment) decision than do E5-E6 (65%) or E7-E9 (48%) personnel.
TIME IN SERVICE	Nearly 79% of first term personnel indicate that the desire for Army training in a civilian-related skill was a factor in the enlistment (re-enlistment) decision while 61% of those personnel in second or subsequent enlistments so indicate.
REGIONAL RECRUITING COMMANDS	No appreciable variation in responses from the five Regional Recruiting Commands.

TYPE OF ARMY JOB (MOS/CMF)	A smaller portion (62%) of Combat Specialists cite Army training in a civilian-related skill as an enlistment (re-enlistment) factor than do Systems Technicians (74%) or General Technicians (70%).
TYPE OF UNIT	BCT/BT (79%), AIT (79%), service school students (75%), and TOE personnel (73%) cite Army training in a civilian-related skill as an enlistment (re-enlistment) factor more frequently than did TDA personnel (63%) or school troops (60%).
EDUCATION LEVEL	A greater proportion (78%) of non high school graduates favor Army training in a civilian-related skill than do high school graduates (69%) or college level personnel (65%).

10. Which of the following are MOST important to your job satisfaction (check FOUR)

a. 14% Salary.

b. 15% Job security.

c. 12% Promotional opportunities.

d. 7% Opportunity to work in MOS area.

e. 15% Army career benefits (medical, PX, retirement benefits, etc.)

f. 14% Opportunity to further education (high school, vocational, college).

g. 10% Opportunity for training in a skill that can be used upon leaving the service.

h. 7% Travel.

i. 3% Opportunity to select unit or station of assignment.

j. 1% Superior/subordinate relationships.

k. 3% Other.

GENERAL ANALYSIS

In the survey question designed to identify those factors (each respondent was invited to select four from a total of eleven factors) considered by enlisted personnel as being most important to job satisfaction, the availability of Army career benefits (medical, PX, retirement, etc.) was the most commonly cited factor - 14.7% of responses. Job security, the second most commonly cited factor received 14.6% of the responses while salary and the opportunity to further education (high school, vocational, college) each accounted for 13.9% of the responses. Next most commonly selected factors were promotional opportunities (11.8%) and the opportunity for training in a skill that can be utilized upon leaving service (9.8%). Factors less commonly mentioned were the opportunity to work in an MOS area (6.6%), travel (6.6%), other unidentified factors (3.4%), opportunity to select unit or station of choice ([illegible]), and superior/subordinate relationships (1.4%).

ANALYSIS OF ITEM RESPONSE BY CHARACTERISTIC OF RESPONDENT

GRADE LEVEL	While overall, the most frequently cited factor in job satisfaction is the area of Army career benefits (14.7%), among E1-E4 personnel, the opportunity to further education is the most commonly cited factor ([illegible]). Most commonly cited factor among E5-E6 is job security, while among E7-E9 personnel it is Army career benefits.
TIME IN SERVICE	Responses by time in service paralleled those of grade level with first termers (16.2%) favoring the opportunity to further education and those beyond the first term (18.1%) preferring Army career benefits.
REGIONAL RECRUITING COMMANDS	No appreciable variation in responses from the five Regional Recruiting Commands.
TYPE OF ARMY JOB (MOS/CMF)	Systems Technicians (8%) and General Technicians (7%) favor the opportunity to work in their MOS area to a greater extent than do combat specialists. No other significant variations.

TYPE OF UNIT	While overall, the most commonly cited factor in job satisfaction is in the area of Army career benefits (14.7%), the opportunity to further education is the most frequently cited factor by BCT/BT (15.6%), service school students (14.2%), and TOE personnel (14.9%). Job security is the most frequently cited factor (15.1%) by AIT personnel. School troops (18.3%) and TDA unit personnel (15.5%) cite Army career benefits most frequently.
EDUCATION LEVEL	Non high school graduates most frequently cite the opportunity to further education as the leading factor in job satisfaction while high school graduates (15.7%) favor Army career benefits. College level personnel (15.2%) most often cite job security.

11. To what extent do Army educational/vocational opportunities impact upon your job satisfaction? (Check only one)

   a. 36% Favorable because they afford me the opportunity to improve my military career.

   b. 37% Favorable because they afford me the opportunity to improve my preparation for a civilian job.

   c. 2% Unfavorable because they do not help me improve my military career.

   d. 5% Unfavorable because they do not help me in preparing for a civilian job.

   e. 20% I have no opinion because these opportunities do not have an impact on my job satisfaction.

GENERAL ANALYSIS

The impact of Army educational/vocational opportunities upon job satisfaction was considered to be favorable by 73% of the survey participants. Of this number, 37% were favorable because they afford the opportunity to prepare the soldier for a civilian job while 36% favored them because they afford the opportunity to improve the soldier's military career. Nearly

7% of the respondents indicated an unfavorable response - 5% because such opportunities do not help in preparing for a civilian job and 2% because they do not help to improve the soldier's military career. Slightly over 20% of the survey participants indicated no particular opinion because educational/vocational opportunities do not impact upon job satisfaction.

ANALYSIS OF ITEM RESPONSE BY CHARACTERISTIC RESPONDENT

GRADE LEVEL	Only a slight variation by enlisted grade level with E5-E6 (77%) being more favorably inclined than E1-E4 (71%) and E7-E9 (72%) to a positive attitude toward the impact of educational/vocational opportunities upon job satisfaction.
TIME IN SERVICE	No appreciable variation in responses from first term personnel and second or subsequent term personnel.
REGIONAL RECRUITING COMMANDS	Little variation in responses among the five Regional Recruiting Commands.
TYPE OF ARMY JOB (MOS/CMF)	Combat Specialists (68%) are less favorably inclined toward Army educational/vocational opportunities as a positive impact on job satisfaction than are Systems Technicians (76%) and General Technicians (73%).
TYPE OF UNIT	Consistently positive responses from personnel in all types of units surveyed - slightly more AIT troops (79%) are favorable and slightly less TOE personnel (72%) are favorable.
EDUCATION LEVEL	No appreciable variations in responses among the three education levels surveyed.

12. Soldiers are likely to participate in the Army's educational/vocational programs because: (check one)

a. 6% Commanders would look favorably upon this.

b. 12% Desire to improve skills in MOS area.

c. 30% Desire to better prepare for a civilian job.

d. 43% Desire to simply improve current education level.

e. 9% No opinion.

GENERAL ANALYSIS

The desire to simply improve one's educational level was cited by nearly 43% of the survey participants as the leading reason for a soldier to participate in Army educational/vocational programs. Over 30% selected the desire to better prepare for a civilian job as the prime motivator while 12% cited the desire to improve MOS skills. Approximately 9% expressed no opinion and nearly 6% felt that soldiers participate in such programs because their commanders look favorably upon such action.

ANALYSIS OF ITEM RESPONSE BY CHARACTERISTIC OF RESPONDENT

GRADE LEVEL	The most frequently identified response from each grade level surveyed was that soldiers are likely to participate in the Army's educational/vocational programs because of a desire to improve their current education level. There was common agreement on the second most frequently identified response - the desire to better prepare for a civilian job.
TIME IN SERVICE	Responses according to time in service were parallel to those of grade level in both first and second most frequently selected responses.
REGIONAL RECRUITING COMMANDS	No appreciable variation in responses from the five Regional Recruiting Commands.
TYPE OF ARMY JOB (MOS/CMF)	The desire to improve one's current education level is the most frequently cited response by all three groups. Also commonly cited as the second most frequent response is the desire to better prepare for a civilian job.
TYPE OF UNIT	Responses from soldiers in the various types of units surveyed were parallel to those identified by grade level, time in service, recruiting command, and type of Army job.
EDUCATION LEVEL	Responses were similar to those of all other groups surveyed and identified above.

13. When you leave the Army would you like to continue to work in a similar civilian skill area for which you were MOS trained? (Check one)

a. 56% Yes

b. 25% No

c. 19% Undecided

GENERAL ANALYSIS

The desire to continue to work, after leaving service, in a similar civilian skill area for which MOS trained was stated by 55.5% of the survey respondents. A lack of such interest was cited by 25.3% of those replying to this survey question with 19.1% indicating no opinion.

ANALYSIS OF ITEM RESPONSE BY CHARACTERISTIC OF RESPONDENT

GRADE LEVEL	All grade levels surveyed indicated a strong interest, upon separation from service, in working in a civilian skill area similar to that for which MOS trained. There is a tendency for this interest to increase as grade level increases.
TIME IN SERVICE	Both first term personnel and beyond first term personnel indicate an interest in continuing, in civilian life, in working in the skill area for which MOS trained. There is a tendency for this interest to increase as time in service increases.
REGIONAL RECRUITING COMMANDS	No appreciable differences in responses from the five Regional Recruiting Commands.
TYPE OF ARMY JOB (MOS/CMF)	Both General Technicians (58%) and Systems Technicians (64%) favor post service careers in their MOS skill areas. Not surprisingly, only 32% of Combat Specialists are interested in this plan.
TYPE OF UNIT	The majority of responses in each group of type of unit favors civilian career in their MOS area upon leaving service. This attitude is particularly pronounced among service school students (63%) and AIT personnel (61%).

EDUCATION LEVEL	**There is uniform agreement (56%) among soldiers grouped by education level that they would desire to pursue in civilian life a career comparable to that for which MOS trained. This feeling tends to increase as the education level increases.**

14. Have you ever heard of a program that promotes recognition by industry for your military training?

a. 36% Yes

b. 64% No

GENERAL ANALYSIS

The majority of survey respondents (63.9%) have not heard of any Army program aimed at promoting recognition by civilian industry of Army acquired training. Approximately 36.1% had heard of such a program.

ANALYSIS OF ITEM RESPONSE BY CHARACTERISTIC OF RESPONDENT

GRADE LEVEL	While survey wide, only 36% of all respondents had heard of a program that promotes recognition by industry for military training, a majority of E7-E9 personnel ([illegible]) were aware of such a program. This figure diminished according to rank - E5-E6 (41%) and E1-E4 (38%).
TIME IN SERVICE	Knowledge of a program for industry recognition of Army training tends to increase as time in service increases - first termers (28%) and beyond first termers (44%).
REGIONAL RECRUITING COMMANDS	Little variation in responses from the five Regional Recruiting Commands.
TYPE OF ARMY JOB (MOC/CMF)	Fewer Combat Specialists (28%) than Systems Technicians (40%) or General Technicians (27%) indicate a knowledge of a program to develop civilian recognition of Army training programs.
TYPE OF UNIT	A greater portion of service school students (39%), TDA personnel (40%) and school troops (42%) indicate a knowledge of an industrial accreditation program than do BCT/BT (28%), AIT (31%) and TOE personnel (34%).

EDUCATION LEVEL	As education level increases, knowledge of a program that promotes civilian recognition of Army training increases - non high school graduates (23%), high school graduates (37%), college level personnel (46%).

15. What would be your feelings if the Army were able to assist you in getting civilian employer acceptance of Army acquired skills and experiences?

    a. 86% Favorable

    b. 2% Unfavorable

    c. 12% Don't have any particular feelings about this.

GENERAL ANALYSIS

Nearly 86% of survey participants expressed a favorable attitude to the proposal that the Army assist the soldier in obtaining civilian employer acceptance of Army acquired skills and experiences. Less than 2% indicated an unfavorable response while 12% indicated no particular feelings about such a proposal.

ANALYSIS OF ITEM RESPONSE BY CHARACTERISTIC OF RESPONDENT

GRADE LEVEL	There is a high degree (86%) of interest in the Army developing a program for obtaining civilian employer acceptance of Army acquired skills and experiences. This interest increases as grade level increases - E1-E4 (84%), E5-E6 (87%), and E7-E9 (90%).
TIME IN SERVICE	First term personnel (84%) and those in second or subsequent terms of enlistment (88%) both show a high degree of interest in a program to develop civilian acceptance of Army training and experience.
REGIONAL RECRUITING COMMANDS	Little variation among the responses from the five Regional Recruiting Commands.
TYPE OF ARMY JOB (MOS/CMF)	Uniform interest among all three (MOS/CMF) groups of personnel - slightly less among Combat Specialists (84%) than General Technicians (85%) or Systems Technicians (88%).

TYPE OF UNIT	No significant variation by type of unit assigned.
EDUCATION LEVEL	High interest by all education levels with a slightly higher interest on the part of high school graduates (87%) than non high school graduates (81%) or college level personnel (85%) in a program to develop civilian acceptance of military acquired skills and experiences.

16. If the Army could obtain civilian employer acceptance of my present MOS acquired skills and experiences:

  a. 62% I would be more satisfied in my present MOS assignment.

  b. 38% Getting civilian employer acceptance wouldn't make any difference to my job satisfaction.

GENERAL ANALYSIS

A majority (61.6%) of survey participants indicated that there would be an increased degree of job satisfaction if the Army could obtain civilian employer acceptance of MOS acquired skills and experience. About 38.4% indicated that such a development would have no impact on job satisfaction.

ANALYSIS OF ITEM RESPONSE BY CHARACTERISTIC OF RESPONDENT

GRADE LEVEL	There is a uniform agreement among all three grade levels surveyed - E1-E4 (62%), E5-E6 (62%), E7-E9 (59%) - that job satisfaction would increase if the Army could obtain civilian employer acceptance of present MOS skills and experiences.
TIME IN SERVICE	No appreciable difference in responses of first term personnel (61%) and those beyond the first term of enlistment (62%) in the feeling that job satisfaction would increase if the Army could obtain civilian recognition of MOS skills and experiences.
REGIONAL RECRUITING COMMANDS	Little variation in responses from the five Regional Recruiting Commands.
TYPE OF ARMY JOB (MOS/CMF)	Systems Technicians (67%) indicate a greater impact on job satisfaction of a program to promote civilian recognition of Army skills than do Combat Specialists (56%) or General Technicians (60%).

TYPE OF UNIT	AIT (72%) and service school students (70%) show a greater impact on job satisfaction of a program of civilian acceptance of Army schools than do BCT/BT (62%), school troops (60%), TOE (60%) or TDA (60%) personnel.
EDUCATION LEVEL	Almost no variation by education level - non high school graduates (62%), high school graduates (61%), college level (63%) - in job satisfaction as related to a program to develop civilian acceptance of MOS skills.

SECTION III

Review and Analysis of Existing Survey and Studies

1. Survey of Personnel Entering Active Service, MARDAC, Survey Research Division, Alexandria, Virginia, September 1974.

A DOD sponsored survey of non-prior service enlisted personnel entering active military duty at all of the 66 Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations (AFEES) during the period 3-17 September 1974 revealed that:

a. The most frequently cited of ten possible reasons for entering military service was to get vocational or job training. Job training was the most important reason for joining all branches of the service, at all educational levels, and for both blacks and whites.

b. The second most important reason for enlistment was to get more education while in the service.

c. When entering personnel were asked why they picked one service over the other, 75% marked "best chance to learn useful skills" as being very important. By way of contrast, "rules on haircuts and beards" was cited as very important by only 7% of those surveyed.

d. When asked what they would have done if they did not have the opportunity to receive VA educational benefits after leaving the service, 24% of the enlistees indicated they would not have enlisted. Another 21% marked "I am not sure." The same proportion (24%) claimed they would not have enlisted if they did not receive in-service financial aid for education.

2. FORSCOM/TRADOC/USAREC, Perception of Enlistee Attitude Team Survey (PEAT), Draft Report, December 1974.

A joint FORSCOM/TRADOC/USAREC study which included a survey of the attitudes and perceptions of newly enlisted personnel concerning the Army. The PEAT visited recruiting stations, AFEES, reception stations, BCT units, and AIT units. A questionnaire was developed and subsequently administered to 430 trainees and 114 cadre. Pertinent findings were:

a. Eighty percent of the enlistees surveyed replied that they expected to learn a skill or trade in the Army which would be useful in civilian life.

b. This represents an increase of 39% over a similar 1971 survey conducted by HumRRO. The expectation to learn skills or trades in the Army is greater for female trainees than for male trainees. Of the less educated group of trainees (8th grade or less) a significantly lower percentage (69% versus 81% for high school graduates) expected to attain a skill usable in civilian work.

3. FORSCOM and TRADOC, Academic Education Study, April 1974.

A joint FORSCOM/TRADOC survey of 1543 enlisted men stationed at eight selected CONUS installations which was aimed in part at determining directly the degree to which the offer of educational and/or skill training opportunities acts as an incentive to enlistment. Specific findings, in this regard, were:

a. Of first term enlistees surveyed, over 32% would not have enlisted if civilian skill training opportunities had not been offered. Furthermore, 37% indicated they would not have enlisted without offers of additional academic education.

b. In a survey question which required the soldier to select one out of several educational priorities, 41% of E1-4 chose academic education as their first choice while 29% selected training in a civilian related skill as the primary education/training incentive for enlistment. The chance to learn an Army skill was chosen by 10% and 20% indicated that education/training was not an incentive.

c. The study group concluded that soldiers have definite education needs which they hope to satisfy in the army and the soldiers have been using and plan to continue to take advantage of Army sponsored educational opportunities.

4. Attitudes and Motivations Toward Enlistment in the U. S. Army, Opinion Research Corporation, Princeton, New Jersey, April 1974.

Opinion Research Corporation conducted this study of the attitudes of 1517 young men (17-21 years of age), 156 parents, 375 boys (14-16 years of age) and 314 educators (principals, vice principals, coaches, and counselors) toward the Army. Pertinent findings were:

a. Young men identified training for a civilian job and the chance to obtain college-type schooling as among the top five motivators for enlistment into the Army. They tend to view enlistment as a short-term commitment that gives them opportunities for training and education and prepares them for civilian life.

b. Young boys look upon the attractions of military service as being the opportunity to learn a trade, to travel, to grow and mature, and to gain experience that will help them make occupational choices.

c. Parents and educators view military service as an opportunity for a young man to gain maturity, get job training, and to learn discipline. Other perceived advantages are the opportunity to travel and further education. Top motivators for enlistment, as viewed by parents and educators, include training for a civilian job and the chance to obtain college-type schooling.

5. Modern Volunteer Army MVA/VOLAR Evaluation Project, Technical Memorandum 4556, Systems Development Corporation, Santa Monica, California, September 1972.

Systems Development Corporation, in a September 1972 worldwide VOLAR Evaluation survey conducted for the Department of the Army, surveyed 48,000 officers and enlisted men (excluding those located in Southeast Asia) concerning attitudes toward various aspects of Army life. Of the 23 various MVA/VOLAR programs surveyed, expanded opportunities to continue education ranked as number one in overall favorable impact among enlisted personnel.

6. OPO, Survey Estimates of Opinions on Incentives for Enlistment, DAPO-PMP, Sample Survey Report Number 57-71-E, August 1971.

A worldwide (exclusive of Vietnam) DA survey of enlisted men which identified a two-year enlistment option, the last three months of which would be devoted to training in a civilian related skill, as the greatest incentive to enlist for one of the combat arms. Other enlistment options included in this survey were: (1) a three year enlistment with choice of CONUS or overseas area for 16 months, (2) a two-year enlistment with choice of location for a portion of enlistment, (3) a two or three-year enlistment with bonus for enlistment in the combat arms, and (4) a two-year enlistment with choice of unit.

7. OPO, Survey Estimate of Retention of Army Personnel, DAPO-PMP, Sample Survey Report Number 20-72-E, August 1971.

A worldwide (exclusive of Vietnam) DA study of 27 factors which are considered to be important in influencing enlisted personnel to make the Army a career. Specific findings were:

> The availability of educational opportunities ranked third (behind job security and medical benefits) as the factor rated as a "strong influence to make the Army a career." Thirty percent of enlisted personnel surveyed rated educational opportunities as a strong influence while medical benefits were rated as a strong factor by 39% and job security was selected by 32% of enlisted personnel.

8. OPO, Survey Estimates of Opinions and Attitude Towards Volunteer Army, DAPO-PMP, Sample Survey Report Number 18-72-E, February 1971.

A worldwide (exclusive of Vietnam) DA study which included a section devoted to identifying those factors considered to be the best incentives for an enlisted man to reenlist. A guaranteed education in any field paid for by the Army was selected by 14.8% of those enlisted men surveyed. This was ranked third behind an indefinite reenlistment with option to quit upon reasonable notice (30.9%) and a guaranteed duty assignment (26.1%). Standings of the remaining five factors were improvement of fringe benefits (9.9%), reenlistment bonus paid in a lump sum (6.5%), choice of MOS (6.5%), reenlistment bonus paid on a monthly basis (2.7%), and paid vacations (2.6%).

9. USAREC, Monthly Army Recruit Probe, January, February, March, April 1975.

A USAREC monthly survey system which samples the attitudes of newly inducted personnel while at the AFEES. One area of interest surveyed is the question of which factors were important to the soldier's enlistment decision. In the field of personal goals, the soldier is asked to indicate the degree of impact exerted by such factors as the availability of job training opportunities and Project AHEAD upon his enlistment decision. Responses are grouped by "very important", "somewhat important", and "of no importance".

During the period January - April 1975, the Army Recruit Probe was administered to 10,659 newly inducted personnel. The availability of job training opportunities was rated as a very important factor in the enlistment decision by monthly percentages ranging from 65 - 73% and as a somewhat important factor by monthly ranges of 20 - 23%. Project AHEAD was given a very important factory rating by a monthly range of 47 - 50% and a somewhat important rating by a monthly range of 27 - 29%.

10. Summary

Educational and vocational training opportunities offered by the Army are positive motivators for enlistment and also serve as favorable factors in reenlistment decisions of enlisted personnel. These programs may have an influence on a soldier's job satisfaction.

APPENDIX A

TRADOC EDUCATIONAL/VOCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES SURVEY

LETTER OF INSTRUCTION

This survey of Army enlistees (new and career) is to determine the impact of availability of educational opportunities and vocational skill development opportunities upon motivation for enlistment and individual job satisfaction. Additionally, it is to determine the soldier's interest in industrial accreditation for skills acquired while in the service.

There is no limit for answering these questions. It takes most people 15 to 20 minutes to complete them. However, please take your time and read each question thoroughly before you answer. This is particularly important since there may be only slight shades of difference between the several choices you will have in most questions.

Please complete the survey on your own WITHOUT consulting anyone else. Since this is merely an opinion survey, not an examination, there are no "right" or "wrong" answers. Please be honest and open with your opinion.

Most questions should be answered by placing an "X" in the space provided next to the appropriate answer. The survey designers are aware that the choices provided to each question may not match your opinion exactly. Please DO NOT write additional answers, but rather select the one which is CLOSEST (BEST) to how you feel, even if it is not exact. Also, do NOT attempt to be more accurate by placing your "X" between two alternatives. Answers received this way cannot be used.

Your answers will be kept completely confidential. Nobody will ever know how you answered these questions. To assure that your answer sheet cannot be identified, you are asked not to put your name on the sheet.

REMEMBER, WE ARE TRYING TO FIND WAYS IN WHICH TO IMPROVE THE ARMY. ONLY IF YOU ANSWER THESE QUESTIONS HONESTLY CAN YOU HELP US REACH THIS OBJECTIVE.

Please use a pencil in recording your answer. If you decide later to change an answer, erase it completely before recording your new response.

Thank you for helping. Now please tear off this general instruction sheet and begin.

TRADOC Educational/Vocational Opportunities Survey

1. Check the one in which your current grade falls.
   a. E1 thru E4 ______
   b. E5 thru E6 ______
   c. E7 thru E9 ______

2. Check the category "1st enlistment" if this is your first tour of active duty in the Army. Check "other" if you are on a re-enlistment tour.
   a. 1st Enlistment ______
   b. Other ______

3. From which Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Station (AFEES) did you enter the Army? Use numerical code adjacent to the city located on the attached listing of AFEES (incl 1). ______

4. What is (or will be) your primary MOS? ______

5. What is your current (or projected) type of unit assignment? (Check one)
   a. ______ BCT/BT (Trainee)
   b. ______ AIT (Trainee)
   c. ______ School (Student)
   d. ______ School Troops
   e. ______ TOE Unit
   f. ______ TDA Unit

6. Which of the following best describes you NOW? (Check one)
   a. ______ I have NOT completed the 8th grade.
   b. ______ I have completed 8th grade but have NOT completed high school (or GED equivalent).
   c. ______ I have completed high school (or GED equivalent) but have NOT completed 2 years of college or its equivalent.
   d. ______ I have completed 2 years of college or its equivalent, but have NOT completed a Baccalaureate Degree.
   e. ______ I have completed a Baccalaureate Degree but have NOT completed a graduate degree.
   f. ______ I have completed a graduate degree.

7. The promise that I would be able to further my education while on active duty: (Check one)

   a. ______ Did NOT influence me at all in making my decision to enlist (re-enlist).

   b. ______ Was a factor in my decision to enlist (re-enlist) but other factors were more important.

   c. ______ Played an important part in making my decision to enlist (re-enlist).

   d. ______ Was one of the THREE most important reasons I enlisted (re-enlisted).

   e. ______ Was the MOST important reason I enlisted (re-enlisted).

8. The most attractive education/training incentive offered me when I enlisted (re-enlisted) was: (Check one)

   a. ______ The chance to learn an Army skill (i. e., infantryman, tanker, etc.)

   b. ______ The chance to learn a civilian-related skill.

   c. ______ The chance to get a high school diploma or certificate of equivalency.

   d. ______ The chance to earn credit toward a college/junior college degree.

   e. ______ None of the above. Education was not an incentive to me.

9. The desire for Army training in a civilian-related skill: (Check one)

   a. ______ Did NOT influence me at all in making my decision to enlist (re-enlist).

   b. ______ Was a factor in my decision to enlist (re-enlist) but other factors were more important.

   c. ______ Played an important part in making my decision to enlist (re-enlist).

   d. ______ Was one of the THREE most important reasons I enlisted (re-enlisted).

   e. ______ Was the MOST important reason I enlisted (re-enlisted).

10. Which of the following are MOST important to your job satisfaction (check FOUR)

a. ______ Salary

b. ______ Job security

c. ______ Promotional opportunities

d. ______ Opportunity to work in MOS area

e. ______ Army career benefits (medical, PX, retirement benefits, etc.)

f. ______ Opportunity to further education (high school, Vocational, college)

g. ______ Opportunity for training in a skill that can be used upon leaving the service

h. ______ Travel

i. ______ Opportunity to select unit or station of assignment

j. ______ Superior/subordinate relationships

k. ______ Other

11. To what extent do Army educational/vocational opportunities impact upon your job satisfaction? (Check only one)

a. ______ Favorable because they afford me the opportunity to improve my military career.

b. ______ Favorable because they afford me the opportunity to improve my preparation for a civilian job.

c. ______ Unfavorable because they do not help me improve my military career.

d. ______ Unfavorable because they do not help me in preparing for a civilian job.

e. ______ I have no opinion because these opportunities do not have an impact on my job satisfaction.

12. Soldiers are likely to participate in the Army's educational/ vocational programs because: (check one)

a. ______ Commanders would look favorably upon this.

b. ______ Desire to improve skills in MOS area.

c. ______ Desire to better prepare for a civilian job.

d. ______ Desire to simply improve current education level.

e. ______ No opinion.

13. When you leave the Army would you like to continue to work in a similar civilian skill area for which you were MOS trained? (Check one)

a. ______Yes

b. ______No

c. ______Undecided

14. Have you ever heard of a program that promotes recognition by industry for your military training?

a. ______ Yes

b. ______ No

15. What would be your feelings if the Army were able to assist you in getting civilian employer acceptance of Army acquired skills and experiences?

a. ______Favorable

b. ______Unfavorable

c. ______Don't have any particular feelings about this.

16. If the Army could obtain civilian employer acceptance of my present MOS acquired skills and experiences:

a. ______ I would be more satisfied in my present MOS assignment.

b. ______ Getting civilian employer acceptance wouldn't make any difference to my job satisfaction.

1 Incl
as

Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Station (AFEES)
(Use in answering question 3)

Alabama
Gunter (01)

Arizona
Phoenix (02)

Arkansas
Little Rock (03)

California
Fresno (04)
Los Angeles (05)
Oakland (06)

Colorado
Denver (07)

Connecticut
New Haven (08)

Florida
Coral Gables (09)
Jacksonville (10)

Georgia
Atlanta (11)

Hawaii
Honolulu (12)

Idaho
Boise (13)

Illinois
Chicago (14)

Indiana
Indianapolis (15)

Iowa
Des Moines Fort (16)

Kentucky
Louisville (17)

Louisiana
New Orleans (18)
Shreveport (19)

Maine
Portland (20)

Maryland
Holabird Fort (21)

Massachusetts
Boston (22)
Springfield (23)

Michigan
Detroit (24)

Minnesota
Minneapolis (25)

Mississippi
Jackson (26)

Missouri
Kansas City (27)
St Louis (28)

Montana
Butte (29)

Nebraska
Omaha (30)

New Hampshire
Manchester (31)

New Jersey
Newark (32)

New Mexico
Albuquerque (33)

New York
Albany (34)
Buffalo (35)
Hamilton Fort (36)
Syracuse (37)

North Carolina
Charlotte (38)
Raleigh (39)

North Dakota
Fargo (40)

Ohio
Cincinnati (41)
Cleveland (42)
Hayes Fort (43)

Oklahoma
Oklahoma City (44)

Oregon
Portland (45)

Pennsylvania
New Cumberland DP (46)
Philadelphia (47)
Pittsburgh (48)
Wilkes Barre (49)

South Carolina
Jackson Fort (50)

South Dakota
Sioux Falls (51)

Tennessee
Knoxville (52)
Memphis (53)
Nashville (54)

Texas
Amarillo (55)
Dallas (56)
El Paso (57)
Houston (58)
San Antonio (59)

Utah
Salt Lake City (60)

Virginia
Richmond (61)

Washington
Seattle (62)
Spokane (63)

West Virginia
Beckley (64)

Wisconsin
Milwaukee (65)

Other not listed (99)

APPENDIX B

ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
BY ENLISTED GRADE LEVEL

7. The promise that I would be able to further my education while on active duty:	ALL GRADES		E1 THRU E4		E5 THRU E6		E7 THRU E9	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. Did NOT influence me at all in making my decision to enlist (re-enlist).	820	30.9%	290	20.3%	297	37.1%	233	54.3%
b. Was a factor in my decision to enlist (re-list) but other factors were more important	592	22.3%	332	23.3%	171	21.4%	89	20.7%
c. Played an important part in making my decision to enlist (re-enlist).	472	17.8%	294	20.6%	127	15.9%	51	11.9%
d. Was one of the THREE most important reasons I enlisted (re-enlisted).	535	20.1%	331	23.2%	164	20.5%	40	9.3%
e. Was the MOST important reason I enlisted (re-enlisted)	237	8.9%	180	12.6%	41	5.1%	16	3.7%
TOTAL	2656		1427		800		429	

1946

BY ENLISTED GRADE LEVEL

QUESTION #8: The most attractive education/training incentive offered me when I enlisted (re-enlisted) was:	ALL GRADES		E1 THRU E4		E5 THRU E6		E7 THRU E9	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. The chance to learn an Army skill (i.e., infantryman, tanker, etc.).	292	11.1%	158	11.1%	86	10.8%	48	11.2%
b. The chance to learn a civilian-related skill.	882	33.4%	553	39.0%	227	28.6%	102	23.8%
c. The chance to get a high school diploma or certificate of equivalency.	287	10.9%	199	14.0%	57	7.2%	31	7.2%
d. The chance to earn credit toward a college/junior college degree.	644	24.4%	350	24.7%	228	28.8%	66	15.4%
e. None of the above. Education was not an incentive to me.	535	20.3%	159	11.2%	195	24.6%	181	42.3%
TOTAL	2640		1419		793		428	

BY ENLISTED GRADE LEVEL

QUESTION #9: The desire for Army training in a civilian-related skill:	ALL GRADES		E1 THRU E4		E5 THRU E6		E7 THRU E9	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. Did NOT influence me at all in making my decision to enlist (re-enlist).	804	30.4%	302	21.2%	281	35.0%	221	52.1%
b. Was a factor in my decision to enlist (re-enlist) but other factors were more important.	638	24.1%	352	24.8%	199	24.8%	87	20.5%
c. Played an important part in making my decision to enlist (re-enlist).	583	22.0%	361	25.4%	170	21.2%	52	12.3%
d. Was one of the THREE most important reasons I enlisted (re-enlisted).	411	15.5%	264	18.6%	105	13.1%	42	9.9%
e. Was the MOST important reason I enlisted (re-enlisted).	213	8.0%	143	10.1%	48	6.0%	22	5.2%
TOTAL	2649		1422		803		424	

BY ENLISTED GRADE LEVEL

QUESTION #10: Which of the following are MOST important to your job satisfaction:	ALL GRADES		E1 THRU E4		E5 THRU E6		E7 THRU E9	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. Salary	1270	13.9%	688	13.7%	362	13.4%	220	16.0%
b. Job security	1330	14.6%	636	12.6%	433	16.0%	261	18.9%
c. Promotional opportunities	1079	11.8%	574	11.4%	341	12.6%	164	11.9%
d. Opportunity to work in MOS area	606	6.7%	343	6.8%	192	7.1%	71	5.2%
e. Army career benefits (medical, PX, retirement benefits, etc.)	1337	14.7%	601	12.0%	431	15.9%	305	22.1%
f. Opportunity to further education (high school, vocational, college)	1266	13.9%	811	16.1%	351	13.0%	104	7.5%
g. Opportunity for training in a skill that can be used upon leaving the service	896	9.8%	569	11.3%	238	8.8%	89	6.5%
h. Travel	599	6.7%	361	7.2%	162	6.0%	76	5.5%
i. Opportunity to select unit or station of assignment	291	3.2%	202	4.0%	72	2.7%	17	1.2%
j. Superior/subordinate relationships	131	1.4%	61	1.2%	48	1.8%	22	1.6%
k. Other	305	3.3%	183	3.6%	73	2.7%	49	3.6%
TOTAL	9110		5029		2703		1378	

BY ENLISTED GRADE LEVEL

Question #11: To what extent do Army educational/vocational opportunities impact upon your job satisfaction.	ALL GRADES NO	ALL GRADES PERCENT	E1 THRU E4 NO	E1 THRU E4 PERCENT	E5 THRU E6 NO	E5 THRU E6 PERCENT	E7 THRU E9 NO	E7 THRU E9 PERCENT
a. Favorable because they afford me the opportunity to improve my military career.	945	35.6%	347	24.2%	382	47.9%	216	50.8%
b. Favorable because they afford me the opportunity to improve my preparation for a civilian job.	992	37.4%	672	47.0%	231	28.9%	89	20.9%
c. Unfavorable because they do not help me improve my military career.	57	2.1%	33	2.3%	11	1.4%	13	3.1%
d. Unfavorable because they do not help me in preparing for a civilian job.	121	4.6%	93	6.5%	19	2.4%	9	2.1%
e. I have no opinion because these opportunities do not have an impact on my job satisfaction.	539	20.3%	286	20.0%	155	19.4%	98	23.1%
TOTAL	2654		1431		798		425	

BY ENLISTED GRADE LEVEL

QUESTION #12: Soldier[illegible]re likely to participate in the A[illegible]'s educational/ vocational programs because:	ALL GRADES		E1 THRU E4		E5 THRU E6		E7 THRU E9	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. Commanders would look favorably upon this.	156	5.9%	63	4.4%	51	6.4%	42	9.8%
b. Desire to improve skills in MOS area.	325	12.3%	176	12.3%	98	12.3%	51	11.9%
c. Desire to better prepare for a civilian job.	796	30.0%	472	33.1%	203	25.5%	121	28.3%
d. Desire to simply improve current education level.	1130	42.6%	557	39.0%	387	48.7%	186	43.6%
e. No opinion.	243	9.2%	160	11.2%	56	7.0%	27	6.3%
TOTAL	2650		1428		795		427	

1951

.62 - A

BY ENLISTED GRADE LEVEL

QUESTION #13: When you leave the Army would you like to continue to work in a similar civilian skill area for which you were MOS trained?	ALL GRADES		E1 THRU E4		E5 THRU E6		E7 THRU E9	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. Yes	1473	55.5%	754	52.6%	465	58.4%	254	59.9%
b. No	673	25.4%	375	26.2%	194	24.4%	104	24.5%
c. Undecided	508	19.1%	305	21.3%	137	17.2%	66	15.6%
TOTAL	2654		1434		796		424	

63

1952

BY ENLISTED GRADE LEVEL

QUESTION #14: Have you ever heard of a program that promotes recognition by industry for your military training?	ALL GRADES		E1 THRU E4		E5 THRU E6		E7 THRU E9	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. Yes	958	36.0%	401	28.0%	330	41.4%	227	53.0%
b. No	1700	64.0%	1032	72.0%	467	58.6%	201	47.0%
TOTAL	2658		1433		797		428	

64

1953

BY ENLISTED GRADE LEVEL

QUESTION #15: What would be your feelings if the Army were able to assist you in getting civilian employer acceptance of Army acquired skills and experiences?	ALL GRADES		E1 THRU E4		E5 THRU E6		E7 THRU E9	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. Favorable	2286	85.9%	1206	84.2%	694	86.6%	388	90.2%
b. Unfavorable	51	1.9%	32	2.2%	13	1.6%	6	1.4%
c. Don't have any particular feelings about this.	325	12.2%	195	13.6%	94	11.7%	36	8.4%
TOTAL	2664		433		801		430	

63

1954

BY ENLISTED GRADE LEVEL

QUESTION #16: If the Army could obtain civilian employer acceptance of my present MOS acquired skills and experiences:	ALL GRADES		E1 THRU E4		E5 THRU E6		E7 THRU E9	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. I would be more satisfied in my present MOS assignment.	1638	61.6%	887	61.9%	497	62.2%	254	59.3%
b. Getting civilian employer acceptance wouldn't make any difference to my job satisfaction.	1022	38.4%	546	38.1%	302	37.8%	174	40.7%
TOTAL	2660		1433		799		428	

APPENDIX C

ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS BY
TIME IN SERVICE

7. *The promise that I would be able to further my education while on active duty:	ALL PERSONNEL		FIRST TERM PERSONNEL		BEYOND FIRST TERM PERSONN	
	NUMBER RESPONDING	PERCENT RESPONDING	NUMBER RESPONDING	PERCENT RESPONDING	NUMBER RESPONDING	PERCENT RESPONDING
a. Did NOT influence me at all in making my decision to enlist (re-enlist).	814	30.8%	265	20.6%	549	40.4%
b. Was a factor in my decision to enlist (re-enlist) but other factors were more important.	591	22.4%	293	22.8%	298	21.9%
c. Played an important part in making my decision to enlist (re-enlist).	470	17.8%	261	20.3%	209	15.4%
d. Was one of the THREE most important reasons I enlisted (re-enlisted).	533	20.2%	291	22.7%	242	17.8%
e. Was the MOST important reason I enlisted (re-enlisted).	236	8.9%	174	13.6%	62	4.6%
TOTAL	2644		1284		1360	

TIME IN SERVICE

QUESTION #2: The most attractive education/training incentive offered me when I enlisted (re-enlisted) was:	ALL PERSONNEL		FIRST TERM PERSONNEL		BEYOND FIRST TERM PERSONNEL	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. The chance to learn an Army skill (i.e., infantryman, tanker, etc.).	290	11.0%	161	11.0%	149	11.0%
b. The chance to learn a civilian-related skill.	881	33.5%	515	40.3%	366	27.1%
c. The chance to get a high school diploma or certificate of equivalency.	287	10.9%	173	13.5%	114	8.4%
d. The chance to earn credit toward a college/junior college degree.	639	24.3%	319	25.0%	320	23.7%
e. None of the above. Education was not an incentive to me.	531	20.2%	129	10.1%	402	29.8%
TOTAL	2628		1277		1351	

QUESTION #9: The desire for Army training in a civilian-related skill:	ALL PERSONNEL NO	ALL PERSONNEL PERCENT	FIRST TERM PERSONNEL NO	FIRST TERM PERSONNEL PERCENT	BEYOND FIRST TERM PERSONNEL NO	BEYOND FIRST TERM PERSONNEL PERCENT
a. Did NOT influence me at all in making my decision to enlist (re-enlist).	801	30.4%	270	21.1%	531	39.2%
b. Was a factor in my decision to enlist (re-enlist) but other factors were more important.	634	24.0%	327	25.5%	307	22.7%
c. Played an important part in making my decision to enlist (re-enlist).	580	22.0%	323	25.2%	257	19.0%
d. Was one of the THREE most important reasons I enlisted (re-enlisted).	409	15.5%	231	18.0%	178	13.1%
e. Was the MOST important reason I enlisted (re-enlisted).	213	8.1%	131	10.2%	82	6.1%
TOTAL	2637		1282		1355	

69

1958

TIME IN SERVICE

QUESTION #10: Which of the following are MOST important to your job satisfaction:	ALL PERSONNEL NO	ALL PERSONNEL PERCENT	FIRST TERM PERSONNEL NO	FIRST TERM PERSONNEL PERCENT	BEYOND FIRST TERM PERSONNEL NO	BEYOND FIRST TERM PERSONNEL PERCENT
a. Salary	1264	13.9%	628	13.7%	636	14.2%
b. Job security	1324	14.6%	583	12.7%	741	16.6%
c. Promotional opportunities	1073	11.8%	504	11.0%	569	12.7%
d. Opportunity to work in MOS area	606	6.7%	329	7.2%	277	6.2%
e. Army career benefits (medical, PX, retirement benefits, etc.)	1330	14.7%	521	11.3%	809	18.1%
f. Opportunity to further education (high school, vocational, college)	1259	13.9%	742	16.2%	517	11.6%
g. Opportunity for training in a skill that can be used upon leaving the service	891	9.8%	532	11.6%	359	8.0%
h. Travel	596	6.6%	331	7.2%	265	5.9%
i. Opportunity to select unit or station of assignment	288	3.2%	190	4.1%	98	2.2%
j. Superior/subordinate relationships	131	1.4%	56	1.2%	75	1.7%
k. Other	304	3.4%	178	3.9%	126	2.8%
TOTAL	9066		4594		4472	

TIME IN SERVICE

QUESTION #11: To what extent do Army educational/vocational opportunities impact upon your job satisfaction.	ALL PERSONNEL NO	ALL PERSONNEL PERCENT	FIRST TERM PERSONNEL NO	FIRST TERM PERSONNEL PERCENT	BEYOND FIRST TERM PERSONNEL NO	BEYOND FIRST TERM PERSONNEL PERCENT
a. Favorable because they afford me the opportunity to improve my military career.	939	35.5%	285	22.1%	654	48.3%
b. Favorable because they afford me the opportunity to improve my preparation for a civilian job.	991	37.5%	627	48.6%	364	26.9%
c. Unfavorable because they do not help me improve my military career.	57	2.2%	29	2.2%	28	2.1%
d. Unfavorable because they do not help me in preparing for a civilian job.	121	4.6%	82	6.4%	39	2.9%
e. I have no opinion because these opportunities do not have an impact on my job satisfaction.	535	20.2%	267	20.7%	268	19.8%
TOTAL	2643		1290		1353	

TIME IN SERVICE

QUESTION #12: Soldiers are likely to participate in the Army's educational/vocational programs because:	ALL PERSONNEL NO	ALL PERSONNEL PERCENT	FIRST TERM PERSONNEL NO	FIRST TERM PERSONNEL PERCENT	BEYOND FIRST TERM PERSONNEL NO	BEYOND FIRST TERM PERSONNEL PERCENT
a. Commanders would look favorably upon this.	152	5.8%	60	4.7%	92	6.8%
b. Desire to improve skills in MOS area.	325	12.3%	156	12.1%	169	12.5%
c. Desire to better prepare for a civilian job.	794	30.1%	433	33.7%	361	26.7%
d. Desire to simply improve current education level.	1125	42.6%	490	38.1%	635	46.9%
e. No opinion.	243	9.2%	146	11.4%	97	7.2%
TOTAL	2639		1255		1354	

TIME IN SERVICE

QUESTION #13: When you leave the Army would you like to continue to work in a similar civilian skill area for which you were MOS trained?	ALL PERSONNEL		FIRST TERM PERSONNEL		BEYOND FIRST TERM PERSONNEL	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. Yes	1466	55.5%	689	53.4%	777	57.4%
b. No	669	25.3%	326	25.3%	343	25.4%
c. Undecided	508	19.2%	275	21.3%	233	17.2%
TOTAL	2643		1290		1353	

TIME IN SERVICE

QUESTION 30: Have you ever heard of a program to promote recognition by industry for your military training?	ALL PERSONNEL		FIRST TERM PERSONNEL		BEYOND FIRST TERM PERSONNEL	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. Yes	951	35.9%	360	27.9%	591	43.6%
b. No	1696	64.1%	932	72.1%	764	56.4%
TOTAL	2647		1292		1355	

1963

TIME IN SERVICE

QUESTION #15: What would be your feelings if the Army were able to assist you in getting civilian employer acceptance of Army acquired skills and experiences?	ALL PERSONNEL		FIRST TERM PERSONNEL		BEYOND FIRST TERM PERSONNEL	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. Favorable	2281	86.0%	1085	84.0%	1196	87.8%
b. Unfavorable	51	1.9%	31	2.4%	20	1.5%
c. Don't have any particular feelings about this.	321	12.1%	175	13.6%	146	10.7%
TOTAL	2653		1291		1362	

TIME IN SERVICE

QUESTION #35: If the Army could obtain civilian employer acceptance of my present MOS acquired skills and experiences:	ALL PERSONNEL		FIRST TERM PERSONNEL		BEYOND FIRST TERM PERSONNEL	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. I would be more satisfied in my present MOS assignment.	1632	61.6%	789	61.1%	843	62.2%
b. Getting civilian employer acceptance wouldn't make any difference to my job satisfaction.	1016	38.4%	503	38.9%	513	37.8%
TOTAL	2648		1292		1356	

APPENDIX D

ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS BY REGIONAL RECRUITING COMMANDS

QUESTION #7 The promise that I would be able to further my education while on active duty:	All Cmds		NE*		SE**		MW***		SW****		W*****	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. Did NOT influence me at all in making my decision to enlist (re-enlist).	752	30.6%	170	33.3%	227	28.4%	140	31.3%	115	30.8%	100	30.2%
b. Was a factor in my decision to enlist (re-enlist) but other factors were more important.	560	22.[illegible]%	127	24.9%	195	24.4%	99	22.1%	75	20.1%	64	19.3%
c. Played an important part in making my decision to enlist (re-enlist).	437	17.7%	74	14.5%	154	19.3%	79	17.7%	73	19.6%	57	17.2%
d. Was one of the THREE most important reasons I enlisted (re-enlisted).	504	20.5%	98	19.2%	150	18.8%	92	20.6%	83	22.3%	81	24.5%
e. Was the MOST important reason I enlisted (re-enlisted).	207	8.4%	41	8.0%	73	9.1%	37	8.3%	27	7.2%	29	8.8%
TOTAL	2460		510		799		447		373		331	

77

1966

*NE - Northeast
**SE - Southeast
***MW - Midwest
****SW - Southwest
*****W - West

REGIONAL RECRUITING COMMANDS

QUESTION #8: The most attractive education/training incentive offered me when I enlisted (re-enlisted) was:	All Cmds		NE *		SE**		MW***		SW****		W*****	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. The chance to learn an Army skill (i.e., infantryman, tanker, etc.).	256	10.5%	55	10.8%	90	11.3%	38	8.6%	45	12.1%	28	8.6%
b. The chance to learn a civilian-related skill.	835	34.1%	192	37.8%	257	32.2%	144	32.6%	118	31.6%	124	38.2%
c. The chance to get a high school diploma or certificate of equivalency.	261	10.7%	43	8.5%	93	11.7%	42	9.5%	51	13.7%	32	9.8%
d. The chance to earn credit toward a college/junior college degree.	605	24.7%	113	22.2%	205	25.7%	116	26.2%	88	23.6%	83	25.5%
e. None of the above. Education was not an incentive to me.	489	20.0%	105	20.7%	153	19.2%	102	23.1%	71	19.0%	58	17.8%
TOTAL	2446		508		798		442		373		325	

*NE - Northeast
**SE - Southeast
***MW - Midwest
****SW - Southwest
*****W - West

REGIONAL RECRUITING COMMANDS

QUESTION #9: The desire for Army training in a civilian-related skill:	All Cmds		NE*		SE**		MW***		SW****		W*****	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. Did NOT influence me at all in making my decision to enlist (re-enlist).	735	30.0%	155	30.6%	242	30.4%	134	30.0%	121	32.5%	83	25.2%
b. Was a factor in my decision to enlist (re-enlist) but other factors were more important.	603	24.6%	112	22.1%	212	26.6%	117	26.2%	92	24.7%	70	21.2%
c. Played an important part in making my decision to enlist (re-enlist).	538	21.9%	118	23.3%	165	20.7%	94	21.0%	81	21.8%	80	24.2%
d. Was one of the THREE most important reasons I enlisted (re-enlisted).	385	15.7%	83	16.4%	124	15.6%	61	13.6%	50	13.4%	67	20.3%
e. Was the MOST important reason I enlisted (re-enlisted).	191	7.8%	38	7.5%	54	6.8%	41	9.2%	28	7.5%	30	9.1%
TOTAL	2452		506		797		447		372		330	

*NE - Northeast
**SE - Southeast
***MW - Midwest
****SW - Southwest
*****W - West

REGIONAL RECRUITING COMMANDS

QUESTION #10: Which of the following are MOST important to your job satisfaction:	All Cmds		NE*		SE**		MW***		SW****		W*****	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. Salary	1176	13.9%	245	13.8%	386	14.7%	225	14.2%	169	13.4%	151	12.6%
b. Job security	1231	14.6%	246	13.9%	404	15.4%	230	14.5%	178	14.1%	173	14.5%
c. Promotional opportunities	1011	12.0%	214	12.1%	315	12.0%	184	11.6%	155	12.3%	143	12.0%
d. Opportunity to work in MOS area	556	6.6%	130	7.3%	147	5.6%	119	7.5%	74	5.9%	86	7.2%
e. Army career benefits (medical, PX, retirement benefits, etc.)	1232	14.6%	257	14.5%	395	15.1%	224	14.1%	184	14.6%	172	14.4%
f. Opportunity to further education (high school, vocational, college)	1169	13.9%	223	12.6%	372	14.2%	220	13.8%	189	15.0%	165	13.8%
g. Opportunity for training in a skill that can be used upon leaving the service	840	10.0%	181	10.2%	235	9.0%	154	9.7%	131	10.4%	139	11.6%
h. Travel	548	6.5%	138	7.8%	141	5.4%	106	6.7%	85	6.7%	78	6.5%
i. Opportunity to select unit or station of assignment	277	3.3%	58	3.3%	93	3.6%	50	3.1%	41	3.3%	35	2.9%
j. Superior/subordinate relationships	119	1.4%	26	1.5%	38	1.5%	21	1.3%	12	1.0%	22	1.8%
k. Other	273	3.2%	52	2.9%	91	3.5%	57	3.6%	42	3.3%	31	2.6%
TOTAL	8432		1770		2617		1590		1260		1195	

*NE - Northeast
**SE - Southeast
***MW - Midwest
****SW - Southwest
*****W - West

REGIONAL RECRUITING COMMANDS

QUESTION #11: To what extent do Army educational/vocational opportunities impact upon your job satisfaction.	All Cmds		NE*		SE**		MW***		SW****		W*****	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. Favorable because they afford me the opportunity to improve my military career.	884	36.0%	182	35.6%	313	39.1%	146	32.8%	135	36.3%	108	33.0%
b. Favorable because they afford me the opportunity to improve my preparation for a civilian job.	915	37.3%	191	37.4%	282	35.3%	173	38.9%	135	36.3%	134	41.0%
c. Unfavorable because they do not help me improve my military career.	49	2.0%	13	2.5%	8	1.0%	9	2.0%	12	3.2%	7	2.1%
d. Unfavorable because they do not help me in preparing for a civilian job.	111	4.5%	24	4.7%	42	5.3%	26	5.8%	11	3.0%	8	2.4%
e. I have no opinion because these opportunities do not have an impact on my job satisfaction.	496	20.2%	101	19.8%	155	19.4%	91	20.4%	79	21.2%	70	21.4%
TOTAL	2455		511		800		445		372		327	

*NE - Northeast
**SE - Southeast
***MW - Midwest
****SW - Southwest
*****W - West

REGIONAL RECRUITING COMMANDS

QUESTION #12: Soldiers are likely to participate in the Army's educational/vocational programs because:	All Cmds		NE*		SE**		MW***		SW****		W*****	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. Commanders would look favorably upon this.	144	5.9%	27	5.3%	53	6.6%	28	6.3%	16	4.3%	20	6.1%
b. Desire to improve skills in MOS area.	296	12.1%	57	11.2%	106	13.3%	46	10.4%	49	13.1%	38	11.5%
c. Desire to better prepare for a civilian job.	723	29.5%	153	30.1%	216	27.1%	134	30.2%	117	31.3%	103	31.2%
d. Desire to simply improve current education level.	1061	43.3%	221	43.5%	360	45.1%	187	42.2%	160	42.8%	133	40.3%
e. No opinion.	229	9.3%	50	9.8%	63	7.9%	48	10.8%	32	8.6%	36	10.9%
TOTAL	2453		508		798		443		374		330	

78-226 062

1971

*NE - Northeast
**SE - Southeast
***MW - Midwest
****SW - Southwest
*****W - West

REGIONAL RECRUITING COMMANDS

QUESTION #13: When you leave the Army would you like to continue to work in a similar civilian skill area for which you were MOS trained?	All Cmds		NE*		SE**		MW***		SW****		W*****	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. Yes	1362	55.5%	285	56.1%	455	56.9%	234	52.5%	195	52.6%	193	58.3%
b. No	625	25.5%	123	24.2%	197	24.7%	129	28.9%	99	26.7%	77	23.3%
c. Undecided	468	19.1%	100	19.7%	147	18.4%	83	18.6%	77	20.8%	61	18.4%
TOTAL	2455		508		799		446		371		331	

1972

*NE - Northeast
**SE - Southeast
***MW - Midwest
****SW - Southwest
*****W - West

REGIONAL RECRUITING COMMANDS

QUESTION #14: Have you ever heard of a program that promotes recognition by industry for your military training?	All Cmds		NE*		SE**		MW***		SW****		W*****	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. Yes	887	36.1%	184	36.1%	302	37.7%	166	37.3%	125	33.7%	110	33.2%
b. No	1571	63.9%	325	63.9%	500	62.3%	279	62.7%	246	66.3%	221	66.8%
TOTAL	2458		509		802		445		371		331	

*NE - Northeast
**SE - Southeast
***MW - Midwest
****SW - Southwest
*****W - West

1973

REGIONAL RECRUITING COMMANDS

QUESTION #15: What would be your feelings if the Army were able to assist you in getting civilian employer acceptance of Army acquired skills and experiences?	All Cmds NO	All Cmds PERCENT	NE* NO	NE* PERCENT	SE** NO	SE** PERCENT	MW*** NO	MW*** PERCENT	SW**** NO	SW**** PERCENT	W***** NO	W***** PERCENT
a. Favorable	2122	86.1%	430	84.5%	695	86.7%	395	88.2%	313	83.7%	289	87.3%
b. Unfavorable	45	1.8%	12	2.4%	15	1.9%	4	.9%	10	2.7%	4	1.2%
c. Don't have any particular feelings about this.	297	12.1%	67	13.2%	92	11.5%	49	10.9%	51	13.6%	38	11.5%
TOTAL	2464		509		802		448		374		331	

1974

*NE - Northeast
**SE - Southeast
***MW - Midwest
****SW - Southwest
*****W - West

REGIONAL RECRUITING COMMANDS

QUESTION #16: If the Army could obtain civilian employer acceptance of my present MOS acquired skills and experiences:	All Cmds		NE*		SE**		MW***		SW****		W*****	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. I would be more satisfied in my present MOS assignment.	1531	62.2%	311	61.0%	505	62.7%	279	62.3%	216	58.7%	220	66.5%
b. Getting civilian employer acceptance wouldn't make any difference to my job satisfaction.	931	37.8%	199	39.0%	300	37.3%	169	37.7%	152	41.3%	111	33.5%
TOTAL	2462		510		805		448		368		331	

*NE - Northeast
**SE - Southeast
***MW - Midwest
****SW - Southwest
*****W - West

APPENDIX E

ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS BY TYPE OF ARMY JOB (MOS/CMF)

QUESTION #7: The promise that I would be able to further my education while on active duty:	ALL PERSONNEL NO	ALL PERSONNEL PERCENT	COMBAT SPECIALISTS NO	COMBAT SPECIALISTS PERCENT	SYSTEMS TECHNICIANS NO	SYSTEMS TECHNICIANS PERCENT	GENERAL TECHNICIANS NO	GENERAL TECHNICIANS PERCENT
a. Did NOT influence me at all in making my decision to enlist (re-enlist).	786	30.7%	123	28.2%	284	34.3%	379	29.3%
b. Was a factor in my decision to enlist (re-enlist) but other factors were more important.	576	22.5%	102	23.4%	185	22.3%	289	22.4%
c. Played an important part in making my decision to enlist (re-enlist).	454	17.7%	79	18.1%	132	15.9%	243	18.8%
d. Was one of the THREE most important reasons I enlisted (re-enlisted).	520	20.3%	94	21.6%	153	18.4%	273	21.1%
e. Was the MOST important reason I enlisted (re-enlisted).	222	8.7%	38	8.7%	75	9.0%	109	8.4%
TOTAL	2558		436		829		1293	

87

1976

TYPE OF ARMY JOB (MOS/CMF)

	ALL PERSONNEL		COMBAT SPECIALISTS		SYSTEMS TECHNICIANS		GENERAL TECHNICIANS	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
QUESTION #8: The most attractive education/training incentive offered me when I enlisted (re-enlisted) was:								
a. The chance to learn an Army skill (i.e., infantryman, tanker, etc.).	275	10.8%	83	19.2%	87	10.5%	105	8.2%
b. The chance to learn a civilian-related skill.	855	33.6%	79	18.2%	351	42.5%	425	33.1%
c. The chance to get a high school diploma or certificate of equivalency.	273	10.7%	60	13.8%	86	10.4%	127	9.9%
d. The chance to earn credit toward a college/junior college degree.	626	24.6%	128	29.6%	140	17.0%	358	27.8%
e. None of the above. Education was not an incentive to me.	514	20.2%	83	19.2%	161	19.5%	270	21.0%
TOTAL	2543		433		825		1285	

1977

TYPE OF ARMY JOB (MOS/CMF)

QUESTION #9: The desire for Army training in a civilian-related skill:	ALL PERSONNEL NO	ALL PERSONNEL PERCENT	COMBAT SPECIALISTS NO	COMBAT SPECIALISTS PERCENT	SYSTEMS TECHNICIANS NO	SYSTEMS TECHNICIANS PERCENT	GENERAL TECHNICIANS NO	GENERAL TECHNICIANS PERCENT
a. Did NOT influence me at all in making my decision to enlist (re-enlist).	768	30.1%	164	37.7%	216	26.1%	388	30.1%
b. Was a factor in my decision to enlist (re-enlist) but other factors were more important.	615	24.1%	100	23.0%	208	25.1%	307	23.8%
c. Played an important part in making my decision to enlist (re-enlist).	566	22.2%	73	16.8%	195	23.5%	298	23.1%
d. Was one of the THREE most important reasons I enlisted (re-enlisted).	399	15.6%	65	14.9%	133	16.1%	201	15.6%
e. Was the MOST important reason I enlisted (re-enlisted).	205	8.0%	33	7.6%	76	9.2%	96	7.4%
TOTAL	2553		435		828		1290	

89

1978

TYPE OF ARMY JOB (MOS/CMF)

QUESTION #10: Which of the following are MOST important to your job satisfaction:	ALL PERSONNEL NO	 PERCENT	COMBAT SPECIALISTS NO	 PERCENT	SYSTEMS TECHNICIANS NO	 PERCENT	GENERAL TECHNICIANS NO	 PERCENT
a. Salary	1212	13.8%	204	13.6%	384	13.5%	624	14.1%
b. Job security	1282	14.6%	233	15.6%	425	14.9%	624	14.1%
c. Promotional opportunities	1037	11.8%	201	13.5%	328	11.5%	508	11.5%
d. Opportunity to work in MOS area	578	6.6%	65	4.4%	215	7.6%	298	8%
e. Army career benefits (medical, PX, retirement benefits, etc.)	1287	14.7%	236	15.8%	433	15.2%	618	14.0%
f. Opportunity to further education (high school vocational, college)	1224	14.0%	231	15.5%	371	13.0%	622	14.1%
g. Opportunity for training in a skill that can be used upon leaving the service	869	9.9%	99	6.6%	322	11.3%	448	10.2%
h. Travel	575	6.6%	105	7.0%	170	6.0%	300	6.8%
i. Opportunity to select unit or station of assignment	282	3.2%	61	4.1%	76	2.7%	145	3.3%
j. Superior/subordinate relationships	120	1.4%	18	1.2%	37	1.3%	65	1.5%
k. Other	286	3.3%	40	2.7%	86	3.0%	160	3.6%
TOTAL	8752		1493		2847		4412	

1979

TYPE OF ARMY JOB (MOS/CMF)

QUESTION #11: To what extent do Army educational/vocational opportunities impact upon your job satisfaction.	ALL PERSONNEL		COMBAT SPECIALISTS		SYSTEMS TECHNICIANS		GENERAL TECHNICIANS	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. Favorable because they afford me the opportunity to improve my military career.	920	36.0%	172	39.4%	311	37.5%	437	33.9%
b. Favorable because they afford me the opportunity to improve my preparation for a civilian job.	954	37.3%	124	28.4%	320	38.6%	510	39.5%
c. Unfavorable because they do not help me improve my military career.	57	2.2%	6	1.4%	24	2.9%	27	2.1%
d. Unfavorable because they do not help me in preparing for a civilian job.	118	4.6%	42	9.6%	32	3.9%	44	3.4%
e. I have no opinion because those opportunities do not have an impact on my job satisfaction.	506	19.8%	92	21.1%	142	17.1%	272	21.1%
TOTAL	2555		436		829		1290	

91

1980

	TYPE OF ARMY JOB (MOS/CMF)							
	ALL PERSONNEL		COMBAT SPECIALISTS		SYSTEMS TECHNICIANS		GENERAL TECHNICIANS	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
QUESTION #12: Soldiers are likely to participate in the Army's educational/vocational programs because:								
a. Commanders would look favorably upon this.	153	6.0%	24	5.5%	55	6.6%	74	5.7%
b. Desire to improve skills in MOS area.	318	12.5%	52	11.9%	114	13.8%	152	11.8%
c. Desire to better prepare for a civilian job.	772	30.2%	126	28.9%	235	28.3%	411	31.9%
d. Desire to simply improve current education level.	1086	42.5%	191	43.8%	345	41.6%	550	42.7%
e. No opinion.	225	8.8%	43	9.9%	80	9.7%	102	7.9%
TOTAL	2554		436		829		1289	

1981

TYPE OF ARMY JOB (MOS/CMF)

QUESTION #13: When you leave the Army would you like to continue to work in a similar civilian skill area for which you were MOS trained?	ALL PERSONNEL NO	 PERCENT	COMBAT SPECIALISTS NO	 PERCENT	SYSTEMS TECHNICIANS NO	 PERCENT	GENERAL TECHNICIANS NO	 PERCENT
a. Yes	1414	55.3%	141	32.4%	532	64.0%	741	57.5%
b. No	654	25.6%	199	45.7%	147	17.7%	308	23.9%
c. Undecided	487	19.1%	95	21.8%	152	18.3%	240	18.6%
TOTAL	2555		435		831		1289	

1982

TYPE OF ARMY JOB (MOS/CMF)

	ALL PERSONNEL		COMBAT SPECIALISTS		SYSTEMS TECHNICIANS		GENERAL TECHNICIANS	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
QUESTION #14: Have you ever heard of a program that promotes recognition by industry for your military training?								
a. Yes	926	36.2%	121	27.6%	333	40.0%	472	36.6%
b. No	1632	63.8%	317	72.4%	499	60.0%	816	63.4%
TOTAL	2558		438		832		1288	

1983

TYPE OF ARMY JOB (MOS/CMF)

QUESTION #15: What would be your feelings if the Army were able to assist you in getting civilian employer acceptance of Army acquired skills and experiences?	ALL PERSONNEL NO	ALL PERSONNEL PERCENT	COMBAT SPECIALISTS NO	COMBAT SPECIALISTS PERCENT	SYSTEMS TECHNICIANS NO	SYSTEMS TECHNICIANS PERCENT	GENERAL TECHNICIANS NO	GENERAL TECHNICIANS PERCENT
a. Favorable	2203	85.9%	369	84.2%	731	87.8%	1103	85.3%
b. Unfavorable	49	1.9%	12	2.7%	17	2.0%	20	1.5%
c. Don't have any particular feelings about this.	312	12.2%	57	13.0%	85	10.2%	170	13.1%
TOTAL	2564		438		833		1293	

95

1984

TYPE OF ARMY JOB (MOS/CMF)

	ALL PERSONNEL		COMBAT SPECIALISTS		SYSTEMS TECHNICIANS		GENERAL TECHNICIANS	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
QUESTION #16: If the Army could obtain civilian employer acceptance of my present MOS acquired skills and experiences:								
a. I would be more satisfied in my present MOS assignment.	1576	61.6%	245	56.5%	561	67.1%	770	59.7%
b. Getting civilian employer acceptance wouldn't make any difference to my job satisfaction.	984	38.4%	189	43.5%	275	32.9%	520	40.3%
TOTAL	2560		434		836		1290	

APPENDIX F

ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS BY TYPE OF UNIT ASSIGNED

QUESTION #7: The promise that I would be able to further my education while on active duty:	ALL UNITS		[illegible]/DT		AIT		SCHOOL		SCHOOL [illegible]		TOE UNIT		TDA UNIT	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. Did NOT influence me at all in making my decision to enlist (re-enlist).	811	31.1%	43	17.8%	54	24.1%	21	30.4%	81	37.7%	248	26.9%	364	39.1%
b. Was a factor in my decision to enlist (re-enlist) but other factors were more important.	583	22.4%	53	21.9%	41	18.3%	14	20.3%	52	24.2%	222	24.1%	201	21.6%
c. Played an important part in making my decision to enlist (re-enlist).	458	17.6%	49	20.2%	47	21.0%	10	14.5%	38	17.7%	160	17.3%	154	16.5%
d. Was one of the THREE most important reasons I enlisted (re-enlisted).	524	20.1%	63	26.0%	53	23.7%	16	23.2%	30	14.0%	206	22.3%	156	16.7%
e. Was the MOST important reason I enlisted (re-enlisted).	229	8.8%	34	14.0%	29	12.9%	8	11.6%	14	6.5%	87	9.4%	57	6.1%
TOTAL	2605		242		224		69		215		923		932	

97

1986

TYPE OF UNIT ASSIGNED

QUESTION #8: The most attractive education/training incentive offered me when I enlisted (re-enlisted) was:	ALL UNITS		BCT/BT		AIT		SCHOOL		SCHOOL TROOPS		TOE UNIT		TDA UNIT	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. The chance to learn an Army skill (i.e., infantryman, tanker, etc.)	288	11.1%	46	19.2%	30	13.5%	10	14.5%	32	15.0%	81	8.8%	89	9.6%
b. The chance to learn a civilian-related skill.	865	33.4%	76	31.7%	86	38.6%	27	39.1%	59	27.6%	318	34.7%	299	32.4%
c. The chance to get a high school diploma or certificate of equivalency.	276	10.7%	28	11.7%	32	14.3%	12	17.4%	13	6.1%	118	12.9%	73	7.9%
d. The chance to earn credit toward a college/junior college degree.	628	24.3%	70	29.2%	42	18.8%	12	17.4%	49	22.9%	234	25.5%	221	23.9%
e. None of the above. Education was not an incentive to me.	529	20.5%	20	8.3%	33	14.8%	8	11.6%	61	28.5%	165	18.0%	242	26.2%
TOTAL	2586		240		223		69		214		916		924	

1987

TYPE OF UNIT ASSIGNED

QUESTION #9: The desire for Army training in a civilian-related skill:	ALL UNITS		[illegible]		AIT		SCHOOL		SCHOOL TROOPS		TOE UNIT		TDA UNIT	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. Did NOT influence me at all in making my decision to enlist (re-enlist).	789	30.4%	51	21.1%	46	20.7%	17	24.6%	86	40.4%	246	26.8%	343	36.9%
b. Was a factor in my decision to enlist (re-enlist) but other factors were more important.	625	24.1%	65	26.9%	56	25.2%	11	15.9%	47	22.1%	220	24.0%	226	24.3%
c. Played an important part in making my decision to enlist (re-enlist).	568	21.9%	54	22.3%	53	23.9%	22	31.9%	32	15.0%	220	24.0%	187	20.1%
d. Was one of the THREE most important reasons I enlisted (re-enlisted).	405	15.6%	54	22.3%	47	21.2%	13	18.8%	35	16.4%	140	15.3%	116	12.5%
e. Was the MOST important reason I enlisted (re-enlisted).	207	8.0%	18	7.4%	20	9.0%	6	8.7%	13	6.1%	92	10.0%	58	6.2%
TOTAL	2594		242		222		69		213		918		930	

99

1988

TYPE OF UNIT ASSIGNED

QUESTION #10: Which of the following are MOST important to your job satisfaction:	ALL UNITS		BCT/ET		AIT		SCHOOL		[illegible]		TOE UNIT		TDA UNIT	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. Salary	1248	14.0%	150	15.5%	119	14.0%	24	11.8%	82	12.5%	425	13.7%	448	14.3%
b. Job security	1304	14.6%	135	13.9%	128	15.1%	26	12.7%	94	14.3%	435	14.0%	486	15.5%
c. Promotional opportunities	1067	12.0%	103	10.6%	112	13.2%	21	10.3%	84	12.8%	348	11.2%	399	12.7%
d. Opportunity to work in MOS area	588	6.6%	43	4.4%	44	5.2%	20	9.8%	40	6.1%	224	7.2%	217	6.9%
e. Army career benefits (medical, PX, retirement benefits, etc.)	1313	14.7%	123	12.7%	112	13.2%	27	13.2%	120	18.3%	443	14.2%	488	15.5%
f. Opportunity to further education (high school, vocational, college)	1228	13.8%	151	15.6%	122	14.4%	29	14.2%	73	11.1%	462	14.9%	391	12.5%
g. Opportunity for training in a skill that can be used upon leaving the service	879	9.8%	80	8.2%	94	11.1%	28	13.7%	54	8.2%	334	10.7%	289	9.2%
h. Travel	587	6.6%	91	9.4%	66	7.8%	10	4.9%	50	7.6%	194	6.2%	176	5.6%
i. Opportunity to select unit or station of assignment	283	3.2%	40	4.1%	21	2.5%	6	2.9%	26	4.0%	108	3.5%	82	2.6%
j. Superior/subordinate relationships	129	1.4%	10	1.0%	9	1.1%	4	2.0%	15	2.3%	36	1.2%	55	1.8%
k. Other	301	3.4%	44	4.5%	20	2.4%	9	4.4%	19	2.9%	100	3.2%	109	3.5%
TOTAL	8927		970		847		204		657		3109		3140	

1989

TYPE OF UNIT ASSIGNED

ESTION #11: what extent do Army educational/ cational opportunities impact on your job satisfaction.	ALL UNITS		BCT/[illegible]		AIT		SCHOOL		SCHOOL TROOPS		TOE UNIT		TDA UNIT	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
Favorable because they afford me the opportunity to improve my military career.	932	35.9%	63	25.8%	76	33.9%	24	35.8%	87	40.7%	304	33.0%	378	40.7%
Favorable because they afford me the opportunity to improve my preparation for a civilian job.	967	37.2%	118	48.4%	102	45.5%	26	38.8%	58	27.1%	363	39.4%	300	32.3%
Unfavorable because they do not help me improve my military career.	55	2.1%	8	3.3%	5	2.2%	1	1.5%	6	2.8%	11	1.2%	24	2.6%
Unfavorable because they do not help me in preparing for a civilian job.	118	4.5%	10	4.1%	5	2.2%	2	3.0%	8	3.7%	51	5.5%	42	4.5%
I have no opinion because these opportunities do not have an impact on my job satisfaction.	526	20.2%	45	18.4%	36	16.1%	14	20.9%	55	25.7%	192	20.8%	184	19.8%
TOTAL	2598		244		224		67		214		921		928	

TYPE OF UNIT ASSIGNED

QUESTION #12: Soldiers are likely to participate in the Army's educational/ vocational programs because:	ALL UNITS		[illegible]		AIT		SCHOOL		SCHOOL TROOPS		TOE UNIT		TDA UNIT	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. Commanders would look favorably upon this.	154	5.9%	9	3.7%	11	4.9%	8	11.4%	19	8.9%	48	5.2%	59	6.4%
b. Desire to improve skills in MOS area.	321	12.4%	28	11.5%	35	15.6%	8	11.4%	30	14.1%	117	12.7%	103	11.1%
c. Desire to better prepare for a civilian job.	775	29.9%	74	30.3%	72	32.0%	21	30.0%	51	23.9%	284	30.9%	273	29.5%
d. Desire to simply improve current education level.	1106	42.6%	100	41.0%	80	35.6%	25	35.7%	92	43.2%	396	43.1%	413	44.7%
e. No opinion	239	9.2%	33	13.5%	27	12.0%	8	11.4%	21	9.9%	74	8.1%	76	8.2%
TOTAL	2595		244		225		70		213		919		924	

TYPE OF UNIT ASSIGNED

QUESTION #13: When you leave the Army would you like to continue to work in a similar civilian skill area for which you were MOS trained?	ALL UNITS		BCT/IT		AIT		SCHOOL		SCHOOL TROOPS		TOE UNIT		TDA UNIT	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. Yes	1443	55.5%	132	54.1%	137	60.6%	44	62.9%	109	51.2%	506	55.1%	515	55.6%
b. No	661	25.4%	48	19.7%	45	19.9%	17	24.3%	68	31.9%	240	26.1%	243	26.2%
c. Undecided	495	19.0%	64	26.2%	44	19.5%	9	12.9%	36	16.9%	173	18.8%	169	18.2%
TOTAL	2599		244		226		70		213		919		927	

103

1992

TYPE OF UNIT ASSIGNED

QUESTION #14: Have you ever heard of a program that promotes recognition by industry for your military training?	ALL UNITS		BCT/AIT		AIT		SCHOOL		SCHOOL TROOPS		TOE UNIT		TDA UNIT	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. Yes	941	36.2%	67	27.6%	69	30.5%	27	38.6%	90	41.9%	316	34.4%	372	40.0%
b. No	1662	63.8%	176	72.4%	157	69.5%	43	61.4%	125	58.1%	602	65.6%	559	60.0%
TOTAL	2603		243		226		70		215		918		931	

TYPE OF UNIT ASSIGNED

QUESTION #15: What would be your feelings if the Army were able to assist you in getting civilian employer acceptance of Army acquired skills and experiences?	ALL UNITS		BCT/AIT		AIT		SCHOOL		SCHOOL TROOPS		TOE UNIT		TDA UNIT	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. Favorable	2239	85.8%	209	85.7%	196	87.1%	57	81.4%	177	81.9%	793	86.1%	807	86.5%
b. Unfavorable	50	1.9%	7	2.9%	2	.9%	5	7.1%	4	1.9%	14	1.5%	18	1.9%
c. Don't have any particular feelings about this.	320	12.3%	28	11.5%	27	12.0%	8	11.4%	35	16.2%	114	12.4%	108	11.6%
TOTAL	2609		244		225		70		216		921		933	

TYPE OF UNIT ASSIGNED

QUESTION #16: If the Army could obtain civilian employer acceptance of my present MOS acquired skills and experiences:	ALL UNITS		[illegible]		[illegible]		SCHOOL		SCHOOL TROOPS		TOE UNIT		TDA UNIT	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. I would be more satisfied in my present MOS assignment.	1599	61.4%	152	62.0%	161	71.6%	48	69.6%	128	60.1%	551	59.6%	559	60.0%
b. Getting civilian employer acceptance wouldn't make any difference to my job satisfaction	1006	38.6%	93	38.0%	64	28.4%	21	30.4%	85	39.9%	371	40.2%	372	40.0%
TOTAL	2605		245		225		69		213		922		931	

APPENDIX G

ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS BY EDUCATION LEVEL

QUESTION #7: The promise that I would be able to further my education while on active duty:	ALL PERSONNEL		NON-HSG*		HSG**		COLLEGE DEGREE	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. Did NOT influence me at all in making my decision to enlist (re-enlist).	820	30.9%	97	23.2%	637	32.6%	86	30.4%
b. Was a factor in my decision to enlist (re-enlist) but other factors were more important.	592	22.3%	82	19.6%	450	23.0%	60	21.2%
c. Played an important part in making my decision to enlist (re-enlist).	472	17.8%	82	19.6%	330	16.9%	60	21.2%
d. Was one of the THREE most important reasons I enlisted (re-enlisted).	534	20.1%	83	21.0%	391	20.0%	55	19.4%
e. Was the MOST important reason I enlisted (re-enlisted).	237	8.9%	70	16.7%	145	7.4%	22	7.8%
TOTAL	2,655		419		1,953		283	

*NON HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES
**HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES

EDUCATION LEVEL

QUESTION #8: The most attractive education/training incentive offered me when I enlisted (re-enlisted) was:	ALL PERSONNEL		NHSG*		HSG**		COLLEGE DEGREE	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. The chance to learn an Army skill (i.e., infantryman, tanker, etc.).	291	11.0%	51	12.2%	217	11.2%	23	8.2%
b. The chance to learn a civilian-related skill.	883	33.5%	131	31.4%	684	35.2%	68	24.3%
c. The chance to get a high school diploma or certificate of equivalency.	287	10.9%	170	40.8%	112	5.8%	5	1.8%
d. The chance to earn credit toward a college/junior college degree.	642	24.3%	28	6.7%	503	25.9%	111	39.6%
e. None of the above. Education was not an incentive to me.	535	20.3%	37	8.9%	425	21.9%	73	26.1%
TOTAL	2638		417		1941		280	

*NON HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES
**HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES

EDUCATION LEVEL

QUESTION #9: The desire for Army training in a civilian-related skill:	ALL PERSONNEL		NHSG*		HSG**		COLLEGE DEGREE	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. Did NOT influence me at all in making my decision to enlist (re-enlist).	804	30.4%	93	22.2%	612	31.4%	99	35.1%
b. Was a factor in my decision to enlist (re-enlist) but other factors were more important.	637	24.1%	99	23.7%	479	24.6%	59	20.9%
c. Played an important part in making my decision to enlist (re-enlist).	582	22.0%	104	24.9%	414	21.3%	64	22.7%
d. Was one of the THREE most important reasons I enlisted (re-enlisted).	410	15.5%	74	17.7%	292	15.0%	44	15.6%
e. Was the MOST important reason I enlisted (re-enlisted).	213	8.0%	48	11.5%	149	7.7%	16	5.7%
TOTAL	2646		418		1946		282	

EDUCATION LEVEL

QUESTION #10: Which of the following are MOST important to your job satisfaction:	ALL INDIVIDUALS		NHSG*		HSG**		COLLEGE DEGREE	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. Salary	1268	13.9%	215	14.0%	914	14.0%	139	13.7%
b. Job security	1328	14.6%	204	13.2%	970	14.8%	154	15.2%
c. Promotional opportunities	1078	11.8%	153	9.9%	814	12.4%	111	11.0%
d. Opportunity to work in MOS area	605	6.6%	97	6.3%	415	6.3%	93	9.2%
e. Army career benefits (medical, PX, retirement benefits, etc.)	1339	14.7%	166	10.8%	1030	15.7%	143	14.1%
f. Opportunity to further education (high school, vocational, college)	1263	13.9%	265	17.2%	872	13.3%	126	12.5%
g. Opportunity for training in a skill that can be used upon leaving the service	896	9.8%	190	12.3%	619	9.5%	87	8.6%
h. Travel	599	6.6%	112	7.3%	425	6.5%	62	6.1%
i. Opportunity to select unit or station of assignment	291	3.2%	61	4.0%	196	3.0%	34	3.4%
j. Superior/subordinate relationships	131	1.4%	12	.8%	95	1.5%	24	2.4%
k. Other	305	3.4%	66	4.3%	201	3.1%	38	3.8%
TOTAL	9103		1541		6551		1011	

*NON HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES
**HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES

EDUCATION LEVEL

QUESTION #11: To what extent do Army educational/vocational opportunities impact upon your job satisfaction.	ALL PERSONNEL NO	ALL PERSONNEL PERCENT	NHSG* NO	NHSG* PERCENT	HSG** NO	HSG** PERCENT	COLLEGE DEGREE NO	COLLEGE DEGREE PERCENT
a. Favorable because they afford me the opportunity to improve my military career.	945	35.6%	98	23.2%	750	38.5%	97	34.3%
b. Favorable because they afford me the opportunity to improve my preparation for a civilian job.	992	37.4%	206	48.8%	682	35.0%	104	36.7%
c. Unfavorable because they do not help me improve my military career.	57	2.1%	13	3.1%	37	1.9%	7	2.5%
d. Unfavorable because they do not help me in preparing for a civilian job.	120	4.5%	28	6.6%	86	4.4%	6	2.1%
e. I have no opinion because these opportunities do not have an impact on my job satisfaction.	538	20.3%	77	18.2%	392	20.1%	69	24.4%
TOTAL	2652		422		1947		283	

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*NON HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES
**HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES

EDUCATION LEVEL

QUESTION #12: Soldiers are likely to participate in the Army's educational/vocational programs because:	ALL [illegible] NO	ALL [illegible] PERCENT	NHSG* NO	NHSG* PERCENT	HSG** NO	HSG** PERCENT	COLLEGE DEGREE NO	COLLEGE DEGREE PERCENT
a. Commanders would look favorably upon this.	156	5.9%	28	6.7%	111	5.7%	17	6.0%
b. Desire to improve skills in MOS area.	325	12.3%	47	11.2%	244	12.5%	34	12.0%
c. Desire to better prepare for a civilian job.	797	30.1%	132	31.4%	582	29.9%	83	29.3%
d. Desire to simply improve current education level.	1129	42.6%	158	37.6%	845	43.4%	126	44.5%
e. No opinion.	242	9.1%	55	13.1%	164	8.4%	23	8.1%
TOTAL	2649		420		1946		283	

*NON-HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES
**HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES

EDUCATION LEVEL

QUESTION #13: When you leave the Army would you like to continue to work in a similar civilian skill area for which you were MOS trained?	ALL PERSONNEL		NHSG*		HSG**		COLLEGE DEGREE	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. Yes	1472	55.5%	221	52.5%	1087	55.8%	164	58.0%
b. No	673	25.4%	92	21.9%	500	25.7%	81	28.6%
c. Undecided	507	19.1%	108	25.7%	361	18.5%	38	13.4%
TOTAL	2652		421		1948		283	

*NON HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES
**HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES

EDUCATION LEVEL

QUESTION #14: Have you ever heard of a program that promotes recognition by industry for your military training?	ALL PERSONNEL		NHSG*		HSG**		COLLEGE DEGREE	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. Yes	958	36.1%	98	23.3%	730	37.4%	130	46.1%
b. No	1698	63.9%	323	76.7%	1223	62.6%	152	53.9%
TOTAL	2656		421		1953		282	

*NON HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES
**HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES

EDUCATION LEVEL

QUESTION #15: What would be your feelings if the Army were able to assist you in getting civilian employer acceptance of Army acquired skills and experiences?	ALL PERSONNEL		NHSG*		HSG**		COLLEGE DEGREE	
	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT	NO	PERCENT
a. Favorable	2286	85.9%	340	81.3%	1705	87.0%	241	84.9%
b. Unfavorable	51	1.9%	12	2.9%	32	1.6%	7	2.5%
c. Don't have any particular feelings about this.	325	12.2%	66	15.8%	223	11.4%	36	12.7%
TOTAL	2662		418		1960		284	

* NON HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES
** HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES

EDUCATION LEVEL

QUESTION #16: If the Army could obtain civilian employer acceptance of my present MOS required skills and experiences:	ALL PERSONNEL NO	ALL PERSONNEL PERCENT	NHSG* NO	NHSG* PERCENT	HSG** NO	HSG** PERCENT	COLLEGE DEGREES NO	COLLEGE DEGREES PERCENT
a. I would be more satisfied in my present MOS assignment.	1637	61.6%	262	61.8%	1199	61.4%	176	62.9%
b. Getting civilian employer acceptance wouldn't make any difference to my job satisfaction.	1021	38.4%	162	38.2%	755	38.6%	104	37.1%
TOTAL	2658		424		1954		280	

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*NON HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES
**HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES

APPENDIX B

ANALYSIS OF QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS BY INSTALLATION RESPONSES

	Aberdeen Proving Ground N=305 PERCENT	Ft Belvoir N=242 PERCENT	Ft Benning N=219 PERCENT	Ft Eustis N=301 PERCENT	Ft Jackson N=317 PERCENT	Ft Knox N=253 PERCENT	Ft Lee N=255 PERCENT	Ft Monroe N=258 PERCENT	Ft Ord N=300 PERCENT	Ft Sill N=191 PERCENT
Question #7: The promise that I would be able to further my education while on active duty:										
a. Did NOT influence me at all in making my decision to enlist (re-enlist).	40.1%	32.6%	31.4%	23.1%	22.4%	31.2%	33.5%	41.7%	26.3%	28.4%
b. Was a factor in my decision to enlist (re-enlist) but other factors were more important.	24.3%	22.6%	20.0%	23.4%	23.6%	27.3%	19.5%	18.9%	22.0%	20.0%
c. Played an important part in making my decision to enlist (re-enlist).	13.5%	15.5%	20.4%	17.4%	19.8%	17.0%	21.1%	13.8%	17.0%	24.2%
d. Was one of the THREE most important reasons I enlisted (re-enlisted).	16.8%	18.8%	20.0%	22.4%	19.8%	19.0%	22.3%	21.3%	22.0%	18.4%
e. Was the MOST important reason I enlisted (re-enlisted).	5.3%	10.5%	8.2%	13.7%	14.4%	5.5%	3.6%	4.3%	12.7%	8.9%
TOTAL										

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2006

INSTALLATION RESPONSES

	Aberdeen Proving Ground N=303 PERCENT	Ft Belvoir N=242 PERCENT	Ft Benning N=25[illegible] PERCENT	Ft Eustis N=301 PERCENT	Ft Jackson N=317 PERCENT	Ft Knox N=253 PERCENT	Ft Lee N=255 PERCENT	Ft Monroe N=258 PERCENT	Ft Ord N=300 PERCENT	Ft Sill N=191 PERCENT
QUESTION #8: The most attractive education/training incentive offered me when I enlisted (re-enlisted) was:										
a. The chance to learn an Army skill (i.e., infantryman, tanker, etc.).	11.2%	8.0%	12.5%	10.4%	18.7%	17.0%	8.5%	4.3%	8.4%	9.8%
b. The chance to learn a civilian-related skill.	34.3%	35.9%	35.0%	39.1%	34.2%	20.6%	32.3%	34.8%	35.8%	29.9%
c. The chance to get a high school diploma or certificate of equivalency.	5.9%	15.6%	10.9%	18.5%	12.6%	8.3%	8.5%	2.8%	13.7%	10.9%
d. The chance to earn credit toward a college/junior college degree.	19.1%	23.2%	21.8%	19.9%	24.8%	28.5%	26.6%	27.7%	24.7%	31.0%
e. None of the above. Education was not an incentive to me.	29.4%	17.3%	19.8%	12.1%	9.7%	25.7%	24.2%	30.4%	17.4%	18.5%
TOTAL										

2007

INSTALLATION RESPONSES

ESTION 49:
e desire for Army training in
civilian-related skill:

	Aberdeen Proving Ground N=305 PERCENT	Ft Belvoir N=242 PERCENT	Ft Benning N=25[illegible] PERCENT	Ft Eustis N=301 PERCENT	Ft Jackson N=317 PERCENT	Ft Knox N=253 PERCENT	Ft Lee N=255 PERCENT	Ft Monroe N=258 PERCENT	Ft Ord N=300 PERCENT	Ft Sill N=191 PERCENT
Did NOT influence me at all in making my decision to enlist (re-enlist).	37.2%	27.2%	31.5%	20.1%	24.0%	39.1%	34.1%	35.4%	25.3%	33.0%
Was a factor in my decision to enlist (re-enlist) but other factors were more important.	23.9%	22.2%	24.0%	23.7%	25.2%	24.9%	25.3%	2[illegible].2%	25.0%	22.9%
Played an important part in making my decision to enlist (re-enlist).	17.9%	25.5%	23.6%	27.4%	26.2%	18.2%	23.3%	16.1%	20.7%	19.7%
Was one of the THREE most important reasons I enlisted (re-enlisted).	15.0%	14.2%	15.0%	18.1%	18.2%	10.3%	12.4%	15.4%	19.0%	16.0%
Was the MOST important reason I enlisted (re-enlisted).	6.0%	10.9%	5.9%	10.7%	6.4%	7.5%	4.8%	9.8%	10.0%	8.5%
TOTAL										

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2008

INSTALLATION RESPONSES

	Aberdeen Proving Ground N=815 PERCENT	Ft Belvoir N=852 PERCENT	Ft Benning N=761 PERCENT	Ft Eustis N=1191 PERCENT	Ft Jackson N=1245 PERCENT	Ft Knox N=1004 PERCENT	Ft Lee N=656 PERCENT	Ft Monroe N=916 PERCENT	Ft Ord N=1176 PERCENT	Ft Sill N=492 PERCENT
QUESTION #10: Which of the following are MOST important to your job satisfaction:										
a. Salary	13.7%	12.8%	14.3%	12.8%	17.5%	13.8%	12.7%	13.4%	13.8%	12.6%
b. Job security	17.4%	14.2%	13.5%	14.8%	13.3%	15.5%	11.9%	16.0%	14.7%	14.0%
c. Promotional opportunities	11.8%	11.4%	13.5%	10.6%	10.4%	13.9%	11.1%	12.7%	11.8%	11.8%
d. Opportunity to work in MOS area	5.8%	8.2%	6.6%	4.5%	5.0%	6.5%	9.0%	9.9%	6.9%	5.3%
e. Army career benefits (medical, PX, retirement benefits, etc.)	20.9%	14.8%	14.1%	16.0%	11.7%	15.3%	16.1%	13.8%	11.1%	16.5%
f. Opportunity to further education (high school, vocational, college)	10.4%	14.7%	13.3	15.8%	15.7%	13.1%	12.8%	11.5%	14.6%	15.6%
g. Opportunity for training in a skill that can be used upon leaving the service	8.0%	11.5%	9.9%	12.0%	6.5%	7.5%	9.9%	9.9%	12.6%	11.0%
h. Travel	5.2%	6.2%	5.1%	7.1%	8.3%	6.5%	7.8%	5.9%	6.8%	5.7%
i. Opportunity to select unit or station of assignment	2.4%	2.1%	3.5%	2.4%	4.0%	4.1%	4.0%	2.4%	3.5%	3.6%
j. Superior/subordinate relationships	1.5%	1.3%	2.2%	1.0%	1.4%	1.3%	2.0%	1.5%	1.7%	.6%
k. Other	2.9%	2.8%	3.9%	3.1%	6.2%	2.4%	2.7%	2.9%	2.5%	3.3%

INSTALLATION RESPONSES

	Aberdeen Proving Ground N=305 PERCENT	Ft Belvoir N=242 PERCENT	Ft Benning N=259 PERCENT	Ft Eustis N=301 PERCENT	Ft Jackson N=317 PERCENT	Ft Knox N=253 PERCENT	Ft Lee N=255 PERCENT	Ft Monroe N=258 PERCENT	Ft Ord N=300 PERCENT	Ft Sill N=191 PERCENT
QUESTION #11: To what extent do Army educational/vocational opportunities impact upon your job satisfaction.										
a. Favorable because they afford me the opportunity to improve my military career.	47.2%	35.3%	34.1%	31.0%	29.8%	37.8%	39.4%	38.2%	29.3%	34.6%
b. Favorable because they afford me the opportunity to improve my preparation for a civilian job.	26.7%	41.5%	33.7%	44.4%	45.1%	30.7%	31.5%	37.8%	42.0%	39.4%
c. Unfavorable because they do not help me improve my military career.	3.3%	.4%	2.7%	1.7%	2.5%	1.6%	2.4%	1.6%	3.3%	1.1%
d. Unfavorable because they do not help me in preparing for a civilian job.	4.0%	5.8%	11.0%	4.0%	5.4%	4.4%	4.4%	1.2%	3.3%	1.6%
e. I have no opinion because these opportunities do not have an impact on my job satisfaction.	18.8%	17.0%	18.4%	18.9%	17.1%	25.5%	22.3%	21.3%	22.0%	23.4%
TOTAL										

INSTALLATION RESPONSES

QUESTION #12: Soldiers are likely to participate in the Army's educational/vocational programs because:	Aberdeen Proving Ground N=305 PERCENT	Ft Belvoir N=242 PERCENT	Ft Benning N=259 PERCENT	Ft Eustis N=301 PERCENT	Ft Jackson N=317 PERCENT	Ft Knox N=253 PERCENT	Ft Lee N=255 PERCENT	Ft Monroe N=258 PERCENT	Ft Ord N=300 PERCENT	Ft Sill N=191 PERCENT
a. Commanders would look favorably upon this.	9.6%	4.6%	3.9%	5.7%	5.7%	6.7%	6.4%	7.1%	5.4%	2.1%
b. Desire to improve skills in MOS area.	13.2%	9.5%	12.1%	12.8%	12.4%	12.3%	18.0%	14.2%	9.1%	8.0%
c. Desire to better prepare for a civilian job.	25.5%	28.2%	32.4%	32.8%	31.1%	28.1%	28.0%	24.9%	35.2%	35.1%
d. Desire to simply improve current education level.	42.1%	48.1%	41.4%	40.5%	38.4%	45.5%	39.2%	47.4%	39.6%	47.3%
e. No opinion.	9.6%	9.5%	10.2%	8.1%	12.4%	7.5%	8.4%	6.3%	10.7%	7.4%
TOTAL										

INSTALLATION RESPONSES

QUESTION #13: When you leave the Army would you like to continue to work in a similar civilian skill area for which you were MOS trained?	Aberdeen Proving Ground N=305 PERCENT	Ft Belvoir N=242 PERCENT	Ft Benning N=2[illegible]9 PERCENT	Ft Eustis N=301 PERCENT	Ft Jackson N=317 PERCENT	Ft Knox N=253 PERCENT	Ft Lee N=255 PERCENT	Ft Monroe N=258 PERCENT	Ft Ord N=300 PERCENT	Ft Sill N=191 PERCENT
a. Yes	58.3%	57.1%	46.[illegible]%	51.9%	59.4%	47.6%	57.5%	68.4%	53.0%	55.0%
b. No	23.0%	25.0%	36.[illegible]%	29.3%	17.5%	33.7%	21.0%	16.8%	24.8%	27.7%
c. Undecided	18.7%	17.9%	16.[illegible]%	18.9%	23.2%	18.7%	21.4%	14.8%	22.1%	17.3%
TOTAL										

INSTALLATION RESPONSES

	Aberdeen Proving Ground N=305 PERCENT	Ft Belvoir N=242 PERCENT	Ft Benning N=259 PERCENT	Ft Eustis N=301 PERCENT	Ft Jackson N=317 PERCENT	Ft Knox N=253 PERCENT	Ft Lee N=255 PERCENT	Ft Monroe N=258 PERCENT	Ft Ord N=300 PERCENT	Ft Sill N=191 PERCENT
QUESTION #14: Have you ever heard of a program that promotes recognition by industry for your military training?										
a. Yes	49.0%	38.6%	27.1%	34.7%	34.6%	36.1%	41.9%	38.6%	27.1%	31.6%
b. No	51.0%	61.4%	72.9%	65.3%	65.4%	63.9%	58.1%	61.4%	72.9%	68.4%
TOTAL										

INSTALLATION RESPONSES

QUESTION #15: What would be your feelings if the Army were able to assist you in getting civilian employer acceptance of Army acquired skills and experiences?	Aberdeen Proving Ground N=305 PERCENT	Ft Belvoir N=242 PERCENT	Ft Benning N=259 PERCENT	Ft Eustis N=301 PERCENT	Ft Jackson N=317 PERCENT	Ft Knox N=253 PERCENT	Ft Lee N=255 PERCENT	Ft Monroe N=258 PERCENT	Ft Ord N=300 PERCENT	Ft Sill N=191 PERCENT
a. Favorable	90.1%	88.8%	82.9%	84.1%	85.1%	86.6%	79.9%	87.5%	84.9%	90.1%
b. Unfavorable	1.0%	1.7%	3.5%	2.4%	2.5%	1.6%	1.2%	1.6%	1.3%	2.6%
c. Don't have any particular feelings about this.	8.9%	9.5%	13.6%	13.6%	12.4%	11.9%	18.9%	10.9%	13.8%	7.3%
TOTAL										

INSTALLATION RESPONSES

	Aberdeen Proving Ground N=305 PERCENT	Ft Belvoir N=242 PERCENT	Ft Benning N=253 PERCENT	Ft Eustis N=301 PERCENT	Ft Jackson N=217 PERCENT	Ft Knox N=253 PERCENT	Ft Lee N=255 PERCENT	Ft Monroe N=258 PERCENT	Ft Ord N=300 PERCENT	Ft Sill N=191 PERCENT
QUESTION #16: If the Army could obtain civilian employer acceptance of my present MOS acquired skills and experiences?										
a. I would be more satisfied in my present MOS assignment.	61.8%	65.0%	57.5%	61.2%	62.5%	58.1%	57.1%	57.1%	69.2%	66.1%
b. Getting civilian employer acceptance wouldn't make any difference to my job satisfaction.	38.2%	35.0%	42.5%	38.8%	37.5%	41.9%	42.9%	42.9%	30.8%	33.9%
TOTAL										

APPENDIX I

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Senator STAFFORD. As I understand your problem with the Army it's not in getting numbers for next year, it's been the quality. My impression is that the Army will be able to recruit the necessary number of people, but without the program we're talking about, you will not get as many high school graduates?

Secretary BROTZMAN. Senator, we're going to try—obviously it's my responsibility and that of all of us. We're going to try, if it is the wisdom of Congress to terminate the GI bill, to do what we can to maintain high quality. I remember that the Senator was a leader in the All-Volunteer Army effort in the House. In fact, I think he helped persuade me it was a good thing and I got on board. So I know you appreciate this need.

Quality is important not only as to readiness but it's important as far as the training loss reduction. It isn't just the fact that we want, necessarily, a lot of smart people; but the training losses are reduced dramatically as you go up the scale and follow it.

One of the breaking points, and I know Senator Hartke knows this well, is if you can get a high school graduate, that individual, male or female, is a much better risk because he or she has proven themselves being able to go through a prescribed course and get through school.

This implies a lot of things. So, without getting off the subject the point is that we will continue to try to attract high school graduates and as long as I'm Assistant Secretary, I'm going to try and get quality people for the Army because I know it's in the best interest of this country.

I also know it's cost effective. We know there are many ways to do this. So, if you terminate the GI bill, then we're going to try to do it by relying on other educational efforts that we have, other alternatives. It's our job to do that.

Senator STAFFORD. What percentage, Mr. Secretary, of the inductees that you've been taking recently have stated that they volunteered because of the entitlements, the GI bill benefits?

Secretary BROTZMAN. You used the term "recently" and I can only refer to that in a general sense. One of the studies that I mentioned in my testimony is the MARDAC study, the Manpower Research and Data Analysis Center study.

In this, they asked about 13,000 young people, volunteers at Armed Forces Entrance and Examination stations during a 1-month period, what caused them to enter the Army. Twenty-eight percent said that they did so to become eligible for the GI bill.

Chairman HARTKE. We will insert the MARDAC study into the record at this point.

[The study follows:]

MANPOWER
RESEARCH
and DATA
ANALYSIS
CENTER

Preliminary Results
May 1975 AFEES Survey

Survey Research Division

2018

Preliminary Results From
the May 1975 Survey of Persons
Enlisting in the Military Services

MARDAC Survey Branch

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Reasons for Entering	Section II
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The Recruiter	Section IV
The Enlistment Decision	Section V

Preface

The intention of this report is to make available on a timely basis certain basic cross tabulations from the May 1975 survey of persons enlisting for military duty. These tabulations are intended as a reference and should be useful in planning in-depth analyses.

The tabulations are broken into five sections by subject category. Each section begins with a few comments on the results and a guide to the tables in that section.

Further inquiries should be directed to MARDAC, Survey Branch, 300 North Washington Street, Alexandria, Virginia 22314 (202 325-0540 or Autovon 221-0540).

Description of the Survey

During the period April 28 through May 9, 1975 the questionnaire shown on page v was administered to 13,299 enlisted personnel entering either active duty or a delayed entry program. Both Non-Prior Service and Prior Service enlistees were included among the respondents. The purpose of the survey was to obtain information about enlistment motivation and related matters. The survey was administered at 65 Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations (AFEES) and at the Anchorage sub-station. Two AFEES, Boston, Massachusetts and Albany, New York, did not receive a shipment of questionnaires and are excluded from the survey.

Each AFEES was instructed to have a pre-determined number of survey forms completed by personnel being processed at their station during the period of the survey. The questionnaires were scanned using a mark-sense optical scanner and the results were edited and copied to magnetic tape. The cases were then weighted as described in the technical notes, and the tables were produced using these weights.

TECHNICAL NOTES

1. Weighting - The number of questionnaires each examining station was asked to complete was based upon the number of enlistees entering active duty or a delayed entry program at that station in January 1975. Since not all stations were able to complete their quota of questionnaires it was desirable to weight the results. In addition, persons entering through a delayed entry program required special treatment in order to avoid over representation, since they could be administered the survey at both the date of entering the delayed entry program and the shipping date.

   An initial set of weights was calculated so that the results would reflect the number of enlistees entering active duty in March 1975 by station and branch of service. These weights were then each multiplied by an appropriate ratio so that the results would also reflect the number of enlistees entering active duty in March 1975 by Army recruiting district, branch of service, and mode of entry (whether through a delayed entry program or not). This latter set of weights was then normalized so that the sum of the weights was equal to the number of persons who completed a questionnaire. The normalized weights were used to create all tables except certain of those discussed in item 6 below.

2. Percentages - Under the number in each cell of most tables are two percentages. The first percentage is a row percentage and uses as a denominator the row total less the non-response and invalid responses. The second percentage is a column percentage and has a comparable definition.

3. Educational Level Categories - In some tables possessors of GED certificates are listed as a separate category. In other tables where there is no separate GED category, these individuals are classified as being "less than a high school graduate" unless they had also completed some years of education beyond the high school level.

4. Employment/School Status - The employment/school status was determined from survey items 14 and 15 as shown in the following table.

Item 14	Item 15 School Status			
Employment Status	Full Time	Part Time	No	Unknown
Working Full Time	1	1	1	1
Working Part Time	3	2	2	2
Looking for Work	3	4	6	6
Unemployed and not Looking	3	4	5	0
Unknown	3	4	0	0

Employment/School Status
0 - Unknown
1 - Working Full Time
2 - Working Part Time
3 - Going to School Full Tim
4 - Going to School Part Tim
5 - Unemployed, Not Looking
6 - Unemployed, Looking

5. Missing Data - In cases where a survey question is not answered or is answered as "Don't know" etc., the observation may be excluded from the computation of percentages. Where such cases are excluded from the percentages they appear in the tables with an "M" beside the count and with 0.0 given for the percentages.

6. Special Populations - Where tables restrict attention to special populations, the tables and the populations they address are identified in the appropriate table guide. Certain of the tables in Section V exclude persons entering active duty from a delayed entry program. These Section V tables are not weighted since the weights would cause an under representation of persons entering through delayed entry programs.

RCS DD-M(OT) 752
17222

MANPOWER AND
RESERVE AFFAIRS

SURVEY of PERSONNEL ENTERING ACTIVE SERVICE

The Department of Defense is conducting a survey to find why people enter military service. Your cooperation in completing the questionnaire as fully as possible will improve our understanding of why people enlist.

Be assured that your answers will be treated confidentially and will not affect you in any way. Your answers will be analyzed along with those of others as group statistics. This is not a test. However, be sure to read each of the questions carefully before choosing the answer which is right for you.

MARKING DIRECTIONS

Your responses will be read by an optical mark reader. Your careful observance of these few simple rules will be most appreciated.

- **Use only black lead pencil (no. 2½ or less).**
- **Make heavy black marks that fill the circle.**
- **Erase cleanly any answer you wish to change.**
- **Make no stray markings of any kind.**

EXAMPLE

1. Are marks made in black pencil the only type the optical reader will recognize?

● Yes
○ No

1. How old were you on your last birthday? (Mark one)

○ 17 ○ 20
○ 18 ○ 21
○ 19 ○ Over 21

2. What is your sex? (Mark one)

○ Male
○ Female

3. What is your race? (Mark one)

○ Black
○ White
○ Other

4. What is the highest level of education that you have completed? (Mark one)

○ 8th grade or less
○ 9th grade (high school freshman)
○ 10th grade (high school sophomore)
○ 11th grade (high school junior)
○ 12th grade but did not graduate
○ High school graduate
○ One year beyond high school
○ Two years beyond high school
○ Three years beyond high school
○ Four years beyond high school

5. If you have not graduated from high school, do you have a GED high school equivalency certificate? (Mark one)

○ Does not apply – I am high school graduate
○ Yes
○ No

6. How long has it been since you have attended school full-time? (Mark one)

○ Still attending full-time
○ Less than 1 month
○ 1-5 months
○ 6-12 months
○ 13-24 months
○ Over 2 years

7. Which branch of the service are you joining? (Mark one)

○ Air Force
○ Army
○ Marine Corps
○ Navy

8. Which branch of the service did you try to enlist in first? (Mark one)

○ Air Force
○ Army
○ Marine Corps
○ Navy

9. How many years of active duty service did you sign up for? (Mark one)

○ Less than one ○ One ○ Three ○ Five
○ Two ○ Four ○ Six

10. If you could not have gotten in the service you are entering, what would you have done? (Mark one)

○ Enlisted in the Air Force
○ Enlisted in the Army
○ Enlisted in the Marine Corps
○ Enlisted in the Navy
○ Not enlisted in any service

11. Not counting any reserve training, have you ever been on active military duty? (Mark one)

○ Yes ○ No

12. Are you entering into Active Duty today? (Mark one)

○ Yes, I will leave for a military post today.
○ No, my entry into Active Duty will be delayed until later.

13. If you are shipping to a military post today, about how long have you been on Delayed Status? (Mark one)

○ Does not apply, I am not shipping today
○ Does not apply, I was not on Delayed status
○ One week
○ Two weeks
○ One month
○ Two months
○ Three months
○ Four months
○ Five months
○ Six months
○ Seven months
○ Eight months
○ Nine months

14. Were you working when you made your final decision to enlist? (Mark one)

○ Yes, full-time
○ Yes, part-time
○ No, but I was looking for work
○ No, and I was not looking for work

15. Were you going to school when you made your final decision to enlist? (Mark one)

○ Yes, full-time
○ Yes, part-time
○ No

16. If you had a full-time job at the time you decided to enlist, what was your average weekly pay before deductions? (Mark one)

○ Does not apply, I did not have a full-time job
○ Less than $67
○ $67 - $86
○ $87 - $105
○ $106 - $125
○ $126 - $144
○ $145 - $163
○ $164 or more
○ Don't recall

17. While making up your mind to enlist, how much did each of these reasons influence you? Indicate the amount of influence for each reason.

	Very Much	Fairly Much	Some	Little	None
A. To do something different	○	○	○	○	○
B. To become eligible for G.I. Bill	○	○	○	○	○
C. To learn a skill	○	○	○	○	○
D. To travel and see the world	○	○	○	○	○
E. For the pay and benefits	○	○	○	○	○
F. To serve my country	○	○	○	○	○
G. Didn't like the job I had	○	○	○	○	○
H. To prepare for a later civilian job	○	○	○	○	○
I. I was tired of going to school	○	○	○	○	○
J. No good civilian jobs were available	○	○	○	○	○
K. I wasn't sure what I wanted to do	○	○	○	○	○
L. No chance for promotion in my civilian job	○	○	○	○	○
M. Chance to get college education while in service	○	○	○	○	○
N. To be able to support myself or family	○	○	○	○	○

18. Which of the above best describes why you are entering military service? (Mark one)

○ A ○ C ○ E ○ G ○ I ○ K ○ M
○ B ○ D ○ F ○ H ○ J ○ L ○ N

19. From your experience how well do each of the following statements describe the recruiters in the service you are joining? (Mark one for each line)

	Very Well	Fairly Well	Somewhat	Not Too Well	Not At All
A. Hard sell, high pressure	○	○	○	○	○
B. Gave honest picture of service life	○	○	○	○	○
C. Explained all options that were open to me	○	○	○	○	○
D. Nice guys, liked them	○	○	○	○	○
E. Answered all my questions	○	○	○	○	○
F. Let me make up my own mind	○	○	○	○	○

20. How long ago did you first talk to a recruiter about military service? (Mark one)

○ Within the last 30 days
○ 1-3 months ago
○ 4-6 months ago
○ 7-12 months ago
○ More than 12 months ago

21. How did you first come in contact with a military recruiter for the service you joined? (Mark one)

○ The recruiter telephoned me
○ The recruiter mailed me some information
○ I visited the recruiting office
○ I telephoned a recruiter
○ I met him through a school activity
○ I wrote a letter
○ Some other way
○ I don't remember

22. Each military service has a slogan it uses in its advertising. Can you match the following slogans to the correct service? (Mark one for each line)

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marines	Don't Know
"The ______ are looking for a few good men."	○	○	○	○	○
"Look up, be looked up to, go ______."	○	○	○	○	○
"Join the people who've joined the ______."	○	○	○	○	○
"Be something special, go ______."	○	○	○	○	○

23. How long ago did you begin to think seriously about entering military service? (Mark one)

○ Within the last 30 days
○ 1-3 months ago
○ 4-6 months ago
○ 7-12 months ago
○ More than 12 months ago

24. When did you make your final decision to enter military service? (Mark one)

○ Within the last 30 days
○ 1-3 months ago
○ 4-6 months ago
○ 7-12 months ago
○ More than 12 months ago

25. Would you still have enlisted if any of the following had happened? Indicate what you would have done in the case of each event by marking the scale following each statement.

① **Definitely would not have enlisted**
② **Probably would not have enlisted**
③ **Not sure**
④ **Probably would have enlisted**
⑤ **Still would have enlisted**

A. Military pay was lowered by $50 a month	⑤	④	③	②	①
B. The G.I. Bill was eliminated	⑤	④	③	②	①
C. You got a civilian job	⑤	④	③	②	①
D. Servicemen's vacations were cut in half	⑤	④	③	②	①
E. A war was declared	⑤	④	③	②	①
F. PX and commissary benefits were reduced	⑤	④	③	②	①
G. You got engaged or married or met someone you really liked	⑤	④	③	②	①
H. You had to sign up for an extra year	⑤	④	③	②	①
I. Military rules and discipline were made more strict	⑤	④	③	②	①

26. When you were making up your mind to enlist, do you recall seeing or hearing any advertisements about the branch of service you are joining in any of the following? (Mark one for each line)

	Yes	No
Newspaper Want Ads Section	○	○
Newspapers some other section	○	○
Radio	○	○
Television	○	○
Magazines	○	○
Billboards	○	○

27. How much of the information in the ads did you believe? (Mark one)

○ All
○ Most
○ Some
○ Not very much
○ None

28. Did these advertisements influence you to seek more information about serving in the military? (Mark one)

○ Not applicable, I didn't see any ads
○ Yes
○ No

29. Based upon what you know now, how well do you think you will like military service? (Mark one)

○ Very well
○ Quite well
○ Fairly well
○ Not too well
○ Not at all
○ Not sure

30. Do you intend to reenlist when you finish your present period of enlistment? (Mark one)

○ Yes
○ Undecided, but probably yes
○ Undecided, but probably no
○ No

31. Which of the following best describes the location of the place in which you grew up? (Mark one)

○ In a rural or farming community
○ In a small city or town of fewer than 50,000 people that is not a suburb of a larger place
○ In a medium-sized city (50,000 - 100,000 people)
○ In a suburb of a medium-sized city
○ In a large city (100,000 - 500,000 people)
○ In a suburb of a large city
○ In a very large city (over 500,000 people)
○ In a suburb of a very large city

32. What is the approximate annual family income before taxes of your parents (or guardian)? (Mark one)

○ $2,999 or under
○ $3,000 - $4,999
○ $5,000 - $7,999
○ $8,000 - $10,999
○ $11,000 - $13,999
○ $14,000 - $16,999
○ $17,000 - $19,999
○ $20,000 or over
○ Don't know

Please provide your Social Security Number below.


Write the number in the boxes
Then, mark the matching circle below each box
(As in this example)
3691

NAVY AND AIR FORCE ENLISTEES

Stop Here

Thank you for your cooperation.

ARMY AND MARINE CORPS ENLISTEES

Answer the remaining two questions.

33. What would you have done if the only way you could have enlisted was to have signed up for Combat Arms (Infantry, Armor, Artillery)? (Mark one)

○ Not applicable, I have signed up for Combat Arms
○ I still would have enlisted
○ I would not have enlisted
○ I don't know

34. Would you enlist in a Combat Arms skill area (Infantry, Artillery or Armor) if it were possible to get: (Mark Yes or No for each line)

	Yes	No
$1500 cash bonus for a 2-year enlistment	○	○
$2500 cash bonus for a 3-year enlistment	○	○
$4000 cash bonus for a 4-year enlistment	○	○
$75 extra each month during a 3-year enlistment	○	○
$100 extra each month during a 4-year enlistment	○	○

Thank you for your cooperation.

FOR PROCESSING ONLY

SECTION I

CHARACTERISTICS OF THOSE ENTERING

Educational level

The educational attainment of the respondents was as follows: 25% less than high school graduates; 17% GED certificate holders; 41% high school graduates; and 17% reporting education beyond the high school level. The ratio of GED certificate holders to high school graduates was higher in this survey (.29) than was found in the September 1974 AFEES survey (.13). The significance of this increase may be clouded by the possible seasonal influence of high school seniors enlisting into delayed entry programs prior to their June graduation. Nevertheless there was a sizeable variation among the services in the ratio of GED certificate holders to High School graduates with the smallest ratio (.15) found among Air Force accessions and the largest (.46) among Marine Corps accessions.

Women

The proportion of women entering military service has increased in the last few years and now has reached over 8% (Table 1-4). The Air Force and Army have the largest proportion of enlistments who are women (Table 1-7), at 14% and 10% respectively. Women account for 6% of Navy enlistments and 2% of Marine Corps enlistments.

Minorities

Table 1-9 shows that 15% of the surveyed enlistees classified themselves as black. The figure is well below that of May 1974, where blacks constituted 22.4%[1] of persons entering active military duty without previous military experience. The Army and Marine Corps had the most blacks, at 20% and 22% respectively. They are followed by the Air Force and the Navy in that order with 10% and 8%.

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[1] According to MARDAC tabulations No. 816E.

Employment/School Status

Forty-three percent of the enlistees were working at the time they decided to enlist (Table I-15). Another 24% were going to school and 33% were unemployed. Older persons were more likely to be working and less likely to be in school.

An exact counterpart to the Bureau of Labor Statistics definition of unemployment is not possible using the survey data. However, it may be approximated by including in the labor force all persons who were working full or part-time or looking for work at the time they decided to enlist. Using these cases for the denominator, the unemployment rate of male enlistees 17-19 at the time they were deciding to enlist was 42% as shown by Table I-17. For whites the unemployment rate was 39%; for blacks and other races it was 55%. These figures are higher than the Bureau of Labor Statistics unemployment rates for March 1975, which were 21.4% for males 16-19 with 19.6% for whites and 37.5% for Negro and other races.[1]

Income Levels

As shown in Table I-24, persons entering the service come from families having quite varied income levels. The median family income of the families of entering servicemen was $11,888.[2] This is well below $14,307 (or $15,223)[3] which was the median 1973 income for families with heads between the ages 35-44 (or 45-54). This difference may be accounted for in part by the fact that the family income question on the survey restricted income to parents or guardians and did not include other possible wage earners in the household.

---

[1] From Employment and Earnings, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Vol. 21 No. 10 April 1975, Table A-3

[2] It will be noted that there is a response bias to the family income question, such that persons of lower education level were less apt to indicate their approximate family incomes.

[3] From Money Income in 1973 of Families and Persons in the United States. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Series P-60 No. 97, Page 50.

SECTION I

CHARACTERISTICS OF THOSE ENTERING

TABLE GUIDE*

	SECOND VARIABLE			
FIRST VARIABLE	AGE(1)	RACE(3)	EDUCATION(4,5)	BRANCH OF SERVICE(7)
Age(1)**	-	1	2	3
Sex(2)	4	5	6	7
Race(3)	1	-	8	9
Education(4,5)	2	8	-	10
Prior Service(11)	11	12	13	14
Employment-School Status(14,15)	15	17[1]	-	16
Weekly Pay(16)	-	18[2]	19[2]	-
Community Size(31)	20	21	22	23
Family Income(32)	-	24	25	-

[1] Table restricted to Males 17 to 19 years of age

[2] Table restricted to persons working full-time

*To find a particular bivariate distribution, locate the row and column containing the items of interest. If a table exists for those items, the table number is given where that row and column intersect.

**The numbers in parentheses refer to the questionnaire items from which the data were derived.

```
1                                                                                         06/25/75
FILE    AFEES     (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
     V1        AGE                                                 BY  V3          RACE
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  1

                        V3
              COUNT   I
              ROW PCT IBLACK     WHITE     OTHER     NO VALID   ROW
              COL PCT I                              RESPNSE    TOTAL
                      I      1  I      2  I      3  I      0  I
V1            --------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                    1 I    275  I   2099  I    132  I     34M I   2507
  17                  I   11.0  I   83.8  I    5.3  I    0.0  I   19.1
                      I   13.7  I   20.3  I   18.6  I    0.0  I
                     -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                    2 I    435  I   2486  I    129  I     32M I   3051
  18                  I   14.3  I   81.5  I    4.2  I    0.0  I   23.3
                      I   21.6  I   24.0  I   18.2  I    0.0  I
                     -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                    3 I    384  I   1847  I    110  I     23M I   2341
  19                  I   16.4  I   78.9  I    4.7  I    0.0  I   17.9
                      I   19.0  I   17.8  I   15.5  I    0.0  I
                     -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                    4 I    252  I   1146  I     77  I     23M I   1475
  20                  I   17.1  I   77.7  I    5.2  I    0.0  I   11.3
                      I   12.5  I   11.1  I   10.9  I    0.0  I
                     -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                    5 I    181  I    780  I     49  I     15M I   1010
  21                  I   17.9  I   77.2  I    4.9  I    0.0  I    7.7
                      I    9.0  I    7.5  I    7.0  I    0.0  I
                     -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                    6 I    489  I   2007  I    212  I     31M I   2708
  OVER  21            I   18.0  I   74.1  I    7.8  I    0.0  I   20.7
                      I   24.2  I   19.4  I   29.9  I    0.0  I
                     -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                    0 I     14M I     17M I      1M I      3M I     35M
  NO VALID RESPNSE    I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0
                      I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I
                     -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
               COLUMN     2016     10365       710      162M    13091
                TOTAL     15.4      79.2       5.4       0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =   179
```

141

Table I-1

```
                                                                   06/25/75
FILE   AFEES     (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V1        AGE                                          BY  ED2
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  2

             ED2
     COUNT  I
   ROW PCT  I8TH GRD   9TH       10TH      11TH      12TH      GED       HS        1 YEAR    2 YEARS   3 YEARS  I4 YEARS   NO VALID    ROW
   COL PCT  IOR LESS   GRADE     GRADE     GRADE     NON-GRAD            GRADUATE  PAST HS   PAST HS   PAST HS  IPAST HS    RESPNSE   TOTAL
            I       1 I       2 I       3 I       4 I       5 I       6 I       7 I       8 I       9 I      10 I      11 I       0 I
V1  --------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
          1 I      22 I     122 I     447 I     641 I     163 I     654 I     454 I      30 I       0 I       2 I       0 I      6M I   2534
  17        I     0.9 I     4.8 I    17.6 I    25.3 I     6.4 I    25.8 I    17.9 I     1.2 I     0.0 I     0.1 I     0.0 I     0.0 I   19.2
            I    27.1 I    51.1 I    55.1 I    43.4 I    22.2 I    29.5 I     8.4 I     2.5 I     0.0 I     1.4 I     0.0 I     0.0 I
           -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
          2 I      27 I      52 I     204 I     521 I     252 I     536 I    1358 I     116 I      10 I       4 I       0 I      2M I   3079
  18        I     0.9 I     1.7 I     6.6 I    16.9 I     8.2 I    17.4 I    44.1 I     3.8 I     0.3 I     0.1 I     0.0 I     0.0 I   23.3
            I    34.1 I    21.7 I    25.1 I    35.3 I    34.2 I    24.2 I    25.0 I     9.9 I     1.6 I     2.4 I     0.0 I     0.0 I
           -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
          3 I      11 I      16 I      67 I     177 I     126 I     291 I    1383 I     241 I      43 I       0 I       2 I      5M I   2359
  19        I     0.5 I     0.8 I     2.8 I     7.5 I     5.3 I    12.3 I    58.6 I    10.2 I     1.8 I     0.0 I     0.1 I     0.0 I   17.9
            I    13.9 I     7.6 I     8.2 I    12.0 I    17.1 I    13.1 I    25.5 I    20.5 I     7.2 I     0.2 I     0.6 I     0.0 I
           -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
          4 I       4 I       8 I      44 I      54 I      72 I     190 I     745 I     267 I      56 I      12 I       3 I      2M I   1494
  20        I     0.3 I     0.5 I     2.9 I     3.6 I     4.8 I    12.7 I    49.9 I    17.9 I     6.5 I     0.8 I     0.2 I     0.0 I   11.3
            I     4.7 I     3.4 I     5.4 I     3.6 I     9.8 I     8.6 I    13.7 I    22.7 I    16.0 I     6.9 I     1.0 I     0.0 I
           -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
          5 I       8 I      12 I      23 I      30 I      42 I     142 I     428 I     181 I     114 I      34 I       5 I      0M I   1019
  21        I     0.8 I     1.1 I     2.3 I     3.0 I     4.1 I    13.9 I    42.0 I    17.8 I    11.2 I     3.3 I     0.5 I     0.0 I    7.7
            I    10.4 I     4.8 I     2.9 I     2.0 I     5.7 I     6.4 I     7.9 I    15.4 I    18.9 I    18.9 I     1.5 I     0.0 I
           -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
          6 I       8 I      27 I      27 I      54 I      81 I     405 I    1061 I     339 I     340 I     125 I     257 I      4M I   2725
  OVER  21  I     0.3 I     1.0 I     1.0 I     2.0 I     3.0 I    14.9 I    38.9 I    12.4 I    12.5 I     4.6 I     9.4 I     0.0 I   20.6
            I    10.3 I    11.3 I     3.3 I     3.7 I    11.0 I    18.3 I    19.5 I    28.9 I    56.4 I    70.2 I    96.4 I     0.0 I
           -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
          0 I      0M I      1M I     10M I      6M I      3M I      4M I     12M I      0M I      0M I      0M I      0M I      1M I    35M
NO VALID RESPNSE I 0.0 I     0.0 I     0.0 I     0.0 I     0.0 I     0.0 I     0.0 I     0.0 I     0.0 I     0.0 I     0.0 I     0.0 I    0.0
            I     0.0 I     0.0 I     0.0 I     0.0 I     0.0 I     0.0 I     0.0 I     0.0 I     0.0 I     0.0 I     0.0 I     0.0 I
           -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
     COLUMN        80       239       811      1476       736      2217      5429      1173       604       178       267       20M   13210
      TOTAL       0.6       1.8       6.1      11.2       5.6      16.8      41.1       8.9       4.6       1.3       2.0       0.0   100.0

                                                              NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =     60
```

Table I-2

2031

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                                                                                                    06/25/75
FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
    V1         AGE                                                      BY  V7       BRANCH OF SERVICE JOINING
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  1 OF  1

                    V7
          COUNT    I
          ROW PCT  IAIR       ARMY       MARINE     NAVY       NO VALID   ROW
          COL PCT  IFORCE                CORPS                 RESPNSF    TOTAL
                   I     1  I     2   I     3   I     4   I     0   I
V1         --------I--------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 1 I   407  I   808   I   650   I   672   I     6M  I  2536
  17               I  16.0  I  31.8   I  25.6   I  26.5   I   0.0   I  19.2
                   I  13.8  I  16.1   I  28.1   I  22.9   I   0.0   I
                  -I--------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 2 I   707  I  1116   I   595   I   660   I     5M  I  3078
  18               I  23.0  I  36.2   I  19.3   I  21.4   I   0.0   I  23.3
                   I  23.9  I  22.2   I  25.8   I  22.5   I   0.0   I
                  -I--------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 3 I   571  I   846   I   438   I   502   I     7M  I  2358
  19               I  24.2  I  35.9   I  18.6   I  21.3   I   0.0   I  17.8
                   I  19.3  I  16.9   I  19.0   I  17.1   I   0.0   I
                  -I--------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 4 I   449  I   545   I   200   I   302   I     2M  I  1496
  20               I  30.0  I  36.4   I  13.3   I  20.2   I   0.0   I  11.3
                   I  15.2  I  10.9   I   8.6   I  10.3   I   0.0   I
                  -I--------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 5 I   273  I   410   I   142   I   197   I     3M  I  1023
  21               I  26.7  I  40.1   I  13.9   I  19.3   I   0.0   I   7.7
                   I   9.2  I   8.2   I   6.2   I   6.7   I   0.0   I
                  -I--------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 6 I   550  I  1295   I   285   I   596   I    13M  I  2726
 OVER  21          I  20.2  I  47.5   I  10.5   I  21.8   I   0.0   I  20.6
                   I  18.6  I  25.8   I  12.3   I  20.3   I   0.0   I
                  -I--------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 0 I    1M  I   18M   I    9M   I    7M   I     1M  I    35M
 NO VALID RESPNSE  I   0.0  I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0
                   I   0.0  I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I
                  -I--------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
            COLUMN    2957      5020      2310      2930        35M     13217
             TOTAL    22.4      38.0      17.5      22.2       0.0     100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =     53
```

Table 1-3

```
                                                                                                06/25/75

FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
     V2          SEX                                                 BY  V1           AGE
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   PAGE  1 OF  1

                      V1
             COUNT   I
            ROW PCT  I17         18         19         20         21         OVER  21 NO VALID    ROW
            COL PCT  I                                                                 RESPNSE   TOTAL
                     I      1  I      2  I      3  I      4  I      5  I      6  I      0  I
V2          ---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                  1  I   2413  I   2808  I   2159  I   1366  I    907  I   2423  I     32M  I  12077
  MALE               I   20.0  I   23.3  I   17.9  I   11.3  I    7.5  I   20.1  I    0.0  I   91.6
                     I   95.3  I   91.5  I   91.7  I   91.7  I   89.1  I   88.9  I    0.0  I
                    -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                  2  I    119  I    259  I    196  I    123  I    110  I    301  I      0M I   1110
  FEMALE             I   10.7  I   23.4  I   17.7  I   11.1  I    9.9  I   27.2  I    0.0  I    8.4
                     I    4.7  I    8.5  I    8.3  I    8.3  I   10.9  I   11.1  I    0.0  I
                    -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                  0  I     10M I     15M I      8M I      8M I      9M I     14M I      3M I     67M
  NO VALID RESPNSE   I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0
                     I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I
                    -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
             COLUMN      2532      3068      2356      1489      1017      2725        35M    13187
             TOTAL       19.2      23.3      17.9      11.3       7.7      20.7       0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =     83
```

2033

Table I-4

```
                                                                                             06/25/75
FILE   AFEL     (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
     V2          SEX                                                  BY V3          RACE
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   PAGE  1 OF  1

                          V3
              COUNT    I
              ROW PCT  IBLACK      WHITE      OTHER      NO VALID   ROW
              COL PCT  I                                 RESPNSE    TOTAL
                       I     1  I      2  I      3  I      0  I
V2             --------I--------I---------I---------I---------I
                   1   I  1861  I  9437   I   655   I   145M  I  11953
  MALE                 I  15.6  I  79.0   I   5.5   I   0.0   I   91.5
                       I  92.2  I  91.3   I  92.6   I   0.0   I
                      -I--------I---------I---------I---------I
                   2   I   158  I   894   I    52   I     5M  I   1105
  FEMALE               I  14.3  I  80.9   I   4.8   I   0.0   I    8.5
                       I   7.8  I   8.7   I   7.4   I   0.0   I
                      -I--------I---------I---------I---------I
                   0   I   11M  I   41M   I    4M   I    12M  I    67M
  NO VALID RESPNSE     I   0.0  I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I    0.0
                       I   0.0  I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I
                      -I--------I---------I---------I---------I
             COLUMN       2019     10330       707       162M    13057
             TOTAL        15.5      79.1       5.4       0.0     100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    213
```

Table I-5

```
                                                                                06/25/75

FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V2        SEX                                                    BY ED2
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  2

                   ED2
                                                                                                        I
          COUNT   I
        ROW PCT   I8TH GRD   9TH       10TH      11TH      12TH      GED       HS        1 YEAR    2 YEARS   3 YEARS  I4 YEARS   NO VALID   ROW
        COL PCT   IOR LESS   GRADE     GRADE     GRADE     NON-GRAD            GRADUATE  PAST HS   PAST HS   PAST HS  IPAST HS   RESPNSE    TOTAL
                  I     1  I     2  I     3  I     4  I     5  I     6  I     7  I     8  I     9  I    10  I    11  I     0  I
V2       ---------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
               1  I     77 I    240 I    810 I   1411 I    688 I   2081 I   4812 I   1045 I    529 I    150 I    226 I    17M I  12068
  MALE            I    0.6 I    2.0 I    6.7 I   11.7 I    5.7 I   17.2 I   39.9 I    8.7 I    4.4 I    1.2 I    1.9 I    0.0 I   91.6
                  I   98.7 I  100.0 I   99.0 I   96.0 I   94.3 I   94.1 I   88.9 I   89.3 I   87.9 I   83.8 I   85.0 I    0.0 I
                 -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
               2  I      1 I      0 I      8 I     59 I     41 I    129 I    603 I    125 I     73 I     29 I     40 I     2M I   1108
  FEMALE          I    0.1 I    0.0 I    0.7 I    5.3 I    3.7 I   11.7 I   54.4 I   11.3 I    6.6 I    2.6 I    3.6 I    0.0 I    8.4
                  I    1.3 I    0.0 I    1.0 I    4.0 I    5.7 I    5.9 I   11.1 I   10.7 I   12.1 I   16.2 I   15.0 I    0.0 I
                 -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  I     2M I     0M I     3M I    10M I     9M I    11M I    24M I     1M I     2M I     0M I     1M I     1M I    67M
NO VALID RESPNSE  I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0
                  I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I
                 -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
         COLUMN         78      240      818     1470      730     2210     5415     1170      602      179      266      20M   13176
          TOTAL        0.6      1.8      6.2     11.2      5.5     16.8     41.1      8.9      4.6      1.4      2.0      0.0   100.0

                                                                        NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =      94
```

2035

Table I-6

```
                                                                                                                 06/25/75
FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
      V2          SEX                                                    BY  V7          BRANCH OF SERVICE JOINING
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  1

                        V7
              COUNT    I
             ROW PCT   IAIR          ARMY          MARINE        NAVY          NO VALID     ROW
             COL PCT   IFORCE                      CORPS                       RESPNSE      TOTAL
                       I       1  I       2  I       3  I       4  I       0  I
V2            ---------I----------I----------I----------I----------I----------I
                   1   I   2533   I   4522   I   2274   I   2751   I    30M   I  12080
  MALE                 I   21.0   I   37.4   I   18.8   I   22.8   I    0.0   I   91.6
                       I   85.8   I   90.5   I   98.3   I   94.0   I    0.0   I
                      -I----------I----------I----------I----------I----------I
                   2   I    418   I    477   I     38   I    176   I     4M   I   1109
  FEMALE               I   37.7   I   43.0   I    3.5   I   15.9   I    0.0   I    8.4
                       I   14.2   I    9.5   I    1.7   I    6.0   I    0.0   I
                      -I----------I----------I----------I----------I----------I
                   0   I     7M   I    37M   I     0M   I    11M   I     4M   I    63M
  NO VALID RESPNSE     I    0.0   I    0.0   I    0.0   I    0.0   I    0.0   I    0.0
                       I    0.0   I    0.0   I    0.0   I    0.0   I    0.0   I
                      -I----------I----------I----------I----------I----------I
              COLUMN       2951       4999       2312       2926        38M     13188
               TOTAL       22.4       37.9       17.5       22.2        0.0     100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =     82
```

2036

Table 1-7

```
                                                                                          06/25/75

FILE   AFFXS    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V3      RACE                                          BY  ED2
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  2

                  ED2                                                                                            I
          COUNT  I
        ROW PCT  I8TH GRD  9TH       10TH      11TH      12TH      GED       HS        1 YEAR    2 YEARS   3 YEARS  I4 YEARS   NO VALID   ROW
        COL PCT  IOR LESS  GRADE     GRADE     GRADE     NON-GRAD            GRADUATE  PAST HS   PAST HS   PAST HS  IPAST HS    RESPNSE   TOTAL
                 I     1  I     2  I     3  I     4  I     5  I     6  I     7  I     8  I     9  I    10  I    11  I     0  I
V3      ---------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
              1  I     5  I    19  I    65  I   299  I   145  I   265  I   798  I   244  I   110  I    41  I    32  I    1* I  2026
  BLACK          I   0.2  I   0.9  I   3.2  I  14.7  I   7.2  I  13.1  I  39.4  I  12.0  I   5.4  I   2.0  I   1.6  I   0.0  I  15.5
                 I  11.1  I   8.1  I   8.1  I  20.4  I  20.0  I  12.1  I  14.8  I  20.9  I  18.4  I  23.0  I  12.C  I   0.0  I
                -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
              2  I    60  I   200  I   693  I  1107  I   544  I  1806  I  4330  I   871  I   437  I   119  I   191  I   12* I 10356
  WHITE          I   0.6  I   1.9  I   6.7  I  10.7  I   5.2  I  17.4  I  41.8  I   8.4  I   4.2  I   1.2  I   1.8  I   0.0  I  79.1
                 I  76.9  I  85.8  I  86.4  I  75.7  I  74.8  I  87.2  I  80.4  I  74.6  I  73.5  I  67.0  I  7196  I   0.0  I
                -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
              3  I    10  I    14  I    45  I    57  I    37  I   124  I   256  I    53  I    48  I    18  I    44  I    0* I   705
  OTHER          I   1.4  I   2.0  I   6.3  I   8.0  I   5.3  I  17.6  I  36.3  I   7.5  I   6.8  I   2.5  I   6.2  I   0.0  I   5.4
                 I  12.5  I   6.1  I   5.6  I   3.9  I   5.2  I   5.7  I   4.7  I   4.5  I   8.1  I   9.9  I  16.4  I   0.0  I
                -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
              0  I    2*  I    6*  I   18*  I   18*  I   12*  I   27*  I   56*  I    6*  I    9*  I    1*  I    0*  I    8*  I  162*
  NC VALID RESPNSE I  0.0 I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   3.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0
                 I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.C  I   0.0  I
                -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
         COLUMN       78       233       803      1462       727      2193      5386      1168       595       178       267       20*   13088
          TOTAL      0.6       1.8       6.1      11.2       5.6      16.8      41.1       8.9       4.5       1.4       2.0       0.0   100.0

                                                                     NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =   162
```

Table I-8

```
                                                                                                      06/25/75
FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F  * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V3        RACE                                                BY  V7        BRANCH OF SERVICE JOINING
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  1

                    V7
          COUNT    I
          ROW PCT  IAIR       ARMY       MARINE     NAVY       NO VALID   ROW
          COL PCT  IFORCE                CORPS                 RESPNSE   TOTAL
                   I      1  I      2  I      3  I      4  I      0  I
V3        ---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 1 I    302  I    982  I    508  I    235  I     2M  I  2028
  BLACK            I   14.9  I   48.4  I   25.1  I   11.6  I   0.0   I  15.5
                   I   10.3  I   19.8  I   22.1  I    8.1  I   0.0   I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 2 I   2530  I   3617  I   1659  I   2547  I    29M  I 10353
  WHITE            I   24.4  I   34.9  I   16.0  I   24.6  I   0.0   I  79.1
                   I   86.4  I   72.7  I   72.3  I   88.1  I   0.0   I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 3 I     97  I    373  I    128  I    111  I     3M  I   708
  OTHER            I   13.7  I   52.6  I   18.1  I   15.6  I   0.0   I   5.4
                   I    3.3  I    7.5  I    5.6  I    3.8  I   0.0   I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 0 I    28M  I    65M  I    24M  I    45M  I     1M  I   162M
  NO VALID RESPNSE I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I   0.0   I   0.0
                   I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I   0.0   I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
            COLUMN     2929      4972      2296      2893       35M    13089
             TOTAL     22.4      38.0      17.5      22.1       0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =   181
```

Table I-9

```
FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
    V7        BRANCH OF SERVICE JOINING                              BY  ED2
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  2

                   ED2
          COUNT  I
        ROW PCT  I8TH GRD  9TH       10TH      11TH      12TH      GED       HS        1 YEAR    2 YEARS   3 YEARS   I4 YEARS  NO VALID   ROW
        COL PCT  IOR LESS  GRADE     GRADE     GRADE     NON-GRAD            GRADUATE  PAST HS   PAST HS   PAST HS   IPAST HS   RESPNSE   TOTAL
                 I     1 I     2 I     3 I     4 I     5 I     6 I     7 I     8 I     9 I    10 I    11 I     0 I
V7        -------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I
              1  I     3 I     9 I    31 I   224 I   145 I   329 I  1570 I   358 I   182 I    47 I    55 I    1* I  2951
  AIR   FORCE    I   0.1 I   0.3 I   1.0 I   7.6 I   4.9 I  11.1 I  53.1 I  12.1 I   6.2 I   1.6 I   1.9 I   0.0 I  22.4
                 I   3.7 I   3.9 I [illegible] I  15.1 I  19.8 I  14.8 I  28.9 I  30.5 I  30.2 I  26.9 I  20.7 I   0.0 I
                -I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I
              2  I    57 I   12[illegible] I   317 I   512 I   305 I   954 I  1835 I   442 I   247 I    81 I   143 I   10* I  5017
  ARMY           I   1.1 I   2.[illegible] I   6.3 I  10.2 I   6.1 I  19.0 I  36.6 I   8.8 I   4.9 I   1.6 I   2.9 I   0.0 I  38.0
                 I  72.8 I  51.[illegible] I  38.6 I  34.6 I  41.6 I  43.0 I  33.8 I  37.7 I  41.9 I  46.1 I  51.7 I   0.0 I
                -I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I
              3  I    10 I    68 I   222 I   392 I   144 I   467 I   796 I   137 I    47 I    11 I    22 I    3* I  2316
  MARINE  CORPS  I   0.4 I   2.9 I   9.6 I  16.9 I   6.2 I  20.2 I  34.4 I   5.9 I   2.0 I   0.5 I   0.9 I   0.0 I  17.5
                 I  12.8 I  28.2 I  27.1 I  26.5 I  19.7 I  21.1 I  14.7 I  11.7 I   7.7 I   6.3 I   8.1 I   0.0 I
                -I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I
              4  I     8 I    39 I   250 I   352 I   139 I   468 I  1222 I   236 I   121 I    36 I    47 I    6* I  2925
  NAVY           I   0.3 I   1.3 I   8.6 I  12.0 I   4.7 I  16.0 I  41.8 I   8.1 I   4.4 I   1.2 I   1.6 I   0.0 I  22.1
                 I  10.3 I  16.3 I  30.5 I  23.8 I  18.9 I  21.1 I  22.5 I  20.1 I  21.1 I  23.7 I  17.5 I   0.0 I
                -I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I
              0  I    2* I    0* I    0* I    1* I    4* I    4* I   13* I    1* I    0* I    3* I    0* I    1* I   39*
  NO VALID RESPNSE I 0.0 I   0.0 I   0.0 I   0.0 I   0.0 I   0.0 I   0.0 I   0.0 I   0.0 I   0.0 I   0.0 I   0.0 I   0.0
                 I   0.0 I   0.0 I   0.0 I   0.0 I   0.0 I   0.0 I   0.0 I   0.0 I   0.0 I   0.0 I   0.0 I   0.0 I
                -I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I-------I
         COLUMN       78     240     821    1479     734    2217    5423    1173     597     176     268     20*   13210
          TOTAL      0.6     1.8     6.2    11.2     5.6    16.8    41.1     8.9     4.5     1.3     2.0     0.0   100.0

                                                                       NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    59
```

Table I-10

```
                                                                                              06/25/75
FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F  * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   VII       EVER BEEN ON ACTIVE MILITARY DUTY                       BY  VI          AGE
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  1 OF  1

                       VI
            COUNT   I
            ROW PCT I17         18        19        20        21        OVER  21 NO VALID   ROW
            COL PCT I                                                             RESPNSE  TOTAL
                    I       1 I       2 I       3 I       4 I       5 I       6 I       0 I
VII         --------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                  1 I     17  I     22  I     41  I     37  I     62  I  1001   I     2M  I   1181
  YES               I    1.5  I    1.9  I    3.5  I    3.2  I    5.2  I  84.8   I    0.0  I    8.9
                    I    0.7  I    0.7  I    1.7  I    2.5  I    6.0  I  36.8   I    0.0  I
                   -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                  2 I   2517  I   3053  I   2319  I   1452  I    962  I  1721   I    33M  I  12024
  NO                I   20.9  I   25.4  I   19.3  I   12.1  I    8.0  I  14.3   I    0.0  I   91.1
                    I   99.3  I   99.3  I   98.3  I   97.5  I   94.0  I  63.2   I    0.0  I
                   -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                  0 I     7M  I     8M  I     5M  I     9M  I     2M  I   16M   I     1M  I    47M
  NO VALID RESPNSE  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I   0.0   I    0.0  I    0.0
                    I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I   0.0   I    0.0  I
                   -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
             COLUMN     2535      3075      2360      1489      1024     2722        35M    13205
              TOTAL     19.2      23.3      17.9      11.3       7.8     20.6        0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    66
```

Table 1-11

```
                                                                                                              06/25/75

FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F  * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V11       EVER BEEN ON ACTIVE MILITARY DUTY                   BY  V3        RACE
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  1 OF  1

                        V3
             COUNT   I
             ROW PCT IBLACK     WHITE     OTHER     NO VALID   ROW
             COL PCT I                              RESPNSE   TOTAL
                     I      1 I      2 I      3 I      0 I
V11          --------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                   1 I   168  I   901  I    88  I    25M I  1157
  YES                I  14.5  I  77.8  I   7.6  I   0.0  I   8.9
                     I   8.3  I   8.7  I  12.5  I   0.0  I
                    -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                   2 I  1856  I  9438  I   615  I   136M I 11909
  NO                 I  15.6  I  79.3  I   5.2  I   0.0  I  91.1
                     I  91.7  I  91.3  I  87.5  I   0.0  I
                    -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                   0 I    6M  I   32M  I    8M  I     1M I    47M
  NO VALID RESPNSE   I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0
                     I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I
                    -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
             COLUMN     2024    10338      703      162M   13066
              TOTAL     15.5     79.1      5.4       0.0   100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    204
```

2041

Table I-12

```
                                                                                              06/25/75
FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V11       EVER BEEN ON ACTIVE MILITARY DUTY                    BY  ED2
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  1 OF  2

              ED2
        COUNT I                                                                                                  I
      ROW PCT I8TH GRC  9TH       10TH      11TH      12TH      GED       HS        1 YEAR    2 YEARS   3 YEARS  I4 YEARS   NO VALID   ROW
      COL PCT IOR LESS  GRADE     GRADE     GRADE     NCN-GRAD            GRADUATE PAST HS   PAST HS   PAST HS  IPAST HS   RESPNSE   TOTAL
              I     1 I     2 I      3 I      4 I      5 I      6 I      7 I      8 I      9 I     10 I     11 I      0 I
V11   --------I-------I-------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
            1 I     6 I    19 I     10 I     17 I     44 I    287 I    473 I    141 I    115 I     24 I     44 I     1M I   1180
  YES         I   0.5 I   1.7 I    0.9 I    1.4 I    3.7 I   24.3 I   40.1 I   12.0 I    9.7 I    2.0 I    3.8 I    0.0 I    8.9
              I   8.2 I   8.1 I    1.2 I    1.1 I    5.9 I   12.9 I    8.7 I   12.1 I   19.1 I   13.3 I   16.7 I    0.0 I
             -I-------I-------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
            2 I    70 I   220 I    807 I   1460 I    688 I   1931 I   4949 I   1028 I    485 I    155 I    222 I    19M I  12016
  NO          I   0.6 I   1.8 I    6.7 I   12.2 I    5.7 I   16.1 I   41.2 I    8.6 I    4.0 I    1.3 I    1.8 I    0.0 I   91.1
              I  91.8 I  91.9 I   98.8 I   98.9 I   94.1 I   87.1 I   91.3 I   87.9 I   80.9 I   86.7 I   83.3 I    0.0 I
             -I-------I-------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
            0 I    3M I    0M I     4M I     3M I     7M I     3M I    17M I     4M I     4M I     0M I     1M I     1M I    46M
 NO VALID RESPNSE I 0.0 I 0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0
              I   0.0 I   0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I
             -I-------I-------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
       COLUMN     77     240      817     1477      732     2218     5422     1169      600      179      266      20M    13196
        TOTAL    0.6     1.8      6.2     11.2      5.5     16.8     41.1      8.9      4.5      1.4      2.0      0.0    100.0

                                                        NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =     74
```

Table 1-13

```
                                                                                                      06/25/75
FILE    AFEES     (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F  * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V11        EVER BEEN ON ACTIVE MILITARY DUTY                  BY  V7          BRANCH OF SERVICE JOINING
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  1 OF  1

                     V7
             COUNT  I
           ROW PCT  IAIR        ARMY       MARINE     NAVY       NO VALID   ROW
           COL PCT  IFORCE                 CORPS                 RESPNSE    TOTAL
                    I       1  I       2  I       3  I       4  I       0  I
V11         --------I----------I----------I----------I----------I----------I
                 1  I      83  I     665  I     105  I     328  I      1M  I   1181
  YES               I     7.0  I    56.3  I     8.9  I    27.8  I     0.0  I    8.9
                    I     2.8  I    13.3  I     4.5  I    11.2  I     0.0  I
                   -I----------I----------I----------I----------I----------I
                 2  I    2869  I    4354  I    2212  I    2605  I     19M  I  12039
  NO                I    23.8  I    36.2  I    18.4  I    21.6  I     0.0  I   91.1
                    I    97.2  I    86.7  I    95.5  I    88.8  I     0.0  I
                   -I----------I----------I----------I----------I----------I
                 0  I      6M  I     18M  I      3M  I      5M  I     15M  I    47M
  NO VALID RESPNSE  I     0.0  I     0.0  I     0.0  I     0.0  I     0.0  I    0.0
                    I     0.0  I     0.0  I     0.0  I     0.0  I     0.0  I
                   -I----------I----------I----------I----------I----------I
            COLUMN       2952       5019       2316       2933        35M    13220
             TOTAL       22.3       38.0       17.5       22.2        0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =     50
```

Table I-14

```
                                                                                                   06/25/75
FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
    STATUS
                                                                    BY  V1          AGE
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  1

                    V1
           COUNT  I
         ROW PCT  I17        18         19         20         21         OVER  21 NO VALID   ROW
         COL PCT  I                                                               RESPNSE   TOTAL
                  I      1  I      2  I      3  I      4  I      5  I      6  I      0  I
STATUS   ---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
               1  I   364   I   879   I   879   I   601   I   420   I  1349   I    10M  I   4523
 WORKING FULL TME I   8.7   I  19.4   I  19.4   I  13.3   I   9.3   I  29.8   I   0.0   I   34.3
                  I  15.5   I  28.7   I  37.3   I  40.2   I  41.1   I  49.5   I   0.0   I
                 -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
               2  I   239   I   281   I   227   I   126   I   102   I   185   I     3M  I   1160
 WORKING PART TME I  20.6   I  24.2   I  19.6   I  10.8   I   8.8   I  16.0   I   0.0   I    8.8
                  I   9.4   I   9.2   I   9.6   I   8.4   I  10.0   I   6.8   I   0.0   I
                 -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
               3  I  1217   I   942   I   340   I   145   I    63   I   174   I     4M  I   2881
 SCHOOL  FULL TME I  42.2   I  32.7   I  11.8   I   5.0   I   2.2   I   6.1   I   0.0   I   21.8
                  I  48.0   I  30.7   I  14.4   I   9.7   I   6.1   I   6.4   I   0.0   I
                 -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
               4  I    80   I    60   I    42   I    24   I    43   I    55   I     0M  I    303
 SCHOOL  PART TME I  26.3   I  19.7   I  13.7   I   8.0   I  14.1   I  18.3   I   0.0   I    2.3
                  I   3.1   I   1.9   I   1.8   I   1.6   I   4.2   I   2.0   I   0.0   I
                 -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
               5  I   108   I   184   I   136   I   101   I    65   I   157   I     1M  I    750
 UNEMPLYD NO LOOK I  14.3   I  24.5   I  18.1   I  13.5   I   8.6   I  21.0   I   0.0   I    5.7
                  I   4.2   I   6.0   I   5.8   I   6.8   I   6.3   I   5.8   I   0.0   I
                 -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
               6  I   498   I   722   I   733   I   496   I   329   I   803   I    17M  I   3580
 UNEMPLYD LOOKING I  13.9   I  20.2   I  20.5   I  13.9   I   9.2   I  22.4   I   0.0   I   27.1
                  I  19.7   I  23.5   I  31.1   I  33.2   I  32.2   I  29.5   I   0.0   I
                 -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
               0  I     8M  I    15M  I     9M  I     4M  I     4M  I    19M  I     1M  I     56M
 NO VALID RESPNSE I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I    0.0
                  I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I
                 -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
           COLUMN     2534      3068      2356      1494      1021      2724        35M    13197
            TOTAL     19.2      23.2      17.9      11.3       7.7      20.6        0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =     73
```

Table I-15

```
                                                                                         06/25/75

FILE   AFEES    (CREATION CATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
    STATUS                                                     BY  V7         BRANCH OF SERVICE JOINING
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  1 OF  1

                      V7
             COUNT   I
           ROW PCT  IAIR        ARMY      MARINE    NAVY   -  NO VALID   ROW
           COL PCT  IFORCE                CORPS                RESPNSE   TOTAL
                    I     1  I     2  I     3  I     4  I     0  I
STATUS      --------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  1 I  1151  I  1696  I   696  I   979  I   12M  I   4522
  WORKING FULL TME  I  25.4  I  37.5  I  15.4  I  21.7  I   0.0  I   34.2
                    I  39.C  I  33.8  I  30.2  I  33.4  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  2 I   264  I   428  I   243  I   228  I    0M  I   1163
  WORKING PART TME  I  22.7  I  36.8  I  20.9  I  19.6  I   0.0  I    8.8
                    I   8.9  I   8.5  I  10.6  I   7.8  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  3 I   733  I   957  I   520  I   673  I    2M  I   2883
  SCHOOL  FULL TME  I  25.4  I  33.2  I  18.0  I  23.3  I   0.0  I   21.8
                    I  24.8  I  19.0  I  22.6  I  22.9  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  4 I    39  I   117  I    73  I    73  I    0M  I    303
  SCHOOL  PART TME  I  13.0  I  38.7  I  24.2  I  24.2  I   0.0  I    2.3
                    I   1.3  I   2.3  I   3.2  I   2.5  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  5 I   124  I   306  I   153  I   164  I    4M  I    747
  UNEMPLYD NO LOOK  I  16.5  I  41.0  I  20.4  I  22.0  I   0.0  I    5.7
                    I   4.2  I   6.1  I   6.6  I   5.6  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  6 I   642  I  1519  I   617  I   817  I    2M  I   3595
  UNEMPLYD LOOKING  I  17.9  I  42.3  I  17.1  I  22.7  I   0.0  I   27.2
                    I  21.7  I  30.2  I  26.8  I  27.8  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  0 I    6M  I   14M  I   19M  I    3M  I   15M  I    56M
  NO VALID RESPNSE  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I    0.0
                    I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
             COLUMN    2952     5024     2301     2935      35M    13212
             TOTAL     22.3     38.0     17.4     22.2      0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    58
```

2045

Table I-16

```
                                                                                                          06/25/75

FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
    V14       WERE WORKING WHEN DECIDED TO ENLIST              BY  V3         RACE
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  1

                      V3
              COUNT  I
            ROW PCT  IBLACK     WHITE     OTHER     NO VALID   ROW
            COL PCT  I                              RESPNSE   TOTAL
                     I     1  I     2  I     3  I     0  I
V14         ---------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                   1 I   152  I  1703  I    70  I    15M I   1965
  YES FULL TIME      I   9.8  I  86.6  I   3.6  I   0.0  I   27.1
                     I  18.9  I  28.9  I  20.5  I   0.0  I
                    -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                   2 I   151  I  1434  I    91  I    29M I   1676
  YES PART TIME      I   9.0  I  85.6  I   5.4  I   0.0  I   23.1
                     I  14.8  I  24.3  I  26.4  I   0.0  I
                    -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                   3 I   503  I  2018  I   123  I    31M I   2644
  LOOKING FOR WORK   I  19.0  I  76.3  I   4.7  I   0.0  I   36.4
                     I  49.4  I  34.2  I  35.9  I   0.0  I
                    -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                   4 I   172  I   745  I    59  I     7M I    976
  NOT LOOKING        I  17.6  I  76.3  I   6.1  I   0.0  I   13.4
                     I  16.9  I  12.6  I  17.2  I   0.0  I
                    -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                   0 I     6M I    23M I     6M I     0M I     33M
  NO VALID RESPNSE   I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I    0.0
                     I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I
                    -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
              COLUMN     1018     5899      344       83M    7261
               TOTAL     14.0     81.2      4.7       0.0   100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =   112
```

157

2046

Table I-17

```
                                                                                        06/25/75

FILE   AFEES   (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F  * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
  V16       WEEKLY PAY WHEN DECIDED TO ENLIST              BY  V4        RACE
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE 1 OF 1

                          V4
                 COUNT   I
                 ROW PCT IBLACK     WHITE     OTHER     NO VALID  ROW
                 COL PCT I                              RESPNSE   TOTAL
                         I    1   I    2   I    3   I    0   I
V16              --------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                       1 I    14  I    21  I     4  I    0*  I     39
  NA DIDNT HAVE JOB      I  35.9  I  53.8  I  10.3  I   0.0  I    0.9
                         I   2.6  I   0.6  I   1.9  I   0.0  I
                        -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                       2 I    22  I   165  I     8  I    1*  I    194
  LESS THAN 67           I  11.3  I  84.9  I   4.1  I   0.0  I    4.3
                         I   4.1  I   4.4  I   3.4  I   0.0  I
                        -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                       3 I    88  I   468  I    29  I    4*  I    585
  $67-$86                I  15.0  I  80.0  I   4.9  I   0.0  I   13.1
                         I  16.5  I  12.6  I  13.8  I   0.0  I
                        -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                       4 I   117  I   746  I    44  I    9*  I    907
  $87-$105               I  12.9  I  82.3  I   4.8  I   0.0  I   20.3
                         I  21.9  I  20.0  I  21.0  I   0.0  I
                        -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                       5 I    83  I   686  I    42  I    7*  I    811
  $106-$125              I  10.2  I  84.6  I   5.2  I   0.0  I   18.1
                         I  15.5  I  18.4  I  20.4  I   0.0  I
                        -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                       6 I    73  I   480  I    24  I   10*  I    577
  $126-$144              I  12.6  I  83.2  I   4.2  I   0.0  I   12.9
                         I  13.6  I  12.9  I  11.4  I   0.0  I
                        -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                       7 I    46  I   407  I    15  I    7*  I    467
  $145-$163              I   9.8  I  87.1  I   3.1  I   0.0  I   10.4
                         I   8.6  I  10.9  I   7.0  I   0.0  I
                        -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                       8 I    89  I   712  I    37  I   16*  I    838
  $164 OR MORE           I  10.6  I  84.9  I   4.4  I   0.0  I   18.7
                         I  16.7  I  19.1  I  17.8  I   0.0  I
                        -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                       9 I     2  I    45  I     6  I    0*  I     54
  DONT RECALL            I   4.0  I  83.3  I  12.0  I   0.0  I    1.2
                         I   0.4  I   1.2  I   3.1  I   0.0  I
                        -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                       0 I    4*  I    2*  I    0*  I    0*  I     6*
  NO VALID RESPNSE       I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I    0.0
                         I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I
                        -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  COLUMN     533      3731       209       53*     4473
                   TOTAL    11.9      83.4       4.7       0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    60
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Table 3-18

2047

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FILE   AFEES   (CREATION DATE = 06/25/78)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V16      WEEKLY PAY WHEN DECIDED TO ENLIST                BY  ED2
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  2

                  ED2
        COUNT   I
        ROW PCT I8TH GRD  9TH       10TH      11TH      12TH      GED       HS        1 YEAR    2 YEARS   3 YEARS  I4 YEARS  NO VALID   ROW
        COL PCT IOR LESS  GRADE     GRADE     GRADE     NON-GRAD            GRADUATE  PAST HS   PAST HS   PAST HS  IPAST HS   RESPNSE   TOTAL
                I     1 I      2 I      3 I      4 I      5 I      6 I      7 I      8 I      9 I     10 I     11 I          I
V16     --------I-------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I----------I
              1 I     1 I      0 I      0 I      3 I      3 I      5 I     17 I      1 I      4 I      4 I      1 I      0M  I     39
 NA DIDNT HVE JOB I   1.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    8.1 I    8.3 I   13.6 I   44.8 I    1.4 I   10.0 I    9.1 I    1.7 I    0.0  I    0.9
                I   4.9 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    1.4 I    1.9 I    0.7 I    0.8 I    0.1 I    1.5 I    4.9 I    0.6 I    0.0  I
               -I-------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I----------I
              2 I     2 I      8 I     16 I     23 I     11 I     40 I     77 I      7 I      5 I      2 I      3 I      0M  I    195
 LESS THAN 67   I   0.9 I    4.0 I    8.3 I   12.0 I    5.8 I   20.3 I   39.4 I    3.8 I    2.8 I    1.3 I    1.4 I    0.0  I    4.3
                I   7.2 I   11.3 I    8.5 I   10.3 I    6.8 I    5.5 I    3.4 I    1.7 I    2.2 I    5.4 I    2.6 I    0.0  I
               -I-------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I----------I
              3 I     4 I     19 I     26 I     35 I     22 I    112 I    296 I     43 I     11 I      6 I     11 I      3M  I    586
 $67-$86        I   0.7 I    3.2 I    4.4 I    6.0 I    3.7 I   19.1 I   50.7 I    7.3 I    1.8 I    1.0 I    2.0 I    0.0  I   13.0
                I  17.1 I   27.7 I   13.4 I   15.5 I   13.0 I   15.4 I   13.3 I    9.6 I    4.2 I    8.0 I   10.6 I    0.0  I
               -I-------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I----------I
              4 I     7 I     16 I     45 I     60 I     31 I    146 I    472 I     73 I     42 I      7 I     16 I      0M  I    916
 $87-$105       I   0.7 I    1.8 I    4.9 I    6.5 I    3.4 I   16.0 I   51.5 I    8.0 I    4.6 I    0.7 I    1.7 I    0.0  I   20.3
                I  27.8 I   23.7 I   23.6 I   26.2 I   18.9 I   20.2 I   21.1 I   16.5 I   16.7 I    9.6 I   14.7 I    0.0  I
               -I-------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I----------I
              5 I     3 I     12 I     46 I     39 I     29 I    139 I    406 I     79 I     39 I     15 I     12 I      0M  I    818
 $106-$125      I   0.4 I    1.4 I    5.6 I    4.7 I    3.5 I   17.0 I   49.7 I    9.7 I    4.7 I    1.8 I    1.4 I    0.0  I   18.1
                I  13.5 I   17.3 I   23.8 I   16.9 I   17.3 I   19.2 I   18.7 I   17.7 I   15.4 I   20.7 I   10.9 I    0.0  I
               -I-------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I----------I
              6 I     2 I      5 I     18 I     23 I     23 I     76 I    321 I     67 I     24 I     10 I     15 I      0M  I    584
 $126-$144      I   0.4 I    0.8 I    3.1 I    3.9 I    4.0 I   13.0 I   55.0 I   11.4 I    4.0 I    1.7 I    2.6 I    0.0  I   12.9
                I   9.2 I    6.7 I    9.5 I   10.1 I   14.1 I   10.4 I   14.4 I   14.9 I    9.3 I   14.2 I   13.5 I    0.0  I
               -I-------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I----------I
              7 I     2 I      4 I     13 I     16 I     21 I     62 I    226 I     71 I     32 I     10 I     19 I      1M  I    472
 $145-$163      I   0.4 I    0.8 I    2.7 I    3.5 I    4.4 I   13.0 I   47.4 I   15.2 I    6.7 I    2.1 I    4.0 I    0.0  I   10.5
                I   7.9 I    5.4 I    6.7 I    7.2 I   12.4 I    8.5 I   10.0 I   15.9 I   12.5 I   14.1 I   17.4 I    0.0  I
               -I-------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I----------I
              8 I     3 I      3 I     24 I     24 I     25 I    133 I    393 I    101 I     95 I     17 I     31 I      4M  I    849
 $164 OR MORE   I   0.4 I    0.4 I    2.8 I    2.8 I    3.0 I   15.7 I   46.3 I   11.9 I   11.1 I    2.0 I    3.7 I    0.0  I   18.8
                I  12.5 I    4.9 I   12.6 I   10.3 I   15.2 I   18.4 I   17.6 I   22.7 I   37.5 I   23.6 I   29.2 I    0.0  I
               -I-------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I----------I
              9 I     0 I      2 I      4 I      5 I      1 I     12 I     25 I      4 I      1 I      1 I      0 I      0M  I     54
 DONT RECALL    I   0.0 I    3.7 I    6.8 I    8.7 I    1.2 I   21.8 I   45.9 I    6.8 I    2.7 I    2.3 I    0.0 I    0.0  I    1.2
                I   0.0 I    2.9 I    1.9 I    2.1 I    0.4 I    1.6 I    1.1 I    0.8 I    0.6 I    1.7 I    0.0 I    0.0  I
        --------I-------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I----------I
              0 I    0M I     0M I     0M I     0M I     0M I     4M I     1M I     1M I     0M I     0M I     1M I      0M  I     6M
 NO VALID RESPNSE I   0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0  I    0.0
                I   0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0  I
               -I-------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I----------I
         COLUMN      24       68      191      228      166      724     2232  [illegible]    252       72      108       8M      4510
          TOTAL     0.5      1.5      4.2      5.0      3.7     16.1     49.5      9.9      5.6      1.6      2.4      0.0     100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    22
```

Table 1-19

```
                                                                                                   06/25/75

FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F  * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V65      LOCATION OF PLACE IN WHICH YOU GREW UP        BY  V1          AGE
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  1 OF  1

                    V1
          COUNT    I
          ROW PCT  I17        18        19        20        21        OVER  21 NO VALID   ROW
          COL PCT  I                                                            RESPNSE  TOTAL
                   I     1  I     2  I     3  I     4  I     5  I     6  I     0  I
V65       ---------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 1 I   535  I   663  I   496  I   315  I   252  I   656  I     7M I   2916
  RURAL COMMUNITY  I  18.3  I  22.7  I  17.0  I  10.8  I   8.7  I  22.5  I   0.0  I   22.5
                   I  21.5  I  22.0  I  21.4  I  21.5  I  24.9  I  24.3  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 2 I   654  I   789  I   622  I   343  I   269  I   675  I     9M I   3352
  SMALL CITY       I  19.5  I  23.5  I  18.6  I  10.2  I   8.0  I  20.1  I   0.0  I   25.8
                   I  26.2  I  26.2  I  26.8  I  23.4  I  26.5  I  25.1  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 3 I   398  I   452  I   364  I   269  I   142  I   333  I     6M I   1958
  MEDIUM CITY      I  20.3  I  23.1  I  18.6  I  13.7  I   7.2  I  17.0  I   0.0  I   15.1
                   I  16.0  I  15.0  I  15.7  I  18.4  I  14.0  I  12.4  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 4 I   177  I   220  I   165  I   101  I    77  I   142  I     1M I    882
  SUBURB-MED CITY  I  20.1  I  24.9  I  18.7  I  11.5  I   8.8  I  16.1  I   0.0  I    6.8
                   I   7.1  I   7.3  I   7.1  I   6.9  I   7.6  I   5.3  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 5 I   235  I   349  I   190  I   144  I   103  I   278  I     9M I   1300
  LARGE CITY       I  18.1  I  26.8  I  14.6  I  11.1  I   8.0  I  21.4  I   0.0  I   10.0
                   I   9.4  I  11.6  I   8.2  I   9.8  I  10.2  I  10.3  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 6 I   193  I   181  I   158  I   127  I    52  I   168  I     2M I    880
  SUBURB-LGE CITY  I  21.9  I  20.6  I  18.0  I  14.5  I   5.9  I  19.1  I   0.0  I    6.8
                   I   7.7  I   6.0  I   6.8  I   8.7  I   5.1  I   6.3  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 7 I   183  I   197  I   187  I    88  I    71  I   285  I     2M I   1011
  VERY LARGE CITY  I  18.1  I  19.5  I  18.5  I   8.7  I   7.0  I  28.2  I   0.0  I    7.8
                   I   7.4  I   6.5  I   8.1  I   6.0  I   7.0  I  10.6  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 8 I   116  I   159  I   135  I    76  I    47  I   154  I     0M I    686
  SUBUR-V LGE CTY  I  16.9  I  23.1  I  19.6  I  11.1  I   6.8  I  22.5  I   0.0  I    5.3
                   I   4.7  I   5.3  I   5.8  I   5.2  I   4.6  I   5.7  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 0 I    43M I    62M I    42M I    26M I    13M I    38M I     3M I   227M
  NC VALID RESPNSE I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I    0.0
                   I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
           COLUMN     2492      3010      2317      1464      1013      2692       35M    12987
           TOTAL      19.2      23.2      17.8      11.3       7.8      20.7       0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATICNS =    283
```

Table 1:20

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                                                                                      06/25/75
FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V65      LOCATION OF PLACE IN WHICH YOU GREW UP        BY  V3          RACE
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  1

                    V3
            COUNT  I
          ROW PCT  IBLACK     WHITE     OTHER     NO VALID   ROW
          COL PCT  I                               RESPNSE   TOTAL
                   I      1  I      2  I      3  I      0  I
V65        --------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 1 I    285  I   2477  I    123  I     38* I   2885
  RURAL COMMUNITY  I    9.9  I   85.9  I    4.3  I    0.0  I   22.4
                   I   14.4  I   24.3  I   17.8  I    0.0  I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 2 I    418  I   2749  I    152  I     42* I   3319
  SMALL CITY       I   12.6  I   82.8  I    4.6  I    0.0  I   25.8
                   I   21.2  I   27.0  I   21.9  I    0.0  I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 3 I    381  I   1459  I    111  I     12* I   1951
  MEDIUM CITY      I   19.5  I   74.8  I    5.7  I    0.0  I   15.2
                   I   19.3  I   14.3  I   16.1  I    0.0  I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 4 I    103  I    729  I     39  I     13* I    871
  SUBURB-MED CITY  I   11.8  I   83.7  I    4.5  I    0.0  I    6.8
                   I    5.2  I    7.1  I    5.6  I    0.0  I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 5 I    310  I    876  I    106  I     16* I   1292
  LARGE CITY       I   24.0  I   67.8  I    8.2  I    0.0  I   10.0
                   I   15.7  I    8.6  I   15.3  I    0.0  I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 6 I     56  I    781  I     34  I     11* I    871
  SUBURB-LGE CITY  I    6.4  I   89.6  I    3.9  I    0.0  I    6.8
                   I    2.8  I    7.7  I    5.0  I    0.0  I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 7 I    322  I    595  I     86  I     11* I   1002
  VERY LARGE CITY  I   32.1  I   59.3  I    8.6  I    0.0  I    7.8
                   I   16.3  I    5.8  I   12.4  I    0.0  I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 8 I     96  I    534  I     40  I     15* I    671
  SUBUR-V LGE CTY  I   14.4  I   79.6  I    6.0  I    0.0  I    5.2
                   I    4.9  I    5.2  I    5.8  I    0.0  I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 0 I     50* I    153* I     19* I      5* I    228*
  NO VALID RESPNSE I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0
                   I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
           COLUMN      1971     10199       692       162*   12861
            TOTAL      15.3      79.3       5.4        0.0   100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    409                                           Table I-21
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```
                                                                                    06/25/75

FILE   APEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F  * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
    V65      LOCATION OF PLACE IN WHICH YOU GREW UP        BY  ED2
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  2

                   ED2                                                                                             I
        COUNT   I
        ROW PCT I8TH GRC  9TH       10TH      11TH      12TH      GED       HS        1 YEAR    2 YEARS   3 YEARS  I4 YEARS   NO VALID   ROW
        COL PCT IOR LESS  GRADE     GRADE     GRADE     NON-GRAD            GRADUATE PAST HS   PAST HS   PAST HS  IPAST HS   RESPNSE   TOTAL
                I     1 I      2 I      3 I      4 I      5 I      6 I      7 I      8 I      9 I     10 I     11 I      0 I
V65     --------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
              1 I     25 I     57 I    217 I    269 I    146 I    491 I   1299 I    212 I    126 I     25 I     50 I     4M I   2916
 RURAL COMMUNITY I    0.9 I    1.9 I    7.5 I    9.2 I    5.0 I   16.8 I   44.5 I    7.3 I    4.3 I    0.9 I    1.7 I    0.0 I   22.5
                I   36.3 I   25.1 I   27.0 I   18.5 I   20.3 I   22.6 I   24.3 I   18.3 I   21.4 I   14.7 I   19.0 I    0.0 I
               -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
              2 I     13 I     64 I    182 I    469 I    182 I    505 I   1428 I    272 I    132 I     37 I     64 I     3M I   3352
 SMALL CITY     I    0.4 I    1.9 I    5.4 I   14.0 I    5.4 I   15.2 I   42.6 I    8.1 I    3.9 I    1.1 I    1.9 I    0.0 I   25.8
                I   19.1 I   28.3 I   22.6 I   32.3 I   25.2 I   23.4 I   26.7 I   23.6 I   22.3 I   21.9 I   24.2 I    0.0 I
               -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
              3 I      8 I     33 I    120 I    191 I    115 I    377 I    821 I    157 I     67 I     28 I     36 I     6M I   1954
 MEDIUM CITY    I    0.4 I    1.7 I    6.1 I    9.8 I    5.9 I   19.3 I   42.0 I    8.0 I    3.4 I    1.5 I    1.9 I    0.0 I   15.1
                I   11.0 I   14.7 I   14.9 I   13.1 I   16.0 I   17.3 I   15.3 I   13.6 I   11.4 I   16.7 I   13.8 I    0.0 I
               -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
              4 I      5 I      7 I     37 I    102 I     66 I    142 I    370 I     81 I     39 I     13 I     22 I     0M I    883
 SUBURB-MED CITY I    0.6 I    0.8 I    4.2 I   11.6 I    7.4 I   16.0 I   42.0 I    9.1 I    4.4 I    1.4 I    2.5 I    0.0 I    6.8
                I    7.2 I    3.0 I    4.6 I    7.0 I    9.1 I    6.5 I    6.9 I    7.0 I    6.6 I    7.4 I    8.3 I    0.0 I
               -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
              5 I      6 I     17 I     91 I    136 I     85 I    253 I    489 I    133 I     55 I     21 I     22 I     0M I   1308
 LARGE CITY     I    0.4 I    1.3 I    6.9 I   10.4 I    6.5 I   19.4 I   37.4 I   10.2 I    4.2 I    1.6 I    1.7 I    0.0 I   10.1
                I    8.2 I    7.6 I   11.2 I    9.4 I   11.8 I   11.6 I    9.1 I   11.5 I    9.4 I   12.6 I    8.3 I    0.0 I
               -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
              6 I      2 I     14 I     56 I    100 I     43 I    120 I    374 I     91 I     56 I      9 I     15 I     1M I    880
 SUBURB-LGE CITY I    0.2 I    1.6 I    6.3 I   11.4 I    4.9 I   13.7 I   42.5 I   10.3 I    6.4 I    1.0 I    1.7 I    0.0 I    6.8
                I    2.5 I    6.4 I    6.9 I    6.9 I    6.0 I    5.5 I    7.0 I    7.9 I    9.5 I    5.4 I    5.7 I    0.0 I
               -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
              7 I      7 I     22 I     62 I    109 I     51 I    171 I    337 I    119 I     64 I     21 I     37 I     5M I   1000
 VERY LARGE CITY I    0.7 I    2.2 I    6.2 I   10.9 I    5.1 I   17.1 I   33.7 I   11.9 I    6.4 I    2.1 I    3.7 I    0.0 I    7.7
                I   10.0 I    9.6 I    7.7 I    7.5 I    7.1 I    7.9 I    6.3 I   10.3 I   10.8 I   12.2 I   14.1 I    0.0 I
               -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
              8 I      4 I     12 I     41 I     76 I     33 I    112 I    234 I     91 I     50 I     16 I     18 I     0M I    685
 SUBUR-V LGE CTY I    0.5 I    1.7 I    6.0 I   11.1 I    4.8 I   16.3 I   34.1 I   13.2 I    7.3 I    2.3 I    2.6 I    0.0 I    5.3
                I    5.4 I    5.2 I    5.1 I    5.3 I    4.6 I    5.1 I    4.4 I    7.9 I    8.5 I    9.2 I    6.7 I    0.0 I
               -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
              0 I     8M I    14M I    15M I    23M I    13M I    62M I    71M I    16M I    15M I     7M I     3M I     1M I   227M
 NC VALID RESPNSE I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0
                I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I
               -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
         COLUMN       69      225      806     1452      720     2175     5351     1155      589      171      264      20M   12978
          TOTAL      0.5      1.7      6.2     11.2      5.5     16.8     41.2      8.9      4.5      1.3      2.0      0.0   100.0

                                                                        NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =   292
```

Table 1-22

```
                                                                                          06/25/75
FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V65       LOCATION OF PLACE IN WHICH YOU GREW UP        BY  V7        BRANCH OF SERVICE JOINING
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  1

                    V7
             COUNT  I
           ROW PCT  IAIR      ARMY      MARINE    NAVY      NO VALID  ROW
           COL PCT  IFORCE              CORPS               RESPNSE   TOTAL
                    I     1  I     2  I     3  I     4  I     0  I
V65        ---------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 1  I   631  I  1208  I   486  I   593  I     5M I  2918
 RURAL COMMUNITY    I  21.6  I  41.4  I  16.7  I  20.3  I   0.0  I  22.5
                    I  21.6  I  24.6  I  21.4  I  20.5  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 2  I   779  I  1185  I   558  I   831  I     8M I  3353
 SMALL CITY         I  23.2  I  35.3  I  16.6  I  24.8  I   0.0  I  25.8
                    I  26.7  I  24.1  I  24.5  I  28.8  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 3  I   448  I   754  I   353  I   404  I     3M I  1959
 MEDIUM CITY        I  22.9  I  38.5  I  18.0  I  20.6  I   0.0  I  15.1
                    I  15.4  I  15.3  I  15.5  I  14.0  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 4  I   220  I   344  I   139  I   180  I     0M I   884
 SUBURB-MED CITY    I  24.5  I  39.0  I  15.8  I  20.4  I   0.0  I   6.8
                    I   7.5  I   7.0  I   6.1  I   6.2  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 5  I   275  I   520  I   285  I   228  I     0M I  1309
 LARGE CITY         I  21.0  I  39.8  I  21.8  I  17.4  I   0.0  I  10.1
                    I   9.4  I  10.6  I  12.5  I   7.9  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 6  I   229  I   282  I   146  I   219  I     5M I   876
 SUBURB-LGE CITY    I  26.1  I  32.2  I  16.7  I  25.0  I   0.0  I   6.7
                    I   7.8  I   5.7  I   6.4  I   7.6  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 7  I   180  I   399  I   194  I   237  I     3M I  1009
 VERY LARGE CITY    I  17.9  I  39.5  I  19.2  I  23.4  I   0.0  I   7.8
                    I   6.2  I   8.1  I   8.5  I   8.2  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 8  I   156  I   221  I   112  I   197  I     0M I   686
 SUBUR-V LGE CTY    I  22.7  I  32.3  I  16.3  I  28.7  I   0.0  I   5.3
                    I   5.3  I   4.5  I   4.9  I   6.8  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 0  I   31M  I  108M  I   40M  I   40M  I     9M I   228M
 NO VALID RESPNSE   I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0
                    I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
            COLUMN     2917     4914     2273     2890       35M   12994
             TOTAL     22.4     37.8     17.5     22.2       0.0   100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    276
```

Table I-23

```
                                                                                              06/25/75

FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V66      PARENTS ANNUAL INCOME BEFORE TAXES          BY  V3        RACE
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  1 OF  1

                     V3
             COUNT  I
            ROW PCT IBLACK     WHITE     OTHER     NO VALID   ROW
            COL PCT I                              RESPNSE   TOTAL
                    I     1  I     2  I     3  I     0  I
V66         --------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  1 I   216  I   275  I    75  I    9* I    566
  $2999 OR UNDER    I  38.2  I  48.6  I  13.2  I   0.0  I    6.4
                    I  16.8  I   3.9  I  18.5  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  2 I   205  I   381  I    60  I    4* I    646
  $3000-4999        I  31.7  I  59.0  I   9.3  I   0.0  I    7.3
                    I  15.9  I   5.3  I  14.8  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  3 I   248  I   873  I    50  I   16* I   1170
  $5000-7999        I  21.2  I  74.6  I   4.3  I   0.0  I   13.2
                    I  19.3  I  12.2  I  12.3  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  4 I   243  I  1266  I    87  I   22* I   1595
  $8000-10999       I  15.2  I  79.3  I   5.5  I   0.0  I   18.0
                    I  18.9  I  17.7  I  21.5  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  5 I   126  I  1333  I    40  I   18* I   1499
  $11000-13999      I   8.4  I  88.9  I   2.6  I   0.0  I   16.9
                    I   9.8  I  18.6  I   9.7  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  6 I   102  I  1054  I    34  I   10* I   1190
  $14000-16999      I   8.6  I  88.6  I   2.8  I   0.0  I   13.5
                    I   8.0  I  14.7  I   8.3  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  7 I    61  I   688  I    17  I    2* I    767
  $17000-19999      I   7.9  I  89.8  I   2.2  I   0.0  I    8.7
                    I   4.7  I   9.6  I   4.2  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  8 I    85  I  1280  I    43  I   23* I   1408
  $20000 OR OVER    I   6.0  I  90.9  I   3.1  I   0.0  I   15.9
                    I   6.6  I  17.9  I  10.7  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  0 I    51* I   163* I    34* I    7* I    256*
  NO VALID RESPNSE  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I    0.0
                    I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I
            --------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  9 I   692* I  3059* I   270* I   50* I   4071*
  DONT KNOW         I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I    0.0
                    I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
             COLUMN     1286      7151       406      162*    8842
              TOTAL     14.5      80.9       4.6       0.0   100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =  4428
```

Table I-24

```
                                                                                         06/25/75
FILE   AFEES     (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V66        PARENTS ANNUAL INCOME BEFORE TAXES                  BY  E02
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  1 OF  2

                    E02
            COUNT  I
          ROW PCT  I8TH GRC  9TH       10TH      11TH      12TH      GED       HS        1 YEAR    2 YEARS   3 YEARS  I4 YEARS   NO VALID   ROW
          COL PCT  IOR LESS  GRADE     GRADE     GRADE     NON-GRAD            GRADUATE  PAST HS   PAST HS   PAST HS  IPAST HS   RESPNSE    TOTAL
                   I     1  I     2  I     3  I     4  I     5  I     6  I     7  I     8  I     9  I    10  I    11  I     0  I
V66       ---------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 1 I    15  I     5  I    24  I    78  I    31  I   127  I   218  I    40  I    15  I     7  I     8  I    1M  I    567
 $2999 OR UNDER    I   2.7  I   0.9  I   4.2  I  13.8  I   5.4  I  22.5  I  38.4  I   7.0  I   2.6  I   1.2  I   1.4  I   0.0  I    6.4
                   I  36.6  I   4.0  I   5.2  I   9.0  I   6.1  I   9.3  I   5.7  I   4.4  I   3.2  I   4.9  I   3.7  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 2 I     6  I    19  I    34  I    70  I    39  I   107  I   240  I    85  I    26  I     3  I    18  I    0M  I    650
 $3000-4999        I   1.0  I   2.9  I   5.3  I  10.8  I   6.0  I  16.5  I  37.0  I  13.1  I   4.0  I   0.5  I   2.7  I   0.0  I    7.3
                   I  15.2  I  15.2  I   7.5  I   8.0  I   7.8  I   7.8  I   6.3  I   9.5  I   5.6  I   2.4  I   8.4  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 3 I     5  I    27  I    62  I   145  I    85  I   194  I   498  I    88  I    42  I    13  I    23  I    3M  I   1183
 $5000-7999        I   0.4  I   2.3  I   5.3  I  12.3  I   7.2  I  16.4  I  42.1  I   7.4  I   3.5  I   1.1  I   1.9  I   0.0  I   13.3
                   I  12.2  I  22.0  I  13.6  I  16.7  I  17.1  I  14.1  I  13.0  I   9.8  I   9.0  I   9.5  I  10.9  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 4 I     3  I    34  I    88  I   148  I    83  I   228  I   740  I   149  I    88  I    22  I    33  I    0M  I   1616
 $8000-10999       I   0.2  I   2.1  I   5.5  I   9.2  I   5.2  I  14.1  I  45.8  I   9.2  I   5.4  I   1.3  I   2.0  I   0.0  I   18.1
                   I   7.2  I  27.6  I  19.3  I  17.0  I  16.7  I  16.5  I  19.3  I  16.5  I  18.9  I  15.7  I  15.5  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 5 I     3  I    18  I    70  I   152  I    80  I   240  I   656  I   159  I    61  I    32  I    45  I    3M  I   1512
 $11000-13999      I   0.2  I   1.2  I   4.6  I  10.1  I   5.3  I  15.9  I  43.4  I  10.5  I   4.0  I   2.1  I   3.0  I   0.0  I   17.0
                   I   7.2  I  14.6  I  15.2  I  17.5  I  16.0  I  17.5  I  17.1  I  17.7  I  13.1  I  23.7  I  21.6  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 6 I     8  I     7  I    68  I   102  I    67  I   199  I   528  I   120  I    65  I    13  I    20  I    3M  I   1197
 $14000-16999      I   0.7  I   0.6  I   5.6  I   8.5  I   5.6  I  16.6  I  44.1  I  10.0  I   5.4  I   1.1  I   1.6  I   0.0  I   13.4
                   I  19.5  I   5.9  I  14.7  I  11.7  I  13.4  I  14.5  I  13.8  I  13.3  I  14.0  I   9.5  I   9.5  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 7 I     1  I     5  I    37  I    73  I    46  I   120  I   334  I    82  I    44  I     9  I    15  I    0M  I    767
 $17000-19999      I   0.1  I   0.7  I   4.8  I   9.5  I   6.0  I  15.7  I  43.6  I  10.7  I   5.7  I   1.2  I   2.0  I   0.0  I    8.6
                   I   2.4  I   4.1  I   8.0  I   8.4  I   9.2  I   8.8  I   8.7  I   9.1  I   9.4  I   6.6  I   7.4  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 8 I     0  I     8  I    75  I   103  I    67  I   160  I   622  I   182  I   123  I    38  I    47  I    5M  I   1427
 $20000 OR OVER    I   0.0  I   0.6  I   5.3  I   7.2  I   4.7  I  11.2  I  43.6  I  12.8  I   8.6  I   2.7  I   3.3  I   0.0  I   16.0
                   I   0.0  I   6.5  I  16.4  I  11.9  I  13.4  I  11.6  I  16.2  I  20.2  I  26.5  I  27.7  I  22.6  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 0 I    7M  I    6M  I   17M  I   25M  I   19M  I   51M  I   73M  I   23M  I   22M  I    8M  I    3M  I    1M  I   253M
 NO VALID RESPNSE  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I    0.0
                   I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I
          ---------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 9 I   32M  I  111M  I  345M  I  563M  I  220M  I  793M  I 1525M  I  247M  I  115M  I   36M  I   55M  I    5M  I  4064M
 DONT KNOW         I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I    0.0
                   I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
           COLUMN       41       123       456       872       499      1376      3837       903       466       137       208       20M     8919
            TOTAL      0.5       1.4       5.1       9.8       5.6      15.4      43.0      10.1       5.2       1.5       2.3       0.0    100.0

                                                                     NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =  4351
```

Table 3-25

2054

SECTION II

REASONS FOR ENTERING

Job Training

"To learn a skill" was the reason most frequently rated (Table II-1) as influencing enlistees "very much" in their decision to enter the service. "To learn a skill" was marked as having very much influence by 70% of enlistees. A related reason "to prepare for a later civilian job", was rated by 48% of enlistees as influencing them very much.

The enlistees were also asked to indicate what was the best description of why they were entering. Twenty-eight percent marked "To learn a skill", (Table II-6) and another nine percent marked "To prepare for a later civilian job".

Income and Benefits

Next to job training, current benefits had the strongest influence on the new enlistees. Over 50% indicated that they were influenced very much by a desire "to be able to support myself or family". Over 40% indicated they were influenced very much by the pay and benefits. When asked to indicate the best description of why they were entering military service almost 15% marked "to support myself or family" and another 7% marked "for the pay and benefits".

G.I. Bill

While 28% rated G.I. Bill eligibility as influencing them "very much", only slightly over 3% indicated that gaining eligibility for the G.I. Bill was the best description of why they were entering. This low figure appears to be at variance with results of the September 1974 AFEES survey, where 13% indicated that their most important reason for joining was "to become eligible for education and other benefits under the G.I. Bill". A possible explanation is that the enlistees are familiar with the benefits, but not always with the term "G.I. Bill", which was not explained in the May survey.

College Education While in Service

Forty-two percent said that a chance to get a college education while in the service as influencing them very much. Slightly over 12% indicated it was the best description of why they were entering. Air Force enlistees claimed getting a college education while in the service as the best description of why they were entering in 16% of cases. They are followed by the Army (13% of cases), Marine Corps (9% of cases) and Navy (7% of cases).

Patriotism

Approximately 6% marked "To serve my country" as the best description of why they were entering the service. Twelve percent of those planning to reenlist (Table II-9) and 12% of those joining the Marine Corps (Table II-8) marked "To serve my country". The Marine Corps also had the lowest proportion of enlistees who said they would not enter if a war were declared (Table II-13).

Unemployment

Despite the high unemployment rates for persons of military age, enlistees did not often cite this as a reason for entering. Only 2% marked "No good civilian jobs were available" as the best description of why they were entering. However, about 7% of enlistees said they definitely would not have enlisted if they had obtained a civilian job (Table II-10).

Effect of Contingencies on the Enlistment Decision

Of the contingencies presented in item 25, the elimination of the G.I. Bill has the greatest professed effect on the respondents' enlistment decision, 21% claiming they would definitely not have enlisted if it were eliminated. Next in anticipated effect, were lowering pay by $50 per month (16% claiming they definitely would not have enlisted), and a declaration of war (11% claiming they definitely would not have enlisted).

Generally persons of higher educational levels were slightly more negative about whether they would have enlisted assuming some contingency occurred (Table II-12). Also blacks were more negative than whites (Table II-11), and persons who did not intend to reenlist were more negative than those who did intend to reenlist (Table II-14).

SECTION II

REASONS FOR ENTERING

TABLE GUIDE*

	SECOND VARIABLE							
FIRST VARIABLE	AGE(1)	SEX(2)	RACE(3)	EDUCATION(4,5)	BRANCH OF SERVICE(7)	BEST DESCRIPTION OF WHY ENTERING(18)	INTENT TO REENLIST(30)	IF ONLY COMBAT ARMS(33)
Influence of reasons on enlistment decision(17)**	1	2		3	4	5	-	-
Reasons which best describes why entering military service(18)	-	-	6	7	8	-	9	-
Effect of contingencies on enlistment decision(25)	10		11	12	13	14	15	-
If only Combat Arms available(33)	16[1]	-	-	-	17[1]	-	18[1]	-
Combat Arms bonus options(34)	19[1]	-	20[1]	21[1]	-	-	-	22[1]

[1] These tables are restricted to Army and Marine Corps enlistees.

*To find a particular distribution, locate the row and column containing the items of interest. If a table exists for those items, its table number is given where that row and column intersect.

**The numbers in parentheses refer to the questionnaire items from which the data were derived.

PERCENT OF ENLISTEES WHO WERE STRONGLY[1] INFLUENCED BY VARIOUS REASONS FOR ENTERING MILITARY SERVICE

BY AGE

REASON FOR ENTERING	AGE 17	18	19	20	21	Over 21	All Ages
To Do Something Different	35.3	34.1	35.8	40.0	43.3	35.5	36.3
To Become Eligible for G.I. Bill	23.2	24.8	29.3	32.9	34.8	30.8	28.2
To Learn a Skill	76.6	74.6	72.7	70.1	67.5	56.5	69.9
To Travel and See the World	44.1	40.2	39.6	39.9	37.7	38.0	40.2
For the Pay and Benefits	40.3	41.2	38.3	41.9	38.7	46.8	41.6
To Serve My Country	36.5	32.2	29.3	31.7	31.1	36.7	33.3
Didn't Like Job I Had	6.6	8.3	9.4	14.6	13.5	15.1	10.7
To Prepare for Later Civilian Job	53.5	52.8	49.4	47.1	49.8	37.9	48.4
I was Tired of Going to School	11.9	7.4	5.3	4.9	3.6	3.3	6.5
No Good Civilian Jobs were Available	19.0	22.7	23.6	27.0	20.9	23.1	22.6
I wasn't Sure What I Wanted to Do	14.3	14.2	11.6	13.2	10.4	8.8	12.2
No Chance for Promotion in Civilian Job	9.2	11.3	12.1	15.8	12.7	16.4	12.7
Chance to Get College Education in Service	35.3	41.4	43.5	47.0	44.6	44.6	42.1
To Be Able to Support Myself or Family	53.9	52.7	52.3	53.9	56.3	52.2	53.2

---

[1] The numbers show the percent of enlistees who indicated they were influenced "Very Much" by a particular reason for entering while making up their minds to enlist.

Table II-1

PERCENT OF ENLISTEES WHO WERE STRONGLY[1] INFLUENCED BY VARIOUS REASONS FOR ENTERING MILITARY SERVICE

BY SEX

		SEX	
REASON FOR ENTERING	MALE	FEMALE	BOTH SEXES
To Do Something Different	35.6	44.2	36.3
To Become Eligible for G.I. Bill	28.4	26.2	28.2
To Learn a Skill	69.9	70.1	69.9
To Travel and See the World	39.5	48.1	40.2
For the Pay and Benefits	41.5	43.3	41.7
To Serve My Country	34.1	24.7	33.3
Didn't Like the Job I Had	10.7	10.6	10.7
To Prepare for a Later Civilian Job	48.6	45.9	48.4
I was Tired of Going to School	6.6	5.5	6.5
No Good Civilian Jobs were Available	22.9	18.1	22.5
I wasn't Sure What I Wanted to Do	12.2	12.3	12.2
No Chance for Promotions. . .	12.5	15.1	12.7
Chance to Get College Education in Service	41.5	48.7	42.2
To Be Able to Support Myself or Family	53.6	48.4	53.2

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[1] The numbers show the percent of enlistees who indicated they were influenced "Very Much" by a particular reason for entering while making up their minds to enlist.

Table II-2

PERCENT OF ENLISTEES WHO WERE STRONGLY[1/] INFLUENCED BY VARIOUS REASONS FOR ENTERING MILITARY SERVICE

BY EDUCATION

REASON FOR ENTERING	EDUCATION NOT A HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	EDUCATION PAST HIGH SCHOOL	ALL LEVELS OF EDUCATION
To Do Something Different	37.7	36.2	32.9	36.3
To Become Eligible for G.I. Bill	24.3	28.9	35.9	28.2
To Learn a Skill	75.7	70.9	52.7	69.8
To Travel and See the World	42.2	39.6	36.2	40.1
For the Pay and Benefits	42.4	41.4	39.6	41.5
To Serve My Country	38.2	31.1	25.9	33.2
Didn't Like Job I Had	6.0	12.2	13.1	10.6
To Prepare for a Later Civilian Job	51.5	48.4	40.9	48.3
I was Tired of Going to School	9.1	3.5	7.9	6.5
No Good Civilian Jobs were Available	23.0	22.6	21.0	22.5
I wasn't Sure What I Wanted to Do	13.6	12.1	9.1	12.2
No Chance for Promotions	11.6	14.0	11.8	12.6
Chance to Get College Education in Service	37.9	43.5	48.2	42.0
To Be Able to Support Myself and Family	58.0	50.5	47.1	53.0

[1/] The numbers show the percent of enlistees who indicated they were influenced "Very Much" by a particular reason for entering while making up their minds to enlist.

Table II-3

PERCENT OF ENLISTEES WHO WERE STRONGLY[1/] INFLUENCED BY VARIOUS REASONS FOR ENTERING MILITARY SERVICE

BY BRANCH OF SERVICE

REASON FOR ENTERING	AIR FORCE	ARMY	MARINE	NAVY	ALL BRANCHES
To Do something Different	31.4	37.1	42.4	35.4	36.3
To Become Eligible for G.I. Bill	25.5	32.4	26.5	25.1	28.2
To Learn a Skill	71.9	65.7	70.4	74.5	69.9
To Travel and See World	32.1	39.1	38.9	51.0	40.1
For the Pay and Benefits	38.4	45.4	38.4	40.8	41.6
To Serve My Country	25.3	34.8	45.3	29.8	33.3
Didn't Like Job I Had	12.8	10.4	10.1	9.5	10.7
To Prepare for a Later Civilian Job	48.3	46.3	46.4	53.3	48.3
I was Tired of Going to School	4.7	6.6	8.9	6.5	6.5
No Good Civilian Jobs were Available	21.4	24.9	18.5	22.8	22.6
I wasn't Sure What I Wanted to Do	11.0	13.9	12.7	10.2	12.2
No Chance for Promotions. . .	13.0	13.8	11.1	11.8	12.7
Chance to Get College Education in Service	47.4	43.7	38.8	36.6	42.1
To be Able to Support Myself and Family	51.0	57.2	52.6	49.0	53.2

[1/] The numbers show the percent of enlistees who indicated they were influenced "Very Much" by a particular reason for entering while making up their minds to enlist.

Table II-4

PERCENT OF ENLISTEES WHO WERE STRONGLY[1] INFLUENCED BY VARIOUS REASONS FOR ENTERING MILITARY SERVICE

BY BEST DESCRIPTION OF WHY ENTERING

REASON FOR ENTERING	DO SOMETHING DIFFERENT	G.I. BILL	TO LEARN A SKILL	TO TRAVEL	PAY AND BENEFITS	TO SERVE COUNTRY	DIDN'T LIKE JOB	PREPARE FOR JOB	TIRED OF SCHOOL	NO CIVILIANS JOBS	NOT SURE WHAT WANT	NO PROMOTIONS	COLLEGE EDUCATION NOW	SUPPORT SELF FAMILY	ALL DESCRIP.
Do Something Different	[illegible]	21.1	33.5	48.1	22.6	44.6	47.1	29.3	20.7	13.2	31.5	[illegible]	34.8	28.3	36.0
G.I. Bill	28.9	89.7	21.8	23.0	31.4	24.5	25.0	25.1	16.1	13.2	21.9	25.9	42.3	21.7	28.0
To Learn a Skill	57.9	47.9	95.0	54.3	49.6	65.6	32.1	75.3	39.9	37.7	42.8	40.6	64.6	61.0	69.7
To Travel	53.1	32.0	39.2	86.9	36.3	43.0	42.4	30.8	34.2	23.7	35.8	35.8	35.6	26.2	39.6
Pay and Benefits	38.4	37.6	35.2	43.9	83.0	36.7	29.2	31.9	27.3	31.6	29.3	34.3	40.0	50.4	41.5
To Serve Country	33.6	25.5	30.5	27.7	[illegible]	90.8	18.1	23.0	14.7	17.5	23.6	20.8	30.3	31.1	32.7
Didn't Like Job	12.3	8.2	9.4	9.0	10.0	9.7	65.5	8.6	10.3	11.7	8.8	32.8	11.8	11.0	10.6
Prepare for Job	33.7	41.0	58.7	30.1	32.0	33.7	38.4	88.5	37.9	25.8	28.3	19.1	48.1	40.6	48.3
Tired of School	8.8	6.8	6.0	7.5	6.4	7.6	3.0	6.6	67.0	4.1	10.1	2.4	4.5	5.5	6.4
No Civilian Jobs	18.0	17.4	19.0	18.0	26.5	12.6	21.4	19.3	26.8	76.2	20.6	26.2	23.1	31.0	22.6
Not Sure What Want	16.3	12.1	10.9	12.6	11.0	8.5	15.5	9.7	23.0	10.0	64.2	5.0	9.3	10.5	12.1
No Promotions	12.0	8.7	12.6	10.0	13.6	10.0	22.0	10.4	7.8	14.2	13.2	79.0	13.0	13.0	12.6
College Education Now	34.7	30.9	35.0	28.8	32.5	34.8	41.9	38.9	26.6	24.1	32.3	39.1	92.1	32.9	41.9
Support Self and Family	42.7	38.2	48.8	38.9	51.1	46.2	35.0	47.6	27.9	38.5	35.9	31.7	51.8	90.3	52.9

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[1] The numbers show the percent of enlistees who indicated they were influenced "Very Much" by a particular reason for entering while making up their minds to enlist.

Table II-5

```
FILE   APEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
    V31        BEST DESCRIPTION OF WHY ENTERING                BY  V3          RACE
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  1 OF  2

                          V3
              COUNT   I
              ROW PCT IBLACK     WHITE     OTHER     NO VALID   ROW
              COL PCT I                              RESPNSE   TOTAL
                      I     1  I     2  I     3  I     0  I
V31           --------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                    1 I   194  I   637  I    63  I    11M I   854
  DO SOMETHING DIF    I  21.7  I  71.3  I   7.1  I   0.0  I   7.1
                      I  10.2  I   6.4  I   9.5  I   0.0  I
                     -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                    2 I    42  I   358  I    23  I     5M I   424
  G.I.     BILL       I  10.0  I  84.5  I   5.5  I   0.0  I   3.4
                      I   2.2  I   3.6  I   3.5  I   0.0  I
                     -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                    3 I   451  I  2876  I   156  I    45M I  3533
  TO LEARN A SKILL    I  13.9  I  81.4  I   4.7  I   0.0  I  28.2
                      I  25.8  I  28.9  I  24.9  I   0.0  I
                     -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                    4 I   108  I   659  I    42  I     6M I   809
  TO       TRAVEL     I  13.3 *I  81.5  I   5.2  I   0.0  I   6.5
                      I   5.7  I   6.6  I   6.4  I   0.0  I
                     -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                    5 I   107  I   663  I    35  I     8M I   304
  PAY  AND BENEFIT    I  13.2  I  82.4  I   4.3  I   0.0  I   6.4
                      I   5.6  I   6.7  I   5.2  I   0.0  I
                     -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                    6 I    98  I   653  I    49  I     6M I   800
  TO SERVE COUNTRY    I  12.3  I  81.5  I   6.2  I   0.0  I   6.4
                      I   5.2  I   6.6  I   7.4  I   0.0  I
                     -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                    7 I     9  I    57  I    10  I     1M I    76
  DIDNT   LIKE JOB    I  11.7  I  74.6  I  13.7  I   0.0  I   0.6
                      I   0.5  I   0.6  I   1.6  I   0.0  I
                     -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                    8 I   148  I   977  I    53  I    11M I  1179
  PREPARE FOR  JOB    I  12.6  I  82.9  I   4.5  I   0.0  I   9.4
                      I   7.8  I   9.8  I   8.0  I   0.0  I
                     -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                    9 I    13  I    40  I    11  I     0M I    64
  TIRED OF SCHOOL     I  20.3  I  62.2  I  17.5  I   0.0  I   0.5
                      I   0.7  I   0.4  I   1.7  I   0.0  I
                     -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
               COLUMN    1904      9954       665      158M   12522
                TOTAL    15.2      79.5       5.3       0.0   100.0
(CONTINUED)
```

Table II-6

```
FILE    AFEES     (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
    V31       BEST DESCRIPTION OF WHY ENTERING                         BY  V3          RACE
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  2 OF  2

                        V3
               COUNT   I
             ROW PCT   IBLACK      WHITE      OTHER      NT VALID   ROW
             COL PCT   I                                  RESPNSE   TOTAL
                       I       1  I       2  I       3  I       0  I
V31            --------I----------I----------I----------I----------I
                   10  I      34  I     214  I      12  I      7*  I    260
   NO CIVILIAN JOBS    I    12.9  I    82.4  I     4.7  I     0.0  I    2.1
                       I     1.8  I     2.2  I     1.9  I     0.0  I
                      -I----------I----------I----------I----------I
                   11  I      36  I     210  I       9  I      2*  I    255
   NT SURE WHT WANT    I    14.3  I    82.4  I     3.6  I     0.0  I    2.0
                       I     1.9  I     2.1  I     1.3  I     0.0  I
                      -I----------I----------I----------I----------I
                   12  I      11  I      66  I       9  I      1*  I     85
   NO PROMOTIONS       I    12.9  I    77.2  I    10.3  I     0.0  I    0.7
                       I     0.6  I     0.7  I     1.3  I     0.0  I
                      -I----------I----------I----------I----------I
                   13  I     289  I    1129  I      88  I     20*  I   1506
   COLLEGE ED-NOW      I    19.2  I    75.0  I     5.9  I     0.0  I   12.0
                       I    15.2  I    11.3  I    13.3  I     0.0  I
                      -I----------I----------I----------I----------I
                   14  I     326  I    1415  I      93  I     32*  I   1832
   SUPPORT SELF-FAM    I    17.7  I    77.2  I     5.1  I     0.0  I   14.6
                       I    17.0  I    14.2  I    14.0  I     0.0  I
                      -I----------I----------I----------I----------I
                    0  I     53*  I    161*  I     27*  I      4*  I   245*
   NO VALID RESPNSE    I     0.0  I     0.0  I     0.0  I     0.0  I    0.0
                       I     0.0  I     0.0  I     0.0  I     0.0  I
                      -I----------I----------I----------I----------I
              COLUMN        1904       9954        665       158*    12522
               TOTAL        15.2       79.5        5.3        0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    748
```

175

2064

TABLE II-60

```
FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F  * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V31       BEST DESCRIPTION OF WHY ENTERING                    BY ED1
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  2

                    ED1
          COUNT   I
        ROW PCT  INOT A HS HS         EDUC       NO VALID   ROW
        COL PCT  I GRAD     GRADUATE PAST  HS  RESPNSE   TOTAL
                 I      1  I      2  I      3  I      0  I
V31     ---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
               1 I    385  I    348  I    164  I     7M  I    897
 DO SOMETHING DIF I   42.9  I   38.8  I   18.3  I    0.0  I    7.1
                 I    7.4  I    6.7  I    7.7  I    0.0  I
                -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
               2 I    142  I    179  I    106  I     2M  I    427
 G.I.    BILL    I   33.2  I   41.8  I   24.9  I    0.0  I    3.4
                 I    2.7  I    3.4  I    5.0  I    0.0  I
                -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
               3 I   1685  I   1497. I    368  I    25M  I   3550
 TO LEARN A SKILL I   47.5  I   42.2  I   10.4  I    0.0  I   28.2
                 I   32.2  I   28.6  I   17.2  I    0.0  I
                -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
               4 I    320  I    362  I    130  I     3M  I    812
 TO      TRAVEL  I   39.4  I   44.6  I   16.0  I    0.0  I    6.4
                 I    6.1  I    6.9  I    6.1  I    0.0  I
                -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
               5 I    301  I    315  I    189  I     4M  I    804
 PAY  AND BENEFIT I   37.4  I   39.2  I   23.5  I    0.0  I    6.4
                 I    5.8  I    6.0  I    8.8  I    0.0  I
                -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
               6 I    417  I    269  I    116  I     5M  I    801
 TO SERVE COUNTRY I   52.0  I   33.5  I   14.5  I    0.0  I    6.4
                 I    8.0  I    5.1  I    5.4  I    0.0  I
                -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
               7 I     16  I     35  I     26  I     0M  I     77
 DIDNT   LIKE JOB I   20.4  I   45.2  I   34.3  I    0.0  I    0.6
                 I    0.3  I    0.7  I    1.2  I    0.0  I
                -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
               8 I    422  I    550  I    215  I     1M  I   1187
 PREPARE FOR  JOB I   35.6  I   46.3  I   18.1  I    0.0  I    9.4
                 I    8.1  I   10.5  I   10.1  I    0.0  I
                -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
               9 I     25  I     13  I     26  I     0M  I     64
 TIRED OF SCHOOL I   39.3  I   20.8  I   39.9  I    0.0  I    0.5
                 I    0.5  I    0.3  I    1.2  I    0.0  I
                -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
          COLUMN     5227      5227      2135       70M    12590
           TOTAL     41.5      41.5      17.0       0.0    100.0
(CONTINUED)
```

Table II-7

```
                                                                                                  06/25/75
FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V31       BEST DESCRIPTION OF WHY ENTERING                         BY  ED1
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  2 OF  2

                    ED1
            COUNT  I
          ROW PCT  INOT A HS HS        EDUC       NO VALID   ROW
          COL PCT  I GRAD     GRADUATE PAST   HS  RESPNSE    TOTAL
                   I      1  I      2  I      3  I      0  I
V31        --------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
               10  I     93  I    110  I     64  I      1M I     266
  NO CIVILIAN JOBS I   34.7  I   41.3  I   23.9  I    0.0  I     2.1
                   I    1.8  I    2.1  I    3.0  I    0.0  I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
               11  I     91  I    114  I     51  I      1M I     257
  NT SURE WHT WANT I   35.6  I   44.5  I   19.9  I    0.0  I     2.0
                   I    1.7  I    2.2  I    2.4  I    0.0  I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
               12  I     16  I     42  I     28  I      0M I      86
  NO PROMOTIONS    I   18.1  I   49.1  I   32.8  I    0.0  I     0.7
                   I    0.3  I    0.8  I    1.3  I    0.0  I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
               13  I    470  I    687  I    366  I      5M I    1522
  COLLEGE ED-NOW   I   30.8  I   45.1  I   24.0  I    0.0  I    12.1
                   I    9.0  I   13.1  I   17.1  I    0.0  I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
               14  I    846  I    707  I    286  I     15M I    1839
  SUPPORT SELF-FAM I   46.0  I   38.4  I   15.6  I    0.0  I    14.6
                   I   16.2  I   13.5  I   13.4  I    0.0  I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                0  I   125M  I    86M  I    32M  I      1M I     244M
  NO VALID RESPNSE I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I     0.0
                   I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
           COLUMN      5227      5227      2135        70M     12590
            TOTAL      41.5      41.5      17.0       0.0      100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    680
```

TABLE II-7a.

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                                                                                                   06/25/75

FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V31       BEST DESCRIPTION OF WHY ENTERING              BY  V7        BRANCH OF SERVICE JOINING
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  1 OF  2

                     V7
             COUNT  I
           ROW PCT  IAIR       ARMY      MARINE    NAVY       NO VALID   ROW
           COL PCT  IFORCE               CORPS                 RESPNSE   TOTAL
                    I     1  I     2  I     3  I     4  I     0  I
V31        ---------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  1 I    181 I    368 I    180 I    177 I     0M I    906
  DO SOMETHING DIF  I   19.9 I   40.6 I   19.9 I   19.5 I    0.0 I    7.2
                    I    6.3 I    7.7 I    8.1 I    6.3 I    0.0 I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  2 I     74 I    203 I     62 I     90 I     0M I    429
  G.I.    BILL      I   17.3 I   47.3 I   14.4 I   21.0 I    0.0 I    3.4
                    I    2.6 I    4.2 I    2.8 I    3.2 I    0.0 I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  3 I    871 I   1045 I    687 I    969 I     6M I   3572
  TO LEARN A SKILL  I   24.4 I   29.2 I   19.2 I   27.1 I    0.0 I   28.2
                    I   30.5 I   21.9 I   31.1 I   34.5 I    0.0 I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  4 I    153 I    264 I    105 I    293 I     0M I    814
  TO       TRAVEL   I   18.8 I   32.4 I   12.9 I   36.0 I    0.0 I    6.4
                    I    5.4 I    5.5 I    4.7 I   10.4 I    0.0 I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  5 I    151 I    408 I    115 I    138 I     0M I    812
  PAY  AND BENEFIT  I   18.6 I   50.2 I   14.2 I   17.0 I    0.0 I    6.4
                    I    5.3 I    8.5 I    5.2 I    4.9 I    0.0 I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  6 I    107 I    292 I    266 I    137 I     4M I    802
  TO SERVE COUNTRY  I   13.4 I   36.4 I   33.1 I   17.0 I    0.0 I    6.3
                    I    3.7 I    6.1 I   12.0 I    4.9 I    0.0 I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  7 I     19 I     34 I     10 I     14 I     0M I     77
  DIDNT   LIKE JOB  I   25.1 I   44.1 I   13.0 I   17.7 I    0.0 I    0.6
                    I    0.7 I    0.7 I    0.5 I    0.5 I    0.0 I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  8 I    312 I    412 I    186 I    276 I     4M I   1186
  PREPARE FOR  JOB  I   26.3 I   34.8 I   15.7 I   23.2 I    0.0 I    9.4
                    I   10.9 I    8.6 I    8.4 I    9.8 I    0.0 I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  9 I     15 I     19 I     15 I     15 I     0M I     64
  TIRED OF SCHOOL   I   24.2 I   29.1 I   23.4 I   23.3 I    0.0 I    0.5
                    I    0.5 I    0.4 I    0.7 I    0.5 I    0.0 I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
            COLUMN      2860     4776     2210     2813       35M    12660
             TOTAL      22.6     37.7     17.5     22.2       0.0    100.0
(CONTINUED)
```

Table II-8

```
                                                                                              06/25/79
FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/79)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V31        BEST DESCRIPTION OF WHY ENTERING                BY  V7        BRANCH OF SERVICE JOINING
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  2 OF  2

                     V7
           COUNT   I
           ROW PCT IAIR       ARMY       MARINE     NAVY       NO VALID   ROW
           COL PCT IFORCE                CORPS                 RESPNSE    TOTAL
                   I     1  I     2  I     3  I     4  I     0  I
V31        --------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
              10   I    57  I   121  I    30  I    58  I     0M I    267
  NO CIVILIAN JOBS I  21.6  I  45.4  I  11.2  I  21.9  I   0.0  I    2.1
                   I   2.0  I   2.5  I   1.3  I   2.1  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
              11   I    58  I   100  I    55  I    44  I     0M I    257
  NT SURE WHT WANT I  22.5  I  39.1  I  21.2  I  17.2  I   0.0  I    2.0
                   .   2.0  I   2.1  I   2.5  I   1.6  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
              12   I    15  I    38  I    16  I    17  I     0M I     86
  NO PROMOTIONS    I  16.5  I  44.5  I  18.4  I  20.2  I   0.0  I    0.7
                   I   0.5  I   0.8  I   0.7  I   0.6  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
              13   I   455  I   628  I   197  I   243  I     4M I   1524
  COLLEGE ED-NOW   I  29.9  I  41.2  I  12.9  I  16.0  I   0.0  I   12.0
                   I  15.9  I  13.2  I   8.9  I   8.6  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
              14   I   391  I   844  I   286  I   342  I     1M I   1863
  SUPPORT SELF-FAM I  21.0  I  45.3  I  15.4  I  18.3  I   0.0  I   14.7
                   I  13.7  I  17.7  I  13.0  I  12.1  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
               0   I    35M I    96M I    45M I    49M I    15M I    245M
  NO VALID RESPNSE I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I    0.0
                   I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
           COLUMN     2860     4776     2210     2813       35M   12660
           TOTAL      22.6     37.7     17.5     22.2       0.0   100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    610
```

TABLE II-8a

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                                                                                                   06/25/75

FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F  * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V31        BEST DESCRIPTION OF WHY ENTERING                    BY  V64        DO YOU INTEND TO REENLIST
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  1 OF  2

                          V64
               COUNT    I
               ROW PCT  IYES        PROBABLY  PROBABLY  NO          NO VALID   ROW
               COL PCT  I           YES       NOT                   RESPNSE    TOTAL
                        I     1   I     2   I     3   I     4   I     0   I
V31             --------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                     1  I   184   I   465   I   177   I    70   I     7M  I    896
  DO SOMETHING DIF      I  20.5   I  51.9   I  19.7   I   7.8   I   0.0   I    7.2
                        I   7.9   I   6.9   I   6.5   I  10.2   I   0.0   I
                       -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                     2  I    38   I   156   I   156   I    71   I     5M  I    422
  G.I.     BILL         I   9.0   I  36.9   I  37.1   I  16.9   I   0.0   I    3.4
                        I   1.6   I   2.3   I   5.8   I  10.4   I   0.0   I
                       -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                     3  I   525   I  2122   I   753   I   139   I    27M  I   3539
  TO LEARN A SKILL      I  14.8   I  60.0   I  21.3   I   3.9   I   0.0   I   28.3
                        I  22.6   I  31.4   I  27.7   I  20.2   I   0.0   I
                       -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                     4  I   135   I   442   I   180   I    44   I    12M  I    801
  TO       TRAVEL       I  16.8   I  55.1   I  22.5   I   5.5   I   0.0   I    6.4
                        I   5.8   I   6.5   I   6.6   I   6.4   I   0.0   I
                       -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                     5  I   214   I   377   I   160   I    46   I    12M  I    797
  PAY  AND BENEFIT      I  26.8   I  47.2   I  20.1   I   5.8   I   0.0   I    6.4
                        I   9.2   I   5.6   I   5.9   I   6.7   I   0.0   I
                       -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                     6  I   282   I   424   I    72   I    25   I     4M  I    803
  TO SERVE COUNTRY      I  35.1   I  52.9   I   9.0   I   3.1   I   0.0   I    6.4
                        I  12.1   I   6.3   I   2.7   I   3.6   I   0.0   I
                       -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                     7  I    36   I    19   I    15   I     7   I     0M  I     77
  DIDNT   LIKE JOB      I  46.1   I  24.4   I  19.9   I   9.7   I   0.0   I    0.6
                        I   1.5   I   0.3   I   0.6   I   1.1   I   0.0   I
                       -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                     8  I    96   I   580   I   405   I    81   I    18M  I   1162
  PREPARE FOR  JOB      I   8.3   I  49.9   I  34.8   I   7.0   I   0.0   I    9.3
                        I   4.1   I   8.6   I  14.9   I  11.8   I   0.0   I
                       -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                     9  I     9   I    33   I    14   I     7   I     1M  I     63
  TIRED OF SCHOOL       I  14.9   I  51.6   I  22.8   I  10.7   I   0.0   I    0.5
                        I   0.4   I   0.5   I   0.5   I   1.0   I   0.0   I
                       -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                COLUMN     2322      6757      2714       689       196M     12433
                 TOTAL     18.6      54.1      21.7       5.5       0.0      100.0
(CONTINUED)
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Table II-9

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                                                                                      06/25/75
FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V31        BEST DESCRIPTION OF WHY ENTERING                        BY  V64        DO YOU INTEND TO REENLIST
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  2 OF  2

                     V64
             COUNT  I
            ROW PCT IYES       PROBABLY PROBABLY NO          NO VALID   ROW
            COL PCT I          YES      NOT                  RESPNSE   TOTAL
                    I     1  I     2  I     3  I     4  I     0  I
V31         --------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 10 I    37  I   135  I    69  I    21  I    3M  I    262
   NO CIVILIAN JOBS I  14.1  I  51.7  I  26.4  I   7.8  I   0.0  I    2.1
                    I   1.6  I   2.0  I   2.5  I   3.0  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 11 I    21  I   128  I    84  I    22  I    3M  I    254
   NT SUFF WHT WANT I   8.3  I  50.2  I  32.6  I   8.7  I   0.0  I    2.0
                    I   0.9  I   1.9  I   3.1  I   3.2  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 12 I    31  I    35  I    17  I     3  I    0M  I     86
   NO PROMOTIONS    I  36.4  I  40.7  I  19.3  I   3.7  I   0.0  I    0.7
                    I   1.3  I   0.5  I   0.6  I   0.5  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 13 I   272  I   835  I   325  I    68  I   27M  I   1499
   COLLEGE ED-NOW   I  18.1  I  55.7  I  21.7  I   4.5  I   0.0  I   12.0
                    I  11.7  I  12.4  I  12.0  I   9.6  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 14 I   443  I  1008  I   287  I    85  I   38M  I   1823
   SUPPORT SELF-FAM I  24.3  I  55.3  I  15.7  I   4.6  I   0.0  I   14.6
                    I  19.1  I  14.9  I  10.6  I  12.3  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  0 I   47M  I  115M  I   31M  I   13M  I   39M  I   245M
   NO VALID RESPNSE I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I    0.0
                    I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
             COLUMN    2322     6757     2714      689     196M    12483
              TOTAL    18.6     54.1     21.7      5.5      0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    787
```

TABLE II-9a

EFFECT OF CONTINGENCIES ON THE ENLISTMENT DECISION

AGE LEVEL

CONTINGENCY	17		18		19		20		21		Over 21		All Ages	
	PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED %	DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLIST %	PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED %	DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLIST %	PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED %	DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLIST %	PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED %	DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLIST %	PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED %	DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLIST %	PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED %	DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLIST %	PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED %	DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLIST %
Military Pay Lowered By $50 A Month	9.7	11.3	11.2	15.2	12.5	16.5	13.0	18.1	12.8	19.1	12.7	19.6	11.7	16.2
G.I. Bill was Eliminated	13.7	14.5	15.5	18.5	17.6	22.8	15.8	26.8	19.2	24.2	16.4	25.9	16.1	21.4
Got A Civilian Job	8.2	6.0	10.6	7.2	10.7	7.3	9.4	7.9	9.8	6.4	7.5	7.4	9.3	7.0
Vacations were Cut in Half	11.9	7.7	11.2	9.2	12.3	10.6	13.1	11.8	13.0	10.3	10.1	11.2	11.7	9.9
War was Declared	9.5	9.4	8.2	11.1	7.8	12.8	7.4	15.2	7.2	11.7	5.3	10.0	7.6	11.4
PX and Commissary Benefits Reduced	8.2	4.5	9.8	6.1	10.3	6.7	9.5	9.7	11.6	8.1	9.3	9.1	8.5	7.1
Engaged or Married or Met Someone You Liked	7.6	7.0	9.6	7.2	8.8	7.6	8.6	10.4	6.1	7.5	4.6	5.9	7.4	7.4
Had to Sign Up For Extra Year	6.2	6.8	7.3	6.6	7.9	8.1	8.2	8.2	8.2	5.8	5.2	6.5	6.9	6.9
Military Rules and Discipline Made More Strict	6.6	5.3	8.1	5.8	7.3	6.8	7.4	7.9	9.4	7.0	6.0	6.0	7.2	6.7

Table 11-10

EFFECT OF CONTINGENCIES ON THE ENLISTMENT DECISION

RACE

CONTINGENCY	BLACK PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED %	BLACK DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLISTED %	WHITE PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED %	WHITE DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLISTED %	OTHER PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED %	OTHER DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLISTED %	ALL RACES PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED %	ALL RACES DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLISTED %
Military Pay Lowered By $50 A Month	12.6	21.0	11.5	15.1	13.5	17.7	11.8	16.1
G.I. Bill was Eliminated	17.7	26.3	15.5	20.7	20.2	19.0	16.1	21.4
Got a Civilian Job	12.7	9.4	8.8	6.5	7.9	7.7	9.3	7.0
Vacations were Cut in Half	11.5	12.9	11.4	9.4	15.1	10.5	11.6	10.0
War was Declared	11.0	16.1	7.0	10.6	7.7	10.6	7.6	11.4
PX and Commissary Benefits Reduced	11.0	1[illegible].6	9.2	6.3	12.9	8.7	9.6	7.1
Engaged or Married or Met Someone You Liked	8.0	7.3	7.3	7.3	8.4	8.3	7.5	7.4
Had to Sign Up for an Extra Year	9.1	9.1	6.4	6.5	7.9	6.9	6.9	6.9
Military Rules and Discipline Made More Strict	8.9	8.8	7.0	5.8	5.9	7.0	7.2	6.3

Table II-11

EFFECT OF CONTINGENCIES ON THE ENLISTMENT DECISION

	EDUCATION							
	NOT A HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE		HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE		EDUC. PAST HIGH SCHOOL		ALL LEVELS	
CONTINGENCY	PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED	DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLISTED	PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED	DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLISTED	PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED	DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLISTED	PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED	DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLISTED
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Military Pay Lowered By $50 a Month	9.1	14.9	13.0	16.9	15.1	17.6	11.7	16.2
G.I. Bill was Eliminated	12.7	16.4	18.0	22.2	19.6	31.3	16.1	21.3
Got a Civilian Job	9.1	6.4	8.9	7.7	11.1	6.8	9.3	7.0
Vacations were Cut In Half	10.2	9.2	12.5	10.4	13.0	10.5	11.6	9.9
War was Declared	8.0	9.4	7.4	11.5	7.4	15.7	7.6	11.4
PX and Commissary Benefits Reduced	8.2	5.7	10.3	7.2	11.0	10.0	9.5	7.1
Engaged or Married or Met Someone You Liked	7.3	7.0	8.0	8.0	6.4	7.0	7.4	7.4
Had to Sign Up for Extra Year	5.6	6.1	7.5	7.7	8.8	6.9	6.9	6.9
Military Rules and Discipline Made More Strict	5.8	6.1	7.9	6.1	9.2	7.3	7.3	6.3

Table II-12

EFFECT OF CONTINGENCIES ON THE ENLISTMENT DECISION

BRANCH OF SERVICE

CONTINGENCY	AIR FORCE		ARMY		MARINE CORPS		NAVY		ALL BRANCHES	
	PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED	DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLISTED	PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED	DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLISTED	PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED	DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLISTED	PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED	DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLISTED	PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED	DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLISTED
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Military Pay Lowered By $50 a Month	13.1	15.3	12.3	19.0	8.6	15.6	11.7	12.8	11.7	16.2
G.I. Bill was Eliminated	18.0	20.7	15.3	24.8	14.3	19.2	16.5	17.9	16.0	21.4
Got a Civilian Job	8.3	5.8	10.6	8.3	8.3	6.4	8.9	6.5	9.3	7.0
Vacations were Cut in Half	12.1	9.1	11.3	11.1	11.5	9.8	11.9	9.0	11.6	10.0
War was Declared	7.5	12.5	8.2	13.8	5.8	7.4	8.1	9.2	7.6	11.4
PX and Commissary Benefits Reduced	10.2	7.0	10.3	7.9	8.3	6.8	9.1	6.0	9.6	7.1
Engaged or Married or Met Someone You liked	6.7	6.0	7.5	8.4	9.1	6.7	6.8	7.5	7.4	7.4
Had to Sign Up for an Extra Year	6.4	5.4	7.7	8.3	6.1	7.0	6.6	6.1	6.9	6.9
Military Rules and Discipline Made More Strict	8.3	5.5	8.0	7.5	4.9	4.8	6.7	5.9	7.2	6.3

Table II-13

EFFECT OF CONTINGENCIES ON THE ENLISTMENT DECISION

BEST DESCRIPTION OF WHY ENTERING (PAGE #1)

CONTINGENCY	DO SOMETHING DIFFERENT		G.I. BILL		LEARN A SKILL		TO TRAVEL		PAY AND BENEFITS		SERVE COUNTRY		DIDN'T LIKE JOB	
	PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED	DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLIST	PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED	DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLIST	PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED	DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLIST	PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED	DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLIST	PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED	DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLIST	PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED	DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLIST	PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED	DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLIST
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Military Pay Lowered By $50 a Month	10.5	14.2	12.6	23.7	10.9	11.9	17.4	16.0	12.5	20.9	6.0	12.4	17.1	10.4
G.I. Bill was Eliminated	13.9	15.1	14.8	61.5	15.2	13.8	16.8	21.6	18.5	26.3	10.2	14.4	14.9	10.4
Got a Civilian Job	7.8	4.3	6.4	5.7	7.8	5.5	8.7	8.6	12.0	8.5	5.0	4.4	2.4	9.4
Vacations were Cut in Half	11.8	9.0	12.5	17.5	10.6	7.6	16.7	11.3	13.7	17.1	4.6	7.2	20.6	21.2
War was Declared	3.9	10.6	8.5	17.5	9.0	8.9	9.2	[illegible]	8.2	14.9	2.2	2.8	10.5	11.9
PX and Commissary Benefits Reduced	8.6	5.0	12.6	9.9	8.5	4.7	11.6	8.0	12.0	10.3	3.6	[illegible]	9.7	15.9
Engaged or Married or Met Someone You Liked	10.8	8.4	11.2	7.1	7.0	3.2	9.5	12.2	[illegible]	8.4	4.9	5.2	7.2	11.7
Had to Sign Up for Extra Year	7.2	0.4	13.7	13.3	8.1	3.8	12.2	6.5	3.9	7.5	2.1	8.1	5.7	16.4
Military Rules and Discipline Made More Strict	7.9	0.5	10.7	13.5	6.5	4.8	8.2	9.3	8.1	8.5	1.3	2.8	11.0	12.5

Table II-14

EFFECTS OF CONTINGENCIES ON THE ENLISTMENT DECISION

BEST DESCRIPTION OF WHY ENTERING (PAGE #2)

CONTINGENCY	PREPARE FOR JOB		TIRED OF SCHOOL		NO CIVILIAN JOBS		NOT SURE WHAT WANT		NO PROMOTIONS		COLLEGE EDUCA-NOW		SUPPORT SELF-FAMILY	
	PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED %	DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLISTED %	PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED %	DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLISTED %	PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED %	DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLISTED %	PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED %	DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLISTED %	PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED %	DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLISTED %	PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED %	DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLISTED %	PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED %	DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLISTED %
Military Pay Lowered By $50 a Month	11.7	15.9	13.8	11.4	15.3	22.5	7.6	18.0	17.0	19.1	12.5	18.3	12.4	20.0
G.I. Bill was Eliminated	19.8	20.9	31.8	12.6	18.6	22.7	17.8	18.8	6.8	[illegible]	20.1	33.7	14.5	20.0
Got a Civilian Job	11.5	7.0	10.5	20.3	23.7	26.9	8.6	8.2	8.7	4.6	7.7	6.6	12.2	8.2
Vacations were Cut in Half	11.6	10.8	24.5	14.8	12.3	11.7	12.4	8.2	6.2	13.5	13.3	9.5	11.5	11.0
War was Declared	6.3	13.4	3.5	26.7	9.0	15.9	8.6	14.3	9.0	8.2	7.8	13.7	7.9	10.9
PX and Commissary Benefits Reduced	10.3	6.1	5.1	8.1	9.0	7.3	5.5	7.6	8.5	13.9	11.6	7.7	11.2	8.1
Engaged or Married or Met Someone You Liked	8.9	7.9	15.9	19.8	8.2	7.6	11.4	17.4	4.1	12.2	7.4	6.6	4.4	5.4
Had to Sign Up for Extra Year	8.5	8.2	9.9	13.7	10.5	7.1	5.4	13.9	5.6	8.4	7.8	6.6	5.5	5.7
Military Rules and Discipline Made More Strict	8.5	5.3	9.8	18.5	8.7	9.0	7.6	6.9	5.9	5.2	8.2	5.4	6.8	6.9

Table II-14 a.

EFFECT OF CONTINGENCIES ON THE ENLISTMENT DECISION

INTENTION TO REENLIST

CONTINGENCY	YES		PROBABLY YES		PROBABLY NOT		NO		ALL CHOICES	
	PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED	DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLISTED	PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED	DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLISTED	PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED	DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLISTED	PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED	DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLISTED	PROBABLY NOT HAVE ENLISTED	DEFINITELY NOT HAVE ENLISTED
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Military Pay Lowered By $50 a Month	8.8	15.9	11.7	14.5	13.8	17.0	14.5	28.0	11.7	16.0
G.I. Bill was Eliminated	11.4	16.3	15.8	18.6	20.7	27.6	14.5	42.3	15.9	21.4
Got a Civilian Job	5.1	5.1	8.9	5.5	13.3	9.4	12.7	19.2	9.3	7.0
Vacations were Cut in Half	8.0	9.0	11.4	8.3	14.8	11.2	15.1	22.5	11.7	9.9
War was Declared	2.5	5.4	7.7	8.5	11.4	18.2	9.6	32.9	7.6	11.4
PX and Commissary Benefits Reduced	8.1	7.8	9.4	6.2	11.2	6.3	11.3	15.0	9.6	7.0
Engaged or Married or Met Someone You Liked	3.0	5.2	6.7	5.6	11.7	10.4	12.4	21.1	7.4	7.4
Had to Sign Up for Extra Year	2.3	3.4	4.4	4.0	14.5	11.8	18.2	27.9	6.9	6.9
Military Rules and Discipline Made More Strict	3.0	3.8	6.7	4.4	11.4	9.0	11.1	21.8	7.3	6.2

Table II-15

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                                                                                                   06/25/75
FILE   APFES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
    V67        WHT WLDVE DNE IF ONLY COMBAT ARMS                BY  V1          AGE
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  1

                   V1
            COUNT  I
          ROW PCT  I17         18         19         20         21         OVER  21 NO VALID   ROW
          COL PCT  I                                                                RESPNSE   TOTAL
                   I     1  I     2  I     3  I     4  I     5  I     6  I     0  I
V67        --------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 1 I    250 I    265 I    220 I    117 I     88 I    361 I     7M I   1301
  NO-COMBAT ARMS   I   19.2 I   20.3 '   16.9 I    9.0 I    6.8 I   27.8 I    0.0 I   18.9
                   I   18.0 I   16.7 I   18.3 I   16.8 I   17.1 I   24.2 I    0.0 I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 2 I    622 I    608 I    407 I    277 I    207 I    644 I    10M I   2766
  STILL   ENLIST   I   22.5 I   22.0 I   14.7 I   10.0 I    7.5 I   23.3 I    0.0 I   40.1
                   I   44.7 I   38.2 I   33.9 I   39.7 I   40.2 I   43.1 I    0.0 I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 3 I    173 I    276 I    222 I    148 I     95 I    240 I     2M I   1156
  NOT     ENLIST   I   15.0 I   23.9 I   19.2 I   12.8 I    8.3 I   20.8 I    0.0 I   16.8
                   I   12.5 I   17.4 I   18.5 I   21.2 I   18.5 I   16.0 I    0.0 I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 4 I    345 I    441 I    352 I    156 I    125 I    249 I     5M I   1667
  DONT    KNOW     I   20.7 I   26.4 I   21.1 I    9.3 I    7.5 I   15.0 I    0.0 I   24.2
                   I   24.8 I   27.7 I   29.3 I   22.3 I   24.2 I   16.7 I    0.0 I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 0 I    67M I   121M I    79M I    47M I    36M I    83M I     2M I   436M
  NO VALID RESPNSE I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0
                   I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
           COLUMN      1390     1590     1201      698      516     1495      27M    6891
            TOTAL      20.2     23.1     17.4     10.1      7.5     21.7      0.0   100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =   460
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189

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                                                                                              06/25/75

FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
    V67        WHT WLDVE DNE IF ONLY COMBAT ARMS               BY  V7         BRANCH OF SERVICE JOINING
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  1

                       V7
             COUNT   I
             ROW PCT IARMY      MARINE     ROW
             COL PCT I          CORPS      TOTAL
                     I     2  I     3  I
V67          --------I--------I--------I
                   1 I  1105  I   204  I  1309
  NA-COMBAT ARMS     I  84.4  I  15.6  I  18.9
                     I  23.5  I   9.2  I
                    -I--------I--------I
                   2 I  1711  I  1064  I  2776
  STILL   ENLIST     I  61.7  I  38.3  I  40.1
                     I  36.3  I  48.2  I
                    -I--------I--------I
                   3 I   877  I   281  I  1158
  NOT     ENLIST     I  75.8  I  24.2  I  16.7
                     I  18.6  I  12.7  I
                    -I--------I--------I
                   4 I  1014  I   658  I  1673
  DONT    KNOW       I  60.6  I  39.4  I  24.2
                     I  21.5  I  29.8  I
                    -I--------I--------I
                   0 I   327M I   109M I   436M
  NO VALID RESPNSE   I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0
                     I   0.0  I   0.0  I
                    -I--------I--------I
             COLUMN     4708     2207     6915
              TOTAL     68.1     31.9    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    436
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2079

Table II-17

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                                                                                                  06/25/75
FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V67        WHT WLDVE ONE IF ONLY COMBAT ARMS                BY  V64      DO YOU INTEND TO REENLIST
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  1 OF  1

                     V64
             COUNT  I
           ROW PCT  IYES       PROBABLY PROBABLY NO           NO VALID   ROW
           COL PCT  I           YES      NOT                 RESPNSE   TOTAL
                    I     1  I     2  I     3  I     4  I     0  I
V67        ---------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  1 I   349  I   669  I   230  I    57  I    1M  I   1305
  NA-COMBAT ARMS    I  26.8  I  51.3  I  17.6  I   4.3  I   0.0  I   19.0
                    I  25.6  I  18.5  I  15.7  I  13.4  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  2 I   668  I  1549  I   418  I   113  I   15M  I   2748
  STILL   ENLIST    I  24.3  I  56.4  I  15.2  I   4.1  I   0.0  I   40.0
                    I  49.3  I  42.7  I  28.7  I  26.6  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  3 I   107  I   494  I   397  I   150  I    8M  I   1147
  NOT     ENLIST    I   9.3  I  43.0  I  34.6  I  13.1  I   0.0  I   16.7
                    I   7.9  I  13.6  I  27.2  I  35.4  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  4 I   231  I   912  I   415  I   104  I    3M  I   1662
  DONT    KNOW      I  13.9  I  54.5  I  25.0  I   6.3  I   0.0  I   24.2
                    I  17.1  I  25.2  I  28.4  I  24.6  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  0 I   56M  I  162M  I   75M  I   34M  I  108M  I   436M
  NO VALID RESPNSE  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I    0.0
                    I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
            COLUMN     1355     3623     1460      424     136M     6862
             TOTAL     19.8     57.8     21.3      6.2      0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    488
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191

2080

Table II-18

PERCENT OF ARMY AND MARINE CORPS ENLISTEES STATING THEY WOULD ENLIST IN A COMBAT ARMS SKILL AREA BY INDUCEMENT AND AGE

INDUCEMENT	17	18	19	20	21	Over 21	All Ages
$1500 Cash Bonus for 2-yr. Enlistment	65.1	57.0	50.5	52.2	52.7	58.4	57.0
$2500 Cash Bonus for 3-yr. Enlistment	68.0	61.4	57.9	57.6	62.8	65.0	62.7
$4000 Cash Bonus for 4-yr. Enlistment	70.4	60.8	58.0	56.3	60.1	66.3	63.0
$75 Extra Each Month during 3 yr. Enlistment	67.4	56.5	53.8	55.0	60.3	60.8	59.4
$100 Extra Each Month During 4-yr. Enlistment	67.9	57.4	58.0	54.7	61.5	64.0	61.1

Table II-19

PERCENT OF ARMY AND MARINE CORPS ENLISTEES STATING THEY WOULD ENLIST IN A COMBAT ARMS SKILL AREA BY INDUCEMENT AND RACE

INDUCEMENT	BLACK	WHITE	OTHER	ALL RACES
$1500 Cash Bonus for 2-yr. Enlistment	56.8	57.2	55.5	57.0
$2500 Cash Bonus for 3-yr. Enlistment	60.8	63.1	62.4	62.6
$4000 Cash Bonus for 4-yr. Enlistement	63.9	62.8	62.1	62.9
$75 Extra Each Month During 3-yr. Enlistment	56.2	59.7	54.0	59.4
$100 Extra Each Month During 4-yr. Enlistment	55.8	62.2	62.6	61.0

Table II-20

PERCENT OF ARMY AND MARINE CORPS ENLISTEES STATING
THEY WOULD ENLIST IN A COMBAT ARMS SKILL AREA
BY INDUCEMENT AND EDUCATION

INDUCEMENT	NOT HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	EDUCATION PAST HIGH SCHOOL	ALL LEVELS
$1500 Cash Bonus for 2-yr. Enlistment	61.2	54.9	49.0	56.9
$2500 Cash Bonus for 3-yr. Enlistment	68.0	59.0	54.5	62.6
$4000 Cash Bonus for 4-yr. Enlistment	68.6	59.7	53.8	62.9
$75 Extra Each Month During 3-yr. Enlistment	65.1	55.2	51.9	59.3
$100 Extra Each Month During 4-yr. Enlistment	65.9	58.1	53.5	61.0

Table II-21

PERCENT OF ARMY AND MARINE CORPS ENLISTEES STATING THEY WOULD ENLIST IN A COMBAT ARMS SKILL AREA BY INDUCEMENT AND RESPONSE TO SURVEY ITEM 33.

	What if combat arms were only way to sign up?				
INDUCEMENT	NA - I Signed Up For Combat Arms	I Still Would Have Enlisted	I Would Not Have Enlisted	I Don't Know	All Cases
$1500 Cash Bonus for 2-yr. Enlistment	84.6	73.9	14.4	39.3	57.0
$2500 Cash Bonus for 3-yr. Enlistment	89.4	81.2	15.0	44.6	62.6
$4000 Cash Bonus for 4-yr. Enlistment	87.1	81.5	17.5	47.5	63.0
$75 Extra Each Month During 3-yr. Enlistment	85.3	77.0	16.9	42.4	59.3
$100 Extra Each Month During 4-yr. Enlistment	83.6	79.3	21.2	44.5	61.0

Table II-22

SECTION III

ADVERTISING

Slogan Recognition

Respondents were asked to match advertising slogans with the appropriate services. Results are presented in Tables III 1-4. The most identifiable slogan of the four presented was "The (Marines) are looking for a few good men", which was correctly identified by 91% of all respondents. The other three services' slogans were each correctly identified by about three fourths of the respondents.

Results by service indicate thqt 99% of the Marine Corps entrants, 90% of the Navy entrants, 83% of the Army entrants and 74% of the Air Force entrants were able to correctly identify their service's slogan.

Advertising Recall

Respondents were asked to recall the media sources through which they have seen or heard advertising about their particular branch of service. The most frequently cited sources were billboards (78%) and magazines (75%). Recall of other sources was as follows: television (66%), radio (39%), newspapers other than the want ad section (29%), and newspaper want ads (27%). Older enlistees were more likely to recall seeing newspaper advertising than were younger recruits.

Credibility and Effect of Advertising

Approximately three-fourths of the individuals surveyed claimed that they believed "some" or "most" of the advertising they saw or heard, and another 12% claimed that they believed "all" of the advertising. Only 8% of the enlistees were so skeptical of the advertising that they indicated that they believed "none" of it. Eighteen percent of the Marine enlistees claimed to believe all of the advertising as compared to 10% for the other services. The proporation of enlistees claiming to believe all the advertising decreased with the educational level of respondents.

One index of the effectiveness of the advertising was that 58% of the respondents claim that advertising influenced them to seek more information about serving in the military. The older a person was or the better educated he was, the less likely he was to make such a claim.

SECTION III

ADVERTISING

TABLE GUIDE*

FIRST VARIABLE	AGE(1)	RACE(2)	EDUCATION(3)	BRANCH OF SERVICE(7)
Slogan recognition(22)**	1	2	3	4
Type of advertisement recall(26)	5	6	7	8
Ad believability(27)	9	10	11	12
Seek more information(28)	13	14	15	16

*To find a particular bivariate distribution, locate the row and column containing the items of interest. If a table exists for those items, its table number is given where that row and column intersect.

**The number in parentheses refer to the questionnaire item(s) from which the data were derived.

PERCENT OF ENLISTEES CORRECTLY MATCHING SLOGAN
WITH BRANCH OF SERVICE: BY AGE

SLOGAN	17	18	19	20	21	OVER 21	ALL AGES
THE _____ ARE LOOKING FOR A FEW GOOD MEN	92.1%	91.4%	91.3%	89.4%	90.3%	88.4%	90.6%
LOOK UP, BE LOOKED UP TO, GO _____	75.8%	75.7%	75.2%	70.2%	70.7%	74.8%	74.4%
JOIN THE PEOPLE WHO'VE JOINED THE _____	79.0%	78.6%	77.0%	73.2%	76.2%	75.7%	77.0%
BE SOMETHING SPECIAL, GO_____	77.2%	76.6%	75.1%	70.8%	68.8%	70.9%	74.0%

Table III-1

PERCENT OF ENLISTEES CORRECTLY MATCHING SLOGAN WITH BRANCH OF SERVICE: BY RACE

SLOGAN	BLACK	WHITE	OTHER	ALL RACES
THE _____. ARE LOOKING FOR A FEW GOOD MEN	84.3%	92.5%	80.5%	90.6%
LOOK UP, BE LOOKED UP TO, GO _____	68.3%	76.0%	69.4%	74.5%
JOIN THE PEOPLE WHO'VE JOINED THE _____	72.2%	78.1%	73.9%	77.0%
BE SOMETHING SPECIAL, GO _____	67.2%	76.0%	66.1%	74.2%

Table III-2

PERCENT OF ENLISTEES CORRECTLY MATCHING SLOGAN WITH BRANCH OF SERVICE: BY EDUCATION

SLOGAN	NOT HS GRAD	HS GRAD	EDUC PAST HS	ALL LEVELS
THE _____ ARE LOOKING FOR A FEW GOOD MEN	89.8%	91.2%	91.6%	90.7%
LOOK UP, BE LOOKED UP TO, GO _____	72.3%	75.7%	76.5%	74.4%
JOIN THE PEOPLE WHO'VE JOINED THE _____	78.3%	76.1%	76.3%	77.1%
BE SOMETHING SPECIAL, GO_____	73.7%	74.6%	73.6%	74.1%

Table III-3

PERCENT OF ENLISTEES CORRECTLY MATCHING SLOGAN
WITH BRANCH OF SERVICE: BY BRANCH OF SERVICE

SLOGAN	AIR FORCE	ARMY	MARINE CORPS	NAVY	ALL BRANCHES
THE _____ ARE LOOKING FOR A FEW GOOD MEN	91.3%	85.2%	99.1%	92.2%	90.6%
LOOK UP, BE LOOKED UP TO, GO _____	74.0%	73.2%	69.7%	80.4%	74.4%
JOIN THE PEOPLE WHO'VE JOINED THE ARMY	69.0%	83.0%	73.5%	77.6%	77.0%
BE SOMETHING SPECIAL, GO _____	59.0%	70.2%	67.9%	90.1%	74.0%

Table III-4

PERCENT OF PERSONS WHO RECALL SEEING OR HEARING ADVERTISEMENT ABOUT THEIR BRANCH OF SERVICE BY MEDIUM AND AGE

MEDIUM	17	18	19	20	21	OVER 21	ALL AGES
NEWSPAPERS, WANT ADS SECTION	20.5%	23.7%	26.6%	28.4%	31.1%	35.2%	27.1%
NEWSPAPER, SOME OTHER SECTION	26.1%	26.7%	27.2%	29.8%	31.4%	33.5%	28.8%
RADIO	38.2%	38.2%	37.2%	40.3%	38.2%	39.5%	38.5%
TELEVISION	66.7%	65.7%	64.6%	69.4%	68.2%	66.1%	66.4%
MAGAZINES	78.1%	75.5%	74.0%	75.6%	74.8%	74.3%	75.4%
BILLBOARDS	80.1%	76.4%	76.4%	80.7%	79.1%	76.6%	77.8%

Table III-5

PERCENT OF PERSONS WHO RECALL SEEING OR HEARING ADVERTISEMENT ABOUT THEIR BRANCH OF SERVICE BY MEDIUM AND RACE

MEDIUM	BLACK	WHITE	OTHER	ALL RACES
NEWSPAPER WANT ADS SECTION	29.5%	26.6%	28.5%	27.1%
NEWSPAPERS, SOME OTHER SECTION	33.4%	27.7%	34.4%	28.9%
RADIO	46.5%	37.4%	35.9%	38.6%
TELEVISION	69.9%	65.9%	63.0%	66.4%
MAGAZINES	75.6%	75.8%	69.1%	75.4%
BILLBOARDS	74.1%	79.4%	66.1%	77.9%

Table III-6

PERCENT OF PERSONS WHO RECALL SEEING OR HEARING ADVERTISEMENT

ABOUT THEIR BRANCH OF SERVICE BY MEDIUM AND EDUCATION

MEDIUM	NOT A HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	EDUCATION PAST HIGH SCHOOL	ALL LEVELS
NEWSPAPER WANT ADS SECTION	24.7%	27.5%	32.1%	27.1%
NEWSPAPERS, SOME OTHER SECTION	26.3%	30.3%	31.5%	28.8%
RADIO	37.5%	39.3%	39.7%	38.6%
TELEVISION	65.3%	68.1%	64.8%	66.4%
MAGAZINES	73.9%	77.0%	76.2%	75.6%
BILLBOARDS	76.4%	78.7%	79.8%	77.9%

Table III-7

PERCENT OF PERSONS WHO RECALL SEEING OR HEARING ADVERTISEMENT ABOUT THEIR BRANCH OF SERVICE BY MEDIUM AND BRANCH OF SERVICE

MEDIUM	AIR FORCE	ARMY	MARINE CORPS	NAVY	ALL BRANCHES
NEWSPAPER WANT ADS SECTION	22.4%	35.8%	21.7%	21.1%	27.1%
NEWSPAPERS, SOME OTHER SECTION	27.1%	34.7%	23.1%	24.8%	28.8%
RADIO	39.4%	43.0%	33.1%	34.3%	38.5%
TELEVISION	68.4%	68.2%	64.6%	62.6%	66.4%
MAGAZINES	75.6%	76.0%	74.2%	75.5%	75.5%
BILLBOARDS	82.9%	74.1%	76.1%	80.4%	77.9%

Table III-8

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                                                                                              06/25/75

FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V61        HOW MUCH OF INFC IN AUS DID YOU BELIEVE        BY  V1          AGE
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  1 OF  1

                        V1
              COUNT   I
              ROW PCT I17         18         19         20         21        OVER  21 NO VALID   ROW
              COL PCT I                                                                RESPNSE   TOTAL
                      I      1  I      2  I      3  I      4  I      5  I      6  I      0  I
V61           --------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   1  I    375  I    290  I    237  I    162  I    114  I    361  I    13M  I   1523
   ALL                I   24.9  I   19.0  I   15.6  I   10.6  I    7.5  I   22.4  I    0.0  I   11.7
                      I   15.1  I    9.5  I   10.2  I   11.1  I   11.4  I   12.7  I    0.0  I
                     -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   2  I   1002  I   1210  I    836  I    580  I    388  I   1036  I     5M  I   5023
   MOST               I   19.5  I   24.1  I   16.7  I   11.5  I    7.7  I   20.6  I    0.0  I   38.6
                      I   39.5  I   39.8  I   36.1  I   39.7  I   38.5  I   37.4  I    0.0  I
                     -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   3  I    766  I   1082  I    934  I    521  I    350  I    936  I     9M  I   4584
   SOME               I   16.6  I   23.6  I   20.4  I   11.4  I    7.6  I   20.4  I    0.0  I   35.2
                      I   30.3  I   35.6  I   40.3  I   35.7  I   34.8  I   34.8  I    0.0  I
                     -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   4  I    133  I    217  I    137  I    118  I     86  I    189  I     4M  I    883
   NOT VERY MUCH      I   15.1  I   24.7  I   15.6  I   13.4  I    9.7  I   21.5  I    0.0  I    6.8
                      I    5.3  I    7.2  I    5.9  I    8.1  I    8.5  I    7.0  I    0.0  I
                     -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   5  I    235  I    228  I    173  I     81  I     69  I    215  I     0M  I   1013
   NONE               I   23.3  I   23.5  I   17.1  I    8.0  I    6.8  I   21.3  I    0.0  I    7.8
                      I    9.4  I    7.8  I    7.5  I    5.5  I    6.8  I    8.0  I    0.0  I
                     -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   0  I    30M  I    45M  I    45M  I    36M  I    19M  I    50M  I     5M  I   133M
   NO VALID RESPNSE   I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0
                      I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I
                     -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
               COLUMN     2508      3038      2319      1462      1007      2687       35M    13021
                TOTAL     19.3      23.3      17.8      11.2       7.7      20.6       0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    249
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2095

Table III-9

```
                                                                                                      06/25/75
FILE   AFEES     (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
    V61       HOW MUCH OF INFO IN ADS DID YOU BELIEVED     BY  V3          RACE
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  1

                     V3
             COUNT  I
            ROW PCT IBLACK     WHITE     OTHER     NO VALID   ROW
            COL PCT I                              RESPNSE   TOTAL
                    I      1 I      2 I      3 I      0 I
V61         --------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  1 I   226  I  1181  I   104  I    22M I   1512
  ALL               I  15.0  I  78.1  I   6.9  I   0.0  I   11.7
                    I  11.4  I  11.6  I  15.1  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  2 I   703  I  4051  I   210  I    65M I   4964
  MOST              I  14.2  I  81.6  I   4.2  I   0.0  I   38.5
                    I  35.4  I  39.7  I  30.3  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  3 I   734  I  3572  I   242  I    45M I   4548
  SOME              I  16.1  I  78.5  I   5.3  I   0.0  I   35.3
                    I  36.9  I  35.0  I  34.9  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  4 I   145  I   655  I    68  I    16M I    868
  NOT VERY MUCH     I  16.8  I  75.4  I   7.8  I   0.0  I    6.7
                    I   7.3  I   6.4  I   9.8  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  5 I   177  I   752  I    69  I    12M I    998
  NONE              I  17.8  I  75.4  I   6.9  I   0.0  I    7.7
                    I   8.9  I   7.4  I   9.9  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                  0 I    43M I   167M I    19M I     1M I   230M
  NO VALID RESPNSE  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I    0.0
                    I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
            COLUMN     1986     10211      692      162M    12889
             TOTAL     15.4      79.2      5.4       0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    381
```

207

2096

Table III-10

```
                                                                                                          06/25/75
FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
    V61        HOW MUCH OF INFO IN ADS DID YOU BELIEVED      BY  ED1
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  1

                     ED1
              COUNT  I
            ROW PCT  INJT A HS HS         EDUC       NO VALID   ROW
            COL PCT  I GRAD     GRADUATE PAST  HS   RESPNSE   TOTAL
                     I       1  I       2  I     3  I       0  I
V61         ---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                  1  I    734  I    577  I    216  I      8M I   1527
  ALL                I   48.1  I   37.8  I   14.1  I    0.0  I   11.8
                     I   13.5  I   10.8  I    9.9  I    0.0  I
                    -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                  2  I   2121  I   2070  I    795  I     29M I   4986
  MOST               I   42.5  I   41.5  I   15.9  I    0.0  I   38.5
                     I   39.1  I   38.8  I   36.3  I    0.0  I
                    -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                  3  I   1741  I   1970  I    850  I     29M I   4561
  SOME               I   38.2  I   43.2  I   18.6  I    0.0  I   35.2
                     I   32.1  I   36.9  I   38.8  I    0.0  I
                    -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                  4  I    335  I    356  I    187  I      2M I    878
  NOT VERY MUCH      I   38.2  I   40.6  I   21.2  I    0.0  I    6.8
                     I    6.2  I    6.7  I    8.5  I    0.0  I
                    -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                  5  I    500  I    365  I    141  I      4M I   1006
  NONE               I   49.7  I   36.3  I   14.1  I    0.0  I    7.8
                     I    9.2  I    6.8  I    6.5  I    0.0  I
                    -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                  0  I     90M I    102M I     34M I      2M I    229M
  NO VALID RESPNSE   I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0
                     I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I
                    -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
             COLUMN      5431      5337      2189        74M    12957
              TOTAL      41.9      41.2      16.9        0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    313
```

Table III-11

```
FILE  AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)                                                  06/25/75

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
     V61         HOW MUCH OF INFC IN AES DID YOU BELIEVE?      BY  V7              BRANCH OF SERVICE JOINING
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  1 OF  1

                     V7
            COUNT   I
            ROW PCT IAIR        ARMY       MARINE     NAVY        NO VALID   ROW
            COL PCT IFORCE                 CORPS                  RESPNSE    TOTAL
                    I       1  I       2  I       3  I       4  I       0  I
V61         --------I----------I----------I----------I----------I----------I
                  1 I    275   I    551   I    408   I    301   I          I
 ALL                I   17.9   I   35.9   I   26.6   I   19.6   I      2M  I   1534
                    I    9.4   I   11.2   I   17.8   I   10.4   I    0.0   I   11.8
                   -I----------I----------I----------I----------I    0.0   I
                  2 I   1157   I   1827   I    893   I   1146   I----------I
 MOST               I   23.0   I   36.4   I   17.8   I   22.8   I      6M  I   5023
                    I   39.7   I   37.0   I   39.1   I   39.5   I    0.0   I   38.5
                   -I----------I----------I----------I----------I    0.0   I
                  3 I   1125   I   1758   I    671   I   1033   I----------I
 SOME               I   24.5   I   38.3   I   14.6   I   22.5   I      6M  I   4587
                    I   38.6   I   35.6   I   29.4   I   35.7   I    0.0   I   35.2
                   -I----------I----------I----------I----------I    0.0   I
                  4 I    191   I    387   I    134   I    169   I----------I
 NOT VERY MUCH      I   21.7   I   43.9   I   15.2   I   19.2   I      3M  I    881
                    I    6.6   I    7.8   I    5.9   I    5.8   I    0.0   I    6.8
                   -I----------I----------I----------I----------I    0.0   I
                  5 I    167   I    411   I    179   I    249   I----------I
 NONE               I   16.6   I   40.8   I   17.8   I   24.7   I      4M  I   1006
                    I    5.7   I    8.3   I    7.8   I    8.6   I    0.0   I    7.7
                   -I----------I----------I----------I----------I    0.0   I
                  0 I    42M   I   104M   I    30M   I    39M   I----------I
 NO VALID RESPNSE   I    0.0   I    0.0   I    0.0   I    0.0   I     15M  I   230M
                    I    0.0   I    0.0   I    0.0   I    0.0   I    0.0   I    0.0
                   -I----------I----------I----------I----------I    0.0   I
             COLUMN     2916       4932       2285       2898   I----------I
              TOTAL     22.4       37.9       17.5       22.2         35M      13031
                                                                     0.0      100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    2[illegible]
```

Table III-12

```
                                                                                          06/25/75
FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V62       DID ADS INFLUENCE YOU TO SEEK MORE INFO       BY  V1          AGE
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  1

                 V1
        COUNT   I
        ROW PCT I17        18        19        20        21        OVER  21 NO VALID   ROW
        COL PCT I                                                           RESPNSE   TOTAL
                I     1  I     2  I     3  I     4  I     5  I     6  I     0  I
V62     --------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
             1  I   165  I   268  I   212  I   109  I    87  I   195  I    4M  I   1036
  NA-DIDNT SEE  I  15.9  I  25.9  I  20.4  I  10.6  I   8.4  I  18.8  I   0.0  I    7.9
                I   6.5  I   8.6  I   9.1  I   7.5  I   8.5  I   7.2  I   0.0  I
               -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
             2  I  1608  I  1842  I  1283  I   836  I   545  I  1403  I   17M  I   7516
  YES           I  21.4  I  24.5  I  17.1  I  11.1  I   7.2  I  18.7  I   0.0  I   57.5
                I  63.8  I  60.5  I  55.0  I  57.1  I  53.4  I  51.9  I   0.0  I
               -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
             3  I   746  I   936  I   836  I   519  I   388  I  1104  I   10M  I   4529
  NO            I  16.5  I  20.7  I  18.5  I  11.5  I   8.6  I  24.4  I   0.0  I   34.6
                I  29.6  I  30.7  I  35.9  I  35.4  I  38.0  I  40.9  I   0.0  I
               -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
             0  I   24M  I   36M  I   33M  I   33M  I    6M  I   35M  I    4M  I   171M
  NO VALID RESPNSE I 0.0 I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I    0.0
                I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I
               -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
         COLUMN    2518     3046     2330     1465     1020     2702      35M    13081
         TOTAL     19.3     23.3     17.8     11.2      7.8     20.7      0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    189
```

Table III-13

```
                                                                                                  06/25/75
FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
    V62       DID AUS INFLUENCE YOU TO SEEK MORE INFO       BY  V3          RACE
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  1

                       V3
              COUNT   I
             ROW PCT  IBLACK      WHITE      OTHER      NO VALID    ROW
             COL PCT  I                                 RESPNSE     TOTAL
                      I      1  I      2  I      3  I      0  I
V62           --------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                    1 I    202  I    746  I     81  I     11* I   1029
  NA-DIDNT SEE        I   19.6  I   72.5  I    7.9  I    0.0  I    7.9
                      I   10.2  I    7.3  I   11.7  I    0.0  I
                     -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                    2 I   1266  I   5751  I    426  I     86* I   7443
  YES                 I   17.0  I   77.3  I    5.7  I    0.0  I   57.5
                      I   63.8  I   56.0  I   61.3  I    0.0  I
                     -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                    3 I    517  I   3772  I    187  I     63* I   4476
  NO                  I   11.6  I   84.3  I    4.2  I    0.0  I   34.6
                      I   26.1  I   36.7  I   26.9  I    0.0  I
                     -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                    0 I     45* I    107* I     17* I      2* I    171*
  NO VALID RESPNSE    I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0
                      I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I
                     -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
               COLUMN     1985      10269        694       162*    12948
                TOTAL     15.3       79.3        5.4        0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    322
```

Table III-14

```
                                                                                                   06/25/75
FILE   AFEES     (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V62        DID ADS INFLUENCE YOU TO SEEK MORE INFO        BY  ED1
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  1

                         ED1
                COUNT   I
              ROW PCT  INOT A HS HS        EDUC      NO VALID   ROW
              COL PCT  I GRAD     GRADUATE PAST  HS  RESPNSE   TOTAL
                        I      1  I      2  I      3  I      0  I
V62            --------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                      1 I    465  I    407  I    158  I      5M I   1031
  NA-DIDNT SEE          I   45.1  I   39.5  I   15.4  I    0.0  I    7.9
                        I    8.6  I    7.6  I    7.2  I    0.0  I
                      -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                      2 I   3228  I   3095  I   1162  I     35M I   7485
  YES                   I   43.1  I   41.3  I   15.5  I    0.0  I   57.5
                        I   59.3  I   57.5  I   52.9  I    0.0  I
                      -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                      3 I   1748  I   1878  I    875  I     32M I   4502
  NO                    I   38.8  I   41.7  I   19.4  I    0.0  I   34.6
                        I   32.1  I   34.9  I   39.9  I    0.0  I
                      -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                      0 I     84M I     58M I     27M I      1M I    170M
  NO VALID RESPNSE      I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0
                        I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I
                      -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
               COLUMN      5441      5381      2196        74M    13018
                TOTAL      41.8      41.3      16.9        0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    252
```

2101

Table III-15

```
                                                                                                          06/25/75
FILE   AFEES     (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
    V62        DID ADS INFLUENCE YOU TO SEEK MORE INFO        BY  V7          BRANCH OF SERVICE JOINING
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   PAGE  1 OF  1

                      V7
             COUNT   I
           ROW PCT  IAIR        ARMY       MARINE     NAVY       NO VALID   ROW
           COL PCT  IFORCE                 CORPS                 RESPNSE    TOTAL
                    I     1  I     2  I     3  I     4  I     0  I
V62         --------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 1  I   195  I   408  I   200  I   229  I    7M  I   1033
  NA-DIDNT SEE      I  18.9  I  39.5  I  19.4  I  22.2  I   0.0  I    7.9
                    I   6.7  I   8.2  I   8.7  I   7.9  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 2  I  1611  I  2950  I  1409  I  1556  I    9M  I   7525
  YES               I  21.4  I  39.2  I  18.7  I  20.7  I   0.0  I   57.5
                    I  54.9  I  59.6  I  61.4  I  53.4  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 3  I  1128  I  1592  I   687  I  1129  I    4M  I   4535
  NO                I  24.9  I  35.1  I  15.1  I  24.9  I   0.0  I   34.6
                    I  38.4  I  32.2  I  29.9  I  38.7  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 0  I   24M  I   87M  I   24M  I   21M  I   15M  I   171M
  NO VALID RESPNSE  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I    0.0
                    I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I
                   -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
            COLUMN     2934     4949     2296     2914      35M    13093
             TOTAL     22.4     37.8     17.5     22.3      0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    177
```

Table III-16

SECTION IV

THE RECRUITER

Reaction to Recruiter

In general, enlistees have a very favorable image of recruiters. They felt that recruiters explained all options to them, answered all questions, and let them make up their own minds about whether or not they wanted to enter the service. However, 16% of the respondents felt that recruiters tended to use high pressure or hard sell tactics. Non-white respondents felt that recruiters used hard sell-high pressure tactis more often than did white respondents. Figures are presented in Table IV-2. White entrants tended to give slightly higher scores to recruiters in such categories as answering all questions and being "nice guys".

Recruiter image varied slightly by service. In general, Air Force and Navy enlistees tended to have a slightly higher image of their recruiters than did Marine Corps or Army enlistees. Marine Corps recruiters (25% and Army recruiters (19%) were rated as "hard sell, high pressure" more often than were their Navy (12%) and Air Force (10%) counterparts.

There was a positive relationship between recruiter image and the respondents' expectations of how well they would like military life and whether they would reenlist. Enlistees who thought they would like military life tended to rate the recruiters highly (Table IV-5), as did enlistees who intended to reenlist (Table IV-6).

Initial Contact with Recruiters

When enlistees were asked how they first came into contact with a recruiter, 63% indicated that they had visited a recruiting office, while another 11% phoned the recruiter (Table IV 7-10). Recruiter initiated contacts occurred through phone calls (5%); sending of information (4%); or school sponsored activities (6%).

SECTION IV

THE RECRUITER

TABLE GUIDE*

FIRST VARIABLE	AGE(1)	RACE(3)	EDUCATION(4,5)	BRANCH OF SERVICE(7)	LIKE MILITARY SERVICE(29)	INTENTION TO REENLIST(30)
Reaction to recruiter(19)**	1	2	3	4	5	6
How recruiter first contacted(21)	7	8	9	10	-	-

*To find a particular bivariate distribution, locate the row and column containing the items of interest. If a table exists for those items, its table number is given where that row and column intersect.

**The numbers in parentheses refer to the questionnaire item(s) from which the data were derived.

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PERCENT OF PERSONS AGREEING WITH DESCRIPTIONS OF
THE RECRUITERS IN HIS SERVICE BY AGE

	17		18		19		20		21		Over 21		All Ages	
DESCRIPTION	VERY WELL %	FAIRLY WELL %	VERY WELL %	FAIRLY WELL %	VERY WELL %	FAIRLY WELL %	VERY WELL %	FAIRLY WELL %	VERY WELL %	FAIRLY WELL %	VERY WELL %	FAIRLY WELL %	VERY WELL %	FAIRLY WELL %
Hard Sell; High Pressure	6.6	9.9	7.8	8.4	6.0	9.2	7.4	8.4	6.6	11.4	7.8	9.2	7.1	9.2
Gave Honest Picture	48.9	29.7	44.1	31.8	40.6	30.5	41.4	34.0	40.2	31.4	47.9	30.5	44.6	31.1
Explain all Options	55.2	25.7	53.5	25.6	47.5	28.5	50.7	28.6	50.7	26.9	55.2	24.9	52.6	26.4
Were Nice Guys	64.2	20.4	58.4	[illegible]	51.7	25.1	56.7	27.5	54.5	31.4	58.4	24.1	58.0	24.8
Answered All Questions	68.7	21.3	66.6	21.9	60.1	26.2	64.8	23.9	64.6	23.0	63.8	22.8	64.9	23.0
Let Me Make Up My Mind	73.9	15.1	72.1	17.3	67.3	19.7	68.9	18.4	69.4	20.7	73.6	16.6	71.4	17.3

7

Table IV-1

PERCENT OF PERSONS AGREEING WITH DESCRIPTIONS OF THE RECRUITERS IN HIS SERVICE BY RACE

DESCRIPTION	BLACK		WHITE		OTHER		ALL	
	VERY WELL %	FAIRLY WELL %	VERY WELL %	FAIRLY WELL %	VERY WELL %	FAIRLY WELL %	VERY WELL %	FAIRLY WELL %
Hard Sell - High Pressure	15.6	15.1	5.3	7.8	11.0	15.0	7.1	9.2
Gave Honest Picture	49.4	24.6	43.5	32.4	46.8	29.2	44.6	31.1
Explained All Options	54.7	23.3	52.2	27.1	51.9	25.5	52.6	26.5
Were Nice Guys	51.8	26.6	59.8	24.2	48.0	26.9	58.1	24.7
Answered All Questions	64.5	19.2	65.5	23.5	58.4	26.3	65.0	23.0
Let Me Make Up My Mind	70.3	16.2	72.2	17.3	62.7	24.7	71.4	17.6

Table IV-2

PERCENT OF PERSONS AGREEING WITH DESCRIPTIONS OF THE RECRUITERS IN HIS SERVICE BY EDUCATION

DESCRIPTION	NOT A HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE		HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE		EDUCATION PAST HIGH SCHOOL		ALL LEVELS	
	VERY WELL	FAIRLY WELL	VERY WELL	FAIRLY WELL	VERY WELL	FAIRLY WELL	VERY WELL	FAIRLY WELL
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Hard Sell - High Pressure	8.0	10.0	5.9	8.2	7.7	9.5	7.1	9.2
Gave Honest Picture	47.8	28.5	43.9	32.4	37.7	34.4	44.5	31.1
Explained All Options	54.1	24.4	53.5	27.0	46.8	29.4	52.6	26.3
Were Nice Guys	59.6	22.5	58.7	25.1	53.0	29.2	58.1	24.7
Answered All Questions	66.1	21.6	66.0	23.1	59.6	25.9	65.0	23.0
Let Me Make Up My Mind	72.6	15.7	71.7	18.3	67.1	20.3	71.3	17.6

Table IV-3

PERCENT OF PERSONS AGREEING WITH DESCRIPTIONS OF THE RECRUITERS IN HIS BRANCH OF SERVICE

DESCRIPTION	AIR FORCE		ARMY		MARINE CORPS		NAVY		ALL	
	VERY WELL %	FAIRLY WELL %	VERY WELL %	FAIRLY WELL %	VERY WELL %	FAIRLY WELL %	VERY WELL %	FAIRLY WELL %	VERY WELL %	FAIRLY WELL %
Hard Sell - High Pressure	3.9	6.1	8.8	10.1	11.7	13.3	4.0	8.0	7.1	9.2
Gave Honest Picture	43.0	35.5	40.8	30.2	52.1	26.3	46.8	31.7	44.6	31.1
Explained All Options	53.3	29.2	49.7	24.8	53.1	25.4	56.5	27.0	52.6	26.4
Were Nice Guys	61.9	25.4	52.6	26.0	55.3	24.3	65.3	22.2	58.0	24.7
Answered All Questions	68.3	22.7	60.1	24.1	69.0	18.0	66.7	25.1	65.0	23.0
Let Me Make Up My Mind	74.7	17.7	67.6	18.9	71.9	16.1	74.2	16.2	71.4	17.5

Table IV-4

PERCENT OF PERSONS AGREEING WITH DESCRIPTIONS OF THE RECRUITERS IN HIS BRANCH BY EXTENT ENLISTEE EXPECTS TO LIKE MILITARY SERVICE

	VERY WELL		QUITE WELL		FAIRLY WELL		NOT TOO WELL		NOT AT ALL		NOT SURE		ALL	
DESCRIPTION	VERY WELL	FAIRLY WELL	VERY WELL	FAIRLY WELL	VERY WELL	FAIRLY WELL	VERY WELL	FAIRLY WELL	VERY WELL	FAIRLY WELL	VERY WELL	FAIRLY WELL	VERY WELL	FAIRLY WELL
Hard Sell - High Pressure	9.9	8.3	5.8	9.0	4.6	9.9	16.9	12.5	25.9	9.6	8.9	11.2	7.1	9.2
Gave Honest Picture	64.5	21.5	43.5	36.5	28.8	35.0	18.6	28.2	26.7	19.8	28.1	31.6	44.6	31.1
Explained All Options	70.3	16.6	53.3	28.5	37.4	34.4	22.4	24.3	23.0	8.5	37.2	28.0	52.7	26.4
Were Nice Guys	74.1	15.4	60.4	25.3	42.9	33.4	32.7	18.3	24.5	9.2	38.8	30.8	58.0	24.7
Answered All Questions	80.0	12.9	67.1	22.9	50.3	33.5	28.6	26.9	31.0	13.2	52.7	26.4	65.0	23.0
Let Me Make Up My Mind	84.3	8.9	73.8	17.4	58.5	25.8	42.8	25.3	25.5	16.6	60.1	21.5	71.4	17.5

Table IV-5

PERCENT OF PERSONS AGREEING WITH DESCRIPTIONS OF THE RECRUITERS IN HIS BRANCH BY INTENTION TO REENLIST

	YES		PROBABLY YES		PROBABLY NOT		NO		ALL	
DESCRIPTION	VERY WELL	FAIRLY WELL	VERY WELL	FAIRLY WELL	VERY WELL	FAIRLY WELL	VERY WELL	FAIRLY WELL	VERY WELL	FAIRLY WELL
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Hard Sell - High Pressure	8.1	8.8	6.9	9.6	6.1	8.7	9.2	7.8	7.1	9.1
Gave Honest Picture	59.4	23.4	46.8	31.4	30.5	37.8	26.7	30.4	44.6	31.2
Explained All Options	64.2	19.5	54.9	26.2	41.8	31.8	33.0	31.5	52.7	26.4
Were Nice Guys	66.6	19.5	61.0	24.0	48.3	30.4	39.1	26.7	58.1	24.7
Answered All Questions	72.7	16.7	67.0	22.3	57.6	29.1	47.5	29.4	65.0	23.1
			73.6							
Let Me Make Up My Mind	79.6	11.4	73.6	16.7	63.2	23.4	56.6	21.8	71.5	17.4

Table IV-6

```
                                                                                                    06/25/75

FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V39      HOW 1ST CONTACTED RECRUITER FOR SERVICE      BY  V1          AGE
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  1

                    V1
          COUNT    I
          ROW PCT  I17        18        19        20        21        OVER  21 NO VALID   ROW
          COL PCT  I                                                           RESPNSE   TOTAL
                   I       1 I       2 I       3 I       4 I       5 I       6 I       0 I
V39       ---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 1 I   155   I   223   I   125   I    51   I    42   I    37   I     1M  I   633
  RECRUITR PHONED  I  24.4   I  35.2   I  19.8   I   8.1   I   6.6   I   5.9   I   0.0   I   4.8
                   I   6.2   I   7.3   I   5.3   I   3.4   I   4.2   I   1.4   I   0.0   I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 2 I   112   I   147   I   129   I    54   I    30   I    60   I     1M  I   533
  RECRTR SENT INFO I  21.0   I  27.7   I  24.3   I  10.2   I   5.6   I  11.3   I   0.0   I   4.1
                   I   4.4   I   4.8   I   5.5   I   3.6   I   3.0   I   2.2   I   0.0   I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 3 I  1312   I  1767   I  1478   I  1040   I   733   I  1931   I    20M  I  8261
  I VISITED OFFICE I  15.9   I  21.4   I  17.9   I  12.6   I   8.9   I  23.4   I   0.0   I  62.9
                   I  52.1   I  57.7   I  63.0   I  70.0   I  72.6   I  71.2   I   0.0   I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 4 I   361   I   268   I   237   I   152   I   113   I   402   I     2M  I  1533
  I PHONED         I  23.5   I  17.5   I  15.5   I   9.9   I   7.4   I  26.2   I   0.0   I  11.7
                   I  14.3   I   8.8   I  10.1   I  10.2   I  11.2   I  14.8   I   0.0   I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 5 I   280   I   273   I   136   I    40   I    19   I    34   I     2M  I   781
  MET AT SCHOOL    I  35.8   I  34.9   I  17.4   I   5.1   I   2.4   I   4.4   I   0.0   I   5.9
                   I  11.1   I   8.9   I   5.8   I   2.7   I   1.8   I   1.3   I   0.0   I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 6 I    21   I    24   I    13   I    14   I     2   I    11   I     0M  I    85
  I WROTE LETTER   I  24.4   I  28.7   I  15.4   I  16.6   I   2.1   I  12.9   I   0.0   I   0.6
                   I   0.8   I   0.8   I   0.6   I   0.9   I   0.2   I   0.4   I   0.0   I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 7 I   255   I   333   I   202   I   108   I    68   I   207   I     4M  I  1174
  OTHER WAY        I  21.7   I  28.3   I  17.2   I   9.2   I   5.8   I  17.7   I   0.0   I   8.9
                   I  10.1   I  10.9   I   8.6   I   7.3   I   6.8   I   7.6   I   0.0   I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 8 I    22   I    26   I    24   I    26   I     3   I    28   I     3M  I   129
  DONT REMEMBER    I  17.0   I  19.7   I  18.7   I  20.2   I   2.6   I  21.8   I   0.0   I   1.0
                   I   0.9   I   0.8   I   1.0   I   1.8   I   0.3   I   1.0   I   0.0   I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 0 I    11M  I    14M  I    14M  I     6M  I     4M  I    14M  I     4M  I    67M
  NO VALID RESPNSE I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0
                   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
            COLUMN     2516      3061      2346      1485      1010      2711       25M   13130
             TOTAL     19.2      23.3      17.9      11.3       7.7      20.6       0.0   100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    140
```

Table IV-7

```
                                                                                                     06/25/75
FILE    AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
    V39       HOW 1ST CONTACTED RECRUITER FOR SERVICE      BY  V3          RACE
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  1

                     V3
            COUNT  I
          ROW PCT  IBLACK     WHITE     OTHER     NO VALID   ROW
          COL PCT  I                              RESPNSE   TOTAL
                   I     1  I     2  I     3  I     0  I
V39       ---------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                1  I   105  I   494  I    23  I   11M  I   622
  RECRUITR PHONED  I  16.9  I  79.4  I   3.6  I   0.0  I   4.8
                   I   5.3  I   4.8  I   3.3  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                2  I   129  I   380  I    18  I    6M  I   527
  RECRTR SENT INFO I  24.6  I  72.1  I   3.3  I   0.0  I   4.1
                   I   6.5  I   3.7  I   2.5  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                3  I  1257  I  6442  I   472  I  105M  I  8171
  I VISITED OFFICE I  15.4  I  78.8  I   5.8  I   0.0  I  62.9
                   I  62.7  I  62.6  I  67.9  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                4  I   200  I  1251  I    66  I   18M  I  1517
  I PHONED         I  13.2  I  82.5  I   4.4  I   0.0  I  11.7
                   I  10.0  I  12.2  I   9.5  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                5  I   119  I   630  I    30  I    3M  I   780
  MET AT SCHOOL    I  15.3  I  80.8  I   3.9  I   0.0  I   6.0
                   I   5.9  I   6.1  I   4.4  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                6  I    12  I    63  I     8  I    3M  I    82
  I WROTE LETTER   I  14.2  I  76.4  I   9.4  I   0.0  I   0.6
                   I   0.6  I   0.6  I   1.1  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                7  I   160  I   944  I    61  I   12M  I  1166
  OTHER WAY        I  13.8  I  81.0  I   5.2  I   0.0  I   9.0
                   I   8.0  I   9.2  I   8.7  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                8  I    23  I    89  I    18  I    3M  I   130
  DONT REMEMBER    I  17.4  I  68.4  I  14.2  I   0.0  I   1.0
                   I   1.1  I   0.9  I   2.7  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                0  I   10M  I   49M  I    8M  I    1M  I   67M
  NC VALID RESPNSE I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0
                   I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
           COLUMN     2005     10293      696      162M   12994
            TOTAL     15.4      79.2      5.4       0.0   100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATICNS =    276
```

Table IV-8

```
                                                                                              06/25/75

FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F  * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V39      HOW 1ST CONTACTED RECRUITER FOR SERVICE       BY  ED1
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  1

                     ED1
            COUNT  I
          ROW PCT  INOT A HS HS        EDUC      NO VALID   ROW
          COL PCT  I GRAD     GRADUATE PAST  HS  RESPNSE   TOTAL
                   I     1  I      2  I     3  I      0  I
V39        --------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                1  I   300  I   285  I    48  I     0M I    632
  RECRUITR PHONED  I  47.4  I  45.0  I   7.6  I   0.0  I    4.8
                   I   5.5  I   5.3  I   2.2  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                2  I   187  I   277  I    70  I     0M I    534
  RECRTR SENT INFO I  35.1  I  51.9  I  13.1  I   0.0  I    4.1
                   I   3.4  I   5.1  I   3.2  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                3  I  3284  I  3352  I  1567  I    58M I   8203
  I VISITED OFFICE I  40.0  I  40.9  I  19.1  I   0.0  I   62.8
                   I  60.1  I  62.0  I  71.4  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                4  I   695  I   575  I   257  I     7M I   1527
  I PHONED         I  45.5  I  37.7  I  16.8  I   0.0  I   11.7
                   I  12.7  I  10.6  I  11.7  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                5  I   349  I   365  I    67  I     2M I    780
  MET AT SCHOOL    I  44.7  I  46.7  I   8.6  I   0.0  I    6.0
                   I   6.4  I   6.7  I   3.1  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                6  I    29  I    44  I    12  I     0M I     84
  I WROTE LETTER   I  33.9  I  52.4  I  13.7  I   0.0  I    0.6
                   I   0.5  I   0.8  I   0.5  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                7  I   567  I   455  I   150  I     5M I   1172
  OTHER WAY        I  48.4  I  38.8  I  12.8  I   0.0  I    9.0
                   I  10.4  I   8.4  I   6.8  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                8  I    54  I    54  I    24  I     0M I    132
  DONT REMEMBER    I  41.1  I  41.0  I  17.9  I   0.0  I    1.0
                   I   1.0  I   1.0  I   1.1  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                0  I    35M I    19M I    11M I     1M I     67M
  NO VALID RESPNSE I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I    0.0
                   I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
           COLUMN     5465     5408     2194       74M    13066
            TOTAL     41.8     41.4     16.8      0.0     100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    204
```

Table IV-9

```
                                                                                          06/25/75
FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F  * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
    V39      HOW 1ST CONTACTED RECRUITER FOR SERVICE        BY  V7        BRANCH OF SERVICE JOINING
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  1

                    V7
           COUNT   I
         ROW PCT   IAIR       ARMY      MARINE     NAVY      NO VALID   ROW
         COL PCT   IFORCE               CORPS                 RESPNSE   TOTAL
                   I      1 I      2 I      3 I      4 I      0 I
V39        --------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
               1   I     91 I    197 I    278 I     64 I     3M I     631
  RECRUITR PHONED  I   14.5 I   31.3 I   44.1 I   10.2 I    0.0 I     4.8
                   I    3.1 I    4.0 I   12.2 I    2.2 I    0.0 I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
               2   I    117 I    208 I    112 I     96 I     1M I     533
  RECRTR SENT INFO I   21.9 I   39.0 I   21.0 I   18.1 I    0.0 I     4.1
                   I    4.0 I    4.2 I    4.9 I    3.3 I    0.0 I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
               3   I   1895 I   3118 I   1287 I   1972 I    10M I    8272
  I VISITED OFFICE I   22.9 I   37.7 I   15.6 I   23.8 I    0.0 I    62.9
                   I   64.3 I   62.6 I   56.3 I   67.5 I    0.0 I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
               4   I    348 I    607 I    191 I    386 I     3M I    1533
  I PHONED         I   22.7 I   39.6 I   12.5 I   25.2 I    0.0 I    11.7
                   I   11.8 I   12.2 I    8.4 I   13.2 I    0.0 I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
               5   I    241 I    273 I    119 I    151 I     0M I     783
  MET AT SCHOOL    I   30.7 I   34.8 I   15.2 I   19.2 I    0.0 I     6.0
                   I    8.2 I    5.5 I    5.2 I    5.2 I    0.0 I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
               6   I     14 I     39 I     18 I     13 I     0M I      85
  I WROTE LETTER   I   16.9 I   46.6 I   21.1 I   15.3 I    0.0 I     0.6
                   I    0.5 I    0.8 I    0.8 I    0.4 I    0.0 I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
               7   I    221 I    469 I    265 I    218 I     4M I    1174
  OTHER WAY        I   18.8 I   40.0 I   22.6 I   18.6 I    0.0 I     8.9
                   I    7.5 I    9.4 I   11.6 I    7.5 I    0.0 I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
               8   I     22 I     73 I     15 I     23 I     0M I     132
  DONT REMEMBER    I   16.3 I   54.9 I   11.4 I   17.4 I    0.0 I     1.0
                   I    0.7 I    1.5 I    0.7 I    0.8 I    0.0 I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
               0   I     6M I    25M I    19M I     6M I    15M I     67M
  NO VALID RESPNSE I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I     0.0
                   I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
           COLUMN      2949     4984     2285     2923      35M    13141
           TOTAL       22.4     37.9     17.4     22.2      0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    129
```

Table IV-10

SECTION V

THE ENLISTMENT DECISION

Time Spent Making the Enlistment Decision

Almost three-fourths of enlistees began to think seriously about entering military service within six months of signing up (Table V-14). Only 18% began serious consideration over 12 months prior to their entry. The elapsed time between first serious thinking and joining tended to be longest for the Air Force enlistees and shortest for Marine Corps enlistees. This latency period also tended to be longer for older enlistees. Interestingly, persons entering delayed entry programs had no longer periods of decision making than did persons who entered active duty without having been in a delayed entry program.

Approximately three-fourths of enlistees first talked to a recruiter within 3 months of signing up. Quite often, particularly for younger enlistees, the first contact with a recruiter came within 30 days of signing up. Persons who marked "other" for race were particularly likely to have first talked to a recruiter within 30 days of enlisting.

The final decision to enter the service was generally made within 30 days of enlisting.

Service Preference and Acceptability of Other Services

Most of the respondents entered the first service in which they **tried** to enlist (Table V-4). This was true for 92% of Air Force enlistees, 87% of Navy enlistees, 83% of Army enlistees and 76% of Marine Corps enlistees. Fifty-three percent of Air Force enlistees claimed they would not have enlisted it they could not have entered the Air Force. Similarly, 47% of Navy enlistees, 42% of Army enlistees, and 41% of Marine Corps enlistees claimed they would not enlist in any service if they **could** not have joined the service they were entering.

Expected Satisfaction with Military Service

Almost no enlistees expect to dislike military service at the time of their enlistment. Most enlistees marked "fairly well", "quite well", or "very well" when asked "How well do you think you will like military service." Only 6% indicated that they were "not sure" (Table V-27). The Marine Corps had the largest proportion of respondents who indicated they expected to like military life "very well".

Intention to Reenlist

Of those taking the survey 19% indicated "yes," they would reenlist. Another 54% marked "probably yes". These positive attitudes were fairly consistent for different services, races and educational levels, but were somewhat more pronounced among 17 year olds and persons over 21.

SECTION V

THE ENLISTMENT DECISION

TABLE GUIDE*

FIRST VARIABLE	AGE(1)	RACE(3)	EDUCATION(4,5)	BRANCH OF SERVICE(7)	ENTERED THROUGH DELAYED ENTRY(12,13)
First service choice(8)**	1	2	3	4	-
What if present service not available(10)	5	6	7	8	-
Time since first contact with recruiter(20)	9[1]	10[1]	11[1]	12[1]	13
How long ago began thinking seriously about joining(23)	14[1]	15[1]	16[1]	17[1]	18
When final decision made(24)	19[1]	20[1]	21[1]	22[1]	23
Expected satisfaction with military service(29)	24	25	26	27	-
Reenlistment intent(30)	28	29	30	31	-

*To find a particular bivariate distribution, locate the row and column containing the items of interest. If a table exists for those items, its table number is given where that row and column intersect.

**The numbers in parentheses refer to the questionnaire item(s) from which the data were derived.

[1] The tables exclude persons entering active duty from a delayed entry program and are not weighted.

```
                                                                                            06/25/75
FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F  * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
    V8       BRANCH OF SERVICE TRIED FIRST                    BY  V1       AGE
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  1

                    V1
          COUNT    I
          ROW PCT  I17        18         19         20         21         OVER  21 NO VALID   ROW
          COL PCT  I                                                               RESPNSE   TOTAL
                   I      1  I      2  I      3  I      4  I      5  I      6  I      0  I
V8         --------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 1 I    495  I    837  I    684  I    493  I    288  I    667  I     7M  I   3463
  AIR FORCE        I   14.3  I   24.2  I   19.7  I   14.2  I    8.3  I   19.3  I    0.0  I   26.5
                   I   19.7  I   27.6  I   29.1  I   33.4  I   28.2  I   24.8  I    0.0  I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 2 I    748  I   1023  I    750  I    495  I    413  I   1148  I    19M  I   4576
  ARMY             I   16.3  I   22.3  I   16.4  I   10.8  I    9.0  I   25.1  I    0.0  I   35.0
                   I   29.8  I   33.7  I   32.0  I   33.6  I   40.4  I   42.6  I    0.0  I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 3 I    565  I    498  I    361  I    185  I     97  I    271  I     2M  I   1982
  MARINE CORPS     I   28.5  I   25.1  I   18.2  I    9.3  I    4.9  I   13.7  I    0.0  I   15.1
                   I   22.6  I   16.4  I   15.4  I   12.6  I    9.5  I   10.1  I    0.0  I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 4 I    702  I    680  I    550  I    301  I    223  I    606  I     8M  I   3063
  NAVY             I   22.9  I   22.2  I   18.0  I    9.8  I    7.3  I   19.8  I    0.0  I   23.4
                   I   27.9  I   22.4  I   23.5  I   20.4  I   21.9  I   22.5  I    0.0  I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 0 I    28M  I    45M  I    19M  I    24M  I     3M  I    45M  I     2M  I   166M
  NO VALID RESPNSE I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0
                   I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
            COLUMN     2514      3038      2345      1474      1021      2692       35M    13085
             TOTAL     19.2      23.2      17.9      11.3       7.8      20.6       0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =   185
```

2117

Table V-1

```
FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)                                                      06/25/75

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
    V8        BRANCH OF SERVICE TRIED FIRST                          BY  V3        RACE
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  1

                     V3
              COUNT  I
             ROW PCT IBLACK     WHITE     OTHER     NO VALID   ROW
             COL PCT I                              RESPNSE   TOTAL
                     I      1  I      2  I      3  I      0  I
V8            -------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   1 I    460  I   2830  I    149  I    30M  I   3439
  AIR FORCE          I   13.4  I   82.3  I    4.3  I    0.0  I   26.5
                     I   23.4  I   27.5  I   21.3  I    0.0  I
                    -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   2 I    853  I   3359  I    318  I    62M  I   4530
  ARMY               I   18.8  I   74.2  I    7.0  I    0.0  I   35.0
                     I   43.3  I   32.7  I   45.4  I    0.0  I
                    -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   3 I    374  I   1462  I    126  I    22M  I   1962
  MARINE CORPS       I   19.0  I   74.5  I    6.4  I    0.0  I   15.1
                     I   19.0  I   14.2  I   18.0  I    0.0  I
                    -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   4 I    282  I   2636  I    108  I    47M  I   3025
  NAVY               I    9.3  I   87.1  I    3.6  I    0.0  I   23.3
                     I   14.3  I   25.6  I   15.4  I    0.0  I
                    -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   0 I    62M  I    92M  I    11M  I     1M  I   166M
  NO VALID RESPNSE   I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0
                     I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I
                    -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
              COLUMN     1968     10288       700      162M    12956
               TOTAL     15.2      79.4       5.4       0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    314
```

Table V-2

```
                                                                                   06/25/75
FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F  * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V8        BRANCH OF SERVICE TRIED FIRST                                BY  ED1
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  1 OF  1

                   ED1
           COUNT  I
         ROW PCT  INOT A HS HS        EDUC       NO VALID   ROW
         COL PCT  I GRAD     GRADUATE PAST  HS  RESPNSE   TOTAL
                  I       1 I       2 I       3 I       0 I
V8       --------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
               1 I     959 I    1779 I     718 I     10M I   3456
  AIR FORCE      I    27.7 I    51.5 I    20.8 I     0.0 I   26.5
                 I    17.6 I    33.2 I    32.6 I     0.0 I
                -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
               2 I    2075 I    1629 I     836 I     36M I   4545
  ARMY           I    45.7 I    35.8 I    18.4 I     0.0 I   34.9
                 I    38.1 I    30.4 I    38.1 I     0.0 I
                -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
               3 I    1063 I     714 I     192 I     15M I   1969
  MARINE CORPS   I    54.0 I    36.3 I     9.7 I     0.0 I   15.1
                 I    19.5 I    13.3 I     8.7 I     0.0 I
                -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
               4 I    1358 I    1242 I     452 I     12M I   3053
  NAVY           I    44.5 I    40.7 I    14.8 I     0.0 I   23.4
                 I    24.9 I    23.2 I    20.6 I     0.0 I
                -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
               0 I     67M I     76M I     21M I      1M I    166M
  NO VALID RESPNSE I   0.0 I     0.0 I     0.0 I     0.0 I    0.0
                 I     0.0 I     0.0 I     0.0 I     0.0 I
                -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
          COLUMN      5459      5365      2198       74M   13022
           TOTAL      41.9      41.2      16.9       0.0   100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    248
```

2119

Table V-3

```
                                                                                                  06/25/75
FILE   AFEES     (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
    V8         BRANCH OF SERVICE TRIED FIRST                          BY  V7         BRANCH OF SERVICE JOINING
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  1 OF  1

                     V7
             COUNT   I
           ROW PCT   IAIR       ARMY      MARINE    NAVY      NO VALID   ROW
           COL PCT   IFORCE               CORPS               RESPNSE   TOTAL
                     I      1  I      2  I      3  I      4  I      0  I
V8          ---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 1   I  2703   I   420   I   146   I   195   I     5M  I  3465
  AIR FORCE          I  78.0   I  12.1   I   4.2   I   5.6   I   0.0   I  26.4
                     I  92.1   I   8.4   I   6.4   I   6.7   I   0.0   I
                    -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 2   I   110   I  4111   I   225   I   138   I     9M  I  4583
  ARMY               I   2.4   I  89.7   I   4.9   I   3.0   I   0.0   I  35.0
                     I   3.7   I  82.6   I   9.9   I   4.7   I   0.0   I
                    -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 3   I    39   I   183   I  1717   I    43   I     2M  I  1983
  MARINE CORPS       I   2.0   I   9.2   I  86.6   I   2.2   I   0.0   I  15.1
                     I   1.3   I   3.7   I  75.6   I   1.5   I   0.0   I
                    -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 4   I    83   I   261   I   183   I  2543   I     2M  I  3070
  NAVY               I   2.7   I   8.5   I   6.0   I  82.8   I   0.0   I  23.4
                     I   2.8   I   5.2   I   8.1   I  87.1   I   0.0   I
                    -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 0   I    23M  I    61M  I    47M  I    18M  I    17M  I   166M
  NO VALID RESPNSE   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0
                     I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I
                    -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
            COLUMN      2935      4975      2272      2919        35M   13100
             TOTAL      22.4      38.0      17.3      22.3       0.0   100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    170
```

Table V-4

```
                                                                                                    06/25/75

FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F  * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
     V10       IF COULDNT GET 1ST SERV-WNT WLOVE DCNE          BY  V1          AGE
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  1 OF  1

                       V1
               COUNT   I
             ROW PCT   I17         18         19         20         21        OVER  21 NO VALID   ROW
             COL PCT   I                                                                RESPNSE   TOTAL
                       I      1  I      2  I      3  I      4  I      5  I      6  I      0  I
V10           ---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                    1  I    528  I    676  I    514  I    351  I    209  I    536  I     2M  I   2814
  JOINED A.F.          I   18.8  I   24.0  I   18.2  I   12.5  I    7.4  I   19.1  I    0.0  I   21.4
                       I   20.9  I   22.1  I   21.9  I   23.6  I   20.5  I   19.8  I    0.0  I
                      -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                    2  I    307  I    350  I    244  I    138  I     83  I    251  I     9M  I   1373
  JOINED ARMY          I   22.4  I   25.5  I   17.8  I   10.0  I    6.1  I   18.3  I    0.0  I   10.4
                       I   12.2  I   11.4  I   10.4  I    9.3  I    8.2  I    9.2  I    0.0  I
                      -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                    3  I    246  I    229  I    172  I     90  I     61  I    151  I     2M  I    950
  JOINED MARINES       I   26.0  I   24.1  I   18.1  I    9.4  I    6.5  I   15.9  I    0.0  I    7.2
                       I    9.8  I    7.5  I    7.3  I    6.0  I    6.0  I    5.6  I    0.0  I
                      -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                    4  I    403  I    551  I    364  I    241  I    151  I    346  I     6M  I   2057
  JOINED  NAVY         I   19.6  I   26.8  I   17.7  I   11.7  I    7.3  I   16.8  I    0.0  I   15.6
                       I   15.9  I   18.0  I   15.5  I   16.2  I   14.8  I   12.7  I    0.0  I
                      -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                    5  I   1043  I   1255  I   1055  I    669  I    514  I   1431  I    14M  I   5967
  NOT ENLISTED         I   17.5  I   21.0  I   17.7  I   11.2  I    8.6  I   24.0  I    0.0  I   45.3
                       I   41.3  I   41.0  I   44.9  I   44.9  I   50.5  I   52.7  I    0.0  I
                      -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                    0  I    15M  I    19M  I    16M  I     8M  I     7M  I    23M  I     2M  I    90M
  NO VALID RESPNSE     I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0
                       I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I
                      -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
              COLUMN      2527      3062      2348      1489      1019      2716       35M    13160
               TOTAL      19.2      23.3      17.8      11.3       7.7      20.6       0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    110
```

2121

Table V-5

```
                                                                                         06/25/75
FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V10       IF COULDNT GET 1ST SERV-WHT WLDVE DONE         BY  V3          RACE
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  1

                       V3
              COUNT  I
            ROW PCT  IBLACK      WHITE      OTHER      NO VALID   ROW
            COL PCT  I                                 RESPNSE    TOTAL
                     I       1  I       2  I       3  I       0  I
V10          --------I----------I----------I----------I----------I
                   1 I    506   I   2129   I    138   I     43M  I   2773
  JOINED A.F.        I   18.3   I   76.8   I    5.0   I    0.0   I   21.3
                     I   25.2   I   20.6   I   19.5   I    0.0   I
                    -I----------I----------I----------I----------I
                   2 I    254   I   1012   I    103   I     13M  I   1368
  JOINED ARMY        I   18.5   I   73.9   I    7.5   I    0.0   I   10.5
                     I   12.6   I    9.8   I   14.6   I    0.0   I
                    -I----------I----------I----------I----------I
                   3 I    174   I    692   I     74   I     12M  I    939
  JOINED MARINES     I   18.5   I   73.6   I    7.8   I    0.0   I    7.2
                     I    8.6   I    6.7   I   10.4   I    0.0   I
                    -I----------I----------I----------I----------I
                   4 I    267   I   1670   I    110   I     16M  I   2047
  JOINED  NAVY       I   13.1   I   81.6   I    5.4   I    0.0   I   15.7
                     I   13.3   I   16.2   I   15.5   I    0.0   I
                    -I----------I----------I----------I----------I
                   5 I    811   I   4812   I    281   I     76M  I   5904
  NOT ENLISTED       I   13.7   I   81.5   I    4.8   I    0.0   I   45.3
                     I   40.3   I   46.7   I   39.9   I    0.0   I
                    -I----------I----------I----------I----------I
                   0 I     17M  I     66M  I      5M  I      2M  I     90M
  NO VALID RESPNSE   I    0.0   I    0.0   I    0.0   I    0.0   I    0.0
                     I    0.0   I    0.0   I    0.0   I    0.0   I
                    -I----------I----------I----------I----------I
             COLUMN      2012      10314        705        162M     13031
              TOTAL      15.4       79.1        5.4         0.0     100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    239
```

Table V-6

```
                                                                                    06/25/75

FILE   AFEES     (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V10        IF COULDNT GET 1ST SERV-WHT WLDVE DONE            BY  ED1
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  1

                         ED1
               COUNT   I
             ROW PCT   INOT A HS HS         EDUC      NO VALID   ROW
             COL PCT   I GRAD    GRADUATE PAST  HS  RESPNSE   TOTAL
                       I     1  I      2  I     3  I      0  I
V10            --------I--------I---------I--------I---------I
                    1  I  1152  I  1146   I   500  I    15M  I  2798
  JOINED A.F.          I  41.2  I  41.0   I  17.9  I   0.0   I  21.4
                       I  21.0  I  21.2   I  22.6  I   0.0   I
                      -I--------I---------I--------I---------I
                    2  I   639  I   545   I   192  I     5M  I  1376
  JOINED ARMY          I  46.4  I  39.6   I  14.0  I   0.0   I  10.5
                       I  11.6  I  10.1   I   8.7  I   0.0   I
                      -I--------I---------I--------I---------I
                    3  I   501  I   327   I   109  I    14M  I   937
  JOINED MARINES       I  53.4  I  34.9   I  11.7  I   0.0   I   7.2
                       I   9.1  I   6.1   I   4.9  I   0.0   I
                      -I--------I---------I--------I---------I
                    4  I   846  I   884   I   317  I     8M  I  2047
  JOINED  NAVY         I  41.3  I  43.2   I  15.5  I   0.0   I  15.6
                       I  15.4  I  16.4   I  14.3  I   0.0   I
                      -I--------I---------I--------I---------I
                    5  I  2348  I  2497   I  1094  I    30M  I  5940
  NOT ENLISTED         I  39.5  I  42.0   I  18.4  I   0.0   I  45.4
                       I  42.8  I  46.3   I  49.5  I   0.0   I
                      -I--------I---------I--------I---------I
                    0  I   39M  I   40M   I   10M  I     1M  I    50M
  NO VALID RESPNSE     I   0.0  I   0.0   I   0.0  I   0.0   I   0.0
                       I   0.0  I   0.0   I   0.0  I   0.0   I
                      -I--------I---------I--------I---------I
              COLUMN      5486      5399      2212       74M    13097
               TOTAL      41.9      41.2      16.9       0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    173
```

Table V-7

```
                                                                                                06/25/75
FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F  * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
    V10       IF COULDNT GET 1ST SERV-WHT WLDVE DCNE          BY  V7         BRANCH OF SERVICE JOINING
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  1 OF  1

                      V7
              COUNT  I
            ROW PCT  IAIR        ARMY       MARINE     NAVY       NO VALID   ROW
            COL PCT  IFORCE                 CORPS                  RESPNSE   TOTAL
                     I       1  I       2  I       3  I       4  I       0  I
V10         ---------I----------I----------I----------I----------I----------I
                  1  I      51  I    1353  I     393  I    1014  I      5M  I   2811
  JOINED A.F.        I     1.8  I    48.2  I    14.0  I    36.1  I     0.0  I   21.3
                     I     1.7  I    27.0  I    17.1  I    34.6  I     0.0  I
                    -I----------I----------I----------I----------I----------I
                  2  I     389  I     224  I     461  I     305  I      4M  I   1379
  JOINED ARMY        I    28.2  I    16.2  I    33.4  I    22.1  I     0.0  I   10.5
                     I    13.2  I     4.5  I    20.1  I    10.4  I     0.0  I
                    -I----------I----------I----------I----------I----------I
                  3  I     159  I     515  I     106  I     171  I      1M  I    950
  JCINED MARINES     I    16.7  I    54.2  I    11.1  I    18.0  I     0.0  I    7.2
                     I     5.4  I    10.3  I     4.6  I     5.8  I     0.0  I
                    -I----------I----------I----------I----------I----------I
                  4  I     788  I     813  I     392  I      64  I      4M  I   2059
  JOINED  NAVY       I    38.3  I    39.5  I    19.1  I     3.1  I     0.0  I   15.6
                     I    26.8  I    16.2  I    17.1  I     2.2  I     0.0  I
                    -I----------I----------I----------I----------I----------I
                  5  I    1557  I    2107  I     940  I    1372  I      5M  I   5977
  NOT ENLISTED       I    26.0  I    35.3  I    15.7  I    23.0  I     0.0  I   45.4
                     I    52.9  I    42.0  I    41.0  I    46.9  I     0.0  I
                    -I----------I----------I----------I----------I----------I
                  0  I     12M  I     24M  I     26M  I     12M  I     16M  I    90M
  NO VALID RESPNSE   I     0.0  I     0.0  I     0.0  I     0.0  I     0.0  I    0.0
                     I     0.0  I     0.0  I     0.0  I     0.0  I     0.0  I
                    -I----------I----------I----------I----------I----------I
             COLUMN       2944       5013       2292       2926        35M    13175
              TOTAL       22.3       38.0       17.4       22.2        0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =     95
```

Table V-8

```
                                                                                                   08/05/75
FILE   APEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
    V38       HOW LONG AGO WHEN 1ST TALKED TO RECRUIT       BY  V1          AGE
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  1 OF  1

                   V1
           COUNT  I
         ROW PCT  I17        18        19        20        21        OVER  21 NO VALID  ROW
         COL PCT  I                                                           RESPNSE   TOTAL
                  I      1  I      2  I      3  I      4  I      5  I      6  I      0  I
V38       --------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                1 I    775  I    855  I    481  I    281  I    199  I    531  I     10M I   3122
 WITHIN LST 30DAY I   24.8  I   27.4  I   15.4  I    9.0  I    6.4  I   17.0  I    0.0  I   44.8
                  I   46.9  I   45.5  I   45.9  I   44.3  I   44.4  I   40.7  I    0.0  I
                 -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                2 I    495  I    551  I    251  I    173  I    134  I    383  I      2M I   1987
 1-3 MONTHS AGO   I   24.9  I   27.7  I   12.6  I    8.7  I    6.7  I   19.3  I    0.0  I   28.5
                  I   29.9  I   29.3  I   24.0  I   27.2  I   30.0  I   29.4  I    0.0  I
                 -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                3 I    225  I    221  I    140  I     58  I     32  I    161  I      1M I    837
 4-6 MONTHS AGO   I   26.9  I   26.4  I   16.7  I    6.9  I    3.8  I   19.2  I    0.0  I   12.0
                  I   13.6  I   11.8  I   13.4  I    9.1  I    7.2  I   12.3  I    0.0  I
                 -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                4 I     92  I    124  I     77  I     41  I     23  I     56  I      3M I    413
 7-12 MONTHS AGO  I   22.3  I   30.0  I   18.6  I    9.9  I    5.6  I   13.6  I    0.0  I    5.9
                  I    5.6  I    6.6  I    7.3  I    6.5  I    5.2  I    4.3  I    0.0  I
                 -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                5 I     67  I    127  I     99  I     82  I     58  I    173  I      1M I    606
 MORE THAN 12     I   11.1  I   21.0  I   16.3  I   13.5  I    9.6  I   28.5  I    0.0  I    8.7
                  I    4.1  I    6.8  I    9.4  I   12.9  I   13.0  I   13.3  I    0.0  I
                 -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                0 I      5M I      3M I      3M I      4M I      1M I      4M I      2M I     22M
 NO VALID RESPNSE I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0
                  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I
                 -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
           COLUMN     1654      1878      1048       635       446      1304       19M     6965
            TOTAL     23.7      27.0      15.0       9.1       6.4      18.7       0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =     63
```

2125

Table V-9

```
                                                                                              08/05/75
FILE   APEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F  * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V38       HOW LONG AGO WHEN 1ST TALKED TO RECRUIT       BY  V3          RACE
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  1 OF  1

                   V3
           COUNT  I
         ROW PCT  IBLACK     WHITE     OTHER     NO VALID   ROW
         COL PCT  I                              RESPNSE   TOTAL
                  I      1  I      2  I      3  I      0  I
V38       --------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                1 I    455  I   2458  I    175  I    45M  I   3088
  WITHIN LST 30DAY I   14.7  I   79.6  I    5.7  I    0.0  I   44.8
                  I   48.4  I   44.0  I   48.7  I    0.0  I
                 -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                2 I    243  I   1606  I    105  I    36M  .   1954
  1-3 MONTHS AGO  I   12.4  I   82.2  I    5.4  I    0.0  I   28.4
                  I   25.8  I   28.7  I   29.2  I    0.0  I
                 -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                3 I    117  I    675  I     36  I    10M  I    828
  4-6 MONTHS AGO  I   14.1  I   81.5  I    4.3  I    0.0  I   12.0
                  I   12.4  I   12.1  I   10.0  I    0.0  I
                 -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                4 I     63  I    334  I     15  I     6M  I    412
 7-12 MONTHS AGO  I   15.3  I   81.1  I    3.6  I    0.0  I    6.0
                  I    6.7  I    6.0  I    4.2  I    0.0  I
                 -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                5 I     63  I    514  I     28  I     2M  I    605
  MORE THAN 12    I   10.4  I   85.0  I    4.6  I    0.0  I    8.8
                  I    6.7  I    9.2  I    7.8  I    0.0  I
                 -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                0 I     7M  I    13M  I     2M  I     0M  I    22M
 NO VALID RESPNSE I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0
                  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I
                 -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
           COLUMN      941      5587       359       99M     6887
            TOTAL     13.7      81.1       5.2       0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    121
```

Table V-10

```
                                                                                                   08/05/75

FILE   APEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
    V38        HOW LONG AGO WHEN 1ST TALKED TO RECRUIT         BY  ED1
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  1

                    ED1
           COUNT   I
          ROW PCT  INOT A HS HS       EDUC      NO VALID   ROW
          COL PCT  I GRAD    GRADUATE PAST  HS  RESPNSE   TOTAL
                   I      1  I      2  I      3  I      0  I
V38       ---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 1 I  1529   I  1136   I   446   I    15M  I   3111
  WITHIN 1ST 30DAY I  49.1   I  36.5   I  14.3   I   0.0   I   44.8
                   I  48.7   I  42.1   I  40.6   I   0.0   I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 2 I   883   I   773   I   317   I    11M  I   1973
   1-3 MONTHS AGO  I  44.8   I  39.2   I  16.1   I   0.0   I   28.4
                   I  28.1   I  28.6   I  28.9   I   0.0   I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 3 I   348   I   346   I   142   I     1M  I    836
   4-6 MONTHS AGO  I  41.6   I  41.4   I  17.0   I   0.0   I   12.0
                  -I  11.1   I  12.8   I  12.9   I   0.0   I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 4 I   180   I   175   I    60   I     1M  I    415
  7-12 MONTHS AGO  I  43.4   I  42.2   I  14.5   I   0.0   I    6.0
                   I   5.7   I   6.5   I   5.5   I   0.0   I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 5 I   201   I   271   I   133   I     2M  I    605
   MORE THAN 12    I  33.2   I  44.8   I  22.0   I   0.0   I    8.7
                   I   6.4   I  10.0   I  12.1   I   0.0   I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 0 I    12M  I     4M  I     6M  I     0M  I     22M
  NO VALID RESPNSE I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I    0.0
                   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
            COLUMN    3141      2701      1098        30M     6940
             TOTAL    45.3      38.9      15.8       0.0     100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    68
```

Table V-11

```
                                                                                                    08/05/75
FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
    V38        HOW LONG AGO WHEN 1ST TALKED TO RECRUIT       BY  V7         BRANCH OF SERVICE JOINING
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  1 OF  1

                    V7
            COUNT  I
          ROW PCT  IAIR        ARMY       MARINE     NAVY       NO VALID   ROW
          COL PCT  IFORCE                 CORPS                 RESPNSE   TOTAL
                   I      1  I      2  I      3  I      4  I      0  I
V38        --------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 1 I    526  I   1403  I    529  I    668  I     7M  I   3126
  WITHIN LST 30DAY I   16.8  I   44.9  I   16.9  I   21.4  I    0.0  I   44.8
                   I   32.4  I   48.3  I   59.8  I   42.9  I    0.0  I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 2 I    563  I    759  I    176  I    488  I     3M  I   1986
  1-3 MONTHS AGO   I   28.3  I   38.2  I    8.9  I   24.6  I    0.0  I   28.5
                   I   34.7  I   26.1  I   19.9  I   31.4  I    0.0  I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 3 I    277  I    311  I     72  I    175  I     3M  I    835
  4-6 MONTHS AGO   I   33.2  I   37.2  I    8.6  I   21.0  I    0.0  I   12.0
                   I   17.1  I   10.7  I    8.1  I   11.2  I    0.0  I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 4 I    113  I    178  I     48  I     77  I     0M  I    416
  7-12 MONTHS AGO  I   27.2  I   42.8  I   11.5  I   18.5  I    0.0  I    6.0
                   I    7.0  I    6.1  I    5.4  I    4.9  I    0.0  I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 5 I    143  I    256  I     60  I    148  I     0M  I    607
  MORE THAN 12     I   23.6  I   42.2  I    9.9  I   24.4  I    0.0  I    8.7
                   I    8.8  I    8.8  I    6.8  I    9.5  I    0.0  I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                 0 I     3M  I    13M  I     4M  I     2M  I     0M  I    22M
  NO VALID RESPNSE I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0
                   I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I
                  -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
           COLUMN      1622      2907       885      1556       13M    6970
            TOTAL      23.3      41.7      12.7      22.3       0.0   100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    35
```

239

Table V-12

```
FILE   AFEES     (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)                                                  06/25/75

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
    V38        HOW LONG AGO WHEN 1ST TALKED TO RECRUIT       BY  ADDELST    DELAYED ENTRY STATUS AND LENGTH OF DELAY
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  2

                  ADDELST
          COUNT  I
        ROW PCT  ILV TODAY ENTERING LV TODAY LV TODAY LV TODAY LV TODAY LV TODAY LV TODAY LV TODAY LV TODAY   ROW
        COL PCT  INO DELAY  DEP     DLY 1 WK DLY 2 WK DLY 1 MO DLY 2 MO DLY 3 MO DLY 4 MO DLY 5 MO DLY 6 MO  TOTAL
                 I      1 I      2 I      3 I      4 I      5 I      6 I      7 I      8 I      9 I     10 I
V38      --------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
              1  I   1751 I   2015 I    258 I    246 I    163 I     61 I     54 I     23 I     18 I     12 I
 WITHIN LST 30DAY I   37.9 I   43.6 I    5.6 I    5.3 I    3.5 I    1.3 I    1.2 I    0.5 I    0.4 I    0.3 I   4617
                 I   45.0 I   47.9 I   57.9 I   44.1 I   13.4 I    5.5 I    6.6 I    6.9 I    6.6 I    6.1 I   35.2
                -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
              2  I   1136 I   1153 I     94 I    177 I    689 I    595 I    239 I     10 I     15 I      5 I
 1-3 MONTHS AGO  I   27.6 I   28.0 I    2.3 I    4.3 I   16.7 I   14.5 I    5.8 I    0.3 I    0.4 I    0.1 I   4115
                 I   29.2 I   27.4 I   21.1 I   31.7 I   56.8 I   54.5 I   28.9 I    3.1 I    5.5 I    2.6 I   31.4
                -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
              3  I    413 I    496 I     46 I     59 I    159 I    244 I    344 I    193 I    141 I     66 I
 4-6 MONTHS AGO  I   19.1 I   22.9 I    2.1 I    2.7 I    7.3 I   11.3 I   15.9 I    9.0 I    6.5 I    3.1 I   2161
                 I   10.6 I   11.8 I   10.4 I   10.5 I   13.1 I   22.4 I   41.5 I   58.0 I   51.9 I   34.7 I   16.5
                -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
              4  I    235 I    234 I     17 I     29 I     68 I     86 I     85 I     64 I     69 I     85 I
 7-12 MONTHS AGO I   22.9 I   22.8 I    1.7 I    2.8 I    6.7 I    8.4 I    8.3 I    6.2 I    6.7 I    8.3 I   1026
                 I    6.0 I    5.6 I    3.9 I    5.2 I    5.6 I    7.9 I   10.3 I   19.2 I   25.5 I   44.8 I    7.8
                -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
              5  I    357 I    306 I     30 I     48 I    134 I    106 I    106 I     43 I     29 I     22 I
 MORE THAN 12    I   29.7 I   25.5 I    2.5 I    4.0 I   11.2 I    8.8 I    8.8 I    3.6 I    2.4 I    1.9 I   1201
                 I    9.2 I    7.3 I    6.7 I    8.5 I   11.1 I    9.7 I   12.8 I   13.0 I   10.5 I   11.8 I    9.2
                -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
              0  I    16M I    12M I     4M I     2M I     1M I     2M I     0M I     0M I     1M I     1M I
 NO VALID RESPNSE I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    66M
                 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0
                -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
         COLUMN     3892     4204      446      558     1213     1092      828      334      271      190    13121
          TOTAL     29.7     32.0      3.4      4.3      9.2      8.3      6.3      2.5      2.1      1.4    100.0
(CONTINUED)
```

Table V-13

```
                                                                                                   06/25/75
FILE    AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
    V38        HOW LONG AGO WHEN 1ST TALKED TO RECRUIT        BY  ADDELST    DELAYED ENTRY STATUS AND LENGTH OF DELAY
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  2 OF  2

                      ADDELST
              COUNT   I
            ROW PCT   ILV TODAY LV TODAY LV TODAY NO VALID     ROW
            COL PCT   IDLY 7 MC DLY 8 MO DLY 9 MO  RESPNSE    TOTAL
                      I     11  I     12  I     13  I      0  I
V38           --------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   1  I      7  I      1  I      8  I     47M I   4617
  WITHIN LST 30DAY    I    0.2  I    0.0  I    0.2  I    0.0  I   35.2
                      I   16.6  I    7.1  I   28.9  I    0.0  I
                     -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   2  I      2  I      0  I      0  I     28M I   4115
  1-3 MONTHS AGO      I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I   31.4
                      I    4.1  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I
                     -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   3  I      1  I      0  I      0  I     16M I   2161
  4-6 MONTHS AGO      I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I   16.5
                      I    1.5  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I
                     -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   4  I     25  I     15  I     13  I      3M I   1026
  7-12 MONTHS AGO     I    2.4  I    1.5  I    1.3  I    0.0  I    7.8
                      I   56.1  I   77.3  I   45.2  I    0.0  I
                     -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   5  I     10  I      3  I      8  I      3M I   1201
  MORE THAN 12        I    0.8  I    0.3  I    0.6  I    0.0  I    9.2
                      I   21.6  I   15.6  I   25.9  I    0.0  I
                     -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   0  I      0M I      0M I      0M I     26M I     66M
  NO VALID RESPNSE    I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0
                      I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I
                     -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
              COLUMN        44        20        29       123M   13121
              TOTAL        0.3       0.1       0.2        0.0   100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    149
```

Table V-13a

```
                                                                                              08/05/75

FILE   SPEED    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F  * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V44         WHEN BEGAN THNKING SERIOUSLY ABT MIL SER     BY  V1          AGE
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  1 OF  1

                  V1
          COUNT  I
        ROW PCT  I17         18         19         20         21        OVER  21 NO VALID   ROW
        COL PCT  I                                                                RESPNSE   TOTAL
                 I      1  I      2  I      3  I      4  I      5  I      6  I      0  I
V44      --------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
               1 I    370  I    447  I    256  I    171  I    104  I    244  I     10*  I   1592
  IN LAST 30 DAYS I   23.2  I   28.1  I   16.1  I   10.7  I    6.5  I   15.3  I    0.0  I   22.9
                 I   22.4  I   23.9  I   24.5  I   27.0  I   23.4  I   18.7  I    0.0  I
                -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
               2 I    528  I    601  I    339  I    181  I    164  I    371  I      4*  I   2184
  1-3 MONTHS AG  I   24.2  I   27.5  I   15.5  I    8.3  I    7.5  I   17.0  I    0.0  I   31.4
                 I   32.0  I   32.1  I   32.4  I   28.5  I   36.9  I   28.5  I    0.0  I
                -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
               3 I    315  I    340  I    214  I    111  I     58  I    246  I      2*  I   1284
  4-6 MONTHS AGO I   24.5  I   26.5  I   16.7  I    8.6  I    4.5  I   19.2  I    0.0  I   18.5
                 I   19.1  I   18.2  I   20.5  I   17.5  I   13.0  I   18.9  I    0.0  I
                -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
               4 I    184  I    174  I    101  I     66  I     34  I    112  I      1*  I    671
  7-12 MONTHS AGO I   27.4  I   25.9  I   15.1  I    9.8  I    5.1  I   16.7  I    0.0  I    9.7
                 I   11.2  I    9.3  I    9.7  I   10.4  I    7.6  I    8.6  I    0.0  I
                -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
               5 I    253  I    309  I    135  I    105  I     85  I    330  I      0*  I   1217
  MORE THAN 12   I   20.8  I   25.4  I   11.1  I    8.6  I    7.0  I   27.1  I    0.0  I   17.5
                 I   15.3  I   16.5  I   12.9  I   16.6  I   19.1  I   25.3  I    0.0  I
                -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
               0 I      9* I     10* I      5* I      5* I      2* I      5* I      2* I     38*
  NO VALID RESPNSE I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0
                 I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I
                -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
          COLUMN     1648      1871      1045       634       445      1303        19*     6946
           TOTAL     23.7      26.9      15.0       9.1       6.4      18.8       0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =     68
```

2131

Table V-14

```
                                                                                    08/05/75
FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F  * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V88        WHEN BEGAN THNKING SERIUUSLY ABT MIL SER     BY  V3        RACE
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  1 OF  1

                       V3
              COUNT    I
             ROW PCT   IBLACK     WHITE     OTHER     NO VALID   ROW
             COL PCT   I                                RESPNSE   TOTAL
                       I      1  I      2  I      3  I      0  I
V88           --------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                     1 I    250  I   1239  I     89  I    25M  I   1578
  IN LAST 30 DAYS      I   15.8  I   78.5  I    5.6  I    0.0  I   23.0
                       I   26.6  I   22.2  I   24.9  I    0.0  I
                      -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                     2 I    288  I   1736  I    132  I    31M  I   2156
  1-3 MONTHS AG        I   13.4  I   80.5  I    6.1  I    0.0  I   31.4
                       I   30.6  I   31.2  I   37.0  I    0.0  I
                      -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                     3 I    168  I   1053  I     50  I    15M  I   1271
  4-6 MONTHS AGO       I   13.2  I   82.8  I    3.9  I    0.0  I   18.5
                       I   17.9  I   18.9  I   14.0  I    0.0  I
                      -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                     4 I     99  I    536  I     31  I     6M  I    666
  7-12 MONTHS AGO      I   14.9  I   80.5  I    4.7  I    0.0  I    9.7
                       I   10.5  I    9.6  I    8.7  I    0.0  I
                      -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                     5 I    135  I   1009  I     55  I    18M  I   1199
  MORE THAN 12         I   11.3  I   84.2  I    4.6  I    0.0  I   17.5
                       I   14.4  I   18.1  I   15.4  I    0.0  I
                      -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                     0 I     8M  I    27M  I     3M  I     0M  I    38M
  NO VALID RESPNSE     I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0
                       I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I
                      -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
               COLUMN       940      5573       357       95M     6870
               TOTAL       13.7      81.1       5.2       0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =   133
```

Table V-15

```
                                                                                        08/05/75

FILE    AFEES     (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
    V66        WHEN BEGAN THNKING SERIOUSLY ABT MIL SER      BY  ED1
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  1 OF  1

                       ED1
              COUNT  I
            ROW PCT  INOT A HS HS        EDUC       NO VALID   ROW
            COL PCT  I GRAD    GRADUATE PAST  HS  RESPNSE   TOTAL
                     I     1  I      2  I      3  I      0  I
V66          --------I--------I---------I---------I---------I
                   1 I   762  I    603  I    229  I     5M  I  1594
  IN LAST 30 DAYS    I  47.8  I   37.8  I   14.4  I    0.0  I  23.0
                     I  24.3  I   22.4  I   20.8  I    0.0  I
                    -I--------I---------I---------I---------I
                   2 I   970  I    860  I    343  I    12M  I  2173
  1-3 MONTHS AG      I  44.6  I   39.6  I   15.8  I    0.0  I  31.4
                     I  31.0  I   32.0  I   31.2  I    0.0  I
                    -I--------I---------I---------I---------I
                   3 I   567  I    502  I    210  I     5M  I  1279
  4-6 MONTHS AGO     I  44.3  I   39.2  I   16.4  I    0.0  I  18.5
                     I  18.1  I   18.7  I   19.1  I    0.0  I
                    -I--------I---------I---------I---------I
                   4 I   288  I    274  I    104  I     2M  I   666
  7-12 MONTHS AGO    I  43.2  I   41.1  I   15.6  I    0.0  I   9.6
                     I   9.2  I   10.2  I    9.5  I    0.0  I
                    -I--------I---------I---------I---------I
                   5 I   546  I    452  I    213  I     6M  I  1211
  MORE THAN 12       I  45.1  I   37.3  I   17.6  I    0.0  I  17.5
                     I  17.4  I   16.8  I   19.4  I    0.0  I
                    -I--------I---------I---------I---------I
                   0 I   20M  I    13M  I     5M  I     0M  I    38M
  NO VALID RESPNSE   I   0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I   0.0
                     I   0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I
                    -I--------I---------I---------I---------I
              COLUMN    3133      2691       1099       38M     6923
               TOTAL    45.3      38.9       15.9       0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS ✓    85
```

2133

Table V-16

```
                                                                                                    08/05/75
FILE    AFEE8    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V44        WHEN BEGAN THNKING SERIOUSLY ABT MIL SER      BY  V7          BRANCH OF SERVICE JOINING
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  1

                      V7
             COUNT  I
           ROW PCT  IAIR       ARMY       MARINE    NAVY       NO VALID   ROW
           COL PCT  IFORCE                CORPS                RESPNSE   TOTAL
                    I      1  I      2  I      3  I      4  I      0  I
V44        ---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                  1 I   227   I   778   I   273   I   321   I     4M  I  1599
  IN LAST 30 DAYS   I  14.2   I  48.7   I  17.1   I  20.1   I   0.0   I  23.0
                    I  14.0   I  26.9   I  30.9   I  20.7   I   0.0   I
                   -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                  2 I   549   I   889   I   259   I   489   !     2M  I  2186
  1-3 MONTHS AG     I  25.1   I  40.7   I  11.8   I  22.4   I   0.0   I  31.4
                    I  33.9   I  30.7   I  29.3   I  31.5   I   0.0   I
                   -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                  3 I   355   I   494   I   139   I   296   I     2M  I  1284
  4-6 MONTHS AGO    I  27.6   I  38.5   I  10.8   I  23.1   I   0.0   I  18.5
                    I  21.9   I  17.1   I  15.7   I  19.1   I   0.0   I
                   -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                  4 I   199   I   261   I    61   I   149   I     2M  I   670
  7-12 MONTHS AGO   I  29.7   I  39.0   I   9.1   I  22.2   I   0.0   I   9.6
                    I  12.3   I   9.0   I   6.9   I   9.6   I   0.0   I
                   -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                  5 I   290   I   475   I   152   I   298   I     2M  I  1215
  MORE THAN 12      I  23.9   I  39.1   I  12.5   I  24.5   I   0.0   I  17.5
                    I  17.9   I  16.4   I  17.2   I  19.2   I   0.0   I
                   -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                  0 I     4M  I    22M  I     5M  I     6M  I     1M  I    38M
  NO VALID RESPNSE  I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0
                    I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I
                   -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
            COLUMN     1620      2897       884      1553        13M    6954
             TOTAL     23.3      41.7      12.7      22.3       0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =     54
```

Table V- 17

```
                                                                                                    06/25/75
FILE   APEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  C R O S S T A B U L A T I [illegible] F  * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V44       WHEN BEGAN THAKING SERIOUSLY ABT MIL SER     BY   [illegible]    DELAYED ENTRY STATUS AND LENGTH OF DELAY
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * [illegible] * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  1 OF  2

                   ADDE.ST
           COUNT  I
         ROW PCT  ILV TODAY ENTERING LV TODAY LV TODAY LV TODAY LV TODAY LV TODAY LV TODAY LV TODAY LV TODAY   ROW
         COL PCT  INO DELAY  DEP     DLY 1 WK DLY 2 WK DLY 1 MO DLY 2 MO DLY 3 MO DLY 4 MO DLY 5 MO DLY 6 MO  TOTAL
                  I      1 I      2 I      3 I      4 I      5 I      6 I      7 I      8 I      9 I     10 I
V44       --------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                1 I    957 I   1010 I    157 I    123 I     88 I     23 I     11 I      4 I      3 I      3 I   2385
  IN LAST 30 DAYS I   40.1 I   42.4 I    6.6 I    5.2 I    3.7 I    1.0 I    0.5 I    0.2 I    0.1 I    0.1 I   18.3
                  I   24.8 I   24.1 I   35.0 I   22.3 I    7.3 I    2.1 I    1.3 I    1.1 I    1.2 I    1.6 I
                 -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                2 I   1250 I   1284 I    131 I    219 I    533 I    422 I    161 I     13 I     11 I      6 I   4031
  1-3 MONTHS AG   I   31.0 I   31.8 I    3.2 I    5.4 I   13.2 I   10.5 I    4.0 I    0.3 I    0.3 I    0.1 I   30.8
                  I   32.4 I   30.6 I   29.2 I   39.6 I   44.0 I   38.7 I   19.4 I    3.9 I    3.9 I    3.2 I
                 -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                3 I    609 I    784 I     60 I     89 I    292 I    356 I    383 I    178 I    120 I     55 I   2929
  4-6 MONTHS AGO  I   20.8 I   26.8 I    2.1 I    3.0 I   10.0 I   12.2 I   13.1 I    6.1 I    4.1 I    1.9 I   22.4
                  I   15.8 I   18.7 I   13.5 I   16.1 I   24.1 I   32.7 I   46.2 I   53.5 I   44.4 I   29.3 I
                 -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                4 I    403 I    378 I     26 I     43 I    118 I    121 I    117 I     85 I     88 I     82 I   1508
  7-12 MONTHS AGO I   26.7 I   25.1 I    1.7 I    2.8 I    7.8 I    8.0 I    7.7 I    5.6 I    5.9 I    5.4 I   11.5
                  I   10.4 I    9.0 I    5.8 I    7.7 I    9.7 I   11.1 I   14.1 I   25.6 I   32.6 I   43.6 I
                 -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                5 I    643 I    734 I     74 I     79 I    181 I    167 I    157 I     53 I     49 I     43 I   2214
  MORE THAN 12    I   29.0 I   33.2 I    3.3 I    3.6 I    8.2 I    7.5 I    7.1 I    2.4 I    2.2 I    1.9 I   16.9
                  I   16.6 I   17.5 I   16.5 I   14.3 I   14.9 I   15.3 I   18.9 I   15.9 I   17.9 I   22.7 I
                 -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                0 I    49M I    24M I     2M I     7M I     2M I     3M I     2M I     1M I     1M I     3M I   119M
 NO VALID RES^NSE I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0
                  I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I    0.0 I
                 -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
          COLUMN      3862     4190      448      553     1212     1089      827      332      271      188    13067
           TOTAL      29.6     32.1      3.4      4.2      9.3      8.3      6.3      2.5      2.1      1.4    100.0
(CONTINUED)
```

Table V-18

```
                                                                                    06/25/75

FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V44       WHEN BEGAN THAKING SERIOUSLY ABT MIL SER     BY  ADDELST   DELAYED ENTRY STATUS AND LENGTH OF DELAY
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   PAGE  2 OF  2

                     ADDELST
            COUNT  I
          ROW PCT  ILV TODAY LV TODAY LV TODAY NO VALID   ROW
          COL PCT  IDLY 7 MC DLY 8 MO DLY 9 MO  RESPNSE   TOTAL
                   I   11   I   12   I   13   I    0   I
V44        --------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 1 I     4  I     2  I     1  I   29M  I  2385
  IN LAST 30 DAYS  I   0.1  I   0.1  I   0.0  I   0.0  I  18.3
                   I   8.0  I   8.2  I   3.3  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 2 I     1  I     0  I     1  I   20M  I  4031
  1-3 MONTHS AG    I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I  30.8
                   I   1.8  I   0.0  I   2.8  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 3 I     2  I     0  I     1  I   24M  I  2929
  4-6 MONTHS AGO   I   0.1  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I  22.4
                   I   4.4  I   0.0  I   2.7  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 4 I    21  I    13  I    13  I    9M  I  1508
  7-12 MONTHS AGO  I   1.4  I   0.9  I   0.9  I   0.0  I  11.5
                   I  48.8  I  66.5  I  44.1  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 5 I    16  I     5  I    14  I   17M  I  2214
  MORE THAN 12     I   0.7  I   0.2  I   0.6  I   0.0  I  16.9
                   I  37.0  I  25.3  I  47.2  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                 0 I    0M  I    0M  I    0M  I   27M  I   119M
  NO VALID RESPNSE I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0
                   I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I
                  -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
            COLUMN      44       20       29      123M   13067
             TOTAL     0.3      0.2      0.2       0.0   100.0

 NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    203
```

2136

Table V-18a

```
                                                                                       08/05/75
FILE    AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
    V45        WHEN MADE FINAL DECISION TO ENTER             BY  V1         AGE
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  1 OF  1

                  V1
             COUNT  I
           ROW PCT  I17        18        19        20        21        OVER  21 NO VALID   ROW
           COL PCT  I                                                            RESPNSE   TOTAL
                    I       1 I       2 I       3 I       4 I       5 I       6 I       0 I
V45        ---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                  1 I   1023  I   1225  I    681  I    423  I    294  I    736  I     14M I   4382
  IN LAST 30 DAYS   I   23.3  I   28.0  I   15.5  I    9.7  I    6.7  I   16.8  I    0.0  I   63.2
                    I   62.2  I   65.7  I   65.2  I   66.8  I   66.2  I   56.7  I    0.0  I
                   -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                  2 I    397  I    426  I    238  I    137  I    111  I    326  I      1M I   1635
  1-3 MONTHS AG     I   24.3  I   26.1  I   14.6  I    8.4  I    6.8  I   19.9  I    0.0  I   23.6
                    I   24.1  I   22.8  I   22.8  I   21.6  I   25.0  I   25.1  I    0.0  I
                   -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                  3 I    138  I    129  I     82  I     44  I     21  I    106  I      2M I    520
  4-6 MONTHS AGO    I   26.5  I   24.8  I   15.8  I    8.5  I    4.0  I   20.4  I    0.0  I    7.5
                    I    8.4  I    6.9  I    7.9  I    7.0  I    4.7  I    8.2  I    0.0  I
                   -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                  4 I     50  I     48  I     21  I     15  I      3  I     35  I      0M I    172
  7-12 MONTHS AGO   I   29.1  I   27.9  I   12.2  I    8.7  I    1.7  I   20.3  I    0.0  I    2.5
                    I    3.0  I    2.6  I    2.0  I    2.4  I    0.7  I    2.7  I    0.0  I
                   -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                  5 I     37  I     37  I     22  I     14  I     15  I     96  I      0M I    221
  MORE THAN 12      I   16.7  I   16.7  I   10.0  I    6.3  I    6.8  I   43.4  I    0.0  I    3.2
                    I    2.2  I    2.0  I    2.1  I    2.2  I    3.4  I    7.4  I    0.0  I
                   -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                  9 I     14M I     17M I      7M I      6M I      4M I      9M I      2M I     59M
  NO VALID RESPNSE  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0
                    I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I
                   -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
             COLUMN     1645      1865      1044       633       444      1299       19M     6930
              TOTAL     23.7      26.9      15.1       9.1       6.4      18.7       0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =     78
```

Table V-19

```
                                                                                                    08/05/75
FILE    AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V45       WHEN MADE FINAL DECISION TO ENTER                    BY  V3        RACE
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  1

                     V3
           COUNT    I
           ROW PCT  IBLACK     WHITE     OTHER     NO VALID   ROW
           COL PCT  I                              RESPNSE   TOTAL
                    I      1  I      2  I      3  I      0  I
V45         --------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                  1 I    576  I   3549  I    214  I     58M I   4339
   IN LAST 30 DAYS  I   13.3  I   81.8  I    4.9  I    0.0  I   63.3
                    I   61.4  I   63.9  I   59.8  I    0.0  I
                   -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                  2 I    209  I   1305  I     98  I     23M I   1612
   1-3 MONTHS AG    I   13.0  I   81.0  I    6.1  I    0.0  I   23.5
                    I   22.3  I   23.5  I   27.4  I    0.0  I
                   -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                  3 I     77  I    412  I     25  I      8M I    514
   4-6 MONTHS AGO   I   15.0  I   80.2  I    4.9  I    0.0  I    7.5
                    I    8.2  I    7.4  I    7.0  I    0.0  I
                   -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                  4 I     36  I    131  I      5  I      0M I    172
   7-12 MONTHS AGO  I   20.9  I   76.2  I    2.9  I    0.0  I    2.5
                    I    3.8  I    2.4  I    1.4  I    0.0  I
                   -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                  5 I     40  I    160  I     16  I      5M I    216
   MORE THAN 12     I   18.5  I   74.1  I    7.4  I    0.0  I    3.2
                    I    4.3  I    2.9  I    4.5  I    0.0  I
                   -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                  0 I     10M I     45M I      3M I      1M I     59M
   NO VALID RESPNSE I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0
                    I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I
                   -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
             COLUMN      938      5557       358        95M     6853
              TOTAL     13.7      81.1       5.2        0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    155
```

Table V-20

```
                                                                                                08/05/75
FILE    AFEES     (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
    V45        WHEN MADE FINAL DECISION TO ENTER              BY  ED1
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  1 OF  1

                        ED1
                COUNT  I
              ROW PCT  INOT A HS HS        EDUC       NO VALID   ROW
              COL PCT  I GRAD     GRADUATE PAST  HS  RESPNSE   TOTAL
                       I      1  I      2  I      3  I      0  I
V45            --------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                     1 I  1992   I  1689   I   689   I     19M I  4370
  IN LAST 30 DAYS      I  45.6   I  38.6   I  15.8   I   0.0   I  63.3
                       I  63.8   I  62.8   I  62.9   I   0.0   I
                      -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                     2 I   721   I   635   I   269   I      7M I  1625
  1-3 MONTHS AG        I  44.4   I  39.1   I  16.6   I   0.0   I  23.5
                       I  23.1   I  23.6   I  24.6   I   0.0   I
                      -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                     3 I   233   I   226   I    61   I      1M I   520
  4-6 MONTHS AGO       I  44.8   I  43.5   I  11.7   I   0.0   I   7.5
                       I   7.5   I   8.4   I   5.6   I   0.0   I
                      -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                     4 I    82   I    58   I    32   I      0M I   172
  7-12 MONTHS AGO      I  47.7   I  33.7   I  18.6   I   0.0   I   2.5
                       I   2.6   I   2.2   I   2.9   I   0.0   I
                      -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                     5 I    95   I    80   I    44   I      2M I   219
  MORE THAN 12         I  43.4   I  36.5   I  20.1   I   0.0   I   3.2
                       I   3.0   I   3.0   I   4.0   I   0.0   I
                      -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                     0 I     32M I     17M I      9M I      1M I     59M
  NO VALID RESPNSE     I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0
                       I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I
                      -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                COLUMN    3123      2688      1095        30M    6906
                 TOTAL    45.2      38.9      15.9       0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =   102
```

2139

Table V-21

```
                                                                                                  08/05/75
FILE    AFEES     (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V45        WHEN MADE FINAL DECISION TO ENTER                BY  V7          BRANCH OF SERVICE JOINING
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  1

                  V7
          COUNT  I
        ROW PCT  IAIR       ARMY      MARINE    NAVY      NO VALID   ROW
        COL PCT  IFORCE               CORPS               RESPNSE   TOTAL
                 I     1  I      2  I      3  I      4  I      0  I
V45      --------I--------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
              1  I   829  I  1970   I   667   I   923   I     0M  I   4389
  IN LAST 30 DAYS I  18.9 I  44.9   I  15.2   I  21.0   I   0.0   I   63.3
                 I  51.2  I  68.2   I  76.3   I  59.4   I   0.0   I
                -I--------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
              2  I   520  I   568   I   133   I   412   I     3M  I   1633
  1-3 MONTHS AG' I  31.8  I  34.8   I   8.1   I  25.2   :   0.0   I   23.5
                 I  32.1  I  19.7   I  15.2   I  26.5   I   0.0   I
                -I--------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
              3  I   179  I   187   I    34   I   122   I     0M  I    522
  4-6 MONTHS AGO I  34.3  I  35.8   I   6.5   I  23.4   I   0.0   I    7.5
                 I  11.1  I   6.5   I   3.9   I   7.9   I   0.0   I
                -I--------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
              4  I    47  I    69   I    15   I    40   I     1M  I    171
  7-12 MONTHS AGO I 27.5  I  40.4   I   8.8   I  23.4   I   0.0   I    2.5
                 I   2.9  I   2.4   I   1.7   I   2.6   I   0.0   I
                -I--------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
              5  I    44  I    95   I    25   I    57   I     0M  I    221
  MORE THAN 12   I  19.9  I  43.0   I  11.3   I  25.8   I   0.0   I    3.2
                 I   2.7  I   3.3   I   2.9   I   3.7   I   0.0   I
                -I--------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
              0  I    6M  I    33M  I    15M  I     4M  I     1M  I     59M
  NO VALID RESPNSE I 0.0  I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I    0.0
                 I   0.0  I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I
                -I--------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
         COLUMN     1619     2889       874      1554        13M      6936
          TOTAL     23.3     41.7      12.6      22.4        0.0     100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =     72
```

Table V-22

```
                                                                                              06/25/75
FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F  * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
    V45       WHEN MADE FINAL DECISION TO ENTER            BY  ADDELST   DELAYED ENTRY STATUS AND LENGTH OF DELAY
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  1 OF  2

                      ADDELST
               COUNT  I
              ROW PCT ILV TCDAY ENTERING LV TODAY LV TODAY LV TODAY LV TODAY LV TODAY LV TODAY LV TODAY LV TCDAY   ROW
              COL PCT INO DELAY  DEP     DLY 1 WK DLY 2 WK DLY 1 MO DLY 2 MO DLY 3 MO DLY 4 MO DLY 5 MO DLY 6 MO  TOTAL
                      I     1  I     2  I     3  I     4  I     5  I     6  I     7  I     8  I     9  I    10  I
V45           --------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                    1 I  2441  I  2687  I   340  I   358  I   292  I    58  I    32  I    14  I     6  I     5  I  6237
   IN LAST 30 DAYS    I  39.1  I  43.1  I   5.4  I   5.7  I   4.7  I   0.9  I   0.5  I   0.2  I   0.1  I   0.1  I  47.7
                      I  62.9  I  64.3  I  76.0  I  64.2  I  24.1  I   5.3  I   3.8  I   4.2  I   2.1  I   2.8  I
                     -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                    2 I   931  I   932  I    73  I   153  I   768  I   815  I   457  I    29  I    10  I     5  I  4174
   1-3 MONTHS AG      I  22.3  I  22.3  I   1.8  I   3.7  I  18.4  I  19.5  I  10.9  I   0.7  I   0.2  I   0.1  I  31.9
                      I  24.0  I  22.3  I  16.4  I  27.4  I  63.4  I  74.7  I  55.1  I   8.7  I   3.8  I   2.9  I
                     -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                    3 I   271  I   321  I    14  I    25  I   104  I   176  I   285  I   250  I   221  I   123  I  1797
   4-6 MONTHS AGO     I  15.1  I  17.9  I   0.8  I   1.4  I   5.8  I   9.8  I  15.9  I  13.9  I  12.3  I   6.9  I  13.7
                      I   7.0  I   7.7  I   3.2  I   4.4  I   8.6  I  16.2  I  34.4  I  74.9  I  81.6  I  65.5  I
                     -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                    4 I   109  I    92  I     8  I     6  I    30  I    25  I    35  I    32  I    33  I    47  I   487
   7-12 MONTHS AGO    I  22.3  I  18.9  I   1.7  I   1.3  I   6.2  I   5.1  I   7.1  I   6.6  I   6.8  I   9.6  I   3.7
                      I   2.8  I   2.2  I   1.9  I   1.2  I   2.5  I   2.3  I   4.2  I   9.6  I  12.2  I  24.7  I
                     -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                    5 I   131  I   147  I    11  I    15  I    17  I    16  I    21  I     9  I     1  I     8  I   384
   MORE THAN 12       I  34.1  I  38.4  I   2.9  I   4.0  I   4.4  I   4.3  I   5.4  I   2.3  I   0.3  I   2.0  I   2.9
                      I   3.4  I   3.5  I   2.5  I   2.7  I   1.4  I   1.5  I   2.5  I   2.6  I   0.4  I   4.1  I
                     -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                    0 I   24M  I   37M  I    3M  I    3M  I    3M  I    3M  I    1M  I    0M  I    1M  I    3M  I  107M
   NO VALID RESPNSE   I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0
                      I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I
                     -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
               COLUMN    3881     4180      447      557     1211     1091      829      334      271      188    13080
                TOTAL    29.7     32.0      3.4      4.3      9.3      8.3      6.3      2.6      2.1      1.4    100.0
(CONTINUED)
```

2141

Table V-23

```
                                                                                                       06/25/75

FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V45        WHEN MADE FINAL DECISION TO ENTER                  BY  ADDELST   DELAYED ENTRY STATUS AND LENGTH OF DELAY
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  2 OF  2

                   ADDELST
           COUNT  I
         ROW PCT  ILV TCDAY LV  TCDAY LV TODAY NO VALID   ROW
         COL PCT  IDLY 7 MO DLY 8 MO DLY 9 MO  RESPNSE   TOTAL
                  I    11  I    12  I    13  I     0  I
V45       --------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
               1  I     4  I     0  I     2  I   45M  I  6237
  IN LAST 30 DAYS I   0.1  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I  47.7
                  I   9.7  I   0.0  I   7.5  I   0.0  I
                 -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
               2  I     1  I     1  I     0  I   32M  I  4174
  1-3 MONTHS AG   I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I  31.9
                  I   3.1  I   4.1  I   0.0  I   0.0  I
                 -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
               3  I     3  I     1  I     2  I   13M  I  1797
  4-6 MONTHS AGO  I   0.2  I   0.0  I   0.1  I   0.0  I  13.7
                  I   6.6  I   3.2  I   7.2  I   0.0  I
                 -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
               4  I    32  I    17  I    21  I    2M  I   487
  7-12 MONTHS AGO I   6.6  I   3.5  I   4.2  I   0.0  I   3.7
                  I  74.5  I  87.0  I  70.7  I   0.0  I
                 -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
               5  I     3  I     1  I     4  I    1M  I   384
  MORE THAN 12    I   0.7  I   0.3  I   1.1  I   0.0  I   2.9
                  I   6.1  I   5.8  I  14.6  I   0.0  I
                 -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
               0  I    1M  I    0M  I    0M  I   29M  I   107M
  NC VALID RESPNSE I  0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0
                  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I
                 -I--------I--------I--------I--------I
          COLUMN       43       20       29      123M    13080
           TOTAL      0.3      0.2      0.2      0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATICNS =    190
```

Table V-23a

```
                                                                                        06/25/75
FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V63          HOW WELL WILL YOU LIKE MILITARY SERVICE       BY  V1          AGE
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  1 OF  1

                       V1
             COUNT   I
             ROW PCT I17        18        19        20        21        OVER  21 NO VALID   ROW
             COL PCT I                                                             RESPNSE   TOTAL
                     I       1 I       2 I       3 I       4 I       5 I       6 I       0 I
V63          --------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   1 I    752  I    846  I    606  I    415  I    289  I   1063  I     18M I   3971
  VERY     WELL      I   18.9  I   21.3  I   15.3  I   10.4  I    7.3  I   26.8  I    0.0  I   30.3
                     I   29.9  I   27.9  I   26.0  I   28.1  I   28.4  I   39.3  I    0.0  I
                    -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   2 I    872  I   1099  I    788  I    537  I    358  I    894  I      6M I   4547
  QUITE    WELL      I   19.2  I   24.2  I   17.3  I   11.8  I    7.9  I   19.7  I    0.0  I   34.7
                     I   34.6  I   36.2  I   33.7  I   36.3  I   35.2  I   33.0  I    0.0  I
                    -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   3 I    715  I    826  I    730  I    405  I    289  I    580  I      8M I   3545
  FAIRLY   WELL      I   20.2  I   23.3  I   20.6  I   11.4  I    8.1  I   16.4  I    0.0  I   27.1
                     I   28.4  I   27.2  I   31.3  I   27.4  I   28.4  I   21.4  I    0.0  I
                    -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   4 I     22  I     41  I     29  I     11  I      6  I     39  I      1M I    148
  NOT   TOO WELL     I   14.6  I   27.5  I   19.9  I    7.2  I    4.4  I   26.4  I    0.0  I    1.1
                     I    0.9  I    1.3  I    1.3  I    0.7  I    0.6  I    1.4  I    0.0  I
                    -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   5 I      6  I     11  I      8  I      3  I      4  I     15  I      0M I     47
  NOT    AT  ALL     I   11.8  I   24.2  I   16.8  I    5.4  I    9.3  I   32.5  I    0.0  I    0.4
                     I    0.2  I    0.4  I    0.3  I    0.2  I    0.4  I    0.6  I    0.0  I
                    -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   6 I    153  I    214  I    174  I    108  I     71  I    114  I      1M I    835
  NOT SURE           I   18.4  I   25.6  I   20.8  I   13.0  I    8.5  I   13.7  I    0.0  I    6.4
                     I    6.1  I    7.0  I    7.4  I    7.3  I    7.0  I    4.2  I    0.0  I
                    -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   0 I     21M I     47M I     29M I     18M I      8M I     32M I      3M I    158M
  NO VALID RESPNSE   I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0
                     I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I
                    -I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
              COLUMN      2519      3036      2335      1478      1017      2706       35M   13092
               TOTAL      19.2      23.2      17.8      11.3       7.8      20.7       0.0   100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    178
```

Table V-24

```
                                                                                            06/25/75

FILE   AFEES     (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *    C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
    V63          HOW WELL WILL YOU LIKE MILITARY SERVICE       BY  V3          RACE
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  1 OF  1

                        V3
               COUNT  I
              ROW PCT IBLACK      WHITE      OTHER      NO VALID   ROW
              COL PCT I                                 RESPNSE    TOTAL
                      I     1  I      2  I      3  I      0  I
V63           --------I--------I---------I---------I---------I
                   1  I   623  I  3101   I   209   I    56M  I   3932
  VERY     WELL       I  15.8  I  78.9   I   5.3   I   0.0   I   30.3
                      I  31.2  I  30.2   I  30.3   I   0.0   I
                     -I--------I---------I---------I---------I
                   2  I   647  I  3635   I   218   I    53M  I   4499
  QUITE    WELL       I  14.4  I  80.8   I   4.8   I   0.0   I   34.7
                      I  32.4  I  35.3   I  31.7   I   0.0   I
                     -I--------I---------I---------I---------I
                   3  I   535  I  2802   I   181   I    35M  I   3518
  FAIRLY   WELL       I  15.2  I  79.7   I   5.1   I   0.0   I   27.1
                      I  26.8  I  27.3   I  26.3   I   0.0   I
                     -I--------I---------I---------I---------I
                   4  I    27  I    91   I    27   I     3M  I    145
  NOT   TOO WELL      I  18.7  I  62.9   I  18.4   I   0.0   I    1.1
                      I   1.4  I   0.9   I   3.9   I   0.0   I
                     -I--------I---------I---------I---------I
                   5  I     8  I    27   I     8   I     4M  I     43
  NOT    AT ALL       I  19.4  I  62.9   I  17.8   I   0.0   I    0.3
                      I   0.4  I   0.3   I   1.1   I   0.0   I
                     -I--------I---------I---------I---------I
                   6  I   154  I   625   I    47   I     8M  I    826
  NOT SURE            I  18.6  I  75.7   I   5.7   I   0.0   I    6.4
                      I   7.7  I   6.1   I   6.8   I   0.0   I
                     -I--------I---------I---------I---------I
                   0  I   37M  I    96M  I    22M  I     3M  I    158M
  NO VALID RESPNSE    I   0.0  I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I    0.0
                      I [illegible]  I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I
                     -I--------I---------I---------I---------I
              COLUMN     1994     10282       689       162M     12964
               TOTAL     15.4      79.3       5.3       0.0     100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    306
```

Table V-25

```
                                                                                          06/25/75

FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V63       HOW WELL WILL YOU LIKE MILITARY SERVICE       BY  ED1
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  1

                        ED1
               COUNT   I
              ROW PCT  INOT A HS HS         EDUC       NO VALID   ROW
              COL PCT  I GRAD    GRADUATE PAST  HS   RESPNSE   TOTAL
                       I      1  I      2  I      3  I      0  I
V63           ---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   1   I   1774  I   1570  I    622  I    21M  I   3965
  VERY    WELL         I   44.7  I   39.6  I   15.7  I    0.0  I   30.4
                       I   32.5  I   29.1  I   28.4  I    0.0  I
                      -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   2   I   1781  I   1961  I    795  I    22M  I   4517
  QUITE   WELL         I   39.4  I   43.0  I   17.6  I    0.0  I   34.7
                       I   32.7  I   36.0  I   36.3  I    0.0  I
                      -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   3   I   1430  I   1475  I    617  I    25M  I   3523
  FAIRLY  WELL         I   40.6  I   41.9  I   17.5  I    0.0  I   27.0
                       I   26.2  I   27.4  I   28.2  I    0.0  I
                      -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   4   I     77  I     50  I     20  I     1M  I    147
  NOT  TOO WELL        I   52.1  I   34.2  I   13.7  I    0.0  I    1.1
                       I    1.4  I    0.9  I    0.9  I    0.0  I
                      -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   5   I     20  I     17  I     10  I     0M  I     47
  NOT   AT ALL         I   42.1  I   36.0  I   21.9  I    0.0  I    0.4
                       I    0.4  I    0.3  I    0.5  I    0.0  I
                      -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   6   I    368  I    340  I    123  I     2M  I    832
  NOT SURE             I   44.3  I   40.9  I   14.7  I    0.0  I    6.4
                       I    6.8  I    6.3  I    5.6  I    0.0  I
                      -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   0   I    74M  I    46M  I    35M  I     2M  I   157M
  NO VALID RESPNSE     I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0
                       I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I
                      -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
              COLUMN       5450      5394      2187        74M    13031
               TOTAL       41.8      41.4      16.8        0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    239
```

Table V-26

```
                                                                                          06/25/75
FILE    AFEES     (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V63       HOW WELL WILL YOU LIKE MILITARY SERVICE      BY  V7        BRANCH OF SERVICE JOINING
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  1

                     V7
             COUNT   I
             ROW PCT IAIR        ARMY       MARINE     NAVY        NO VALID   ROW
             COL PCT IFORCE                 CORPS                  RESPNSE    TOTAL
                     I     1  I      2  I      3  I      4  I      0  I
V63          --------I--------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   1 I   846  I   1495  I    775  I    860  I     13M I   3975
  VERY     WELL      I  21.3  I   37.6  I   19.5  I   21.6  I    0.0  I   30.4
                     I  28.8  I   30.2  I   33.8  I   29.5  I    0.0  I
                    -I--------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   2 I  1150  I   1662  I    704  I   1031  I      5M I   4548
  QUITE    WELL      I  25.3  I   36.6  I   15.5  I   22.7  I    0.0  I   34.7
                     I  39.1  I   33.6  I   30.7  I   35.3  I    0.0  I
                    -I--------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   3 I   785  I   1322  I    616  I    817  I      8M I   3545
  FAIRLY   WELL      I  22.2  I   37.3  I   17.4  I   23.1  I    0.0  I   27.1
                     I  26.8  I   26.7  I   26.9  I   28.0  I    0.0  I
                    -I--------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   4 I    13  I     86  I     31  I     18  I      0M I    148
  NOT  TOO WELL      I   9.1  I   58.3  I   23.6  I   12.0  I    0.0  I    1.1
                     I   0.5  I    1.7  I    1.3  I    0.6  I    0.0  I
                    -I--------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   5 I     8  I     28  I      4  I      7  I      0M I     47
  NOT   AT ALL       I  16.1  I   59.6  I    9.5  I   14.8  I    0.0  I    0.4
                     I   0.3  I    0.6  I    0.2  I    0.2  I    0.0  I
                    -I--------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   6 I   134  I    353  I    162  I    184  I      1M I    834
  NOT SURE           I  16.1  I   42.4  I   19.4  I   22.1  I    0.0  I    6.4
                     I   4.6  I    7.1  I    7.1  I    6.3  I    0.0  I
                    -I--------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                   0 I   16M  I    90M  I    25M  I    20M  I      8M I    158M
  NO VALID RESPNSE   I   0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0
                     I   0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I
                    -I--------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
              COLUMN    2946      4947       2295       2916        35M    13098
              TOTAL     22.4      37.8       17.5       22.3        0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    172
```

Table V-27

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                                                                                                    06/25/75 .

FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V64       DO YOU INTEND TO REENLIST                    BY  V1          AGE
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  1 OF  1

                      V1
              COUNT  I
            ROW PCT  I17        18        19        20        21       OVER  21 NO VALID   ROW
            COL PCT  I                                                          RESPNSE   TOTAL
                     I     1  I     2  I     3  I     4  I     5  I     6  I     0  I
V64         ---------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                   1 I   418  I   415  I   300  I   228  I   158  I   941  I    4M  I  2458
  YES                I  16.9  I  16.9  I  12.2  I   9.3  I   6.4  I  38.3  I   0.0  I  18.9
                     I  16.7  I  13.8  I  13.0  I  15.5  I  15.6  I  34.9  I   0.0  I
                    -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                   2 I  1477  I [illegible] I  1305  I   762  I   569  I  1233  I   17M  I  7043
  PROBABLY YES       I  21.0  I  24.1  I  18.5  I  10.8  I   8.1  I  17.5  I   0.0  I  54.1
                     I  59.1  I  56.3  I  56.3  I  51.9  I  56.0  I  45.6  I   0.0  I
                    -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                   3 I   488  I   705  I   572  I   388  I   223  I   420  I    9M  I  2796
  PROBABLY NOT       I  17.5  I  25.2  I  20.5  I  13.9  I   8.0  I  15.0  I   0.0  I  21.5
                     I  19.5  I  23.4  I  24.7  I  26.4  I  22.0  I  15.[illegible]  I   0.0  I
                    -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                   4 I   118  I   198  I   139  I    90  I    66  I   107  I    3M  I   718
  NO                 I  16.4  I  27.5  I  19.4  I  12.5  I   9.2  I  15.0  I   0.0  I   5.5
                     I   4.7  I   6.6  I   6.0  I   6.[illegible]  I   6.5  I   4.0  I   0.0  I
                    -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
                   0 I   30M  I   56M  I   36M  I   27M  I   10M  I   36M  I    3M  I   198M
  NO VALID RESPNSE   I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0
                     I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I   0.0  I
                    -I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I--------I
             COLUMN     2499     3013     2317     1469     1015     2701       35M   13014
              TOTAL     19.2     23.2     17.8     11.3      7.8     20.8       0.0   100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    256
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2147

Table V.28

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                                                                                              06/25/75
FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F  * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
   V64       DO YOU INTEND TO REENLIST                                BY  V3         RACE
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  1

                         V3
                COUNT  I
              ROW PCT  IBLACK     WHITE     OTHER     NO VALID   ROW
              COL PCT  I                              RESPNSE   TOTAL
                       I      1  I      2  I      3  I      0  I
V64           ---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                    1  I   305   I  1985   I   130   I    41M  I  2421
  YES                  I  12.6   I  82.0   I   5.4   I   0.0   I  18.8
                       I  15.4   I  19.4   I  19.1   I   0.0   I
                      -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                    2  I  1137   I  5487   I   356   I    76M  I  6980
  PROBABLY YES         I  16.3   I  78.6   I   5.1   I   0.0   I  54.2
                       I  57.4   I  53.7   I  52.0   I   0.0   I
                      -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                    3  I   395   I  2231   I   152   I    25M  I  2778
  PROBABLY NOT         I  14.2   I  80.3   I   5.5   I   0.0   I  21.6
                       I  19.9   I  21.8   I  22.3   I   0.0   I
                      -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                    4  I   143   I   518   I    45   I    14M  I   707
  NO                   I  20.2   I  73.3   I   6.4   I   0.0   I   5.5
                       I   7.2   I   5.1   I   6.7   I   0.0   I
                      -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
                    0  I    50M  I   115M  I    28M  I     4M  I   198M
  NO VALID RESPNSE     I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0
                       I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I   0.0   I
                      -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
               COLUMN     1980     10222       683      161M    12885
                TOTAL     15.4      79.3       5.3       0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    385
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Table V-29

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                                                                                                   06/25/75
FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
    V64       DO YOU INTEND TO REENLIST                                         BY  ED1
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  PAGE  1 OF  1

                    ED1
          COUNT   I
         ROW PCT  INOT A HS HS         EDUC       NO VALID   ROW
         COL PCT  I GRAD     GRADUATE PAST   HS  RESPNSE   TOTAL
                  I       1 I       2 I       3 I       0 I
V64      ---------I---------I---------I---------I---------I
              1   I   1108  I    901  I    430  I     19M I   2439
  YES             I   45.4  I   37.0  I   17.6  I    0.0  I   18.8
                  I   20.5  I   16.8  I   19.7  I    0.0  I
                 -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
              2   I   3001  I   2917  I   1090  I     39M I   7008
  PROBABLY YES    I   42.8  I   41.6  I   15.6  I    0.0  I   54.1
                  I   55.4  I   54.5  I   50.0  I    0.0  I
                 -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
              3   I   1025  I   1238  I    534  I      6M I   2798
  PROBABLY NOT    I   36.6  I   44.3  I   19.1  I    0.0  I   21.6
                  I   18.9  I   23.1  I   24.5  I    0.0  I
                 -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
              4   I    282  I    299  I    126  I      9M I    707
  NO              I   39.9  I   42.3  I   17.8  I    0.0  I    5.5
                  I    5.2  I    5.6  I    5.8  I    0.0  I
                 -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
              0   I     90M I     67M I     38M I      2M I    197M
  NO VALID RESPNSE I   0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0
                  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I    0.0  I
                 -I---------I---------I---------I---------I
          COLUMN      5416      5356      2180        74M   12952
           TOTAL      41.8      41.4      16.8 .      0.0   100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =    318
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Table V-30

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                                                                                                    06/25/75
FILE   AFEES    (CREATION DATE = 06/25/75)

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *   C R O S S T A B U L A T I O N   O F   * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
    V64        DO YOU INTEND TO REENLIST
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  BY  V7       BRANCH OF SERVICE JOINING
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * PAGE  1 OF  1

                   V7
            COUNT  I
          ROW PCT  IAIR        ARMY        MARINE      NAVY        NO VALID   ROW
          COL PCT  IFORCE                  CORPS                   RESPNSE    TOTAL
                   I       1  I       2  I       3  I       4  I        0  I
V64 .    ----------I----------I----------I----------I----------I----------I
                1  I    472   I   1034   I    381   I    570   I       6M  I   2456
  YES              I   19.2   I   42.1   I   15.5   I   23.2   I     0.0   I   18.9
                   I   16.1   I   21.0   I   16.8   I   19.6   I     0.0   I
                  -I----------I----------I----------I----------I----------I
                2  I   1677   I   2511   I   1277   I   1582   I      13M  I   7047
  PROBABLY YES     I   23.8   I   35.6   I   18.1   I   22.5   I     0.0   I   54.1
                   I   57.4   I   51.0   I   56.3   I   54.5   I     0.0   I
                  -I----------I----------I----------I----------I----------I
                3  I    645   I   1075   I    461   I    617   I       6M  I   2798
  PROBABLY NOT     I   23.1   I   38.4   I   16.5   I   22.1   I     0.0   I   21.5
                   I   22.1   I   21.8   I   20.3   I   21.3   I     0.0   I
                  -I----------I----------I----------I----------I----------I
                4  I    129   I    308   I    151   I    133   I       1M  I    720
  NO               I   17.9   I   42.7   I   20.9   I   18.4   I     0.0   I    5.5
                   I    4.4   I    6.2   I    6.6   I    4.6   I     0.0   I
                  -I----------I----------I----------I----------I----------I
                0  I     24M  I     96M  I     39M  I     29M  I       9M  I   198M
  NO VALID RESPNSE I    0.0   I    0.0   I    0.0   I    0.0   I     0.0   I    0.0
                   I    0.0   I    0.0   I    0.0   I    0.0   I     0.0   I
                  -I----------I----------I----------I----------I----------I
           COLUMN      2923       4927       2269       2902          35M    13021
            TOTAL      22.4       37.8       17.4       22.3         0.0    100.0

NUMBER OF MISSING OBSERVATIONS =   249
```

Table V-31

Senator STAFFORD. What methodology has the Army used to determine the GI bill benefits were the recruitment factor as opposed to such other factors as current unemployment situations, generally better wages in the military, job security, or patriotic motives?

Secretary BROTZMAN. In that same study, we found that these other factors are most important, of course. We don't have a real fix that I can testify to as to just exactly what the economic situation does but we know it's a plus. We know we're working in a plus situation but there are a lot of other factors involved, as you've indicated. We found that in that same study, "job training" was at the top; "income and benefits" were second. We found the GI bill was third. That's the 28 percent factor. "College, while in service," was next. "Patriotism" was another—the next in order. "Unemployment" was the next, although I think "income and benefits," which was number two, would probably have to play with unemployment in some way to make sense. Then, the combat arms bonus was the last of the group.

Senator STAFFORD. If the Congress terminated the PREP program effective December 31 of this year, what problem would that cause you?

Secretary BROTZMAN. This PREP program is terribly important to us, Senator Stafford. I mentioned in my testimony in chief, some numbers. The PREP is the high school effort. This is the opportunity for us to bring our people up to a high school level. I told you how important we deem that.

We think it helps us whether we get the person who had the high school diploma when he or she comes in, but also we think it benefits us that they proceed to get their high school diploma. That's why I emphasized in my testimony in chief how important that was to the Army, and certainly I imagine the other services would say the same if they were here. Obviously, this is a most effective recruiting incentive, I also think it's a great thing for our country.

Whatever happens with the GI bill, and whatever you do in your wisdom, I certainly want to make a strong recommendation that we maintain and keep this program going not only from my own parochial interest but because I know it's the right thing for the Nation.

Senator STAFFORD. Thank you Mr. Secretary. Mr. Chairman, I do have one or two additional questions but I think I'll submit that for the record.

Chairman HARTKE. They will be submitted for the record and the Secretary will be instructed to answer them.

[Subsequent to the hearing, Senator Stafford submitted the following questions to Secretary Brotzman. Secretary Brotzman's response to Senator Stafford's questions is as follows:]

RESPONSE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY DONALD G. BROTZMAN TO THE WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF HON. ROBERT T. STAFFORD, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT

Question 1. If we terminate the PREP Program, would you seek legislation to operate alternative programs sponsored and financed by the Department of Defense?

Answer 1. The Administration is in favor of retaining an education program, similar to PREP, that affords the serviceman the opportunity for obtaining a high school diploma or its equivalency. The Department of Defense would fund such a program. Since the fiscal year 1976 Appropriation Bill has passed the House, and this bill would require alteration to allow the Department of Defense to fund a program similar to PREP, the administration favors continued VA funding of the PREP Program for the remainder of this fiscal year.

Additional legislation to operate alternative high school level programs would not be required as the authority to do so already exists. Additional funds would be required to offset the loss of VA funds which currently support the PREP Program. VA does not maintain PREP statistics by service; however, it is estimated that approximately $22–23M annually be required to replace PREP in the Army.

Question 2. If the PREP Program were terminated, and no alternative programs were authorized, how would that affect your reenlistments?

Answer 2. It would significantly reduce the numbers of soldiers eligible for reenlistment since the Army requires service personnel to have a high school diploma or equivalency to be eligible for reenlistment. During fiscal year 1975, 18,243 high school diplomas and 9,812 state equivalencies were issued through PREP—total of 28,055 made eligible for reenlistment. Elimination of PREP and alternatives provides fewer eligibles for reenlistment.

Question 3. What percentage of men on active duty use part of their GI bill (where GI bill pays tuition but no subsistence) eligibility? How does this practice aid the mission of the Army?

Answer 3. Participation rates in educational programs are based on educational level of the military population. Currently there are about 145,000 non-high school graduate soldiers. In the fourth quarter fiscal year 1975, 30,827 (20.6 percent of the number eligible) were enrolled in PREP. Use of PREP does not have any GI bill entitlement loss to the individual. At the post secondary level, 64,383 enlisted men and 11,797 officers were enrolled in academic and vocational/technical courses offered by accredited colleges. Nearly 46 percent of the participation was paid by individuals from GI bill entitlements.

Availability of funding through the GI bill has enhanced the educational opportunities offered servicemen, particularly in the harder skill areas which are in most cases directly related to military requirements. Costs for these programs are greater than academic courses because of costs for equipment, materials and supplies. Colleges have become more willing to assess them and evaluate and award academic credit for military training and experience and then design programs that complement and support the occupational skills of the soldiers.

The PREP supports the Army by raising through a high quality program the educational level of soldiers to meet reenlistment standards. In fiscal year 1975, 28,055 soldiers achieved high school completion. Experience has shown that those soldiers who achieve this academic goal during service will reenlist at a higher rate than those who entered service with the educational level.

Chairman HARTKE. Secretary Brotzman, before I ask any questions, I think it's only fair to note that as a matter of public record prior to the time the President made his final decision concerning the GI bill that neither the Department of the Army nor the Department of Defense wanted the GI bill to be terminated.

As a matter of fact a book written by John Hersey, entitled "A Week in the Life of the President" describes, on page 49, at 2:03 p.m. a session in which Secretary Schlesinger personally tried to convince the President of the need for such educational benefits.

Now, that the President has made a decision I suppose the Department's desire for continuation of the GI bill is now terminated. We all understand this procedure and we realize that you're expected to support the President.

For the Congress, however this process has just begun. Our responsibility in the legislative branch is to examine this proposal to terminate the GI bill as to its effect, not only upon the military, but on the welfare of the Nation, on veterans, and on the performance of the Army's mission.

So, understanding your situation, in light of what I've said, I would hope you will be as candid as possible within the framework of your limitation in supplying the Committee with the information that it will need to make its final decision.

I do want to point out that you've indicated the economy was a factor in answer to the questions by Senator Stafford.

However, if it is turned around the other way, and the economy gets better, as we all hope it does, that would mean that the plus in recruiting would disappear and in the case of a real sharp decrease in unemployment, it could be a minus. The opportunity to recruit on the basis of providing job opportunities and income maintenance would disappear. In summary, there would be more serious recruiting problems than you have now.

If we look at the termination of the GI bill in relation to the performance of the Army's mission, I wonder if you could tell us what studies have been completed and what they show, with respect to the termination of the GI bill on the Army's ability to recruit and to retain the level of quality of men and women they seek?

Secretary BROTZMAN. I would refer again to our studies, and I'll go back over them again if you wish in more detail.

Chairman HARTKE. Fine.

Secretary BROTZMAN. We have three basic studies. I will just go through and summarize what these three found because these are really all that I know of that are germane to your question.

Would that be proper at this point?

Chairman HARTKE. Fine.

Secretary BROTZMAN. The first, to reidentify it, was the TRADOC, what we call the "TRADOC Quality Soldier Study." This was the one that was completed on May 1975. Once again, the purpose was to define and assess the impact of the GI bill loss. The survey base, and I think this is important, it will vary in the three studies and I will call it specifically to the chairman's attention and that of the Committee. The survey base in this case is 70 company-sized units of force command.

QUALITY REDUCTION

The best estimate there, 15-percent decrease in high school graduates. That extrapolates into a figure of about 22,000 high school graduates annually.

In addition, according to this study, this will impact on resources in this fashion: It will increase annual losses requiring 3,818 additional accessions.

To explain that, with lesser high school degree graduates we will have greater training losses and that will occasion the need for more accessions; the figure being 3,818.

This will call for expansion of training load resulting from increased accessions and academic recycles; 1,661 trainee man-years.

The added annual trainee and accession cost would be about $7 million to do that.

Three will be a decrement in leadership. This is perhaps subjective in some of its connotations.

The discipline, as I indicated, is a more severe problem with those in the nonhigh school graduate area. We have figures here predicated upon the numbers that I gave you, that it would cause 1,375 additional AWOL's per year; 1,503 additional article 11 per year in units; 430

additional court-martial cases per year; and 580 additional occasional users of hard drugs per year in units.

Senator Stafford. Mr. Chairman, could the Secretary tell us, article III, is that nonjudicial punishment you're referring to?

Secretary Brotzman. May I correct the record? It's really article XV, which is company punishment.

If I could proceed in response to your question. The next study that I mentioned is the HUMRRO study. If you recall that's Human Resources Research Organization.

The HUMRRO study. I will summarize this because it is an addendum to that first study, which I think probably is a very credible one and I will just tell you what we found.

We arrived at the same basic proposition as those of the TRADOC study except they came up with a higher figure on high school diploma graduate decrements. Instead of 15 percent, theirs was about 22 percent.

Then, turning to the last study, the MARDAC study, this one I did mention involved over 13,000 individuals but I must also point out that it was done on a limited time frame. It was on a 30-day period at the AFEES—Armed Forces Entrance and Examination Station.

This one generally bore out the same findings as the others. The GI bill fell into the third reason for entering the Army and 28 percent picked that.

Chairman Hartke. Mr. Secretary, what you're saying is that education is a very important element in recruiting and in the operation of the mission of the military service.

Secretary Brotzman. Yes, sir.

Chairman Hartke. And, in the event of an emergency—in the case of combat—the desire to have people who are better educated, better disciplined, better at leadership becomes all the more important, does it not?

Secretary Brotzman. Yes, sir.

Chairman Hartke. We earlier inserted the TRADOC and MARDAC studies in the record. The HUMRRO study will be inserted into the record at this point.

[The study follows:]

2155

Special Report
SR-ED-75-25

Educational Benefits Analysis

An Examination of the Effects of G.I. Bill Educational Benefits on Service Accessions

November 1975

Richard L. Eisenman
Mark J. Eitelberg
Agnes C. Purcell
Barry M. Richmond
Curtis L. Wagner III

Management Sciences Group
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EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS ANALYSIS

An Examination of the Effects of G.I. Bill Educational Benefits on Service Accessions

November 1975

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EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS ANALYSIS

ABSTRACT

Problem

Serious consideration of the termination of post-service G.I. Bill educational benefits led to President Ford's May 1975 request for legislation to end benefits for future accessions.

The Department of Defense, therefore, required an assessment of the impact of G.I. Bill termination on Service accessions and a means for measuring the relative costs and benefits of alternative educational programs. At the outset of the Educational Benefits Analysis, evidence could be found to support impact estimates anywhere within the range of 3 to 60 percent.

Approach

Systematic modeling was undertaken to explain and quantify the mechanism by which the G.I. Bill operates as an incentive. Three models were developed to address *motivation*, the *queue*, and *costs and comparative benefits* -- and to integrate respective findings.

The *motivation model*, or micro analysis, involved the organization of both incentives and individuals into groups and scales. This organization of quantitative attitudinal data employed statistical procedures which include factor analysis, indices, Guttman scaling, correlation, the Automatic Interaction Detector (AID), and Exploratory Data Analysis.

The *queue model*, or macro analysis measured personnel flows by means of the computerized Educational Benefits Model (EBM). The EBM first processed census estimates into enlistment-proclivity groups and then into queue estimates. Information sources were the Census Bureau, current attitudinal surveys, and the National Longitudinal Study. Termination impact was evaluated through four validating analytical methods, centering on an econometric macromodel.

Assessment of *costs and benefits* involved a general appraisal of the G.I. Bill as well as the design of specific post-service alternatives. The general appraisal phase consisted of a trend analysis of the post-service G.I. Bill as a proportion of military compensation. The evaluation and design of alternatives were developed as a part of management support activities, conducted in the operational policy environment.

Management support activities were an intergral part of the overall Educational Benefits Analysis project. These activities helped the Analysis team maintain a policy focus and provided management with a number of analytical working documents.

Results

Costs and Benefits

- The post-service G.I. Bill represented 31% of an enlistee's compensation in 1948 versus 20% in 1973.
  - While in-service compensation became competitive with military jobs. (See figure opposite)
- A variety of substitutes for the post-service G.I. Bill are feasible.
  - Costs could range from $21M to $1,006M yearly.
  - Number of new users could range from 15,000 to 260,000 yearly.
  - Benefits to Defense could include a Reserve service eligibility requirement.
  - Administration could be handled by commercial insurance.
- As an enlistment incentive, the post-service G.I. Bill provides at most 20,000 Army high school graduates and costs at least $1B.
  - Thus, $50,000 per accession.



The G.I. Bill as a Proportion of Military Compensation

- If there is any serious concern for enlistment losses, it can be narrowed down to *high school graduates* for the *Army*. (See figure opposite).
    - The Army would be borderline for high school graduate requirements even with the G.I. Bill.
    - The other Services should be able to make their self-stated high school graduate requirements even without the G.I. Bill.
    - All Services can make their total (graduate and nongraduate) requirements without the G.I. Bill.
- The best estimate is that G.I. Bill termination would deplete 15% of the queue, if no management actions were taken.
    - Upper limit would be 21%.
    - Overestimates (40% to 60%) of termination impact result from surveys of self-professed interest in the G.I. Bill.
    - Underestimates (3%) result by considering the G.I. Bill as a primary or independent enlistment incentive.
- Although G.I. Bill termination might increase reenlistment eligibles by 12%, this increase is probably not needed.
    - G.I. Bill seekers tend not to reenlist (odds vs. reenlistment are 7.6:1 compared to about 2.5:1 overall).
- Major changes in the national environment could alter impact predictions.
    - The present queue without the G.I. Bill would be comparable to the queue of a few years ago with the G.I. Bill.
    - In the 1960's, termination impact was about 25%.
    - Unemployment and the G.I. Bill are overlapping influences since the same people would be lost through a decrease in unemployment as through G.I. Bill termination.



Estimated Accession Queue for Male HS Graduates
vs. Stated Requirements for July 1975-June 1976

Motivation

- Educational benefits are not in themselves major incentive factors, but rather secondary motivators.
- In-service education and post-service G.I. Bill benefits are correlative and are most often cited in a package with three or more other incentives.
- G.I. Bill seekers are generally older and differ from their peers in aspiration for advanced education.
- G.I. Bill seekers are similar to their peers in distribution by intended branch of Service, and in their support of other enlistment incentive items.

Recommendation

- The best management options are to:
  - Develop new approaches to attract the 19-25 year-old high school graduate.
  - Organize and publicize a centralized in-service education package.
  - Settle the contingency plan for a post-service benefit.

FOREWORD

The educational benefits analysis was supported by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (OASD(M&RA)) and performed by the Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO). The prinicpal objectives were (1) to examine the impact of terminating the G.I. Bill in respect to the number, quality, and representativeness of Service accessions; and (2) to provide a means for measuring the relative costs and benefits of alternative educational programs which might be needed to sustain military strength in the event of G.I. Bill termination.

The study involved assembly and interpretation of a substantial information base, constructed from existing sources. Previous papers on educational programs were culled for useful results and guidance. Quantitative data came primarily from the Census Bureau, the National Longitudinal Study (by the Office of Education), Gilbert Youth Surveys and Department of Defense Surveys.

The Management Sciences Group (MSG) in HumRRO's Eastern Division is responsible for the design and execution of this analysis. Richard L. Eisenman directed the project. Mark J. Eitelberg, Barry M. Richmond, Curtis L. Wagner III, and Agnes C. Purcell served as principal research investigators. Richard W. Hunter of OASD(M&RA) guided the project and participated in the policy focus. Other MSG members also contributed to the overall effort--especially Mr. Gus C. Lee, Mr. Alastair C. Fyfe, Mrs. M. Nell Bailey, Mrs. Ruth W. Benedict, Mr. Levin B. Broughton, and Mrs. Mary E. Morrissey.

The special cooperation of the Manpower Research and Data Analysis Center (MARDAC) of OASD(M&RA), The National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES) of the Office of Education, the Policy Analysis staff of the American Council on Education (ACE), Dr. Dave Grissmer of the General Research Corporation (GRC), and Dr. Dave O'Neill of the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), is also gratefully acknowledged.

EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS ANALYSIS

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

SPECIFICATION OF OBJECTIVES AND THE STUDY ENVIRONMENT

In March 1975, HumRRO's Management Sciences Group (MSG) suggested a comprehensive study of the G.I. Bill to its sponsors in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (OASD[M&RA]). On May 6, 1975, a meeting was held between representatives of OASD (M&RA) and the MSG to discuss the direction of future research efforts under HumRRO's Work Unit DRAMA. At that meeting, the following *Statement of Need* and *Task Order* were decided to be the guide for research which would estimate the impact of possible G.I. Bill termination:

Statement of Need

There is an urgent requirement for OSD to have a current, comprehensive and credible analysis of the impact of G.I. Bill termination on the supply of volunteers for military services. The analysis should also cover the costs and effects on manpower supply of alternative educational programs which may be needed to sustain military strengths in event of the G.I. Bill termination.

The need is urgent because OMB has proposed to the President that the G.I. Bill be terminated. Previous studies of the effects of the G.I. Bill termination are out of date; none of the studies considered the effects of varying employment levels; and the studies varied widely in their conclusions - partly because the data base was inadequate.

Task Order: Educational Benefits Analysis

HumRRO will construct a special data base, develop the models needed, and perform the definitive studies needed of the costs and effects of educational benefits, including the G.I. Bill and alternatives, as enlistment and reenlistment incentives. The task is expected to provide the data and analysis needed for the ASD(M&RA) to reach definitive findings and conclusions on such issues as:

1. The loss in number, quality and population representativeness of new enlistments, by Services, which would result from G.I. Bill termination.
2. The effect of G.I. Bill termination on the number of reenlistments by Services.

3. The effect of varying employment levels on the foregoing estimates.
4. The marginal role of educational incentives in the context of other incentives.
5. The variance between intentions and enlistment behavior among individuals who perceive the G.I. Bill and other educational incentives as a significant enlistment incentive; conversely, the variance among those who do not regard educational incentives as important.
6. The costs and comparative benefits of alternate educational programs which may be needed to sustain military strengths in event of G.I. Bill termination.

On the next day (May 7, 1975), President Ford declared the formal end of the "Vietnam Era" and issued a proclamation terminating non-legislated wartime benefits for new military recruits. At the same time, the President sent to Congress legislation which would set June 30, 1975 as the final date on which an individual enlisting in the military could qualify for educational benefits under the G.I. Bill.

The " ...urgent requirement for OSD to have a current, comprehensive and credible analysis of the impact of G.I. Bill termination..." became even more urgent, therefore, as events began to unfold. In the period immediately following the Presidential request for termination, there arose a strong operational need for a decision structure which would array current policy alternatives in an evaluative format. To facilitate the systematic analysis and comparison of decision alternatives -- within the atmosphere of uncertainty regarding Congressional action -- it also became desirable for the MSG to provide frequent consultation and management support activities to OASD(M&RA). These activities were directed at maintaining current information about educational benefit policy options, and setting suitable strategy to counteract the effects of possible termination.

The present research was conducted to satisfy the need for credible information within the environment of imminent termination. It is an interdisciplinary effort to model the impact on Service accessions of possible termination of G.I. Bill educational benefits. Appropriate new analytical techniques and approaches have been developed and used. It is expected that further study of educational benefits will build upon the approach and results of this research.

PROBLEM FORMULATION BASED ON PREVIOUS PAPERS

Endorsement of Education as an Incentive

Survey research over the past twenty-six years shows that the most frequently endorsed reasons for enlistment in the Armed Forces were related to education and training.

In 1949, the Armed Forces Information and Education Division conducted open-ended interview surveys of Army and Air Force recruits, in order to collect information regarding the most important reasons for enlistment. In both Services, the opportunity for advanced education was cited as the most important enlistment incentive.

Since 1949, numerous surveys designed to specify motivators for enlistment have shown the importance of general education and training incentives. A list of several significant surveys and the relative importance attributed to education in each appears in Table 1.1. It should be noted, however, that the types of responses requested were not always consistent among surveys. Therefore, these results can not be compared on the basis of frequency measures or construed to be indicative of any historical trend.

The G.I. Bill as One Opportunity for Education

Although there is a historical stream of survey data which indicates the relative importance of educationally-defined incentives for enlistment, there is no evidence to support the conclusion that *opportunity for advanced education and training* is always associated with the *G.I. Bill.* In fact, both previous[1] and current[2] analysis suggest that a distinction between "education" and "G.I. Bill" may exist in the results of surveys which list both as reasons for enlistment. In addition, it is not altogether clear that the "G.I. Bill" is exclusively associated with post-service education. It is true that the G.I. Bill is usually defined as a veteran's benefit, and eligibility is determined by completion of a specified term of active

---

[1] cf. Fisher and Harford (1974) and Kriner, Orend, and Rigg (1975).

[2] For a further discussion of this theory, see Chapter 2,(Organization of Incentives).

Table [illegible]

The Endorsement of Educational Enlistment Incentives [illegible] Surveys [illegible]

Source	Year of [illegible]	Data	[illegible]
USD, Armed Forces Information and Education Division, Attitude [illegible] for Enlistment. [illegible]	[illegible]	Survey of [illegible]	[illegible]
USD, Armed Forces Information and Education Division, Attitude [illegible] for Enlistment. [illegible] February, [illegible]	[illegible]	Survey of [illegible]	[illegible]
Bureau of Naval Personnel, [illegible] ment Survey.	[illegible]	Survey of [illegible] Enlisted Men	[illegible]
Bureau of Naval Personnel, [illegible] Survey. Motivational Factors [illegible] Enlistment Decision.	[illegible]	Survey of [illegible] Enlisted Men	[illegible] of personnel endorsed [illegible] advanced education [illegible] from structured list of [illegible] reasons.
Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Young Men [illegible] Service: A [illegible] Transition Project.	[illegible]	Nationwide [illegible] survey of [illegible] nearing high school graduation [illegible]	[illegible]
Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Young Men and Military Service.	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Naval Personnel Research and Development Laboratory, [illegible] Naval [illegible] A Longitudinal Research [illegible]	[illegible]	Survey of [illegible] Navy Men (First Sample)	[illegible] of personnel endorsed [illegible] advanced education [illegible] structured list of [illegible] reasons.
Research Analysis Corporation, [illegible] of the Modern Volunteer Army [illegible] Volume III.	[illegible]	Survey of [illegible] Army Personnel at six Selected Installations	[illegible] structured list of [illegible] reasons among all High School graduates.
American Institutes for Research, [illegible] Motivation Program [illegible] Motivation.	[illegible]	Personal interviews of [illegible]	[illegible]
American Institutes for Research, [illegible] Experimental [illegible] Enlistment Incentives.	[illegible]	[illegible] young men age [illegible] years [illegible]	[illegible]
MARDAC, Attitudes of Youth Toward Military Service in the [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	"Opportunity for [illegible]

[illegible]

Table 1.1 (Continued)

The Endorsement of Educational Enlistment Incentives In Surveys Over Time

Source	Year of Analysis	Data	Attributed Influence of Educational Incentives
HumRRO, [illegible] Motivation and [illegible] Applicants	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Opinion Research Corporation, [illegible] and Motivators [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] to the Army
MARDAC, [illegible] Gilbert Youth Survey [illegible] Military [illegible]	[illegible]	Gilbert Youth Survey, [illegible]	[illegible] greater than [illegible] tional [illegible] influences ranked first [illegible] among [illegible] enlistment probability [illegible]
MARDAC, Preliminary [illegible] AFEES Survey	[illegible]	AFEES Survey data of [illegible]	To get more education while in service ranked second on list of 10 most important reasons for enlistment; [illegible] (ranked second). [illegible] ted they would not have enlisted without postsecondary educational assistance; [illegible] indicated non-enlistment in absence of [illegible] levels of higher educational attainment.
MARDAC, Preliminary Results of May [illegible] AFEES Survey	[illegible]	AFEES Survey data of [illegible] entering [illegible]	[illegible] indicated "chance to get a college education while in service" [illegible] ranked [illegible] of 14. [illegible] indicated G.I. Bill [illegible] of [illegible] enlistment contingencies listed, [illegible] G.I. Bill ranked first [illegible] of enlistees claimed non-enlistment in absence of G.I. Bill.
TRADOC, TRADOC [illegible]	[illegible]	Survey of [illegible] personnel [illegible]	[illegible] of personnel listed "promise that a [illegible] would be able to further his educa- tion [illegible] as a [illegible] factor. [illegible] personnel and first-term personnel [illegible] higher.
[illegible], Army [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] G.I. Bill [illegible] of enlistment [illegible]

SURVEYS DESIGNED TO SPECIFY
MOTIVATORS FOR ENLISTMENT
HAVE CONSISTENTLY DEMONSTRATED
THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF
EDUCATIONAL INCENTIVES

duty -- but it is also a benefit which may be used while on active duty in pursuance of "advanced education and training". The problem lies in the fact that even separate listings of "opportunity for advanced education", "opportunity for training", and "eligible for the G.I. Bill" do not necessarily indicate either exclusive or inclusive definitions. Even "learn a trade or skill valuable in civilian life" is not clearly distinctive in meaning from the possible reasons attributed to qualification for the G.I. Bill. Termination of the G.I. Bill would, for example, affect the opportunities for trade or skill training currently available -- both directly, by reducing available support for training (other than MOS training) and indirectly, by reducing the opportunities for supportive education such as PREP, OJT, higher education courses, or correspondence school.

The Imputed Effect of G.I. Bill Termination

Previous attitudinal surveys which specify the relative influence of *motivators* for enlistment among both potential and actual recruits are available for evaluation. Statistical inference alone, however, cannot estimate the effects of G.I. Bill *termination* on Service accessions.

The problem of predicting changes in enlistment behavior is further complicated by the absence of a suitable precedent for analysis and the nature of the historical environment. In fact, interest in the G.I. Bill was minimal until discussions of the All Volunteer concept.[1] In 1963, the Department of Defense actually opposed the reinstitution of Cold War G.I. Bill educational benefits -- on the grounds that such benefits would severely hamper retention programs (U.S. Congress, "Cold War G.I. Bill", 1963, pp. 27-28). The G.I. Bill was viewed as a negative influence on the maintenance of a quality force. To accommodate the Pentagon, eligibility was extended to soldiers after they had completed two years of active duty (later reduced to 180 days) so that there would not necessarily be an incentive to leave the military (Starr, 1973, p. 238). Even the Gates Commission, which launched the volunteer force, exhibited indifference to the possible influence of G.I. Bill incentives on enlistment rates (U. S. President's Commission on an All Volunteer Armed Force, 1970).

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[1] Ironically, Title 38, United States Code, Veterans Benefits, (Chapter 34) lists "enhancing and making more attractive service in the Armed Forces of the United States" as the first "Purpose" of education programs created under the G.I. Bill (38 USC 1651).

Interest in the G.I. Bill and other educational benefits as enlistment incentives was restimulated by the "Youth in Transition" and Gilbert Youth Research Surveys -- in which several education-related experimental incentive concepts were shown to have high degrees of potential attraction.[1] Nevertheless, the major issue here was how educational benefits could be increased or modified to attract quality accessions. *The question of termination was never addressed as a part of the transition from war to peace and draft to volunteer force.*

The philosophical justification and possible impact of G.I. Bill termination (in the peacetime *all*-volunteer environment) first received attention in the 1973 Interagency Task Force Report on the "The G.I. Bill and the All Volunteer Force." The OMB-led Task Force recommendation for the discontinuance of veterans' educational benefits prompted several additional attempts to measure the effects of termination on volunteer accessions (e.g., Department of Defense, 1973; Eisenman, 1973). The primary basis for computation in these papers, however, was previous survey data -- *collected in an environment of continuing and expanding benefits* -- and from which only broad confidence interval estimates could be made.

Although previous literature does provide a substantial amount of information regarding the importance attributed to educational benefits by potential enlistees,[2] the utility of such information for the purposes of this research is limited. Questions regarding individual interpretations of G.I. Bill benefits and the possible effects of a "contraction" of educational incentives have never been adequately explored.

In order to specifically address these issues, a systems perspective of the educational benefits question was adopted.

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[1] As Johnston and Bachman note: "Nonetheless, we were singularly impressed by one finding. Considering the first choice of respondents, [illegible] incentive stands out above all others: 'The government agrees to pay for up to four years of college ... in return for four years of active duty.' This was selected by a margin of 4 to 1 over the second-ranked incentive, military pay comparable to civilian pay" (1970, p. 40).

[2] Appendix B also summarizes previous relevant studies on the "quality" individual, motivational evidence (relating to educational incentives), and the enlistment decision process.

THE APPROACH: SYSTEMS MODELING

Often it is neither possible, nor desirable, to determine the impact of some policy action on a particular system through direct experimentation on the system itself. In such cases, it is usually possible to construct a *model* of the system upon which the appropriate experimentation can then be performed.

Models, however, are of necessity only incomplete representations of the systems they are intended to proxy. This becomes particularly true when the system to be modeled is quite large (as is the case in the Educational Benefits Analysis). The effect of terminating G.I. Bill educational benefits can be modeled at a highly *aggregate* level -- the four Service Branches, or the Department of Defense -- or at a very fine *disaggregate* level -- that is, the individual's own particular set of personal characteristics, and their relationship to the incentive and motivational structure of enlistment/reenlistment decisions.

There are distinct advantages to models constructed at each of these levels of aggregation. *Macro* models, by dealing with statistical aggregation, lend themselves to a quantification of the overall impact of termination policy. The Educational Benefits Model (EBM) was designed for this study to facilitate analysis of the impact of terminating post-service educational benefits on various populations. The impact was then assessed for DoD as a whole, each Service separately, for race, and high school performance levels.

Although such macro analyses can calculate the dimensions of the problem, correlated *micro* analyses are required for more penetrating estimations of problem area causes and solutions. In dealing at the level of the individual, for example, one can more fully comprehend the structure of incentive appeal among similar groups of potential enlistees -- and thereby design an appropriate educational benefits program to attract target populations.

While the macro and micro models were essentially independent in structure, however, they should not be viewed in an either/or context. In fact, each was used as a check on the results generated by the other. This mutually enhancing relationship between the two models is depicted in Figure 1.1.


Demographic, proclivity, transition of proclivity, econometric, statistical analyses.
MACRO MODEL
Termination Impact Statements
MICRO MODEL
Social, Motivational, & Behavioral Science Theory, Surveys, and Statistical Analyses
Individual Characteristics, Expectations, Motivation, and Enlistment Behavior
COST
Extent of Need for Offsetting Management Policy Actions
Insight into which Offsetting Actions Will be the Most Effective
Development of Cost/Effective Offsetting Management Policy Actions

Figure 1.1 Interdependence of Macro and Micro Models in The Educational Benefits Analysis

Chapter 2

ENLISTMENT MOTIVATION: *Micro Analysis*

METHODS FOR MODELING ENLISTMENT MOTIVATION

Methods for determining the impact of educational benefits policy may include controlled experimentation and the examination of historical evidence. There is no previous recruiting environment which parallels present conditions for termination, however, and experimentation on the system is neither feasible nor particularly desirable. In the absence of such methods, therefore, two phases of micro-analysis -- concept and organization -- were developed and applied to evaluate motivational and behavioral patterns.

The Concept of Motivation as It Relates to Educational Benefits

Measuring the impact of the G.I. Bill and its alternatives implies the ability to predict behavioral change -- that is, the various modifications in behavior which can be expected to occur in either the presence or absence of those incentives.

It is generally acknowledged that motivation is crucial for behavioral change. It is often conceptualized as an "enduring energy system" of needs, drives, or motives which impel and sustain responsiveness. Incentive theories of motivation assume that this responsiveness can be changed and, in effect, determined by reinforcement conditions. Since the individual behaves largely in anticipation of reinforcing consequences, therefore, motivation can be regulated through the *arrangement of incentive conditions.*

The number and variety of motivating conditions which may influence enlistment decisions received considerable attention when discussions of the modern All-Volunteer Force first began.[1] Statements regarding the effects of certain incentives should presuppose an understanding of the processes of behavioral change, however, and the *relative importance* of certain inventives in causing enlistment. Simplistic evaluations of enlistment behavior often occur in the absence of such understanding, and certain incentives are erroneously identified as singular determinants of behavior: e.g., a "quality" man enlists in the Army because he wants to be eligible for G.I. Bill benefits when his term of service ends. Broad generalizations such as this, nevertheless, are incomplete descriptions of the true situation.

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[1] During the draft era, mandate was used in place of motivation as the primary regulator of enlistment behavior. Accessions above the basic core number of highly self-motivated enlistees were entered through conscription. The issue of creating *increased interest* among *potential* quality recruits was not a major policy concern.

For each individual, a variety of factors must be at work -- and each, to varying degrees, may influence or motivate enlistment behavior. A multidimensional function, $Y = f(x_1, x_2, x_3, \ldots x_n)$ -- where Y represents enlistment behavior and x_1 to x_n represent a set of positive and negative influences on the enlistment decision -- is required to represent the relationship of motivating factors to the enlistment decision. G.I. Bill benefits may interact with other motivators to create a complex of reasons for enlistment -- e.g., furtherance (and postponement) of education, career development, job dissatisfaction, civilian insecurity, financial needs, upward mobility, personal advancement, etc. These factors, when combined, can produce a need situation strong enough to induce enlistment and result in a successfully completed term of service as goal-directed activity (education with educational assistance). Acting as enlistment incentives, therefore, educational benefits will combine with other personal, individual drives and perceptions to create the "motivating situation" -- as depicted in Figure 2.1.

The Organization of a Micro Model

With a basic understanding of the multifarious dimensions and interacting variables of enlistment motivation, one can proceed to define those elements which fit into the categories of the educational motivating situation -- specifically, by *establishing relationships* among incentives and *organizing individuals* into homogeneous groups. To achieve this end, analysis undertook both the grouping and scaling of Service incentives (*vis-a'-vis* the G.I. Bill) and the grouping and scaling of


The "Motivating Situation"
Incentive
G.I. Bill Educational Benefits
Availability of Incentive
* In-Service Benefits
* Post-Service Benefits
* Perceived Access
Individual Need
* Tuition Assistance
* Personal and Family Needs
* Financial Limitations
Expectancy of Use
* Perceived Eligibility
* Pre-enlistment plans; postpone completion of education
* Plans During Service
* Plans for Non-re-enlistment
* Post-Service Plans
Motive or Reason
* Further Education
* Career Development
* Job Dissatisfaction
* Civilian Insecurity
* Monetary
* Upward Mobility
* Personal Advancement
Resultant Behavior
Goal-Directed Behavior or Activity
* Inquire
* See Recruiter
* Enlist
Goal Activity
* Use In-service Benefits
* Serve Term(s) of Enlistment; Separate and Utilize Post-Service Benefits

Figure 2.1 Educational Benefits as Enlistment Incentives


Motivation
Behavior
Service Incentives
Career-Oriented
a
b
c
d
GI BILL
Grouped
Scaled/Ordered
Societal &
Experiential
Influences
Unemployment,
Military image
White
Male
a
b
c
d
Probably
Will
Enlist
Grouped
Scaled/Ordered
Individual Motives
Goal-Directed
Activity
See Recruiter;
Enlistment Process
reenlist
In-Service
Education
Post-
Service
Education
Goal-Achievement
Activity

Figure 2.2 The Organization of Enlistment Motivation

DISAGGREGATE BEHAVIORAL CHANGE CAN BE EVALUATED THROUGH THE ORGANIZATION OF INCENTIVES AND INDIVIDUAL'S MOTIVES individuals (according to enlistment motivations). The analytical model for this phase of research is depicted in Figure 2.2.

By organizing incentives and individuals into groups and scales, insights were obtained regarding the degree of influence of educational benefit alternatives *within the set of incentives* and *upon different sets of individuals*. The organization was accomplished by applying statistical models to quantitative attitudinal data. The statistical techniques chosen for this micro analysis were Automatic Interaction Detector (AID) for grouping individuals; Factor Analysis for grouping incentives; and basic crosstabulations, reinforced by Exploratory Data Analysis and Guttman Scaling, for ordering. The data sources were attitudinal surveys and the National Longitudinal Study (NLS) (described in Appendix C).

A final major point is that longitudinal studies have been particularly helpful in tracing the individual's conversion from attitude to behavior. This conversion from attitude to behavior and to changes in attitude usually involves more complex processes than are readily apparent in the results of cross-sectional surveys. An additional longitudinal perspective forms the conclusion of this chapter, therefore, to examine retroactive attitudinal change among first-term Service personnel and to link reenlistment intentions with original enlistment motivation.

ORGANIZATION OF INCENTIVES

Grouping of Incentives

A Factor Analysis was designed to identify a grouping of reasons for enlistment among new recruits. The data were survey responses to a question, listing fourteen possible reasons for enlistment, which appeared on the May 1975 Armed Forces Entrance and Examination Stations (AFEES) questionnaire.1/ For each reason, the enlistee indicated the extent of influence on the decision to enlist, using the following five-point scale: very much, fairly much, some, little, and none. Factor analysis was used to group the fourteen possible reasons for enlistment among enlistees entering the Services, and to identify the common structure of incentive appeal between Services.

For each Service cohort, intercorrelation matrices were constructed for the fourteen item responses. Intercorrelation matrices were then factor analyzed, using the principal components factor analysis program in the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). Orthogonal varimax rotation of the principal factor solution was then performed for each Service to achieve a working factor structure of incentives. The resulting rotated factor matrix was then analyzed and evaluated for highest factor loadings and interpretatively labeled according to established relationships of strong incentives within each factor solution.2/ Service listings under interpretative labels appear in Tables 2.1 and 2.2; actual Factor value computations appear in Tables 2.3a through 2.3d.

The results of this Factor Analysis suggest several conclusions concerning the current structure of educational benefit incentives for enlistment.

"To become eligible for the G.I. Bill" and "Chance to get a college education while in service" exhibit relatively weak loadings within factor solutions. In no instance may either incentive be said to dominate or

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1/ Criterion question: (Q.17) "While making up your mind to enlist, how much did each of these reasons influence you? Indicate the amount of influence for each reason."

2/ A minimum eigenvalue of 1.0 was used as a cut-off point for the selection of factors. This explains why the Marine Corps solution of this data contains only four factors. It should also be noted that the percentage of explained common variance was never less than 7.8 for any factor, and at least 51.6 percent (Marines) of the common variance was accounted for in each of the Service factor solutions.

prevail among alternative incentives. That is, *educational benefits are not a major incentive factor for any branch of Service.*

There are noticeable differences in maximum-strength loadings within Factors (and among the Services) of the two educational incentives. The differences in the partner-incentives with which education benefits received highest weights may be seen in Table 2.2. Maximum weights between the "college education while in service" and "G.I. Bill" incentive categories also differ among factors in the Navy and Marine Corps solutions (as seen in Tables 2.3b and 2.3c). The overall differences in weights between these two incentives was much smaller than had been anticipated.[1] If one is to assume -- from previous related research -- that "advanced education" is equated with "in-service education" by survey respondents,[2] then current research may indicate *increasing associations of in-service educational opportunities with G.I. Bill benefits* (and/or simple increasing patterns of Factor structure). The fact that a *separate* in-service question exists, is suggestive in itself to survey respondents that there is some difference between enlisting to "get a college education in service" and being "eligible for the G.I. Bill". That any similarity in structure should be made -- despite this fact -- is noteworthy.

Previous research also suggests that there may be a *shifting pattern in the general structure of educational enlistment incentives.* Many individuals who previously recognized the attractiveness of the G.I. Bill as an incentive for enlistment conceptualized it as a "personnel benefit" (Fisher and Rigg, 1974). Although G.I. Bill still correlates very well with "pay and benefits" incentives, the association is not as obviously strong as it once was. Similarly, where "opportunity for advanced education" was once highly

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[1] Studies by Fisher and Rigg (1974), Fisher and Harford (1974), and Kriner, Orend, and Rigg (1975) of survey data through 1973 suggested primary differences in interpretations of "G.I. Bill" and "opportunity for advanced education" by Service enlistees. The latter study, in fact, hypothesized that "advanced education" could be closely associated with in-service opportunities -- while the G.I. Bill was more exclusively a post-service benefit.

[2] An alternative theory of interpretation could be that a distinction is made in the level of education implied by "advanced education" -- or that there is widespread lack of knowledge concerning the extent of G. I. Bill benefits.

Table 2.1 Enlistment Incentive Factors by Services

Enlistment Incentive Factors (Interpretive Labels)	Corresponding Order[1]			
	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
Travel and Excitement	1	1	2	1
Career Development	2	2	1	4
Job Dissatisfaction	3	3	3	2
Civilian Insecurity	4	5	4	5
Monetary	5	4	N/A	3

[1] cf. Tables 2.3a through 2.3d for complete breakout of incentive weights by factors.

Table 2.2 Position of Educational Benefit Incentives Within Factors

Enlistment Incentive Factor (Interpretive Labels)	POSITION OF EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS INCENTIVES WITHIN FACTORS							
	ARMY		NAVY		MARINE CORPS		AIR FORCE	
	GI Bill	I Service College	GI Bill	In Service College	Bill	In Service College	Bill	In Service College
Travel and Excitement	6	7	4 *Highest Loading*	6	5	7	4	7
Career Development	4 *Highest Loading*	3 *Highest Loading*	6	5	6	5 *Highest Loading*	5	3
Job Dissatisfaction	6	4	5	3 *Highest Loading*	10	6	4	3
Civilian Insecurity	10	13	13	14	2 *Highest Loading*	7	12	13
Monetary	4	6	5	4	N/A	N/A	3 *Highest Loading*	4 *Highest Loading*

EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS ARE
NOT A MAJOR INCENTIVE FACTOR

Table 2.3a

Factor Analysis of Incentives

BASE: Army (AFEES, May, 1975)

Incentives	Factors				
	1	2	3	4	5
A. To do something different.	.56	.17	.07	.19	.002
B. *To become eligible for the G.I. Bill.*	.23	.26	.10	.09	.23
C. To learn a skill.	.25	.64	-.03	.08	.08
D. To travel and see the world.	.60	.11	.04	.11	.13
E. For the pay and benefits.	.27	.04	.02	.07	.61
F. To serve my country.	.47	.09	.06	-.12	.22
G. Didn't like the job I had.	.09	.03	.57	.10	.01
H. To prepare for a later civilian job.	.02	.68	.03	.13	.10
I. I was tired of going to school.	.08	.03	.04	.44	.06
J. No good civilian jobs were available.	-.11	.10	.15	.41	.27
K. I wasn't sure what I wanted to do.	.11	.09	.16	.61	-.01
L. No chance for promotion in my civilian job.	.04	.05	.74	.18	.09
M. *Chance to get college education while in service.*	.17	.30	.15	-.03	.19
N. To be able to support myself or family.	.06	.19	.03	.10	.47
Eigenvalue	2.97	1.57	1.25	1.15	1.14
Percent of variance accounted for	21.2	11.2	8.9	8.2	8.1
Cumulative percent of variance accounted for	21.2	32.5	41.4	49.6	57.7

Table 2.3b

Factor Analysis of Incentives

BASE: Navy (AFEES, May 1975)

Incentives	Factors				
	1	2	3	4	5
A. To do something different.	.64	.05	.14	-.11	.26
B. *To become eligible for the G.I. Bill.*	.35	.12	.19	.21	.002
C. To learn a skill	.23	.65	.01	.10	.03
D. To travel and see the world.	.45	.16	-.05	.08	.17
E. For the pay and benefits	.32	.06	-.02	.52	.12
F. To serve my country	.45	.02	.06	.17	-.03
G. Didn't like the job I had.	.05	-.01	.60	.02	.12
H. To prepare for a later civilian job.	.02	.64	.04	.14	.09
I. I was tired of going to school.	.09	.04	.04	.04	.39
J. No good civilian jobs were available	-.19	.12	.12	.39	.45
K. I wasn't sure what I wanted to do	.15	.02	.21	.05	.39
L. No chance for promotion in my civilian job.	.04	.03	.58	.07	.16
M. *Chance to get college education while in service.*	.28	.15	.32	.24	-.12
N. To be able to support myself or family	.09	.16	.11	.51	.08
Eigenvalue	2.84	1.46	1.35	1.17	1.09
Percent of variance accounted for	20.3	10.4	9.6	8.4	7.8
Cumulative percent of variance accounted for	20.3	30.7	40.3	48.7	56.4

Table 2.3c

Factor Analysis of Incentives

BASE: Marine Corps (AFEES, May 1975)

Incentives	Factors			
	1	2	3	4
A. To do something different	.13	.42	.10	.19
B. *To become eligible for the G.I. Bill.*	.26	.33	.05	.38
C. To learn a skill	.63	.27	.06	-.05
D. To travel and see the world	.15	.54	.06	.13
E. For the pay and benefits	.39	.36	.06	.36
F. To serve my country	.12	.54	.03	-.08
G. Didn't like the job I had	.01	.14	.60	.14
H. To prepare for a later civilian job.	.59	.03	.05	.18
I. I was tired of going to school	.04	.10	.01	.31
J. No good civilian jobs were available	.22	-.09	.17	.43
K. I wasn't sure what I wanted to do	.05	.04	.18	.37
L. No chance for promotion in my civilian job	.12	.04	.81	.14
M. *Chance to get college education while in service.*	.35	.23	.10	.20
N. To be able to support myself or family	.48	.22	.01	.22
Eigenvalue	3.38	1.50	1.23	1.11
Percent of variance accounted for	24.2	10.7	8.8	7.9
Cumulative percent of variance accounted for	24.2	34.9	43.7	51.6

Table 2.3d

Factor Analysis of Incentives

BASE: Air Force (AFEES, May 1975)

Incentives	Factors				
	1	2	3	4	5
A. To do something different	.64	.13	.02	.09	.14
B. *To become eligible for the G.I. Bill.*	.26	.15	.29	.12	.003
C. To learn a skill	.21	.003	.10	.60	.01
D. To travel and see the world	.55	.001	.14	.03	.10
E. For the pay and benefits	.23	.05	.58	-.02	.11
F. To serve my country	.34	-.03	.27	.15	-.15
G. Didn't like the job I had	.09	.66	.06	.02	.09
H. To prepare for a later civilian job	-.02	.08	.10	.69	.03
I. I was tired of going to school	.06	-.01	.01	-.02	.35
J. No good civilian jobs were available	-.16	.20	.26	.09	.42
K. I wasn't sure what I wanted to do	.12	.16	-.01	.02	.55
L. No chance for promotion in my civilian job	.03	.64	.16	.08	.14
M. *Chance to get college education while in service.*	.13	.15	.29	.22	-.06
N. To be able to support myself or family	-.01	.07	.53	.12	.07
Eigenvalue	2.68	1.58	1.32	1.16	1.12
Percent of variance accounted for	19.1	11.3	9.4	8.3	8.0
Cumulative percent of variance accounted for	19.1	30.4	39.8	48.2	56.2

correlated with career opportunities and valuable trades or skills, i.e., Career Development (Fisher and Harford, 1974, pp. 20-23; Kriner, Orend and Rigg, 1975, pp. 26-27), the same association of "college education in-service" is not as obvious in current analysis.

Scaling of Incentives

Educational benefits policy could be greatly simplified if each individual responded literally in the sense of a "hierarchy of needs," and one could discern precisely where G.I. Bill motivators appear in each potential enlistee's pyramid or ladder of incentive needs.[1/] If there were such a perfect ordering, it might also be possible to isolate those individuals who view educational benefits as *the one* incentive to cause enlistment.

The incentives presented in Table 2.4 appear to be well-ordered. However, this ordering is in *aggregate* form and does not represent the *one-by-one* importance of incentives to the individual. A statistical test -- Guttman Scaling -- is available to evaluate whether a set of questions can, in fact, be "scaled". Guttman Scaling was applied to enlistment incentives, therefore, in an effort to determine if typical pyramidal patterns exist among the various reasons for enlistment. The results shown in Table 2.5 verify that no typical order of incentives operates for potential enlistees.

Until a hierarchy of enlistment incentives can be sorted for various populations, attempts to develop micro analyses will be incomplete. One workable alternative is to place a particular incentive in focus and subordinately group other incentives in a corresponding manner. Table 2.4 singles out G.I. Bill interest and subordinates other incentives to the G.I. Bill termination question. Its major point is that G.I. Bill seekers are quite similar to enlistees in general -- except that G.I. Bill seekers have a greater interest in in-Service education and a

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[1/] cf, for example, the work of Abraham Maslow, especially Motivation and Personality (1970).

(somewhat surprising) lesser interest in skill training. The latter point suggests that the G.I. Bill has a special role in attracting a share of high quality personnel to combat arms skills.

A third approach to scaling, as shown in Tables 2.6 and 2.7, sheds light on the relation between motivators and deterrents. A correlation was computed between the importance for being positively influenced by G.I. Bill eligibility cited by enlistees, and against enlisting if the G.I. Bill had been terminated prior to actual enlistment. The correlation value of -.46, although numerically larger than four similar pairings, is not particularly strong. Thus endorsement of the G.I. Bill does not correlate strongly with deterrence in the event of termination.

Table 2.4

What Best Describes Why You Are Entering Military Service?

Legend: __________ Entrants Who Answer "Def Not" to "Would you still have Enlisted if the GI Bill was Eliminated?"
---------- Total Entrants



G.I. BILL SEEKERS ARE COMPARABLE TO THEIR PEERS IN OTHER MOTIVATORS

TABLE 2.5

Guttman Scaling of Incentives

Source: NLS base year and first followup study of High School seniors, restricted to those who planned to enlist; twelve incentives measuring "very" versus "somewhat or not" important in helping decide to enter.

Procedure: SPSS Scalogram Analysis: Subprogram Guttman Scale

Statistical Result

* G.I. Bill was 5th most cited of 12 incentives.
* College-in-Service was 6th most cited.
* 3% cited G.I. Bill but 0 other incentives.
  8% cited G.I. Bill with 1 or 2 other incentives.
  15% cited G.I. Bill with 3 or 4 other incentives.
  13% cited G.I. Bill with more than 4 other incentives.
  39%
* Minimum marginal reproducibility = .7247.
* Percent of scaling improvement = .0821.
  - Coefficient of scalability = .2982.

Interpretation

* Reinforces the "secondary" role of educational benefits incentives.
* In-Service education is on the heels of G.I. Bill as an incentive.
* Where the G.I. Bill is cited, it is most often part of a coalition of 3 or more other incentives.
* There is a generous tendency to endorse incentives as "very important".
* Incentives tend strongly not to line up in the same priorities for different people.

Table 2.6 Strength of Enlistment Motivators



Motivator	Mean Score	S.D.
To learn a skill	3.5	0.96
For pay & benefits	3.0	1.01
To prepare for a civilian job	2.9	1.30
To be able to support myself or family	2.9	1.43
To travel and see the world	2.8	1.22
To serve my country	2.7	1.15
Chance to get college education in Service	2.7	1.42
To do something different	2.6	1.32
To become eligible for the G.I. Bill	2.3	1.44
No good civilian jobs available	1.8	1.56
I wasn't sure what to do	1.4	1.40
No chance for promotion in present job	1.1	1.47
Didn't like the job I had	1.0	1.40
I was tired of going to school	0.6	1.17

Source: May 1975 AFEES survey

ON AVERAGE FOR ALL INDIVIDUALS, THE G.I. BILL IS A SECONDARY MOTIVATOR

Table 2.7 Consistency between Motivators and Deterrents

MOTIVATOR	DETERRENT	CORRELATION COEFFICIENT
Pay & Benefits	PX Privileges Cancelled	-0.10
Pay & Benefits	Pay Cut $50/Month	-0.06
G.I. Bill Eligibility	G.I. Bill Cancellation	-0.46
Couldn't Find Work	Found Civilian Job	-0.27
Wanted to Serve Country	War Was Declared	+0.34

Source: Individual answers to the May 1975 AFEES survey.

ENDORSEMENT OF THE G.I. BILL DOES NOT CORRELATE WITH DETERRENCE IN THE EVENT OF TERMINATION

ORGANIZATION OF INDIVIDUALS

Grouping of Individuals

Assessment was focused on the question: *Whom does the G.I. Bill affect in the marketplace?*

Answers to this question were sought through investigation of the response patterns of the prospective enlistees in the NLS Base Year sample. The object was to identify those characteristics in a respondent's background that best predicted how strongly the G.I. Bill was valued in the course of an enlistment decision. "Characteristics" were chosen from a variety of personal and socio-economic attributes: parents' income and education, family size, race, size of community, intended branch of service, etc. Throughout this part of the analysis, the key variable is that percentage of the population being considered which rated G.I. Bill eligibility as a very important part of its enlistment decision. The results among several groups of people are summarized in Table 2.8.

Table 2.8

G.I. Bill Importance for Several Groups of People

Classification	Proportion who said the G.I. Bill was a very important incentive
0. Overall	39%
1. Educational level Student Plans to Attain	
Graduate from Junior College	67%
Graduate from a four-year College	49%
Finish High School but no further	21%
2. Parents' Income	
$7500 to $8000	56%
$10,500 to $17,000	46%
over $18,000	29%
3. Race	
Black	57%
Mexican-American	50%
White	36%
4. Intended Service	
Marines	47%
Army	42%
Air Force	36%
Navy	36%
5. Grades	
Mostly B's through mostly C's	40%
Mostly A's through 1/2 A's and 1/2 B's	37%
1/2 C's and 1/2 D's through mostly below D	36%

THE IMPORTANT SEPARATORS OF G.I. BILL INTEREST ARE EDUCATIONAL PLANS AND RACE; LESS IMPORTANT ARE INTENDED SERVICE AND GRADES

Since grades and intended branch of Service show little fluctuation within classes, it follows that this information offers little explanation as to an individual's G.I. Bill interest. Each characteristic of Race, Income and Educational-Level Planned, on the other hand, clearly differentiates between high-interest and low-interest individuals -- i.e., they contain substantial explanatory power.

For a more penetrating and objective investigation of the explanatory powers, the aggregate interaction of these variables and G.I. Bill interest was measured by use of the Automatic Interaction Detector (AID) technique. The output is schematized in the diagrams that follow. Though there are a number of ways of interpreting AID diagrams, the most relevant to this case is simply to consider the attribute used in forming the two "children-groups" as the attribute which best differentiates the G.I. Bill interest level of the "parent-group". These AID evaluations, diagrammed as Figures 2.3 through 2.7, have an interesting pattern as to those characteristics which have large enough explanatory power to show up in the first levels of differentiation. In all cases except the Marine Corps prospects, educational plans are the overriding characteristic which distinguishes G.I. Bill seekers from their peers, followed by socio-economic status and peer influence.[1] There is also a message in the omitted characteristics, notably that G.I. Bill seekers are like their peers in school grades and as to preferred branch of Service. Although race is important and does enter the Army sort, the racial difference is overshadowed by educational plans and socio-economic status in the total picture.

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[1] It should be noted that age differentiation was not considered here since the populations were all HS seniors.


• Block WIDTH corresponds to the number of people (shown in the lower right hand corner of the block).
• Block HEIGHT corresponds to the percentage of people expressing interest in the G.I. Bill (shown above block).
43% CONSIDER THE G.I. BILL VERY IMPORTANT TO THEIR ENLISTMENT DECISION.
High School Seniors Who Plan to Enlist
100
66%
Plan Jr. College or More
30
80%
Fathers High School or More
23
92%
Parents Make Less Than $15K
13
62%
Parents Make More Than $15K
9
32%
Fathers High School or Less
8
32%
Plan Technical School or Less Education
70
64%
Bl. or Span.
16
88%
Worked More Than 25 hrs/wk.
8
43%
Worked Less Than 25 hrs/wk.
9
25%
White
54
White

Figure 2.3. Importance of G.I. Bill in the Decisions of High School Seniors Who Plan to Enlist in the ARMY

THE ARMY-UNIQUE FEATURE IS THAT RACE ENTERED AS A THIRD LEVEL SORT


* Block WIDTH corresponds to the number of people (shown in the lower right hand corner of the block).
* Block HEIGHT corresponds to the percentage of people expressing interest in the G.I. Bill (shown above block).
36% CONSIDER THE G.I. BILL VERY IMPORTANT TO THEIR ENLISTMENT DECISION.
High School Seniors Who Plan to Enlist
100
46%
Plan Jr. College or More
43
63%
From Fam. w/ Four or More Dep. Child.
36
71%
Plan Jr. or Four Year College
17
46%
Plan Grad. or Prof. School
9
32%
Fam. w/ Three or Less Dep. Children
32
53%
Friends go to Military
11
18%
Friends go to Col. or Work
21
22%
Plan Tech. School or Less
16
55%
Friends to Work Full Time
7
18%
Friends go to Col. or Mil.
11
9%
32
Fathers Had H.S. or Less
27%
Fathers Studied Beyond H.S.
9

Figure 2.4. Importance of G.I. Bill in the Decisions of High School Seniors Who Plan to Enlist in the NAVY

THE NAVY FEATURE IS
PARENTAL AND PEER
INFLUENCE


• Block WIDTH corresponds to the number of people (shown in the lower right hand corner of the block).
• Block HEIGHT corresponds to the percentage of people expressing interest in the G.I. Bill (shown above block).
47% CONSIDER THE G.I. BILL VERY IMPORTANT TO THEIR ENLISTMENT DECISION.
High School Seniors Who Plan to Enlist
100
71%
Friends go to Military
31
37%
Friends go to College
68
50%
Plan Four Year College or More
44
14%
Plan Jr. Col. or Less
22
62%
Live in City with Population of over 50,000
17
42%
Live in city with population of less than 50,000
27

Figure 2.5. Importance of G.I. Bill in the Decisions of High School Seniors Who Plan to Enlist in the MARINE CORPS

ONLY THE MARINE CORPS HOLDS EDUCATIONAL PLANS BACK TO SECOND-LEVEL IMPORTANCE


* Block WIDTH corresponds to the number of people (shown in the lower right hand corner of the block).
* Block HEIGHT corresponds to the percentage of people expressing interest in the G.I. Bill (shown above block).
36% CONSIDER THE G.I. BILL VERY IMPORTANT TO THEIR ENLISTMENT DECISION.
High School Seniors Who Plan to Enlist
100
44%
Plan Technical School or More
78
55%
Parents Make More Than 21SK
47
65%
Friends Going Into Military
35
25%
Friends Going to College
12
25%
Parents Make Less Than 21SK
22
52%
Plan Jr. College
4
13%
Plan Four Year Col. or More
11
13%
Plan High School or Less
14
42%
Friends Going to Military
8
0%
Friends go to College

Figure 2.6. Importance of G.I. Bill in the Decisions of High School Seniors Who Plan to Enlist in the AIR FORCE

THE AIR FORCE AND NAVY STATE SLIGHTLY LOWER G.I. BILL IMPORTANCE THAN M.C. AND ARMY


* Block WIDTH corresponds to the number of people (shown in lower right hand corner of block).
* Block HEIGHT corresponds to the percentage of people expressing interest in the G.I. Bill (shown above block).
39% CONSIDER THE G.I. BILL VERY IMPORTANT TO THEIR ENLISTMENT DECISION.
High School Seniors Who Plan to Enlist
100
53%
Plan Jr. College or More
29
66%
Parents Make Below $15K
20
82%
Plan to Army
5
61%
Plan to Navy MC AF
15
25%
Parents Make Above $15K
9
33%
Plan Technical School or Less Education
71
55%
Bl. or Span.
12
63%
Friends go to Military or Industry
6
47%
Friends go to College
6
29%
White
59
41%
Friends go to Military
14
25%
Friends go to College or Industry
45

Figure 2.7. Importance of G.I. Bill in the Decisions of High School Seniors Who Plan to Enlist (All Services Combined)

* THE LARGER GROUPS ARE LESS G.I. BILL MOTIVATED (THE WIDER RECTANGLES ARE SHORT)
** SERVICE DIFFERENCES ARE MINIMAL

Scaling Individuals

For enlistment discussions, the ideal method to scale individuals would be a waiting line -- with those who are more reluctant in the rear. With some degree of confidence, this lineup has been achieved through the Educational Benefits (macro) Model (Chapter 3). There, the lineup of potential enlistees is estimated through the "Proclivity Derived Queue" computation which transforms proclivity attitudes into positions in the queue.

The essential feature of the queue model arises directly from the motivation concept of this chapter. This model of motivation assumes that attitude can be measured; a parallel measurement of incentive appeal can be made; and, that these two tracks can be combined to transform attitude (proclivity) to behavior (queue position). Therefore, the starting point for scaling individuals is their stated military inclination.

Figure 2.8 shows degrees of military inclination for four cases: FY74 and FY76 entrants, with and without the assumption of termination. The results indicate that negative attitudes regarding military Service have declined substantially, and that the hypothesized termination of the G.I. Bill might cause military disinclination to climb back to the levels of FY74.

The information to construct Figure 2.8 was derived from the May 1973 and the May 1975 Gilbert Youth Surveys of proclivity for enlistment. These attitude measures capture the pulse of the population who are eligible for military service.[1] The respondents place themselves in one of five "attitude toward enlistment" categories: definitely not, probably not, don't know, probably will, or definitely will.

Figure 2.8 was derived as follows. An individual who stated "definitely not" was placed at the far left of the index scale. To this group were added those responding "probably not;" resulting in a "probably not enlist, or lower" group. Next, the "don't know" group was added, followed by the "probably yes" group (who are still counted as "possibly non-

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[1] In this sense, the total scenario of the military image, civilian alternatives, perceptions of military opportunities, and advertising are captured in this proclivity vector.



Of a cohort group, approximately this level is not needed for military service

- NON-MILITARY INCLINATION HAS DECREASED
- FY76 ENTRANTS W/O G.I. BILL ARE COMPARABLE TO FY74 ENTRANTS WITH THE G.I. BILL
- THE GROWTH IN INTEREST IS STRONGER WITH THE G.I. BILL THAN WITHOUT

Figure 2.8. Degrees of Non-Military Inclination

SOURCE: May 1973 & May 1975 Gilbert Surveys
(See text for exact interpretation)

military"). While this cumulative indexing has recognizable imperfections, it does allow a full view of degrees of non-military inclination, especially helpful for comparison purposes.

Next, a corresponding distribution was constructed after an assumed G.I. Bill termination. Respondents were asked to adjust their proclivity toward the military, if necessary, to reflect their new attitude under the assumption of termination. In so doing, a fair percentage of individuals seemingly improved their proclivities under the hypothesized termination. In order to correct for this anomaly, such individuals were constrained to their originally stated proclivities. (Many of these individuals had quite logically said "Don't know" as a reaction to G.I. Bill termination after having earlier said "I will (probably) not enlist.") After this "diagonalization", the G.I. Bill termination information was treated in the same manner as the original proclivities, to generate its cumulative index of non-military inclination.

REENLISTMENT INTENT VERSUS ORIGINAL ENLISTMENT MOTIVE

Three questions led to an examination of the role of the G.I. Bill in the decisions of *first-term* enlisted personnel. First, how important was the G.I. Bill in the individual's final enlistment decision, according to retrospective survey responses? Second, how much counterbalancing impact has the G.I. Bill in creating *greater* enlistment demands as a negative influence on retention? And, third, what is the trend, over time, in reenlistment decisions and their relation to the G.I. Bill?

To provide answers to these questions, data were extracted from the 1973 in-service Survey of Enlisted Personnel, and Exploratory Data Analysis procedures were applied. Table 2.9 (a-c) shows pertinent results.[1]

For the first question -- retrospective importance applied to the G.I. Bill in an individual's enlistment decision -- Table 2.9a indicates that the G.I. Bill is approximately in the middle (879) of selected single reasons for enlistment. The proportion who select the G. I. Bill -- 879/5793 = 15.2% -- is also consistent with the set of impact estimates presented in Chapter 3. Thus, according to this information, G.I. Bill termination might be expected to deplete every sixth or seventh potential enlistee.

The counterbalancing impact of the G.I. Bill, through lower reenlistments, is also apparent in this data. *Table 2.9b shows that the odds against reenlistment are far greater among G.I. Bill seekers than among any of the six other motivation groups.* In fact, for G.I. Bill seekers the odds are 7.58 to 1 against reenlistment -- whereas the odds for other groups are in the range of 2.90 through 0.63 to 1.[2]

---

[1] The "effects analysis" in Table 2.9 is a simple and relatively new procedure, described in the subsequent discussion.

[2] The measure of adverse odds was chosen because Exploratory Data Analysis suggested that this provided a better fit than the more customary measure, the probability of probably reenlisting.

Further clarification concerning the counterbalancing effect of the G.I. Bill upon reenlistments can be found in Table 2.9c. In this "effects analysis" the G.I. Bill effect is seen to *add* 5.10 to the overall odds of 2.48 -- giving anti-reenlistment odds of 7.58. A comparison of the G.I. Bill with the other six principal motivators shows that the G.I. Bill is conspicuous as a negative inducement to reenlistment.

The row effects in Table 2.9 indicate that people in the first year of service (0-1 case) tend to say they will reenlist more than do persons in the following years; with a definite reenlistment adversity (4.52) in the second year of service. This merely reaffirms known reactions to military life. However, the departures or *residuals* from the pattern are rather revealing. For example, the residuals on the G.I. Bill seekers are much more pronounced than for any other principal enlistment incentive. The residual of -1.91 in the first year suggests that G.I. Bill seekers are more positively motivated when they first enlist. This is consistent with the otherwise paradoxical motivation of G.I. Bill seekers: Why should a person who wants to attend college enter the Service in the first place -- unless the individual desires only to postpone further education? Thus, that individual might seem more favorable to the military (lower non-reenlist odds) at first, but progressively becomes eager to leave. Another way of observing this rather intricate phenomenon is to note that for this data, the overall odds are 2.48 to 1 against reenlistment; while among G.I. Bill seekers, the odds are 5.10 more than that, or 7.58 against reenlistment; and finally, among G.I. Bill seekers who have started their fourth year of service, the odds are another 0.92 + 0.30 greater, or 8.30. (Thus the original entry is decomposed as the sum of the common value plus the column effect plus the row effect plus the [interaction] residual.)

Table 2.9b also shows that G.I. Bill seekers are almost diametrically opposed to "advanced education" seekers in the lineup of reenlistment odds. Those who chose "advanced education" in the forced choice against "G.I. Bill" must be more career oriented and satisfied that they can advance academically in-Service.

These measurements seem to dramatically support the intuitive hypothesis that the G.I. Bill negatively influences reenlistments. It can

Table 2.9

Reenlistment Intent vs First Reason for Entry into the Military

a. Counts. First Reason for Entry Into the Military (Retrospective Appraisal)

YOS	Probably Reenlist	G.I. Bill	Skill	Travel	Like Guns	Patriotism	Advanced Education	Pay	Total
0-1	Yes	20	139	89	17	67	169	32	533
	No	97	208	140	26	54	131	18	674
1-2	Yes	36	136	98	28	111	145	43	597
	No	355	396	272	44	146	203	51	1,467
2-3	Yes	35	101	116	14	119	114	35	534
	No	238	300	214	40	176	103	16	1,087
3-4	Yes	10	39	75	12	76	65	24	301
	No	88	165	161	21	96	62	7	600
		879	1,484	1,165	202	845	992	226	5,793

b. Odds of not reenlisting

	G.I. Bill	Skill	Travel	Like Guns	Patriotism	Advanced Education	Pay	Total
0-1	4.85:1	1.50:1	1.57:1	1.53:1	0.81:1	0.78:1	0.56:1	1.26:1
1-2	9.86:1	2.91:1	2.78:1	1.57:1	1.32:1	1.40:1	1.19:1	2.46:1
2-3	6.80:1	2.97:1	1.84:1	2.86:1	1.48:1	0.90:1	0.46:1	2.04:1
3-4	8.80:1	4.23:1	2.15:1	1.75:1	1.26:1	0.95:1	0.29:1	1.99:1

c. Row & Column Effects & Residuals (Effect Analysis)

	G.I. Bill	Skill	Travel	Like Guns	Patriotism	Advanced Education	Pay	Row Effect	Row Fit
0-1	-1.91	-0.58	+0.30	+0.42	+0.41	+0.59	+0.75	-0.82	1.66
1-2	+1.76	-0.52	+0.17	-0.88	-0.42	-0.13	+0.04	+0.52	3.00
2-3	-0.77	+0.08	-0.24	+0.94	+0.27	-0.10	-0.16	-0.01	2.47
3-4	+0.92	+1.02	-0.24	-0.48	-0.26	-0.36	-0.64	+0.30	2.78
Column Effect:	+5.10	+0.43	-0.39	-0.55	-1.26	-1.47	-1.85	2.48 (Common value)	
Column Fit:	7.58	2.91	2.09	1.93	1.22	1.01	0.63		

Source: 1973 DoD InService Survey Form D.

- SOME 15% OF FIRST-TERMERS RECALL THE G.I. BILL AS A FIRST REASON FOR ENTRY
- THE ODDS AGAINST REENLISTMENT ARE 2.5:1 OVERALL, BUT 7.6:1 FOR G.I. BILL SEEKERS

easily be calculated from Table 2.9 that elimination of the G. I. Bill might increase the pool of potential first-reenlistments by 12 percent. Yet, when quality reenlistment applicants in the appropriate skills exceed reenlistment quotas for those skills, as is currently the case, this 12% boost for those skills is not needed.

Chapter 3

Queue Estimates: *Macro Analysis*

STRUCTURE AND LOGIC

Model Overview

The Educational Benefits Model (EBM) was designed to serve as an operational vehicle for evaluating various educational benefits policy alternatives in terms of their impact on the overall effectiveness of the military force. A conceptual representation of the EBM is presented in Figure 3.1.

Data Base

The model has been designed to process census data using both the Gilbert Surveys of Youth and the National Longitudinal Study (NLS). Efforts were directed at evaluating the impact of eliminating post-Service educational benefits on the accession "queue." The Gilbert survey provides current proclivity assessments which take the total scenario into account, and the NLS gives the factors which convert each proclivity cell into a queue of real prospects. Since the NLS was conducted at the end of the draft era, removal of draft-motivated persons left a set of prospects who had the new all-volunteer incentives and yet requirements exceeded supply (so that the queue was fully visible).

Model Logic

The EBM, as indicated in Figure 3.2, proceeds through five input processing steps, incorporating information from various Gilbert Surveys and the NLS, as needed.

In Step 1, Census data was used to assemble an "initial" (i.e., prior to entry into the military) population of male High School graduates along the dimensions of age, race, and high school grades. This population was further distributed in the fourth dimension of proclivity according to the May 1975 Gilbert Omnibus Survey.

Table 3.1 EBM Population Parameters

DIMENSION	PARAMETER VALUES	
Age	17 - 18, 19 - 25	
Race	Caucasian, Other	
HS Grades	A&B, B&C, D& Below	
Proclivity	GILBERT: Definitely Yes Probably Yes Probably No Definitely No No Plans, N/A	NLS: Intend to Serious Might Definite No No Plans, N/A

In Step 2 of processing, a "shredder" (derived from the 1974 Gilbert Survey) was applied to the initial populations to distribute potential enlistees by "intended branch of Service."

Step 3 required an actual "merge" of the Gilbert and NLS data bases. While Gilbert provided current estimates of the initial population and the "intended branch of Service", the NLS was required in order to translate *expressed intentions* into *actual enlistments*. The two surveys were essentially compatible along the age, race and HS grade dimensions. However, the proclivity wordings were different enough to require a translation matrix. This was calibrated on their common 1972 populations.

With the proclivity translation accomplished, Step 4 was the application of a matrix of transition probabilities (derived from the NLS) to the initial population in order to arrive at an "intended branch of Service" queue.

The final step of model logic consisted of applying a "cross-elasticity matrix" from NLS (which showed the shift from the intended branch to one of the other branches) to the "intended branch of Service" queue to arrive at the final flow of individuals toward each of the Services.

This concluded the input-processing phase of the EBM. Outputs from the model consist of summary and detailed statements which indicate the impact of termination of post-service benefits on the various population sub-groups. The Gilbert termination losses were adjusted by a constant factor to make total losses agree with the econometric estimate (Chapter 3, "Methods for Measuring Termination Impact")--to recognize that Gilbert proclivity shifts were somewhat biased.

Model Assumptions

The principal operating assumption inherent in the EBM is that the proclivity distribution (i.e., the distribution of individuals according to their attitudes toward the Military) accurately reflects the total "tenor of the times". The most important advantage of adopting this approach is that it then becomes unnecessary to attempt to disentangle the complex of factors (e.g., unemployment, National posture, etc.) which combine to influence accession flows. Instead, the proclivity distribution, at any point in time, is taken to capture the net result of all of the factors impinging upon the enlistee at that time.

Two assumptions are implicit in the formulation of the EBM. One is that the formula which was used to convert from the Gilbert to the NLS proclivity language is valid. The other is that the transition probabilities (Step 4) for a given proclivity, age, race, and high school grade combination remain constant over time.

A major assumption was made to the effect that older men (19-25) who replied "definitely not" to the enlistment question are even less likely to enlist than the 17-18 year olds (NLS) who made the same response. Based roughly on quarter-of-entry data, it was assumed that the older "definitely not" enlistment rate was half that of the younger "definitely not".

Another assumption in the EBM is that the "intended branch of Service" distribution (i.e., Step 2 in the model logic) for non-Caucasians is *insensitive* to High School grades. This assumption was necessary because the non-Caucasian sample size was not large enough to permit this detailed a sub-categorization (the proclivity and age categorizations were maintained, however).

Finally, termination losses among grades and two among Services were adjusted in four cells, when application of the econometric adjustment to a cell brought that cell higher after termination than before.


MODEL LOGIC
INFORMATION SOURCES
Initial Population
Proclivity Without Post-Service Educational Benefits By Age, Race and High School Grades
Initial Population
Proclivity With Post-Service Educational Benefits by Age, Race and High School Grades
CENSUS
GILBERT 1975
Distribution of Potential Enlistees by Intended Branch of Service
GILBERT 1974
Proclivity Conversion from Gilbert to NLS Language by Age, Race and High School Grades
GILBERT 1972
NLS 1972
Transition from Civilian to Military Status by Proclivity, Race, Age and High School Grades
NLS 1972
Distribution of Enlistees by Intended Branch of Service, Age, Race and High School Grades
Transition from Intended to Actual Branch of Service
NLS 1972
INPUTS
OUTPUTS
Queue by Service According to Age, Race, High School Grades & Proclivity Without Post-Service Benefits
Queue by Service According to Age, Race, High School Grades & Proclivity With Post-Service Benefits

FIGURE 3.1. EBM INFORMATION SOURCES AND MODEL LOGIC

INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE TO ESTIMATE QUEUES FROM PROCLIVITIES


ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
Scenarios Involving
— Unemployment
— National Posture
— Income Levels
— Attitudes Toward Education
1. THE 'QUEUE'
Age
Race
Quality
Intended Branch of Service
Propensity To Enlist
2. ACCESSIONS
3. FIRST TERM ACTIVE MILITARY
PREMATURE TERMINATION
Age
Race
Quality
Branch of Service
Propensity To Enlist
LEAVE SERVICE
EOT TERMINATION
4. CAREER MILITARY
RETIREMENT
Age
Race
Quality
Branch of Service
Propensity To Enlist
DECISION FACTORS
Educational Benefits Policy Options
- G.I. Bill Termination
- In-Service Program
- Post Service Program
Other Management Policy Options
- Marketing
- Other Pay Incentives
- Recruitment
POLICY EVALUATION
Measure Impact On Current Status Dimensions
Measure Cost Of Policy Implementation

FIGURE 3.2. EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS MODEL

VALIDATION OF TERMINATION IMPACT

Central to this study is a forecast of the impact of G.I. Bill termination on high school graduate potential enlistees. Because this estimate is vitally important, the following four independent estimation methods were employed and subsequently used as cross-checks on each other:

Empirical Termination Impact in the 1960's

G.I. Bill educational benefits were actually terminated for Service entrants between the years 1955 and 1966 (although they were retroactively reinstated). A suitable method for computing the impact which this termination had on enlistments is to replicate the Gates Commission multiple linear regression analyses used to establish the new military pay levels for the All Volunteer Force.[1] The Gates analysis did not use the G.I. Bill termination period, however, in considering effects on enlistment rates.[2] Therefore, the Gates analysis has been replicated with an additional consideration (dependent variable) for G.I. Bill benefits. The results are shown in Table 3.2.

Proclivity Shift in Response to Termination Assumption

How do individuals feel that they would adjust their interest in the military if G.I. Bill educational benefits were terminated? Measurements of this stated proclivity shift are available from two Gilbert Youth Surveys, as recorded in Table 3.3. The Educational Benefits Model (EBM) is designed to compute the impact of termination from these proclivity shifts by processing the adjusted proclivity specification. However, it is not reasonable to assume that the transition probability for a given proclivity level would be the same for the real question of enlistment

---

[1] The independent variables which were used to explain the historical behavior of the enlistment rates can be found in Volume II of the Gates Commission Study (U.S. President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, Vol. II, 1970).

[2] Recent discussions with Gates Commission analysts are inconclusive as to whether a conscious decision was made to avoid consideration of the G.I. Bill.

TABLE 3.2 Empirical Impact of G.I. Bill Termination

Statistical Result

- The G.I. Bill "dummy" has a coefficient of 1.602 with an average (dependent variable) enlistment rate of 5.891.
- The coefficient of determination increased from 0.58 to 0.72 through introducing the G.I. Bill variable.
- When the G.I. Bill variable was introduced, the set of significant variables picked up unemployment but dropped relative civilian pay and the Berlin crisis.

INTERPRETATION

- IN THE 60'S, G.I. BILL TERMINATION IMPACT WAS ABOUT 25%.
- THE G.I. BILL VARIABLE (THOUGH NOT USED IN THE GATES STUDY) CONTRIBUTES SUBSTANTIAL EXPLANATORY POWER.
- CONSIDERATION OF THE G.I. BILL IMPACT WOULD HAVE CONCURRENTLY SUGGESTED THE IMPORTANCE OF UNEMPLOYMENT.

Source: The data base of Alan Fechter appearing in "Impact of Pay and Draft Policies on Army Enlistment Behavior," Study 3, Volume I, Studies Prepared for the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, November 1970.

PROCEDURE: Addition of a G.I. Bill dependent variable with value 0 for the termination period of the 3rd quarter of CY 1964 through the 3rd quarter of CY 1968 [where data ended].

under existing circumstances, as it would for the devaluated proclivity statement under hypothetical termination -- recognizing the tendency for bias toward an exaggeration of impact.[1/] This recognition led to the idea of averaging the "before and after" statements. The resulting impact is shown in Table 3.4.

Reinforced "A Posteriori" Statements of Termination Impact.

Statements are available, from as recently as May 1975, indicating the influence of G.I. Bill benefits on the enlistment decision of actual recruits. In order to validate the self-stated importance of the G.I. Bill as a motivator, two methods have been employed. For new entrants, the statement "I would not have enlisted were it not for the G.I. Bill" was checked for pairing with the statement "The G.I. Bill was very important in my enlistment decision." The resultant 15% impact is shown in Table 3.5. Another validation check consisted of examining responses to similar questions concerning original enlistment motivation -- after several years of Service experience. These results, as depicted in Table 2.9, also indicate a 15% termination impact.

Econometric Estimate of Impact.

In making an econometric estimate of the impact of the elimination of post-service educational benefits on accessions, a central step is the estimation of the present value of the benefits to the enlistee. One way of making this estimation is to use a survey response from Question 701 of the October 1973 Gilbert Youth Attitude Study which reads:

> Some people have said it would be more fair to give all veterans a large sum cash payment in place of the G.I. Bill. What cash payment do you feel would be fair to offer someone to give up his G.I. Bill benefits?

[1/] The logic here is that an individual, in effect, has "nothing to lose" by saying that loss of benefits will affect the enlistment decision, but "everything to lose" by replying in the negative.

TABLE 3.3

Shift in Stated Proclivity in Reaction to G.I. Bill Termination

a. FY74 Entry Group

Stated Proclivity	Stated Proclivity Hypothesizing G.I. Bill Termination					
	Def. Yes	Prob. Yes	Don't Know	Prob. No	Def. No.	TOTAL
Definite Yes	42	16	9	8	25	→ 100%
Probably Yes	2	33	25	16	24	→ 100%
Don't Know	0	0	57	12	31	→ 100%
Probably No	0	6	24	27	43	→ 100%
Definitely No	1	3	20	9	67	→ 100%

b. FY76 Entry Group

Stated Proclivity	Stated Proclivity Hypothesizing G.I. Bill Termination					
	Def. Yes	Prob. Yes	Don't Know	Prob. No	Def. No.	TOTAL
Definite Yes	22	21	12	21	24	→ 100%
Probably Yes	2	34	13	30	22	→ 100%
Don't Know	0	5	49	19	27	→ 100%
Probably No	0	5	5	52	39	→ 100%
Definitely No	0	1	4	7	87	→ 100%

Source: May 73 & May 75, Gilbert.

HYPOTHESIZED G.I. BILL TERMINATION
INDUCES ABOUT HALF THE POPULATION
TO PLACE THEMSELVES ONE NOTCH LOWER
ON THE PROCLIVITY SCALE

Table 3.4 G.I. Bill Termination Impact According to Proclivity Shifts

SERVICE BRANCH: ARMY

AGE	RACE	HS GRADES	BEFORE POL IMP	AFTER POL IMP	PERCENT CHANGE
17-18	CAUC.	A&B	2675	2195	-17.9
		B&C	7148	5892	-17.[illegible]
		D&F	6515	5052	-22.4
	OTHER	---	5379	3702	-31.[illegible]
19-25	CAUC.	A&B	20381	13133	-3[illegible]
		B&C	17247	12358	-2[illegible]
		D&F	17634	17023	-2.[illegible]
	OTHER	---	21069	15371	-27.[illegible]
TOTAL IMPACT			[illegible]	76931	-21.1

SERVICE BRANCH: NAVY

AGE	RACE	HS GRADES	BEFORE POL IMP	AFTER POL IMP	PERCENT CHANGE
17-18	CAUC.	A&B	5228	4291	-17.9
		B&C	13238	[illegible]	-17.8
		D&F	3707	[illegible]	-22.4
	OTHER	---	6206	[illegible]	-22.[illegible]
19-25	CAUC.	A&B	21364	13547	-3[illegible]
		B&C	42444	30711	-2[illegible]
		D&F	9959	[illegible]	-2.1
	OTHER	---	10565	[illegible]	-1[illegible]
TOTAL IMPACT			[illegible]	[illegible]	-2[illegible]

SERVICE BRANCH: MARINE CORPS

AGE	RACE	HS GRADES	BEFORE POL IMP	AFTER POL IMP	PERCENT CHANGE
17-18	CAUC.	A&B	5702	4735	-17.0
		B&C	2473	2300	-17.[illegible]
		D&F	2839	2204	-22.[illegible]
	OTHER	---	2497	2300	[illegible]
19-25	CAUC.	A&B	3438	2249	-35.[illegible]
		B&C	5670	4216	-2[illegible]
		D&F	5138	[illegible]	-2.1
	OTHER	---	23910	20915	-12.[illegible]
TOTAL IMPACT			53304	45175	-1[illegible]

SERVICE BRANCH: AIR FORCE

AGE	RACE	HS GRADES	BEFORE POL IMP	AFTER POL IMP	PERCENT CHANGE
17-18	CAUC.	A&B	[illegible]	[illegible]	-17.[illegible]
		B&C	13235	[illegible]	-17.[illegible]
		D&F	[illegible]	[illegible]	-22.4
	OTHER	---	5639	[illegible]	-1[illegible]
19-25	CAUC.	A&B	23247	[illegible]	-3[illegible]
		B&C	41914	[illegible]	-2[illegible]
		D&F	7076	[illegible]	-2.1
	OTHER	---	17740	11129	-33.[illegible]
TOTAL IMPACT			102708	76017	-26.0%

PROCLIVITY SHIFTS ESTIMATE OF TERMINATION IMPACT: 23%

Table 3.5 G.I. Bill Termination Impact
According to Reinforced Self-Assessment

(Percent of Enlistees Lost for Each Group
is Shown in Its Position)

AGE	RACE	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE	DoD
17-18	White	16.7	8.3	16.7	8.7	12.3
	Other	11.8	15.0	10.1	14.3	12.3
19-25	White	19.0	11.5	13.4	14.5	15.2
	Other	17.4	15.7	22.4	18.8	18.1
Service	Total	17.8	11.3	15.5	13.5	14.8

Source: Computed from May 1975 AFEES Survey, by dividing the total entry population of each cell into those who stated both that they were strongly motivated to enlist by the G.I. Bill and they would definitely be deterred from enlistment without it.

REINFORCED SELF-ASSESSMENT ESTIMATE OF TERMINATION IMPACT: 15%

Assuming that the responses constitute a reasonable reflection of the respondents' perceived value of the G.I. Bill, one should be able to obtain a fairly good estimate of what the G.I. Bill is worth to the enlistee, especially, since only those respondents who had previously indicated an intention of probably or definitely enlisting were used.[1/]

These respondents were classified according to their intended branch of service, and then further subdivided according to their high school grades. It was assumed that those who indicated the fair cash payment to be over $10,000 valued the G.I. Bill at $11,300, which would be the maximum benefit (for a user with two dependents) possible. No attempt to assign a dollar value to the "no cash payment should be offered" response was made due to its ambiguity. While such a response could indicate a present value of zero, it could also indicate a desire to keep the G.I. Bill. For example, all of the Army A & B high school graduates who had listed the G.I. Bill as a "strong influence" in their enlistment decision gave the "no cash payment" response. Therefore, it was necessary to utilize the "some influence" response for this particular group. The only other exception in this instance, where "some influence" responses had to be employed, were the Marine Corps A and B students, in which there were no individuals who considered the G.I Bill as a strong influence for enlisting.

To calculate the present value of the post-service educational benefit package, a weighted average (i.e., the number of respondents selecting each value being the weights) was taken. The results are shown under the "Perceived Value of G.I. Bill" column in Table 3.6. Once a present value had been established, a wage elasticity coefficient was applied to express the relationship between the percentage change in quantity of enlistees supplied and the percentage change in wages.

[1/] In most cases this group was further restricted to include only those who had expressed the G.I. Bill as a "strong influence" (Question 195) in their decision to enter military service. (For the exceptions, only "some influence" responses were used because there were no "strong influence" responses.)

Table 3.6

Econometric Estimates of the Impact of G.I. Bill Termination on Accessions

Accession Group	Cell Size of NLS Sample[1]	Planned Usage Rate (% of Accession Group)[2]	Perceived Value of G.I. Bill[3]	Shortfall Estimates	# Drop from G.I. Bill Termination in NLS Sample
Army					
A's & B's	11,701	12.1%	$10,000	6.4%	749
B's & C's	23,919	26.7	6,095	11.0	2,631
≤ D	5,898	11.2	11,300	6.3	372
Total	41,518	--	--	9.0	3,752
Navy					
A's & B's	14,093	20.5	11,300	11.6	1,625
B's & C's	18,502	24.6	7,097	11.3	2,051
≤ D	3,576	23.1	8,564	11.1	397
Total	36,171	--	--	11.4	4,173
Marine Corps					
A's & B's	2,841	47.7	10,934	26.5	753
B's & C's	6,729	12.3	10,010	6.7	451
≤ D	3,168	21.1	11,300	11.9	377
Total	12,738	--	--	12.4	1,581
Air Force					
A's & B's	15,068	15.2	8,290	7.2	1,085
B's & C's	19,860	29.2	6,763	12.1	2,403
≤ D	3,474	16.1	11,300	9.1	316
Total	38,402	--	--	9.9	3,804
DoD					
A's & B's	43,703	--	--	9.7	4,222
B's & C's	69,010	--	--	11.0	7,576
≤ D	16,116	--	--	9.1	1,467
Total	128,829	--	--	10.3 *	13,260
Ceiling Estimate[4]	98,484	27.7	11,300**	20.7*	20,388

ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATE OF TERMINATION IMPACT: 10% - 21%

*Thus establishing the impact range of 10%-21% for DoD.

** Measuring the G.I. Bill influence in dollars is consistent with the finding in the May 1975 AFEES survey that G.I. Bill and pay have a correlation of 0.51. No other incentive correlates as highly with pay as G.I. Bill, and vice versa.

[1] The NLS sample is weighted in order to reflect the total high school population of 1972.

[2] Developed from the National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972; only the responses of those who actually entered the service by 18 months later were used.

[3] Developed from the Gilbert Youth Attitude Study of October, 1975; only those respondents considering the G.I. Bill as a "strong influence" (except for Army and Marine Corps A's & B's where "some influence" was used instead) in their enlistment decision, as well as indicating a high probability or certainty of enlisting, were used.

[4] Using a planned usage rate which was based only on the population who said "I do" or "I do not", and thus omitted the "I don't know". In addition, the largest CNA 1974 elasticity value, 1.65, was used instead of 1.25.

$x = EV/(P+V)$

where E = the wage elasticity coefficient
V = the present value of the G.I. Bill
P = the present value of first-term pay.

The present value of the enlistee's pay, as calculated in the OMB model (discounted at 20%) equals $13,687. By employing the elasticity coefficient developed by the Gates regression study (valued at 1.25) the percentage drop of Army enlistees planning to use the G.I. Bill, who also have grades averaging in the A's and B's, can be calculated as follows:

$$x = (1.25)(10{,}000)/(13{,}687 + 10{,}000) = 52.8\%$$

This result represents a drop only in those accessions planning to use the G.I. Bill. To discover the impact on total accessions, the equation needs to be transformed in the following manner:

$$\Delta Q_i = U_i EV/(P+V)$$

where: U_i = the % of accessions from population group i who plan to use the Bill
ΔQ_i = the % change in the group i

Usage rates (U_i) can best be calculated from the National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 (NLS). This survey (Question 22P) asks the following question: "Do you plan to use funds available from any of the following programs for further study beyond high school?"

There are several reasons for choosing the NLS Survey to derive usage rates. First, it focuses on those who actually did enlist. Secondly, the feeling about the G.I. Bill among this group is in close correspondence with that of present day accessions (as seen by comparing the NLS Survey with the 1975 AFEES Survey). According to the NLS Survey almost 44% of those who actually enlisted considered the G.I. Bill to be "very important" in helping them decide to join the Service (Q46). The May 1975 AFEES result was 44.9% (Q17B). To the extent that the responses are biased, they should be biased in a similar fashion since the structure of both questions is similar. Second, the responses should both be expected to be heavily grounded on the respondents' usage. Therefore, similar results on the importance of the G.I. Bill should indicate similar rates of usage.

With usage rates obtained, the impact of termination can be estimated for the mental groups of the four Services. The impact on each of the Services as a whole and DoD as a whole can be found by expressing the predicted numerical drop of the NLS sample as a percentage of the appropriate population cell size. For example, by multiplying the Army A's and B's cell sample (11,701) by 6.4% (ΔQ), it is discovered that 749 individuals in the sample would not have enlisted if the G.I. Bill were terminated. By repeating the same process for the other two mental groups and then summing the results, one derives a loss of 3,752 Army enlistees which constitutes 9.0% of the sample. This figure and the other predicted impacts can be found in Table 3.6 under "Shortfall Estimates".

As with any estimate, the sensitivity of the forecast variable (in this case accessions) is an important issue. It can be readily seen that a percentage change of 1% in either the expected rate of usage or the coefficient of wage elasticity -- *ceteris paribus* -- leads to a change of 1% in accessions. The estimate of perceived value of the Bill is not as crucial, however. To see this, raise the present value estimate of the Army A's and B's ($10,000) by 1% (to $10,100). Calculating the resulting change in accessions (with U = 12.1%):

$$\Delta Q = 6.42\%$$

Thus, a percentage rise of 1% in perceived value leads to only a 0.3% rise in impact.

It is interesting to note that, with the exception of the Marine Corps, the B's and C's had the highest planned usage rates, and yet, the present values of the B's and C's were the lowest for all three Services. It is also interesting that in five of the twelve cases, the responses for a single cash value to replace the G.I. Bill were unanimous.[1/] The B's and C's showed the most variation in their present value responses, as these populations had three out of the four largest standard deviations (the Army B's and C's has the largest).

[1/] The groups were: Army A's and B's, Army below D's, Navy A's and B's, Marine Corps below D's, and Air Force below D's.

The econometric study assumes the same elasticity coefficient (1.25) for all branches of Service. With regard to the Navy and especially the Marine Corps, such an assumption could very well result in *overestimates* of the termination impact. A recent General Research Corporation study (Lawrence Goldberg, 1975, p. 10) produced estimates of *zero* wage elasticity for the Navy and the Marine Corps while noting that the zero estimate should not be taken literally. Similarly, in the Gilbert Youth sample, there were no individuals intending to join the Marine Corps, with grades averaging in the A's and B's, who felt the G.I. Bill to be a "strong influence" in their enlistment decisions. On balance, the 1.25 elasticity coefficient may be considered accurate for the total DoD impact assessment.

Summary of Impact Measures

As of President Ford's request for termination in May 1975, the estimates of impact were too far-ranging to be useful. Estimates ranged from as low as a 3% loss of quality enlistees to in excess of 60%. (The 3% estimate is based on new recruits who attribute the G.I. Bill as the *sole* reason for enlisting, and estimates at or above 60% are based upon stated endorsement of the G.I. Bill.) Earlier sections of this report have explained why neither of these extremes is valid, and the present section has presented four impact models which were designed to depolarize the extreme views. These four estimates place the DoD-wide impact between 10% and 23%.

Confidence can now be placed in a nummary upper limit for the impact of G.I. Bill termination upon Defense accessions overall. Based upon conservative econometric assumptions, and reinforced by the other methods in this section, the upper limit estimate should be taken as 21%. The deviation of this result is provided in the last row of Table 3.6 on page 53.

In order to further evaluate the impact upon important subgroups, the output of the Educational Benefit Model has been used. Specifically, the subgroups by branch of Service, by age, by race, and by grades (for Caucasians) were evaluated. The essential tools for evaluating these *relevant* impact factors are depicted in Figure 3.1, page 44. The subgroups which were evaluated are by branch of service, by age, by nace, and by academic grades (for Caucasians only). Naturally, less confidence would be placed in the impact assessed for each cell than in the overall average. All of these estimated percentage drops appear in Table 3.7 for the upper limit case (21% overall), and in Table 3.8 for the best estimate (15% overall).

Summary of Impact Measures

As of President Ford's request for termination in May 1975, the estimates of impact were too far-ranging to be useful. Estimates ranged from as low as a 3% loss of quality enlistees to in excess of 60%. (The 3% estimate is based on new recruits who attribute the G.I. Bill as the *sole* reason for enlisting, and estimates at or above 60% are based upon stated endorsement of the G.I. Bill.) Earlier sections of this report have explained why neither of these extremes is valid, and the present section has presented four impact models which were designed to depolarize the extreme views. These four estimates place the DoD-wide impact between 10% and 23%.

It is recommended for planning purposes that the "worst case" estimate be considered at 21%, which is based upon conservative econometric assumptions. This estimate, shown in Table 3.8, *does not take advantage of any offsetting management actions*. The motivation modeling in Chapter 2 strongly suggests that a well-marketed in-service program could signicantly mitigate the impact. Conversely, changes in recruiting force size or similar management policy actions could increase the impact.

Table 3.7 Estimated % Drops if G.I. Bill
Were Terminated: Upper Limit

Male HS Graduate Subgroup			Army	Navy	MC	AF	DoD
Age	Race	HS Grades					
17-18	Caucasian	A&B	26%	21%	22%	22%	22%
		B&C	15	15	17	15	15%
		≤ D	29	29	29	28	29%
	Other	–	23	25	12	22	22%
19-25	Caucasian	A&B	31	50	6	53	42%
		B&C	3	4	5	3	4%
		≤ D	10	10	10	10	10%
	Other	–	37	29	10	53	30%
Total			22%	19%	12%	26%	21%

TRANSITION WILL DETER 19-25
YEAR OLDS WHO HAD HIGH GRADES
AND 17-18 YEAR OLDS WHO HAD
HIGH AND LOW GRADES.

Table 3.8 Estimated % Drops if G.I. Bill Were Terminated: Best Estimate

Male HS Graduate Subgroup			Army	Navy	MC	AF	DoD
Age	Race	HS Grades					
17-18	Caucasian	A&B	19%	15%	16%	16%	16%
		B&C	11	11	12	11	11%
		≤D	21	21	21	20	21%
	Other	-	16	18	9	16	16%
19-25	Caucasian	A&B	22	36	4	37	30%
		B&C	2	3	4	2	3%
		≤D	7	7	7	7	7%
	Other	-	26	21	7	38	21%
Total			16%	14%	9%	19%	15%

TRANSITION WILL DETER 19-25 YEAR OLDS WHO HAD HIGH GRADES AND 17-18 YEAR OLDS WHO HAD HIGH AND LOW GRADES.

VALIDATION OF QUEUE SIZE

The new EBM method for estimating queues of potential enlistees can be partially validated by several methods. The major method of validation has been to check its "Proclivity-Derived-Queue" against previous years' actual experience. A second method has been to compare the transition probabilities used in the EBM, derived from the National Longitudinal Study, to similar transition probabilities which were derived for this study from the 1973 Gilbert Survey (where social security numbers were taken). Results from these two validation procedures are reported below. A third type of exploratory validation has been used, consisting of the continuous comparison of pieces of EBM output with results from other information -- to check for plausibility and consistency. (For example, the *relative* impact among Services was validated against AFEES data.)

In Table 3.9, a comparison of EBM output versus actual enlistments is made for the past three years. Each entry gives the ratio of actual high school graduate accessions to the EBM queue forecast, which was based upon the preceding Spring's census data[1] and proclivity distribution. Ratios which depart from unity are due to (1) the Services missing their enlistment objectives, (2) inappropriate EBM assumptions, and/or (3) inaccuracies in the EBM data base.

A further perspective on these "fits" of EBM queues with later enlistments emerges from the Exploratory Data Analysis treatment in Table 3.10. In this table, the overall average (or "comparison value") of 0.823, as well as the row and column effects, have been subtracted from each entry of Table 3.9. This subtraction leaves only the "residual" coupling interaction effect remaining as the entry in each cell. To interpret this breakdown, note that: Original cell entry = Comparison Value + Row Effect + Column Effect + Interaction Residual.[2] On the basis of Table 3.10, one can

---

[1] Population estimates used in the Gilbert survey did not agree with the Census data. The latter were used here.

[2] Thus, for example, the 1973 Army ratio: 1.538 = 0.823 +0.550 + 0.050 + 0.115.

Table 3.9

Ratio of Actual Enlistments to "A Priori" EBM Estimate

	Accession Years		
	1973	1974	1975
Army	1.538	1.190	1.390
Navy	0.607	0.566	0.721
Marine Corps	0.490	0.507	0.694
Air Force	0.854	.637	0.677

Table 3.10

Service and Year Effects on the Ratio of Actual Enlistments to EBM Estimates

	Residual Interaction Effects			Service	
	1973	1974	1975	Effects	
Army	.115	- .085	- .031	0.550	
Navy	- .074	.033	.042	-0.192	
Marine Corps	- .124	.041	.082	-0.259	
Air Force	.081	.012	- .094	-0.100	
Year Effects	0.050	-0.098	- .048	0.823	Overall Average Ratio

THE EBM QUEUE ESTIMATES ARE PLAUSIBLE ACCORDING TO EMPIRICAL DATA

TABLE 3.11 TRANSITION PROBABILITIES:
NLS vs GILBERT

Stated Proclivity to Join the Military	Proportion Actually Entered After One Year	
	NLS HS Seniors	Gilbert 19-25 Year Olds*
Definitely Yes	33%	26%
Probably Yes	10%	10%
Don't Know	9%	N.A.
Probably No	5%	2%
Definitely No	2%**	1%

* THE GILBERT YOUTH TRANSITION PROBABILITIES ARE LESS ACCURATE BUT GENERALLY CONSISTENT WITH THOSE FROM THE NLS
* CONVERSION OF "INTENT" TO "JOIN UP" IS LOWER AMONG OLDER ELIGIBLES

SOURCES: National Longitudinal Study check on actual behavior versus announced intentions; and 1973 Gilbert Youth Survey tracking of social security numbers against later military accessions.

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* In the Gilbert case, social security numbers cannot be tracked for those not found in the military; stated social security numbers are also often incorrect. The Gilbert conversions should therefore be considered under-estimates. Furthermore, the Gilbert sampling error is substantially larger than the NLS.

** For the EBM treatment of 19-25 year olds, a factor of 1/2 was used.

ferret out individual phenomena. The Service (row) effects are compatible with general knowledge about recruiting. The Army's needs exceed its natural queue and are somewhat met by extra recruiting effort and by excesses from other Services; the Marine Corps concentrates upon younger men and, therefore, may not be utilizing its full queue of graduates from past years; and the Air Force queue exceeds its needs. Turning to the year (i.e., column) effects, the main point to notice is that they are very small -- indicating that the PDQ method is not biased over these years. Finally, note that the residual interaction effects are also very small -- suggesting that this statistical model fits the data quite well.

In summary, the EBM is adjudged to be valid because: the ratio of actual enlistments to the EBM "PDQ" averages slightly under 1, shows appropriate Service effects, and shows very little yearly effect.

EBM OUTPUT

The major purpose of the EBM was to predict the queue of high school graduate potential enlistees for FY1976, with and without G.I. Bill termination.

The following Tables were generated by successive runs of the EBM. In each table, the population of potential high school graduate enlistee is broken into subgroups by Age, Race, and high school grades (for each Service branch):

> Table 3.12 shows the queue of high school graduates in thousands for July 1975 through June 1976 -- assuming continuance of post-service educational benefits.
>
> Table 3.13 shows the projected impact of terminating these benefits in the various population subgroups and Service branches.
>
> Table 3.14 presents an estimate of the non-high school graduate queue.

In Figure 3.3, estimated accession queues for male high school graduates (with and without G.I. Bill educational benefits) are compared with the Service-stated accession requirements for FY76.

Table 3.12

H.S. Graduate Queue for July 75-June 76: with Continued G.I. Bill (In Thousands)

Subgroup			Army	Navy	MC	AF	DoD
Age	Race	Grades					
17 | 18	Cau.	A&B	2.7	5.2	5.8	6.9	20.6
		B&C	7.1	10.9	2.9	10.2	31.1
		≤D	6.5	3.8	2.8	3.9	17.0
	Caucasian		*16.3*	*19.9*	*11.5*	*21.0*	68.7
	Other		*5.7*	*6.5*	*1.6*	*6.0*	19.8
	Subtotal		22.0	26.4	13.1	27.0	88.5
19 | 25	Cau.	A&B	20.4	21.1	3.5	20.2	65.2
		B&C	17.2	43.0	5.9	31.9	98.0
		≤D	19.6	9.1	6.1	7.1	41.9
	Caucasian		*57.2*	*73.2*	*15.5*	*59.2*	205.1
	Other		*20.9*	*10.5*	*24.0*	*16.8*	72.2
	Subtotal		78.1	83.7	39.5	76.0	277.3
Total (HS)			100.1	110.1	52.6	103.0	365.8

Table 3.13

H.S. Graduate Queue for July 75-June 76: with Terminated G.I. Bill (In Thousands)

Subgroup			Army	Navy	MC	AF	DoD
Age	Race	Grades					
17 | 18	Cau.	A&B	2.2	4.4	4.9	5.8	17.3
		B&C	6.3	9.8	2.5	9.1	27.7
		≤D	5.1	3.0	2.2	3.1	13.4
	Caucasian		*13.6*	*17.2*	*9.6*	*18.0*	*58.4*
	Other		*4.8*	*5.3*	*1.5*	*5.1*	*16.7*
	Subtotal		18.4	22.5	11.1	23.1	75.1
19 | 25	Cau.	A&B	15.8	13.6	3.4	12.7	45.5
		B&C	16.8	41.9	5.7	31.1	95.4
		≤D	18.2	8.5	5.7	6.6	38.9
	Caucasian		*50.8*	*63.9*	*14.7*	*50.4*	*179.8*
	Other		*15.4*	*8.4*	*22.3*	*10.4*	*56.5*
	Subtotal		66.2	72.3	37.0	60.9	236.3
Total (HS)			84.6	94.8	48.1	84.0	311.5

Table 3.14

Non H.S. Graduate Queue for July 75-June 76

	With G.I. Bill	Without G.I. Bill[1/]
Army[1/]	110.7	94.1
Other Services	119.9	101.9
DoD	230.6	196.0

[1/] Based upon the Army's share of 1975 non-HS accessions.



Figure 3.3

Estimated Accession Queue for Male HS Graduates vs. Stated Requirements for July 1975-June 1976

THE ARMY WILL BE BORDERLINE FOR HS GRADS EVEN WITH THE G.I. BILL, WHEREAS OTHER SERVICES HAVE ADEQUATE QUEUES EVEN WITHOUT THE G.I. BILL.

Chapter 4

COSTS AND BENEFITS

TRENDS OF MILITARY COMPENSATION

As Figure 4.1 indicates, while the G.I. Bill has been increasing in terms of dollars, it has been declining as a proportion of an enlistee's compensation. This decline has become particularly pronounced with the beginning of the All-Volunteer Force.

The G.I. Bill portion for the first two time periods shown in Figure 4.1 represent the average amount of Bill-related educational benefits received by veterans during the duration of each of the first two G.I. Bills.[1] The third bar represents the average amount received from the beginning of the third and current G.I. Bill through April 1975. The fourth bar utilizes the estimate of current average benefits ($4,100), As developed by DoD. The in-service compensation includes both pay and the housing allowance averaged for enlisted grades E1 through E3. It is assumed that the enlistee has one dependent. The median male income (ages 20-24) are summations of this income for the same three-year period of each corresponding in-service bar.

As the dollar amounts for compensation continually rise with the passage of time, it is desirable to use in-service compensation close to the middle of the G.I. Bill's duration. In the case of the World War II G.I. Bill (the first bar), however, this was not feasible, and the in-service compensation is located close to the termination date. Consequently, the Bill's proportion can be expected to be slightly greater than that portrayed. This means that the decline should also be greater.

With the proposed termination, questions arise concerning the desirability of a decline. Part of the G.I. Bill's justification lies in compensating veterans for economic exploitation suffered under the draft. With the end of the draft, this justification is no longer valid.

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[1] Often referred to as the World War II G.I. Bill and Korean G.I. Bill.



Figure 4.1

The G.I. Bill as a Proportion of Military Compensation

THE G.I. BILL HAS BEEN DECLINING
AS A PROPORTION OF AN ENLISTEE'S
COMPENSATION

1/ Developed from V.A. Information Bulletin (DVB IB 20-75-5) except for the 1972-74 figures which were provided by DoD.

2/ Provided by H.A.S.C. No 94-5, Pay and Allowances of the Uniformed Services, pp. 99-102. Includes Pay and Housing Allowance.

3/ Provided by the Bureau of the Census.

However, a reading of the current Bill's purpose will show that readjustment and compensation are not the only reasons for the G.I. Bill. *In fact, the first two reasons stated are to provide an incentive to enlist and to extend the benefits of education to deserving young persons.*

Sec 1651. Veterans' Educational Assistance -- Purpose

> The Congress of the United States hereby declares that the education program created by this chapter is for the purpose of (1) enhancing and making more attractive service in the Armed Forces of the United States, (2) extending the benefits of a higher education to qualified and deserving young persons who might not otherwise be able to afford such an education, (3) providing vocational readjustment and restoring lost educational opportunities to those service men and women whose careers have been interrupted or impeded by reason of active duty after January 31, 1955, and (4) aiding such persons in attaining the vocational and educational status which they might normally have aspired to and obtained had they not served their country. (Title 38 -- United States Code, Veterans' Benefits, Chapter 34 .)

Therefore, while a complete answer to the question of the desirability of G.I. Bill termination lies outside the scope of enlistment motivation -- and, consequently, outside the scope of this study -- a start can be made through an examination of costs and benefits. While this effort should not be regarded as definitive, it does provide a foundation for further research.

COSTS OF G.I. BILL ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMS

The costs of the post-service G.I. Bill and proposed alternatives are presented in Table 4.1.[1] This section briefly describes the nature of program options and the manner in which cost estimates were calculated.

The Cost of G.I. Bill Post-Service Educational Benefits.

The number of users was found by multiplying the total number of enlistees for FY1975 (456,000) by the historical usage rate of 57%. This figure was then multiplied by the average historical cost of $4100 in order to derive the program cost.[2] The average cost-per-user could be looked upon as a function of the monthly stipend used (averaging around $200, a veteran with no dependents could use as much as $270 per month) and the number of months the stipend is received (averaging 20 months). Therefore, the G.I. Bill is subject to three variables (rate of usage, monthly stipend, and months of use), with a change in any one of these variables generating a change in total cost. In addition to this, the "months of use" variable is to some extent influenced by the rates of retention, which are also subject to fluctuation. Consequently, budget control will not be particularly easy.

It should be pointed out that the "Cost of Program" column in Table 4.2 relates to the cost of procuring enlistees for a *single* year. Therefore, while the chief (but not the only) benefit is incurred during the first three-year term of enlistment (except where an incentive to reenlist is provided by the program), the costs are stretched over a period of years -- which could well last over a decade. Consequently, the one billion dollar cost of the G.I. Bill should not be confused with the four billion dollar budgetary figure (which is part of a *process* of paying off *several* yearly accession groups).

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[1] Costs of in-service G.I. Bill are about $100M yearly. It has been assumed in this study as well as throughout the Defense Department that the in-service G.I. Bill budget will be transferred from VA to DoD.

[2] As of April 1975, the Vietnam era participation rate was 58.5%, with a greater participation rate in college-level training than any prior group of veterans. Ascending usage trends have resulted in a projected budget of over $6B for FY76.

TABLE 4.1

Estimated Costs of G.I. Bill Post Service Education and Alternative Programs

Program[1]	Numbers of New Users (per annum)	Average Cost/User[4] (1975 Data)	Cost of Program (per annum)
G.I. Bill	259,920	$4,100	$1,066M
Reservist G.I. Bill	114,000	4,100	467M
Reservist and High School Graduate G.I. Bill	81,478	4,100	334M
Reservist and Critical Skills G.I. Bill	5,000	4,100	21M
Clements Alternative	228,000	2,650	604M
Clements Modified	37,735	2,650	100M
Critical Skill Scholarship	15,000	4,000	60M
Scholarship Insurance	15,000	4,000	53.8M[2]
Critical Skills Bonus	20,000	1,200-1,640[3]	24M-33M[3]
High School Graduate Bonus	325,910	1,200-1,640[3]	+391M-550M[3]
Scholarship Bonus	46,666	3,000	140M
Clements Scholarship Bonus	22,651	4,415	100M

FEASIBLE POST-SERVICE G.I. BILL ALTERNATIVES RANGE IN COST FROM $21M TO $1,066M YEARLY

1/ See Text for program details and assumptions

2/ Cost incurred by DoD; the cost incurred by the insurance firm would be $60M (excluding risk and administrative costs), the same as the Critical Skills Scholarship.

3/ The lower extreme assumes a shortfall (from G.I. Bill termination) of 10.3% (total DoD(, while the higher extreme assumes a shortfall of 21.0%.

4/ The FY76 figure of $66 was considered inflated by unemployment, so that the FY75 figure was used as a best estimate.

The Reservist G.I. Bill

In the attempt to reduce the cost of the G.I. Bill without significantly affecting its attractiveness, it has been proposed that an enlistee be required to join the reserves [1/] upon discharge in order to gain eligibility to use the Bill. Cost savings would then be generated by a reduced rate of usage. By referring back to the econometric study on page 48, it was discovered that while the historical usage has been 57%, the planned usage was only about 25%. This suggests that more than one-half of the Bill's users were not attracted to the Services by the Bill. Assuming that the proposal lowers the actual usage rate to the planned usage rate of 25%, the number of users would be reduced to 114,000, and the cost would then be reduced to $467M. By further restricting the Bill to high school graduates, the cost would be further reduced to $334M (portrayed as "Reservist and High School Graduate G.I. Bill"). Finally, the program could be further restricted to include only 20,000 enlistees with critical skills. This would reduce the cost to $21M (portrayed as "Reservist and Critical Skills G.I. Bill").

The Clements Alternative

The Clements Alternative seeks to reduce both the rate of usage and the average cost-per-user. The usage rate reduction is accomplished by two program features. First, eligibility after one's discharge from active duty is reduced to a period of five years (as opposed to ten years under the current G.I. Bill). The second feature is that use of the benefits are to be restricted to accredited schools with classroom participation. This is expected to lower the usage rate to 50%, leaving 228,000 users.

The average cost-per-user is also reduced by two features. The first is the reduction of the monthly stipend to $200 maximum, regardless of how many dependents the veteran has to support. Under the current G.I. Bill, an enlistee with no dependents is entitled to $270 per month and increased allowances are given for each dependent. Since the current monthly stipend averages to $200, it is assumed that the Clements re-

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[1/] A significant manpower depletion in the Army Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) is anticipated within the next few years -- and directly bears on the issue of alternative means for the maintenance of reserve force levels.

duction in the maximum will cause the average to drop to $150. The other new feature is the reduction of the entitlement to period-of-service ratio. Under the current Bill, a serviceman gains 1.5 months of entitlement for each month of service, up to a total of 36-months for three years of service. The Clements Alternative reduces this ratio to one month entitlement for two months of service. Thus, after three years of service, a person under the Clements Alternative would have only six years before earning the maximum entitlement of 36 months. This should be expected to reduce the months of actual usage. For the purposes of this study, acceptance of the following DoD assumptions are made: those with three years of service will utilize benefits for 12 months; those with four years will use 18 months; those with five years will use 24 months; those with six years will use 30 months; and those above six years will use the maximum of 36 months.

By applying the retention rates used in the OMB-led Task Force Study (so as to determine the percentages of the accession group who will have specific periods of completed service), the Clements Alternative is costed at $604M. The average cost-per-user is calculated to be $2,650, while the benefits on the average will be used for approximately 18 months.

The Clements Modified, The Critical Skills Scholarship, and Scholarship Insurance.

The Clements Modified differs from Clements Alternative only in its cost restriction of $100M. Therefore, with the cost exogenously determined, it becomes necessary only to discover how many could use the program while keeping the cost under the $100M ceiling. This is simply derived by dividing $100M by the average cost-per-user, with a result of 37,735.

However, by restricting post-service education benefits to enlistees with critical skills, it is possible to keep costs below $100M -- even without having to resort to a measure such as the Reservist G.I. Bill. The Critical Skills Scholarship provides an example as to how this can be done. To be eligible for this program, the veteran must have at least three years of service and be a high school graduate. Payments will be made to any accredited college attended by the veteran, spouse, or child.

In addition to this, $1,000 subsistence will be granted per full-time semester, although total aid (both tuition and subsistence) is not to exceed $8,000.

It is assumed that the average cost-per-user will be $4,000, and 15,000 people will participate in the program (a usage rate of 75%). This establishes the cost of the program at $60M.

This $60M figure could be reduced through the contracting of an insurance firm. This concept is illustrated by the Scholarship Insurance Proposal.[1/] Under the Insurance program, eligible veterans will receive exactly the same benefits as under the Critical Skills Scholarship. The difference is that the benefit, rather than being paid by the VA, will be paid by a contracted insurance firm. For each of the 20,000 enlistees, DoD will pay to the insurance firm $74.66 for 36 months. Therefore, the program cost to DoD will be $53.8M -- a cost saving of $6.2M.

The reader might perhaps be wondering how would it be possible to persuade a profit motivated insurance firm to accept $53.8M in return for having to pay out $60M by some later date? The answer lies in the benefit of being able to *use* money. It is expected that on the average, payments will not begin until five years after the day of enlistment. Therefore, by simply letting the money sit in a bank at 7% interest per annum, the firm would have its investment of $53.8M grow into $70.5M, (which would allow $10.5M to cover the administrative costs as well as the cost of risk).

Scholarship Insurance is an example of the substitution of private enterprise for governmental administration.

The Critical Skills Bonus and the High School Graduate Bonus

Another possible way to mitigate the impact of G.I. Bill termination would be to give a straight cash bonus for enlistment. The necessary size of the cash bonus can be estimated through the use of the Gates supply

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[1/] Details of this concept are formulated in the Scholarship Insurance "options paper" presented in Appendix A.

elasticity coefficient in a way very similar to the derivation of the econometric estimates.

$\Delta q = 1.25\ \Delta P/13{,}687$
where: 1.25 = the Gates elasticity coefficient
13,687 = the present value of enlistee's pay
Δq = the % drop of enlistees due to the Bill's termination
ΔP = the size of the bonus

As can be seen, the higher the termination impact, the higher will be the bonus needed to offset this impact. Therefore, if the econometric estimate is assumed to be 10.3%, the bonus will equal $1,200. However, if the impact estimated by the EEM is adopted (i.e., 15%), the size of the bonus rises. Solving for the ΔP, the needed bonus is seen to be $1,640).

If only the impact on critical skills is to be mitigated, this bonus can be restricted to 20,000 enlistees. This established the cost as ranging from $24M - $33M. However, if the force quality is to be maintained at about present levels, then it would be advisable to grant the bonus to all enlistees with a high school diploma. This would raise the cost range to $391M - $550M. The variance in these cost estimates is accounted for by the difference in the bonus estimates. For example, the $24M figure listed under the "Critical Skills Bonus" is based upon the $1.200 bonus, while the $46M is based on the $2,300 bonus.

The Scholarship Bonus

The Scholarship Bonus is a proposal which is designed to give a $3,000 bonus to a restricted number of enlistees upon completion of three years service. The restrictions were to be the same as the original Callaway Alternative -- which, when applied to DoD, was costed at $70M. With this figure, it becomes possible to determine the number of eligibles under the Callaway proposal.

$$\$70M = x\ \$2{,}500\ (60\%)$$

where \$2,500 = the scholarship under the Callaway Alternative
60% = the assumed rate of usage by the Callaway Alternative
x = the number of eligibles

Solving for x, the program is found to be restricted to 46,666 enlistees.

One major difference between the Callaway Alternative and the Scholarship Bonus is the freedom, under the Scholarship Bonus, given to recipients for spending the money as they please -- while under the Callaway Alternative, the money can be spent only on college education. Without user restrictions, therefore, the usage rate under the Scholarship Bonus is expected to be 100%. Consequently, the number of users under the Scholarship Bonus will equal the number of eligibles (46,666). Multiplying 46,666 by the \$3,000 bonus will give the program a cost of \$140M.

The Clements Scholarship Bonus

The Clements Scholarship Bonus is designed to provide incentives for both enlistment and reenlistment. Upon the completion of three years of service, an individual in this program will receive a cash bonus of \$3,600. If this individual chooses to reenlist, he will be granted an extra \$200 monthly entitlement until the completion of six years of service. Thus, a person could earn a bonus as large as \$7,200.

As in the Clements Modified, the costs of the program were set by fiat at \$100M. Since the amounts tendered are based upon length-of-service, it is necessary to use the retention rates applied in the OMB-led Task Force model. This approach yields the information that the program must restrict itself to 22,651 users. The average cost-per-user will equal \$4,415.

COMPARATIVE BENEFITS

The costing study reveals the "Reservist and Critical Skills G.I. Bill" as the cheapest and the G.I. Bill as most expensive of the proposed alternatives. Yet, cost figures are not sufficient to determine which of the programs is in an overall sense the best. While the cost of the Reservist and Critical Skills G.I. Bill is estimated at only $21M (less than 2% of the current G.I. Bill cost), it would, at best, only mitigate the impact of the Bill's proposed termination in critical areas. Consequently, noncritical areas will suffer a reduction in quality, and the Armed Forces will to some extent not be as strong as at present. Therefore, it may be desirable to extend the Reservist G.I. Bill to all high school graduate enlistees. It should be pointed out, however, the cost of doing this is not insignificant. It would entail an incremental addition of $313M -- an increase of over 1,400% from the $21M figure.

Despite this increase, the Reservist G.I. Bill compares favorably with the current G.I. Bill, the Clements Alternative, and the High School Graduate Bonus. Thus, one might be led to conclude -- from a DoD standpoint -- that the Reservist G.I. Bill is the most efficient concept among the alternatives. However, this conclusion must be conditioned by the understanding that the Reservist G.I. Bill estimates are the most uncertain. This uncertainty applies to both costs and benefits. It is quite possible that the usage rate would be allowed to go beyond 25% and drive up the costs. On the benefits side of the problem, it is uncertain as to how attractive the program will be to potential enlistees. Therefore, to the extent that one is predisposed to exercise caution, the more attractive proposals such as the Critical Skills Bonus or the High School Graduate Bonus will become (provided one is only interested in capturing benefits directly related to national defense).

The difficulty, however, with adopting such a purely Defense-oriented posture, is that such a position may not be the most economic. This stems from the *public good* aspects of education. An individual who consumes education not only benefits himself, but also benefits society in becoming a more productive member. "Productive" can be understood both in the sense of providing goods and services as well as a more general benefit. Therefore, as James M. Buchanan points out in Public Finances, education can in part be conceived as a form of investment (Buchanan, p. 350). This conception leads to another argument for state support of education. In contrast to other forms of investment, the prospective student cannot as easily resort to the capital market. While part of the difficulty lies in the imperfections of the capital market, this is not the whole problem,as Dr. Buchanan states:

> The real difficulty is only in part the result of imperfections in the capital market as such; the trouble lies in the fact that the individual person cannot legitimately consider himself, his own person, as a capital asset for purposes of providing collateral for loans. The prospective lender of funds cannot secure a wholly valid legal claim against the person of the student in exchange for lending the required investment funds. (Buchanan, p. 351)

So, even apart from the social welfare aspect of education, there is an economic justification for state support -- although the capital market problem would suggest loans to students rather than general public subsidization.

Critics of the G.I. Bill have suggested that HEW and other sectors of government could more efficiently provide support for education on a dollar-for-dollar basis. In the absence of more information, this contention appears to be correct. However, the criticism overlooks an important fact -- that is, the costs of the G.I. Bill are "joint costs". (This refers to the ability of a cost to simultaneously accomplish two or more benefits.) The current G.I. Bill not only attracts enlistees, but also educates them. A cash bonus, on the other hand, provides only an incentive for enlistment, Likewise, a HEW program will do nothing to increase enlistments. Therefore, the current G.I. Bill could be a more efficient option than an enlistment bonus combined with budgetary increases to HEW. As a hypothetical example, if $391M were appropriated for enlistment bonuses, and if $700M were deemed necessary to offset the impact of the Bill's termination on education, it would be preferable to keep the G.I. Bill rather than incur the extra cost of $25M.

Since the above example is only hypothetical, it should not be construed as an argument for the continuation of the G.I. Bill. Rather, it seeks to point out *the need for further research* which will measure the overall effects of termination on society. For example, it would be helpful to know to what extent expenditures for education will drop if the Bill is terminated. It would then be advisable to discover at what level of cost would it be efficient for the state to make up for some, if not all, of this decline. This being determined, it would be necessary to discover what program or package of programs could accomplish the desired objectives at the lowest possible cost. For example, even if the "joint cost approach" of the G.I. Bill is deemed to be cost-effective, it may still be advisable to introduce some variant of the Scholarship Insurance proposal so as to capitalize on further cost reduction (as the preceding cost study would indicate to be the case).

It is also interesting to note that the Scholarship Insurance proposal could lead to public benefits outside the immediate realm of education and national defense. It should be expected, for example, to increase the capital market and thereby further the objective of economic growth by providing more physical capital *as well as* more human capital. Furthermore, increased private investment could lead to higher productivity -- which in turn could help reduce inflationary pressures.

While the focus of this study has centered around economic efficiency, it is important to consider that other criteria may influence the decisions of policy-makers. There is no compelling priori reason why economic efficiency should be the overriding determinant of public policy. For example, one may hold that education is a more worthwhile form of consumption than other consumer goods, regardless of the actual private demand (which can be a function of income as well as taste). It would then follow that public support of education could be warranted even beyond the level authorized by social benefits. Especially, it may be deemed desirable to provide assistance to those who are motivated toward education but possess only a limited ability to pay.

The above consideration could be a support for post-service education. On the other hand, another non-economic criterion -- that of equity -- tends to weigh against post-service educational benefits, especially now that the draft has ended. It is felt by many people that equals should be treated equally. However, as post-service education is used in widely varying amounts (and a proportion of veterans do not use it at all), post-service education rewards some veterans more than others regardless of their contribution in the Armed Services. While it may be argued that veterans desiring education are not to be considered equal, non-veterans may consider the current form of military compensation as overly generous whereas veterans may consider Service too high a price to pay relative to HEW aid.

In conclusion, as non-economic criteria are brought to bear on policy, economics cannot by itself preempt the function of policy-making. Yet, it is not without importance. If the G.I. Bill had been costed at two billion dollars rather than one billion, even the stronger supporter of the G.I. Bill may have found his resolve weakening. While economics or any form of scientific endeavor is not concerned with making policy, it can provide policy makers with information so as to render their decisions more intelligent and rational. It is toward this goal that this study aspires.

Chapter 5

Results and Implications

The list of policy issues which led to this study may now be addressed. Summary statements appear below, supported by substantiating references to the body of the report (Chapters 2-4).

General Role of the G.I. Bill

Since 1947, the proportion of an enlistee's compensation which is represented by the G.I. Bill has declined from 31% to 20%. During the transition to a volunteer force, in-service compensation became comparable with median civilian incomes. The G.I. Bill post-service benefit provided a 20% "bonus" attraction in the volunteer enlistment incentive package, and this role went relatively unchallenged during the transition period. (Figure 4.1)

President Ford's May 1975 proclamation of the end of the Vietnam Era included his request to Congress for a delimiting period of G.I. Bill eligibility. In evaluating the effects of termination, a major policy issue for the Department of Defense is the possible losses (in quality, number, and representativeness) in new enlistments. Related issues are the effect of varying employment levels, the effect on reenlistments, education in context with other incentives, the costs and comparative benefits of alternative programs, and the best offsetting management policy options. Information has been made available to assess these issues. (Figure 3.1, Table 3.10)

Losses in New Enlistments

If there is any serious concern for losses, it can be narrowed down to new enlistments of high school graduates into the Army. Although non-graduates are somewhat motivated by the G.I. Bill, the supply exceeds the demand by more than enough to compensate for any non-graduate losses. Similarly, the queue of high school graduates exceeds the service-stated requirements (FY1976) for the Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force. On the other hand, the Army is not expected to meet its self-stated high school graduate requirements even with the G.I. Bill. (Table 3.14, Figure 3.3)

Termination of the G.I. Bill would affect certain groups more than others. A few small homogeneous groups are strongly interested in G.I. Bill benefits while larger groups are less so. The distinguishing features are educational aspirations and age; secondary features are family status and race; unimportant is the intended branch of Service. Among high school seniors who are potential enlistees, only 29% plan Junior college or more -- and therefore express strong G.I. Bill interest. Furthermore, the greater part of the 1976 high school graduate queue does not come from the 1975 class, but from earlier classes where there are now large numbers with lower enlistment propensity. (Figure 2.7, Table 2.7; Table 3.8; Table 3.11)

It follows from the above that the *quality* impact would not be caused by G.I. Bill seekers being more desirable prospects but rather by the fact that any replacement is likely to be of lower quality, since the queue is only of modest size. Estimates within five percentage points are available as to the *quality* impact. It is certain that the measurement of professed interest leads to overestimates of absolute impact (40% to over 60%), and that underestimates (3%) result from consideration of the G.I. Bill as a primary, or independent enlistment incentive. Rather, the best estimate is that G.I. Bill termination would deplete 15% of the High School queue -- if no compensating management actions were taken. (Tables 2.4; 2.8; 3.5; 3.6)

Effect of Varying Employment Levels

Major changes in levels of unemployment or the influence of other exogenous factors would alter impact predictions. Disinclination for military enlistment has generally decreased over time. In fact, the queue now without the G.I. Bill would be comparable to the queue of a few years ago with the G.I. Bill. The G.I. Bill termination impact in the 1960's was about 25%. (Figure 2.8; Table 3.2)

It is important to note that unemployment and the G.I. Bill are overlapping, rather than independent influences. Many of those potential enlistees who would be lost as a result of an increase in employment are the same individuals who would be lost in the event of G.I. Bill termination. Also, separate study by the General Research Corporation suggests that anticipated changes in recruiting force size will have greater impact on enlistments than changes in unemployment. Substantial drops in 16-24 year-old populations after 1980 (as indicated by current census forecasts) could also impact significantly on the absolute number of potential enlistees. (Figure 2.8; Table 2.6; Table 3.6).

Effect on Reenlistments

Although G.I. Bill-motivated enlistees do have greater odds against reenlisting, and termination of the post-service G.I. Bill might eventually increase the reenlistment pool by 12%, the current pool is substantially larger than needed. Post-service G.I. Bill seekers are also diametrically opposed to in-service education seekers insofar as reenlistment is concerned. (Table 2.8)

Education in Context with Other Incentives

Educational benefits, in-service as well as post-service, are not in themselves major incentive factors, but are rather secondary motivators. In-service education correlates with the (post-service) G.I. Bill as an enlistment incentive, and each is most often cited in a package with three or more other incentives. This secondary role may explain why positive endorsement of the G.I. Bill does not correlate with negative deterrence in the event of termination. Those who do seek the G.I. Bill are, however, comparable to their peers in other motivators. (Figure 2.2; Tables 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.3)

The Costs and Comparative Benefits of Alternative Programs

A number of substitutes for post-service G.I. Bill as an enlistment incentive are feasible. Alternative programs could range in cost from $21M yearly to $1,066M yearly. Considerable attention has been given to the reduction of costs by restricting the number of new users (15,000-260,000) and, to a lesser extent, the entitlement per user ($1,200-$4,400). Attention has also focused on increasing the returns which the Department of Defense will gain -- e.g., by requiring participation in the Reserves. Finally, attention has been given to the reduction of administrative burdens -- e.g., through a commercially-administered scholarship insurance program. (Table 4.1)

Whatever decision is made concerning post-service educational benefit programs, it is clear that the current G.I. Bill entails substantial economic rent. The post-service G.I. Bill may be responsible for approximately 15% of enlistments; only 23% who plan to enter service anticipate G.I. Bill usage; subsequent to enlistment, 68% plan usage. Historically, approximately 57% have actually used post-service G.I. Bill benefits. Furthermore, some of the G.I. Bill seekers are surplus to requirements. It could be argued that, as an enlistment incentive, the G.I. Bill provides at most 20,000 Army high school graduates and costs at least $1B (or $50,000 per enlistee). Before final selection of an alternative: (1) a judgment must be made as to whether the further depletion of Army high school graduate enlistees is tolerable; and (2) an evaluation should be made concerning the national impact of G.I. Bill termination -- both of which are outside the present study. (Chapter 4)

Management Options

Termination of the G.I. Bill will not put a major market segment abruptly out of reach, but will shift enlistment interest slightly downward. A feasible alternative is to market the in-service educational package. (Table 3.3; Table 2.2)

The greatest need - and the most obvious neglect to date - has been for a repackaging and marketing of in-service educational benefits. The best management options in this reappraisal are: (1) to develop new approaches to attract 19-25 year-old high school graduates who might consider enlistment as educational goal-related activity; (2) to organize and publicize a revitalized set of in-service education motivators; and (3) to settle the contingency planning for a post-service alternative to the G.I. Bill.

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APPENDIX A

Management and Staff Support Activities

During the period of research, frequent consultation and support activities were provided to OASD(M&RA). Assistance was also provided in the flow of information regarding the timing, development, and content of educational benefit policy options. The following documents were developed for these purposes and appear in chronological order.

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Delayed Decision Diagram. A flow diagram of the decision options and expected sources of information (May). 95

Alternative Educational Benefit Programs (I and II). An information table of current (May-June) program parameters and the components of pending alternatives to G.I. Bill programs; a revised table to include the "Scholarship Bonus" . . . 96&97

Decision Chart: Should DoD Promote a Specific Post-Service Educational Benefits Program. A management tool to aid in the determination of the costs and benefits of current alternatives and the immediate or deferred selection of same (June-July). 98

Alternative Educational Benefit Concepts/and Score Sheet. A listing and explanation of several alternative program concepts; a "score sheet" for comparing programs with DoD objectives -- in order to elicit a consensus ranking of "current program concepts" (June-July). 99 100 101

G.I. Bill Termination - Army Information Papers. A report, summary, and editorial comment of Army research activity during the month of May (June-July). 102

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Army Recruit Probe Survey (8) - G.I. Bill. A table of selected percentage frequency responses to post-service educational benefit questions (G.I. Bill) by mental category/educational level (June-July). 103

Preliminary Draft: The Educational Benefits Impact Model. The "preliminary" educational benefits model -- developed to structure research efforts and guide DoD policy processes (July). 104

Discussion Chart: The Allocation of Post-Service Educational Benefit Funds. Designed to generate discussion and raise significant issues concerning the advantages and disadvantages of each allocation plan. Used in the first meeting of Service representatives on program alternatives and allocation options (July). 105

Papers on In-Service Education. Included are the following: In-Service information "fact sheets" on the Fall Semester of the 1974-75 academic year; charts showing "Service staff views of in-Service education" (as derived from interview discussions) and a subjective discussion on the value of In-service education (July-September) 106-111

Chart: Implementation of Educational Benefits Program. A modified Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) chart of potential program implementation activity, significant events, and time estimates (September). 112

Congressional Hearings on G.I. Bill Termination. Included are notes of the hearings before the House Subcommittee on Education and Training of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs. Notes of the hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Readjustment, Education, and Employment of the Committee on Veterans' Affairs have not been included. (September-October) 113

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Scholarship Insurance as a Post-Service Educational Benefit. A G.I. Bill post-Service alternative developed by HumRRO, in consultation with OASD(M&RA) and Servicemen's Group Life Insurance (SGLI) representatives(October-current). 114-115

DELAYED DECISION DIAGRAM


TIME
Now
June 15
July 15
Aug. 15
Nov. 15
Can we afford to wait 30 days without assurance of benefits?
NO
YES
Has Congress terminated G.I. Bill?
YES
NO
Can services meet long term quality needs without post service educational incentive?
NO
YES
STOP
Can we afford to wait 30 days without requesting a DoD funded post service program?
NO
YES
Has Congress terminated G.I. Bill?
YES
NO
Can services meet long term quality needs without post service educational incentives?
NO
YES
STOP
Has Congress terminated G.I. Bill?
YES
NO
Can services meet long term quality needs without post-service incentives?
NO
YES
STOP
Is issue resolved by Congress?
NO
Continue to Monitor
YES
Can services meet long term quality needs without post-service educational benefits?
NO
YES
STOP
$2500 scholarship for critical skills ($70M)
consider alternatives
other
Clements ($400M)
Clements modified ($100M)
Incoming Information

First month of recruiting for delay pool without benefit of assured G.I. Bill post-service education.

First report by HumRRO and GRC on impact analysis studies and longitudinal study

May Gilbert Youth Omnibus Study becomes available with comparative question on G.I. Bill dating back to 1971.

Have results of two months of recruiting for delay pool without benefit of assured G.I. Bill.

Evaluate recruiting capability and quality of recruit

Major results of HumRRO and GRC impact studies available.
Market survey results become available.

ALTERNATIVE EDUCATIONAL BENEFIT PROGRAMS I (May 1975)

(for Delayed Decision Review)

Program Parameters	Pending DoD Alternatives to Current GI Bill Programs			Current GI Bill Programs	
	The Clements Alternative (and *Modification*) (March 1975)	The Scholarship Alternative (April 1975)	Expanded Use in Service	V.A. Post Service	V.A. In Service
WHO Eligibility	Service > 3 yrs No retirees Undergraduate level only *Modification-critical skills area only*	Service ≥ 3 yrs No retirees or officers Accepted by AHEAD or SOC participant prior to discharge Limited to critical skills area	All active duty Service approval Officers 2 yr. obligation	Service > 180 days Discharge due to disability Includes retirees and officers	Service > 180 days Established need (educationally disadvantaged and/or V.A. approval
WHAT Benefits	18 mos. entitlement/3 yrs service 1 mo. entitlement/2 mos. additional service; max. of 36 mos./6 yrs. service In-service benefits program	Service ≥ 3 yrs. for specified scholarship (e.g. $2500) Contractual agreement in lieu of other incentives	Remedial and H.S. completion 100% entitlement Voc/Tech programs tuition assistance Institutions of higher learning tuition assistance Correspondence courses DANTES tuition assistance	1 1/2 mos. entitlement/ 1 mo. service Maximum of 36 mos. Extension allowance of 9 mos. to total 45 mos.	PREP free entitlement Voc/Tech programs tuition assistance Institutions of higher learning tuition assistance (SOC) correspondence courses tuition assistance under CMF and DANTES
WHEN Time Frame of Eligibility	New in service + 5 yrs. after discharge	Current in service + 4 yrs after discharge (must start within one year after discharge)	Prior to discharge or release from active duty On duty time for H.S. completion and remedial education (will require change in current appropriations language)	10 years after discharge	Prior to discharge or release from active duty
WHERE Program Level and Recipient	Accredited schools with classroom participation Undergraduate only In service options: A. < 3 yrs./tuition assistance in specified areas; B. > 3 yrs./tuition asst. in related skill areas; C. C. > 3 yrs./option for asst. to be counted against basic entitlement	Limited to associate, baccalaureate, or graduate degrees only at SOC or AHEAD college Full-time students only	Service approved educational programs Service approved, accredited institutions	Institutions of higher learning at graduate, undergraduate levels Below college level schools and programs O.J.T., apprenticeships, work study	PREP remedial and refresher H.S. level Voc/Tech levels College level courses Flight, correspondence
HOW Method of Funding	$200/month of entitlement No dependency allowance	$2500 (proposed) scholarship Paid directly to participating college	H.S. and remedial 100% service funded tuition assistance (will require change in current appropriations language) Other service approved institutions 1/2 service funded tuition assistance Paid to individual as reimbursal	Full Time $270/mo. + deps. allowance Part Time proportionate entitlement Paid to individual	PREP free entitlement Tuition Assistance 75% of total course costs; must complete courses (does not count against basic entitlement)
WHY Service Goals	Major enlistment incentive for high quality personnel Enlistment + first reenlistment in critical skills area Improved capabilities of the services	Major enlistment incentive for high quality personnel Enlistment in critical skills area (high turnover rate of quality personnel) Improved capabilities of the services	General enlistment incentive Increase ability levels, motivation, personal and service capabilities Improved organizational capacity Reenlistment enhancement through individual advancement	Major enlistment incentive for quality personnel Improved capabilities of the services Historical, readjustment, compensation	General enlistment incentive Increase ability levels, motivation, personal and service capabilities Improved organizational capacity Reenlistment enhancement through individual advancement
COST Per/Year	$400 M (projected steady state) *Modification $100 M (projected steady state)* In service program $85 M	$45 M total Army (projected steady state) $70 M DoD (projected steady state) In Service: same as present	$189.7 M (includes: $84.0 M DoD in-service; $104.7 M V.A. FY76 ($35 M below college, $40.5 M college, $29.2 correspondence))	$3.8-4.2 B (FY76, V.A.) $1.0-1.25 B (projected s.s. for future service strength requirements)	PREP $75 M Other $87.5 M (includes BCL vocational; V.A., FY76)
MANPOWER 1. Utilization 2. Reenlistment 3. Accession Target Market	1. 50% (assumed; reduction by restrictions) 2. On basis of increasing entitlement and in service program; post service, negative incentive 3. Moderately controlled quality target; flexible	1. 70% total recruits (60% original program contract recruits Army est.) 2. Negative incentive for controlled turnover; option for maintenance of benefits through reenlistment 3. Controlled quality target; restrictive	1. Current DoD + V.A. 2. On basis of individual advancement opportunities 3. General	1. 57% (current); historical cost of $4100/user 2. On basis of increasing entitlement; negative incentive 3. General	1. PREP 317,060; tuition asst. 400,000 (college level 160,000; college level participation 4.1% career, 6.3% non career) (by enrollment, projected FY75) 2. On basis of individual advancement opportunities 3. General
ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS	**Short Range** Monthly review and evaluation of delayed pool recruiting without GI Bill assurances; field survey and evaluation of recruiting capabilities GI Bill termination effect on current project AHEAD and SOC initiatives GI Bill termination effect on general quality needs and the quality mix of new enlistments Review of enlistment bonuses without GI Bill assurances Review of May Gilbert Youth Omnibus Survey		**Mid Range** Controlled experiment of educational benefits incentive impact on current accession market The loss in number and population representativeness of new enlistments and reenlistments resulting from GI Bill termination; critical skills area evaluation Major longitudinal study results: the variance between intentions, perceptions, and actual enlistment behavior The marginal value of post service, in service, expanded in service, and pre-service benefits as enlistment and/or negative incentives		The effect of varying levels of employment on manpower estimates The costs and comparative benefits of alternative educational benefit programs Evaluation of the administration, coordination, delivery systems, service goals, and parameter variables within alternative program areas; evaluations based on individual service manpower needs **Long Range/Results** Evaluation of alternatives based on foregoing research and analysis Recommendations; ranking of alternatives

ALTERNATIVE EDUCATIONAL BENEFIT PROGRAMS II (June 1975)

(for Delayed Decision Review)

Program Parameters	Pending DoD Alternatives to Current GI Bill Programs			Current GI Bill Programs	
	The Clements Alternative (and Modification) (March 1975)	The Scholarship Bonus Alternative (June 1975)	Expanded DoD In Service (Minimum Alternative)	V.A. Post Service	V.A. In Service
WHO Eligibility	Service ≥3 yrs No retirees Undergraduate level only Modification—critical skills area only	Service ≥4 yrs No retirees or officers Accepted by AHEAD or SOC participant prior to discharge(?) Limited to critical skills area	All active duty Service approved Officers 2 yr. obligation	Service > 180 days Discharge due to disability Includes retirees and officers	Service > 180 days Established need (educationally disadvantaged and/or V.A. approval
WHAT Benefits	18 mos. entitlement/3 yrs service 1 mo. entitlement/2 mos. additional service, max. of 36 mos./5 yrs. service In-service benefits program	Contractual agreement in lieu of other incentives As the veteran chooses	Remedial and H.S. completion 100% entitlement Voc/Tech programs tuition assistance Institutions of higher learning tuition assistance Correspondence courses DANTES tuition assistance	1 1/2 mos. entitlement/ 1 mo. service Maximum of 36 mos. Extension allowance of 9 mos. to total 45 mos.	PREP free entitlement Voc/Tech programs tuition assistance Institutions of higher learning tuition assistance (SOC) correspondence courses tuition assistance under CBF and DANTES
WHEN Time Frame of Eligibility	Now in service + 5 yrs. after discharge	Now in service + anytime after discharge	Prior to discharge or release from active duty On duty time for H.S. completion and remedial education (will require change in current appropriations language)	10 years after discharge	Prior to discharge or release from active duty
WHERE Program Level and Category	Accredited schools with classroom participation Undergraduate only In-service options: A. > 3 yrs./tuition assistance in specified areas; B. > 3 yrs./tuition asst. in related skill areas; C. E. > 3 yrs. (option for asst. to be counted against basic entitlement	As the veteran chooses	Service approved educational programs Service approved, accredited institutions	Institutions of higher learning at graduate, undergraduate levels Below college level schools and programs O.J.T., apprenticeships, work study	PREP remedial and refresher H.S. level Voc/Tech levels College level courses Flight, correspondence
HOW Method of Funding	$270/month of entitlement No dependency allowance	$3000 scholarship Paid directly to the veteran on discharge Using current enlistment bonus legislation	H.S. and remedial 100% service funded tuition assistance (will require change in current appropriations language) Other service approved institutions 75% service funded tuition assistance Paid to individual as reimbursal	Full-Time $270/mo. + dependency allowance Part Time proportionate entitlement Paid to individual	PREP free entitlement Tuition Assistance 75% of total course costs, must complete course (does not count against basic entitlement)
WHY Service Goals	Major enlistment incentive for high quality personnel Enlistment + first reenlistment in critical skills area Improved capabilities of the services	Major enlistment incentive for high quality personnel Enlistment in critical skills area (high turnover rate of quality personnel) Improved capabilities of the services	General enlistment incentive Increase ability levels, motivation, personal and service capabilities Improved organizational capacity Reenlistment enhancement through individual advancement	Major enlistment incentive for quality personnel Improved capabilities of the services Historical, readjustment, compensation	General enlistment incentive Increase ability levels, motivation, personal and service capabilities Improved organizational capacity Reenlistment enhancement through individual advancement
COST Per Year	$400 M (projected steady state) Modification-$100 M (projected steady state) In-service program $45 M	$45 M total Army (projected steady state) $70 M DoD (projected steady state) In-Service: same as present	$189.2 M (includes: $84.5 M DoD in-service; $104.7 M V.A. FY76 ($35 M below college, $40.5 M college, $29.2 correspondence))	$3.8-4.2 B (FY76, V.A.) $1.0-1.25 B (projected s.s. for future service strength requirements)	PREP $25 M Other $87.5 M (includes 8(?) vocational, V.A., FY76)
MANPOWER 1. Utilization 2. Recruitment 3. Accession Target Market	1. 50% (assumed, reduction by restrictions) 2. On basis of increasing entitlement and in-service program, post service negative incentive 3. Moderately controlled quality target, flexible	1. 20% total recruits (80% original program contract recruits Army est.) 2. Option for maintenance of benefits through reenlistment 3. Controlled quality target, restrictive	1. Current DoD + V.A. 2. On basis of individual advancement opportunities 3. General	1. 57% (current), historical cost of $4,100/user 2. On basis of increasing entitlement negative incentive 3. General	1. PREP 17,000, tuition asst. 400,000 (college level) 160,000, college level participation 4.1% career, 6.7% non-career (by enrollment, projected FY75) 2. On basis of individual advancement opportunities 3. General
ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS	**Short Range** Monthly review and evaluation of delayed-pool recruiting without GI Bill assurances, field survey and evaluation of recruiting capabilities GI Bill termination effect on current project AHEAD and SOC initiatives GI Bill termination effect on general quality needs and the quality mix of new enlistments Review of enlistment bonuses without GI Bill assurances Review of May Gilbert Youth Omnibus Survey		**Mid Range** Controlled experiment of educational benefits incentive impact on current accession market The loss in number and population representativeness of new enlistments and reenlistments resulting from GI Bill termination critical skills area evaluation Major longitudinal study results, the variance between intentions, perceptions, and actual enlistment behavior The marginal value of post service, in service, expanded in service and pre service benefits as enlistment and/or negative incentives	The effect of varying levels of employment on manpower estimates The costs and comparative benefits of alternative educational benefit programs Evaluation of the administration, coordination, delivery systems, service goals, and parameter variables within alternative program areas, evaluations based on individual service manpower needs **Long Range/Results** Evaluation of alternatives based on foregoing research and analysis Recommendations, ranking of alternatives	

DECISION CHART:
SHOULD DoD PROMOTE A SPECIFIC POST SERVICE EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS PROGRAM?

Decision Factors	Minimum Program	← Current Options			→	Maximum Program
	Expand DoD In-Service	Defer Selection	Select Scholarship Bonus	Select Elements - Modified	Select Elements	Current V.A. G.I. Bill
Scope, Scale, Cost	Budget / In Service / Post Service From VA to DoD 10M (max) 0 Current DoD 85 0 $195M(max) 0	Budget / In Service / Post Service From VA to DoD ? ? Current DoD 85 0 ? ?	Budget / In Service / Post Service From VA to DoD 10M (max) 100 Current DoD 85 0 $195M(max) $100M	Budget / In Service / Post Service From VA to DoD 10M (max) 100 Current DoD 85 0 $195M(max) $100M	Budget / In Service / Post Service From VA to DoD 10M (max) 400 Current DoD 85 0 $195M(max) $400M	Budget / In Service / Post Service Stays in VA 113 1,300* DoD 85 0 $198M $1,300M (*FY 76 budget = $4,300M)
Program Elements	- H.S. and remedial: 100% tuition Other: 75% tuition	- To be developed from service needs and results of analysis	- $2000 Enlistment Bonus - In lieu of other incentives - Limited to critical skills - Paid directly to user (at discharge?)	- Post Service: Service ≥ 2 years - 1½ mos. entitlement/1 mo. Service (36 max. ent.) - Eligible thru 5 yrs. after discharge - Pays $200/mo. (No dependency) - No graduate work supported Critical Skills only	All Skills	- Post Service: Service 181 days - 1½ mos. entitlements/1 mo. T active (36 max. ent.) - Eligible thru 10 yrs. after discharge - Pays $270/mo. + dependency
Implementation Action Required Now	- Change DoD appropriations language to permit fully funded [illegible] H.S. completion - Change budget for FY 76	- Initiate any bill which affect 90 days after passage – FYP - Proceed with analysis - Keep contingency plan in case Congress terminates G.I. Bill	- Define eligibility criteria & administrative details - Request language change in PL 93-277 - Change budget for FY 76	- Prepare specifics of program - Draft legislation - Submit legislation to Congress		No action: will continue unless terminated by Congress
Advantages	- Minimum benefit required - President indicated support - Lowest cost	- Increased information in any decision - Continues present program	- Ease of implementation - Actively supports President's termination request	- Focused on specific accession needs (especially Army) - Actively supports President's termination request	- Similar to current Post Service with limiting factors - Maintains incentive	- Status quo - Effective program
Disadvantages	- May not be adequate incentive - May lower quality	- Acquisition of information - May have adverse effect on recruitment	- Immediate budget increase - DoD's formal attention could speed Congress to stop G.I. Bill - May not be adequate incentive - [illegible] - Law expires June 30, 77	- DoD's formal attention could speed Congress to stop G.I. Bill - Decreased incentive from current G.I. Bill		- Excessive costs - Burden to DoD, if DoD assumes the budget - Administration opposition
Post Decision Program Development	- Improve management to reflect [illegible] the impact and quality requirements	- Prepare DoD interim issue paper for Congress - Review monthly - Final decision NLT Nov 15, 75	- Refine eligibility criteria & administrative details	- How to control cost Function of: - pre-service eligibility rules? - in-service criticality of skill? - post-service usage constraints? - simply total budget constrained?		- Eventually [illegible]

HUMAN RESOURCES RESEARCH ORGANIZATION

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June 10, 1975

ALTERNATIVE EDUCATIONAL BENEFIT CONCEPTS

There is an expansive variety of educational benefit alternatives. This listing provides an overview of several alternative areas, and is limited to standard program variations.

Pre-Service

Concept: Full time, fully-funded education prior to service; or, percent of funding; or, integrated plan of pre-service, in-service, post-service.

Variations: Degree of pre-service funding and required term of service; 2+3+2 plan--2 years of pre-service education + 3 years of service (+ in-service education option) + 2 years of post-service benefits (+ Reserve service option).

Status: There are presently no pre-service enlisted education programs with obligated service requirements (note, however, officer pre-service programs, ROTC, Platoon Leader Course, Nuclear Propulsion Officer Candidate Program, etc.). Pre-service vocational training (with obligated service requirements) is an incentive area which has not been fully explored. There appears to be little Service enthusiasm for this idea, however. The Services have indicated that they would prefer to use their own training programs.

Expanded In-Service

Concept: Expand current DoD programs to include current V.A. in-service (minimum benefit requirements); expand current program tuition assistance to level of 75%-100%; also, expanded below-college level and vocational/technical programs.

Variations: Military skills requirements, military utilization potential, years of service commitment, and quality-level requirements; also, continuation option for post-service benefits on 1 year/1 year basis.

Status: In-service benefits at current DoD and V.A. levels are considered minimum educational benefit requirements. Expanded in-service benefits and tuition assistance (above current levels) are alternative areas which may provide increased incentives for enlistment and reenlistment. It is not altogether certain, however, whether this incentive program will (1) satisfy the Army's need to recruit for critical skills, or (2) maintain overall quality levels.

Continued In-Service

Concept: Maintain in-service, part-time tuition assistance program for continued post-service entitlement.

Variations: Percentage entitlement; skills requirements; term of service; obligated Reserve service.

Status: This concept has not been included in current discussions.

Post-Service Variations

Concept: Maintain principles of current V.A. post-service program and develop variations of program parameters according to service needs.

Variations: Changes in eligibility requirements, benefits, time-frame, and methods of funding affect cost estimates and target accession markets. Variations, therefore, can be developed according to specific service goals and within feasible budgetary limits. The Clements Alternative and Clements Modified are examples of Post-service variations based largely on current G.I. Bill principles.

Status: There are cost estimates for variations of several post-service program elements. The Clements Alternative and Clements Modified are now under discussion as pending DoD alternatives to current G.I. Bill programs.

Educational Grant

Concept: Educational grant (scholarship) based on years of enlistment/contractual obligation.

Variations: Educational grant (e.g., $3,000/3 year enlistment); use of enlistment bonus; increasing scale based on a maximum grant of $6,000/10 years of service. Variations may also include eligibility restrictions by critical skills enlistment, quality level, prior achievement criteria, etc.

Status: Cost estimates for general educational grant programs, without limiting criteria, are relatively high when compared to other alternatives. The Army Scholarship and Scholarship Bonus Alternatives are outgrowths of this concept--with refinements and specific eligibility criteria. A general grant program without restrictions, however, has received generally low ranking among alternatives. The Scholarship Alternative (April, 1975) and the Scholarship Bonus (June, 1975) are now under discussion as pending DoD alternatives to current G.I. Bill programs.

Student Loan

Concept: Money to be borrowed by student on a sliding scale.

Variations: Interest (e.g., 7%) to be paid by DoD while individual is in school; $6,000 loan/3 year enlistment; maximum of $9,000 loan/6 year enlistment; first repayment due 90 days after graduation, with total repayment to be completed within 10 years of graduation. Variations based on amount of loan, rates, eligibility criteria, etc.

Status: Recovery rates on student loans are generally low. Administrative costs can likewise be expected to add considerably to total cost estimates. For these general reasons, loan concepts have not received favorable response.

Educational Savings Plan/Matching Grant

Concept: Individual requests payroll deduction for deferred educational savings account; entitlement added either on percent or matching (one for one) grant basis.

Variations: Limits on total entitlement (e.g., $2700/3 year enlistment with maximum of $5400/6 year enlistment). Variations on totals, percentage/matching/years of enlistment, eligibility criteria, etc. are numerous.

Status: Matching grants tend to favor those individuals who are financially able to save--as opposed to those individuals with family responsibilities and increased financial commitments. It is possible, however, to develop a variation of the savings plan concept where the amount of benefit is less dependent on total savings (ability to save) and is directed (on a % basis) toward years of service and/or skills area commitments. The Army fears that resulting inequities and the actual limitations on an individual's capacity to save will "create creditability problems" here.

Matching Credit

Concept: Match academic credits for post-service entitlement with credits earned while in service.

Variations: Maximum credit entitlements/years of enlistment (e.g., 48 credits/3 year enlistment; 60 credits/4 year enlistment). Limitations on eligibility criteria; skills area requirements.

Status: Inequities would result from the application of this concept. Educational opportunities vary according to the nature of an individual's job responsibility (time requirements) and the accessibility of educational programs (location of service). For general reasons of inequity, therefore, the Army considers this option unacceptable.

Serviceman-Citizen-Reservist (Bradley Commission)

Concept: Include Reserve service options for additional post-service entitlement.

Variations: 1 year post-service entitlement/each 2 years of active duty; additional educational entitlements according to additional years of active duty and/or Reserve service. Variations same as post-service, with inclusion of incentive for Reserve enlistment.

Status: This concept has not been fully explored as an "option." Reserve enlistment incentives should be seriously studied, however, as extensions of long-term educational benefit program packages. The following concept, therefore, can be considered as one such area for further study:

Tuition Assistance for Non-Prior Service Reserve Personnel

Concept: % entitlement for 6 year standard Reserve enlistment; % entitlement for reenlistment.

SCORE SHEET

PROGRAM CONCEPTS[1/]	FUNDAMENTAL DOD OBJECTIVES 1. Enlistment Incentive for Hi-Quality Personnel		2. Reduction of Negative Incentives for Reenlistment	3. Reduction of Cost vis-a-vis current VA GI Bill	4. Provision of a General Enlistment Incentive	5. Performance, Motivation, Personal & Services Capabilities, & Organizational Capacity
	a) All Skills	b) Critical Skills				
A. PRE-SERVICE - Full time, fully funded education prior to service, or percent of funding for post-education service obligation.						
B* EXPANDED IN-SERVICE - Expand current DoD programs to include current V.A. In-Service (minimum requirements).						
C. CONTINUED IN-SERVICE - Maintain in-service, part-time tuition assistance program for veterans as post-service program.						
D* POST-SERVICE VARIATIONS - Maintain principles of current V.A. post-service program and develop variations of program parameters according to service needs. Current V.A. System						
E* Elements						
F* Elements Modified						
G. EDUCATIONAL GRANT - Educational Grant (Scholarship) based on years of enlistment/contractual obligation. Army Scholarship						
H* Scholarship Bonus						
I. STUDENT LOAN - Money to be borrowed by student on sliding scale; interest paid by DoD while student is in school.						
J. EDUCATIONAL SAVINGS PLAN/MATCHING GRANT - Individual requests payroll deduction for deferred educational savings account; entitlement added on percent or matching (one for one) grant basis.						
K. MATCHING CREDIT - Match academic credits for post-service entitlement with credits earned while in service.						
L. SERVICEMAN/CITIZEN/RESERVIST - Include Reserve service options for additional post service entitlement (post service variation).						

[1/] See accompanying paper for more complete description of concepts, variations, and status.

* Pending DoD alternatives

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HUMAN RESOURCES RESEARCH ORGANIZATION

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11 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: OASD(M&RA)

SUBJECT: G.I. Bill Termination - Army Information Papers

Summary of Relevant Content

I. Servicemen's Opportunity College - Reports

A. Benefits termination would cause local economy "multiplier factor" effect (e.g., losses to State of California of $1.2B; San Diego County, $425M).
B. Decrease in total college enrollments due to termination anticipated to be 1.5M; reduced dollar flow to institutions.
C. College and Community reaction - little awareness of impending termination; 50-95% of current vets would be unable to continue in college without G.I. Bill benefits.
D. College Student Aid Officers - $2500 scholarship too limited in amount.

II. USAREC

A. Estimates 50% of current DEP will request active duty prior to 1 July or release from obligation.
B. Will require 3,818 additional accessions; expand training load by 1,661 trainee man-years; add annual training and accession costs of $7M; and have a general lowering effect across the board on quality-related training and performance indices.
C. Anticipates "loss of faith among enlistees and influencers".

III. Army Recruit "Probe 7" Data (HSG, n=1063)

A. Aspects of G.I. Bill considered "very important" to high school graduates (by % strength of response)
   1. length of eligibility after discharge - 75%
   2. amount of monthly living expenses - 74%
   3. length of education after leaving service - 73%
   4. availability of college education - 69%
   5. availability of voc/tech training - 59%

B. 52% of H.S.G. believed G.I. Bill educational benefits were a "firm part" of enlistment contract.
C. 28% indicated they would cancel enlistment, if given the opportunity, in the event G.I. Bill benefits were rescinded; 42% would not; 30% not sure.

IV. Quality Standards

A. The Army is not willing to lower quality standards to meet strength requirements.
B. High School Graduate goals will likewise be given higher priority than Category I-IIIa accession goals.

Editorial Comment

The Army is a staunch believer in the power of educational benefits to attract quality recruits. And, although executive economizers may accuse the Army of being alarmist in its reaction to the President's proposal, there is significant cause for immediate action. This is not to suggest that extreme interpretations of inconclusive data be made here. It is only to emphasize the fact that there is a reasonable basis - in previous and current research findings - to justify the apprehensive attitude of the Army.

General agreement is indicated on the need to "come up with a DoD proposal in time to be effective upon termination of the current G.I. Bill". Fears of immediate loss in quality cannot be allayed, however, while the threat of G.I. Bill termination remains constant. Current and future enlistees must have immediate assurances that educational benefits will be available to them. Public assurances can only be provided if: 1) the DoD announces an acceptable alternative package, or 2) a language change is made in the President's proposal to extend grace-period eligibility 30 days beyond termination.

The campaign to include a language change in the terminating legislation would appear to be most desirable at this time. Pressures to amend the current proposal should not, however, act in such a way as to speed the legislative process - i.e., by indicating DoD preparedness to cope with the effects of the amended legislation. The preparation of an interim status paper for submission to Congress may be helpful here in laying out the current state of affairs (and especially, Army fears) within the DoD.

"Coming up with a DoD proposal in time to be effective upon termination of the current G.I. Bill" should also mean that a contingency plan is available and ready to be promoted as an alternative - should the need be apparent.

The legislative process will be slow enough to allow adequate room for maneuverability. Immediate promotion of an alternative benefits package, however, will only act to speed the process and transfer the budgetary burden much sooner than might otherwise be expected. Within the environment of assured benefits to new recruits - satisfying the Army's need for quality accessions - it would be advantageous to approach alternative program proposals with discriminating caution. A carefully scheduled decision process would thereby enable DoD to simultaneously reduce apprehension and utilize the profits of advanced knowledge.

Army Recruit Probe Survey (B) - G.I. Bill

EFFECT OF CHANGES IN CURRENT G.I. BILL EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS ON ENLISTMENT DECISIONS AMONG SELECTED GROUPS
(ARMY RECRUIT PROBE B, 2-6 JUNE 1975)

Mental Category/ Educational Level	(7) "I definitely would not have enlisted if ...."							
	A. Could get at most 27 months, instead of 36 months, after discharge	B. Could not get vocational or correspondence school training after discharge	C. Could get at most $220/mo. (without dependency) instead of current $270/mo. with dependency	D. Could get at most 18 months of education after discharge	E. Could not get a college education after discharge	F. Had to enroll within 5 years after discharge or lose school benefits, instead of current 10 year limitation	G. Would not be eligible for education benefit unless honorably discharged after term of first enlistment	H. Would not receive living expenses, but cost of tuition and books would be paid.
Mental Category I & II (n=397)	5%	9%	8%	11%	26%	5%	6%	8%
Mental Category IIIa (n=485)	5%	7%	5%	8%	20%	6%	5%	8%
Total HSG (n=935)	5%	8%	5%	9%	20%	4%	6%	7%
Total College (n=310)	7%	12%	11%	14%	33%	7%	8%	12%

RESPONSES TO POST-SERVICE EDUCATIONAL BENEFIT QUESTIONS BY SELECTED GROUPS (ARMY RECRUIT PROBE SURVEY B, 2-6 JUNE, 1975)

Maximum Effect

Minimum Effect

MENTAL CATEGORY/ EDUCATIONAL LEVEL	(6)(E) A college education when I get out of service: available and expect to take advantage	(7) I definitely would not have enlisted (e) [if I] could not get a college education after I left the service	(8) Very important to me (E) A college education after leaving service	(9)(1) The benefits (G.I. Bill) is a firm part of my enlistment contract	(10) If the G.I. Bill were totally rescinded (?) I would cancel (my enlistment)	MEAN SCORE
A. Mental Category I & II (n=397)	66%	26%	66%	50%	27%	47%
B. Mental Category IIIa (n=495)	60%	20%	57%	43%	23%	40.6%
C. Total HSG (n=935)	60%	20%	59% [Probe ?, 69%]	46% [Probe ?, 47%]	21% [Probe ?, 29%]	41.2% [47.?%]
D. Total College (n=310)	75%	32%	80%	60%	35%	56.6%

Preliminary Draft: The Educational Benefits Impact Model


PROCLIVITY TO ENLIST
MENTAL CATEGORY
EDUCATIONAL LEVEL
DECISION FACTORS
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
IN-SERVICE EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS
$ 100 M
+ 200 M
POST-SERVICE EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS
$ 200 M
Present GI
MARKETING
Recruiter Policy
Advertising Expenditure
OTHER PAY INCENTIVES
Increased Salary
Skill Bonus
TERMS OF ENLISTMENT
Years of Service
Choice of Skill
Combat Skill
ACCESSION PROBABILITIES
UNEMPLOYMENT
Present
Optimistic
Pessimistic
INCOME LEVELS (Civilian)
Present
High
Low
PERCEIVED VALUE OF EDUCATION
Present
High
Low
CURRENT EVENTS
Threats
War
Conflict
ENLISTMENT DECISIONS
MENTAL CAT QUALITY LEVELS
EDUCATIONAL QUALITY LEVELS
BRANCH OF SERVICE
TOTAL ACCESSIONS
EFFECTIVENESS
(Manpower Mix)
COSTS
(Economic & Environmental Factors)
DECISION OPTIONS
No
Cost-Effective Educational Benefit Policy
Yes
STOP

]

DISCUSSION CHART:

How Should Post-Service Educational Benefit Funds Be Allocated Among the Services?

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION:	Allocation Plan I				Allocation Plan II				Allocation Plan III				Allocation Plan IV			
What are the advantages and disadvantages of these allocation plans in terms of their:	Proportional to Current Accessions				Proportional to Accession Objectives				Proportional to Shortages				Proportional to Losses			
	Sub-Plan				Sub-Plan				Sub-Plan				Sub-Plan			
	total	HSGs	cat. I+IIs	crit skill	total	HSGs	cat. I+IIs	crit skill	total	HSGs	cat. I+IIs	crit skill	total	HSGs	cat. I+IIs	crit. skill
1.) Ability to counteract the effects of G.I. Bill termination?	Incentive impact? Quality levels? Service capabilities? Recruitment?															
2.) Impact on internal Service objectives? A.) immediate? B.) long-term?	Skills area needs? Negative incentives for reenl; turnovers? Specific target mkts? Improved economic conditions environ?															
3.) Impact on overall DoD objectives? A.) immediate? B.) long-term?	Total DoD manpower strength levels? Operational impact? Education initiatives? Overall effectiveness?															
4.) Effect on internal Administrative program needs?	Discretionary administration? DoD specificity? Internal program targets?															
5.) Requirements for further analysis?	Minimum needs? Effects of G.I. Bill? Service goals? Effectiveness? Alloc. equity v. needs															

In-Service Training Under the GI Bill

- FACT SHEET -

- The number of persons training under the GI Bill while on active duty reached an all-time high of 93,821 in November 1974: 4.4 percent of the active military strength. Of this number, 19,233 were training in institutions of higher learning - also an all-time high.

- Of service personnel trained during FY74, 26.2 percent trained at the college level and 73.8 percent in schools other than college.

- There was an overall 10.5 percent increase for service personnel in training between November 1973 and November 1974; service personnel in college training rose 22.6 percent; the number in correspondence training rose 9.0 percent.

- While the number of persons on active duty has declined, the number of service personnel using training benefits has increased.

- 9.1 percent of service personnel in training were full-time. Of the personnel training in college, 36.8 percent were full-time.

- Service personnel trainees have had a greater percentage of their number train in schools other than college than either peacetime post-Korean or Vietnam veterans.

- 52.3 percent of all service personnel ever in training through November 1974 were high school graduates; 21.4 percent had one or more years of prior college education.

- The cumulative number of educationally disadvantaged service trainees ever trained increased in the period November 1973 to November 1974 from 85,649 to 142,059, or 65.9 percent.

- As of November 30, 1974, the distribution of active duty personnel in training included:

	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	Other
% of active duty personnel CY74	3.8	4.2	2.6	5.4	N/A
% of service personnel in training Nov.'74	31.7	24.9	5.4	36.2	1.8
% of service personnel ever trained	37.2	20.6	9.2	31.8	1.2

Source: Dept. of Veterans Benefits, Veterans Administration, "Veterans Benefits Under Current Educational Programs," Information Bulletin DVB IB 20-75-3, November 1974.

In-Service Correspondence Training Under the GI Bill

- FACT SHEET -

- Service personnel enrollments in correspondence training increased by nine percent from November 1973 to November 1974; correspondence trainees at the college level (for all enrollees, in-service and post-service) comprise less than one percent of all correspondence trainees.

- The greatest number of service personnel in training at the end of November 1974 were in correspondence training (other than college): 67,902 trainees. These correspondence trainees comprise 72.4 percent of all service persons in training during this period.

- Service personnel in correspondence training (other than college) during FY74 accounted for 39 percent of all service persons in training that year.

- Service personnel who have trained under the current GI Bill through November 1974 have had a greater propensity to take correspondence training (43 percent cumulative) than either Vietnam era veterans (15.8 percent) or peacetime post-Korean conflict veterans (26.2 percent).

- Of all enrollees (in-service and post-service) training in correspondence schools, 0.1 percent were training in public facilities.

- Since November 1972, the proportion of total trainees taking correspondence training has been falling. This may have occurred for three reasons: 1) compensation for completed correspondence training was decreased from 100 percent to 90 percent after 1 January 1973; 2) affirmation of enrollment was required; and 3) service personnel were required to receive the concurrence of their unit education officer prior to taking correspondence training.

- Percentage distribution of service personnel ever in training: college correspondence 0.2 percent (undergraduate 0.1., non-degree 0.1); post-high school vocational or technical correspondence 8.9 percent, other vocational or technical correspondence 33.7 percent, high school correspondence 0.2 percent.

SOURCE: Dept. of Veterans Benefits, Veterans Administration, "Veterans Benefits Under Current Educational Programs," Information Bulletin DVB IB 20-75-3, November 1974.

Table 13. SERVICE STAFF VIEWS OF IN-SERVICE EDUCATION

	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE
Objectives	Self-enhancement Increase productivity	Up-grade individual Enhance fleet readiness	Augment training Provide HS diploma or equiv. for all EM	Career growth Enhance svc. attractiveness Increase retention
Should benefits be expanded?	Only in PREP and tuition assistance for officers	Yes	Perhaps	Yes
New programs?	National Apprentice Standards	No	Want to re-institute Associate Degree Program. More vocational.	No
Is there a saturation point?	Yes, when interferes w/combat readiness	Yes, but don't know where	Yes	Yes, but don't know where
Necessary or desirable for commonality among svc. programs?	No, incentives vary from svc. to svc.	Philosophical differences among svcs. militate against uniformity	No, must meet unique needs	No, programs must respond to peculiar needs of each svc.
What incentive for enlistment?	40% of HSG said opportunity for ed. was a primary motivation	50% said ed. opportunities caused enlistment	Significant	Primary incentive for over 70%
Abuses?	Cannot address	Not aware of any	None. Good checks and balances	Not aware of any. Program well audited
Complaints from servicemen	Duty doesn't permit participation	Not aware of any	Lack of variety Inflexibility of schools	High quality (Harvard) programs not available Mil. duties do not permit participation

Table 12. In-Service Education Course Enrollments (in Thousands) and Completion Rates

Note: Navy data primarily reflects shore activities and is therefore not representative of total participation rates.

	ARMY		AIR FORCE		NAVY	
	FY 73	FY 74	FY 73	FY 74	FY 73	FY 74
Academic Courses (Class Instruction)	132.7	198.9	15.1	8.4	.6	3.7
Completion Rate	81.5%	79.3%	89.7%	97.7%	57.0%	67.4%
Academic Courses (Civilian Schools, Colleges & Universities)	134.5	155.0	173.3	210.2	27.6	35.9
Completion Rate	81.6%	87.5%	89.4%	90.1%	90.3%	93.3%
High School Courses	8.9	15.1	30.7	36.9	6.5	9.8
Completion Rate	64.4%	73.3%	65.6%	80.5%	52.9%	51.3%
Technical/Vocational Courses	148.1	178.7	78.2	100.0	.6	1.2
Completion Rate	72.3%	54.0%	86.7%	91.6%	40.8%	71.3%
Correspondence Courses	56.9	59.5	105.2	113.4	4.4	1.6
Completion Rate	51.4%	48.2%	47.3%	50.6%	51.1%	92.3%
Totals	541.1	607.3	402.4	468.9	39.7	52.2
Overall Completion Rate	74.7%	70.7%	76.1%	82.7%	73.5%	83.0%

Is In-Service Education "Good"?

In-Service education is now accepted as an integral part of service life, as opposed to its earlier position as a morale and welfare function. The two questions most frequently raised are: a. How much can DoD afford for in-service education? and b. What impact do in-service education programs have on combat readiness?

In-service education must compete with other important programs within the service operations and maintenance budgets. The costs of education are high, primarily because it is labor intensive. The Industrial Revolution has not occurred for the education industry. Technology, except for television and audio-visual devices, has had little impact on education. There is increasing evidence that computer-administered instruction is a promising approach for reducing costs but it is estimated that its impact will be insignificant until the late 1980's.1/

1/ Richard G. Nibeck, Deputy Executive Director, Association for Education Communications and Technology.

In January 1975, funds for the General Educational Development Program of the Army were exhausted. Over $30 million was needed to keep it alive. Personnel were encouraged to use the G.I. Bill. Fort Hood, Texas, with one of the largest troop populations in the world, offers an example of the financial demands of in-service education. Fort Hood has an unresolved problem of providing adequate facilities for education programs. There are not enough counselors to meet the requirements for both enrollment counseling and long-range counseling for selection of career, civilian vocational and education goals.2/

Although funded under operations and maintenance, in-service education is undoubtedly perceived by the Congress as a DoD "people" cost, already a matter of considerable concern. In May 1974, Congress directed the Marine Corps to terminate its Marine Associate Degree Program. Earlier, the Air Force's Airman Commissioning Program was stopped by Congress. Educators whose institutions cooperate with the DoD in providing in-service education complain about the inability of the services to live up to their commitments. One prominent educator, for example, stated that in over fourteen years of administering in-service post secondary programs, he believed that in each year without exception at least one of the services failed to honor its agreements due to fund exhaustion.3/

The message of the Secretary of Defense to the Sixth Worldwide Armed Forces Educational Conference on December 6, 1974 is encouraging:

> In this time of limited funding the one resource that can continue to grow is the individual. This growth is through education. That is why we consider our educational opportunities so very essential to maintenance

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2/ Education Services Plan, III Corps and Fort Hood, FY76.

3/ Conversations with the Dean, University College, University of Maryland. July 16, 1975.

> of the All-Volunteer Force. You may rest assured that continuing to provide these opportunities is, and will remain, one of top priority.

Turning from cost considerations to the impact of in-service education on combat readiness, we find a more amorphous question. Some commanders inevitably ask:"How does the education make them fight better?" Education which enables the serviceman to absorb military training more readily, e.g., PREP, is generally recognized as a contributor to force effectiveness. It is not readily apparent, however, how a chief petty officer suddenly becomes more productive to the Navy while he is earning a college degree. [4] The services do pay a short-run price for in-service education. This price is probably lowest in the Air Force which operates as an industrial organization. Regular duty shifts permit an integration of mission requirements and educational pursuits. It is probably higher in other Services where sea duty, field training exercises, ROTC summer support, domestic unrest, natural disaster and other responsibilities require units to leave their home stations. The commander must either do without the services of at least some soldiers engaged in in-service education or disrupt the continuity essential for successful completion of their programs. However, there appears to be a growing correlation between mission and education, an increasing awareness that education contributes to rather than competes with combat effectiveness. It reinforces military training in developing the technical and leadership skill required in a modern defense force. It is responsible for cost avoidance by a wholesome occupation of the serviceman's time, with a concomitant reduction in delinquency rates.

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[4] See Christopher John's response to the CNB Task Force Study (Center for Naval Analyses, 11 July 1973).

Opportunities for Extension

A number of trends are discernible in in-service education, many of which will continue regardless of the fate of the G.I. Bill. Participation will continue to rise. Furthermore, there is room for new initiatives in providing new in-service educational programs in order to reach new constituencies. Examples from the past few years are the Navy Campus for Achievement and the Community College of the Air Force. The most recent example is the Army's National Apprenticeship Standards to provide registered certification of the individual soldier's skilled craft occupational training.

Now that personnel are no longer a draftable "free good," the services should make a greater effort to achieve an equitable balance between lower priority mission requirements and a reasonable response to the legitimate aspirations of servicemen for personal development. As a result the services can provide a more congenial and constructive environment for growth through education.

Educational counseling will receive increased emphasis to assist the serviceman in determining his short and long range personal improvement goals, and the educational programs available to assist him in meeting those goals. The Marine Corps, for example, now uses education officers, rather than civilian educational counselors, at its major bases. These officers possess advanced degrees in education and are managed like other Marine Corps officers sent to graduate school for the acquisition of a skill for which the Corps has a validated requirement.

The academic community will continue to support -- even woo -- in-service education with diverse institutions and with diverse educational packages consorting in education centers in the U.S. and overseas.

Table 14 roughly estimates the impact of each factor which we expect will alter in-service education participation.

What actions should the services take if the G.I. Bill were terminated with only a fair warning clause? Obviously an effort would be made to continue to attract the potential enlistee for whom education is a major motivating factor.

More *on-duty education* would enhance the attractiveness of in-service education. The *increase in tuition assistance percentage* as proposed by all the Services, could have a positive impact on attracting the higher mental categories into the Services. Inversely the Veterans Administration reported a drop in correspondence training following the drop in the reimbursement from 100% to 90%. This drop led first to a slowing in the growth of the number in correspondence training and then to a drop in the number in training.

Consideration could be given to *advancement or a bonus* for new educational levels achieved during a year or an enlistment, as is already done for passing skill tests. This practice is also followed in most educational systems.

New educational programs and new recruiting campaigns would be developed to *reach new populations*. An attractive target is the part-time student in a post secondary institution. A report on financing part-time students, the new majority in post secondary education, documents that 53% of them say cost is their main obstacle.[5]

Strategies for reaching the high school market should be examined and alternatives developed based on a joint Services approach.

If as the result of the termination of the G.I. Bill, the Services were unable to achieve recruiting objectives without enlisting a higher number of non-high school graduates then desired,

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[5] Report of the Committee on the Financing of Higher Education for Adult Students to the Office of Government Relations of the American Council on Education, 1974.

Table 14. FACTORS WHICH WILL INFLUENCE PARTICIPATION IN IN-SERVICE EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS

Factor	Preliminary Estimate of Impact
General Trend within DOD	Up to 15% yearly increase
New Concepts in Adult Education	Up to total of 2/3 of total participation
Fiscal Undertow of Academic Institutions	Up to 10% yearly increase
Increased Accession of HS Graduates	Negligible[1]
Primacy of Combat Readiness	Places some ceiling[2]
Peacetime Military--less moves, longer terms	Noticeable increase, esp. Army
Saturation of Interest	Places some Ceiling[3]
Services' Initiatives--CCAF, SOC, etc.	Marginal Increase[4]
*Only Applicable in Event of GI Bill Termination	
New Breed of Entrants	Fewer "Warmups"
"Get it while you can" attitude	Part of the 57% now "Saving"
Increase % Support & no more reason to "save"	Marginal Increase[5]

NET ESTIMATE: Substantial potential to increase participation additional programs should be established to insure that the maximum number acquired the *basic educational skills* that accompany a high school education.

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[1] PREP takes the place of post-secondary study for these individuals.

[2] Will be estimated from surveys of Commanders.

[3] Will be estimated from available information sources.

[4] CCAF, SOC and AHLAD have not led to significant increases.

[5] MSG "factoring" method will be applied here.

Assuming some intensification of in-service education to attract the person for whom education is an important enlistment incentive, the Services should also seek to involve, educationally, the serviceman who enlisted for reasons other than educational benefits. A person who is learning and growing will be a more productive person in any situation. The success of the Pro-Life Program of MG Henry Emerson in the 2d U.S. Infantry Division bears testimony to this precept. Maximum involvement reduces the possibility of polarity developing between those interested and disinterested in education.

A program of *controlled experiments* in educational benefits might be attractive (in preference, e.g., to the full-scale "AHEAD" venture).

Three other ideas for extending in-Service education which should be evaluated have recently come to our minds. The first is increased *civilian skill training* for military jobs, where feasible. The second (possibly related) is *seasonal offering of benefits*, which serve to manage the flow of accessions more uniformly into military schools. The third is new or renewed emphasis on *transitioning from enlisted status to officer status*, which is especially attractive since there were 25,535 minority enlisted personnel - 13,326 in the Army - who had already completed at least a year of college in FY1974.

Two *methods of generating programs* should be considered. First, the full system educational benefits model is generative, and could be used to structure ideas in a workshop of educational experts. Second, a contest could be run in the High Schools for program ideas -- or *prospective enlistees* could be asked to submit a personal proposal, in the form of a binding contract, for Service acceptance.

IMPLEMENTATION OF EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS PROGRAM


Present
OCT 75
NOV 75
31 DEC 75
-Draft legislation for contingency post-service benefit
-Prepare to expand in-service programs
-Continue to analyze impact and evaluate alternatives
Implementation Path I
Implementation Path II
Submit Legislative Rider on Termination Bill
Termination Legislation Acted Upon
GI Bill Educational Benefits Terminated For New Enlistees
GI Bill Educational Benefits Maintained
STOP
Assume Prep
Appropriate For New In-Service
Analyze Experience Without GI Bill Post-Service
Take No Action
STOP
Submit Legislation For New Benefit Package
Congressional Process;
Executive Process
Receive Funds For Program
Put Program Into Operation
STOP
Indeterminate Action
Present
OCT 75
NOV 75
31 DEC 75
Period After Termination

Subcommittee on Education and Training
Committee on Veterans' Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives
Hearings on G.I. Bill Educational Benefits: July 29, 1975

ISSUE	VETERANS ADMINISTRATION	VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS	AMERICAN LEGION	NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF CONCERNED VETERANS	FLEET RESERVE ASSOCIATION
Terminate G.I. Bill for New Enlistees	Support (but with amendments to protect Delayed Entry Pool and 10-year eligibility provision)	Oppose termination.	Support termination	Oppose termination	"Appreciates the need to terminate veterans wartime benefits."
Transfer Budget to DoD	No mention	" The cost of the G.I. Bill should be charged to DoD as part of the cost of national security". "...[T]he DoD likes to dance so long as someone else pays the fiddler."	Implied support	No mention	No mention
DoD Enlistment Impact/Effect on Quality Levels	DoD surveys indicate DEP releases "could run as high as 30% of enlistees concentrated among those with the best qualifications."	"If it takes the G.I. Bill to attract the caliber of personnel needed for a strong national defense, and we believe it does, then the DoD ought to pick up the bill and educate the public as to the real cost of national defense."	Recognizes current recruitment incentive, but differentiates between "rehabilitation" aspects of "wartime programs" and enlistment benefit of "peacetime era."	No mention	No mention
Terminate PREP	There is "no longer a need for PREP". And, "the extensive training and educational programs" developed by DoD "can provide the means" for required education.	Implied	No mention	No mention	No mention
Delayed Entry Pool Eligibility	Benefits to those who enlist in DEP prior to G.I. Bill termination date.	No mention	No mention	No mention	No mention
Extension of Eligibility to 45 months (under current G.I. Bill).	Oppose."36 months ... is reasonable and equitable."	Support (but no official comment)	Support."The American Legion is committed to the concept of equal benefits for equal service."	Support. "NACV stands ready to assist the Congress in any possible way to ensure that our veterans receive equal treatment for equal service."	Support. "Such an extension will assure veterans of the opportunity to complete their education and earn their degrees."
View of Current G.I. Bill Educational Benefits	"The military service recognizes that they must provide effective inducement among which educational opportunity is one of the most attractive." There should be a "distinction between those required to perform military service and those who ... choose to serve."	The G.I. Bill is a valuable inducement to maintain our manpower needs in the Armed Forces." "...[I]t has been proven for every dollar spent on the G.I. Bill at least three dollars have returned to the Government in the form of higher taxes paid by those with higher education and, it follows, higher income."	The G.I. Bill "was to provide vocational readjustment and restore lost educational opportunities to those servicemen and women whose careers were interrupted or impeded by reason of active duty during a period of war or declared hostilities".	"NACV is particularly pleased over the passage of P.L. 93-508, The 'Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974' with its many provisions of benefit to today's veterans. This law is an excellent step toward reaching the goal of parity and equality for all veterans."	"The Government's costs in providing education benefits...have proven to be 'bread cast upon the waters.' Veterans' education has contributed significantly to our nation's economy and has increased the Government's revenue."

SCHOLARSHIP INSURANCE AS A POST-SERVICE EDUCATIONAL BENEFIT

Criteria for a Post-Service Educational Benefit Program

The following criteria are considered essential for establishment of a post-service benefit program:

- #1. Can be funded by a DoD budget within the range of $100M.
- #2. Offset the decrement of high school graduate, Mental Group I-III accessions caused by termination of the G.I. Bill.
- #3. Minimize post-service administration.
- #4. Avoid a strong incentive for separation.
- #5. Target specifically for education.

The Scholarship Insurance Concept and Its Relation to the Criteria

The "scholarship insurance" concept is simply a recognition of two existing conditions. First, the quality H.S. graduate who might enter service wants to keep his college options open; this option can be provided by an insurance program. Second, there is a professionally operated insurance program for Servicemen in SGLI and VGLI.

The concept appears to meet the criteria for a post-service benefit program:

- #1. Cost Reduction. The scholarship insurance policy has not been costed in detail, but costs as little as $54M yearly in the example discussed below.
- #2. Quality Accessions. The insurance program would be expected to pick up losses effected by G.I. Bill termination.
- #3. Minimal Administration. The Program could operate under the minimal administration of V.A., through contracted insurance experts, similar to SGLI.

- #4. Avoid Incentive for Separation. Scholarship insurance would be in force until its use, so that it would not provide an incentive to separate. It could be doubled for selected reenlistees.
- #5. Education Purpose. Claims are to be honored only upon receipt of a bonafide college billing.

Example of a Scholarship Insurance Policy

The following specific provisions of a scholarship insurance policy have been drafted to serve as a point of reference.

General

- Legislation is needed to establish Servicemen's Scholarship Insurance.
- The insurance would be purchased from a commercial insurance company by the V.A., using DoD funds.
    - in accordance with SGLI provisions of title 38, U.S.C., Ch. 19, Section III, as amended.
- An administrative office would be established by the prime insurance company contractor.

Cost. The cost of insurance is borne by the Department of Defense, on a monthly premium basis for specified skills; (and possibly by the individual Service member for other skills.)

Claims are made by the insured for college work of self, spouse or child. Payment is made by the insurance company in the amount of a submitted binding commitment to an accredited college, plus $1,000 subsistence per full-time semester not to exceed a total withdrawal of $8,000. A proof of insurance in force will be submitted with each claim.

Beneficiaries are the insured, or, in the event of the insured's death, the beneficiary designated by the insured (as administrator).

Persons Eligible to be Insured. The insured must enlist or reenlist in a skill designated by the Secretary of Defense, and fulfill all the terms of the contract before becoming eligible for claims. The contract will require a three-year term, and may require a specific branch of Service, a specific skill, and waiver of other enlistment options such as base of choice. Must be a HS graduate.

Election of Payment of Proceeds. (See "Claims", above). The binding commitment will be paid by check directly to the accredited college, and the subsistence share will be paid by check in the name of the student.

Termination occurs when either the insured has exhausted $8,000 or the insured, spouse and children are all deceased.

Forfeiture rules similar to those of SGLI apply.

Administrative Decisions. Determinations of the V.A. would be conclusive under the policy.

Advisory Council on SSI. The Law would provide for an Advisory Council consisting of the Secretaries of the Treasury (Chairman), Defense, Commerce, HEW, Transportation, and the Director of OMB. It meets at the call of the Administrator once a year, or more often to advise the Administrator on matters of policy.

Maintenance of Records. Names and amount of insurance committed should be maintained by the Service concerned while the member is on active duty, and the V.A. thereafter. Once a claim has been filed with OSSI, the claims records will be retained by OSSI.

Information and Assistance may be obtained at designated V.A. offices and the applicable Service's distribution center.

Preliminary Cost & Benefit Estimates

Based upon the example policy outlined above, assuming it to be available for Army combat arms skills and "hard" skills, leads to the following preliminary program cost estimates:

Number of insured added yearly: 20,000

Premium to allow full payment by end of 3-year term: $74.66 monthly per enlistee

(assumes 75% usage rate, for 50% of the face value; payable at an average of two years after completion of term; with money at 6% annual interest rate; allows for a 10% administrative and risk cost.)

Yearly budget:

20,000 enlistees per year X 3 years X $74.66 monthly X 12 months = $53.8M (3 years accounts for steady state)

These costs assume that any other Service members who may be allowed to participate are covering their own costs.

The primary benefit would be attraction of 20,000 high school graduates to selected skills, thus counterbalancing the decrements in numbers and quality which have been estimated due to G.I. Bill termination. In the Educational Benefits Analysis 20,000 H.S. graduate decrement is an upper estimate of termination impact and 10,000 is a "best" estimate.

Disadvantages of Scholarship Insurance

The major disadvantage of SSI is that the specific concept is new, even though based upon SGLI experience. Since the concept is new, neither the administrative problems nor the actual attractiveness to potential recruits can be definitely predicted.

Appendix B

Summary of Literature

A summary of previous literature on the subject of educational benefits incentive appeal was conducted for the purposes of this analysis. Previous research which directly addressed the central theme of incentive endorsement and the imputed effect of G.I. Bill benefits was incorporated in Chapter 1, Problem Formulation Based on Previous Papers. In addition, prior analytical material was used as a supplementary source of insight and guidance in this study. This Appendix summarizes several additional topics related to the subject of educational benefits policy and contained in previous literature.

The Quality Individual

There is an abundance of research on the subject of enlistment motivation which supports the hypothesis that educational benefits are more attractive -- and, in many cases, *most* attractive -- to the "quality" individual. The indices of quality which are used, however, vary among studies -- depending for the most part on the availability and validity of certain "quality measures" within each particular data base.

Generally, quality is defined within the dimensions of educational attainment, mental aptitude, and academic standing (or grades) -- with high school graduation being the most frequently used criterion. Some studies have even extended the common delineations of quality to include more judgmental aspects such as an individual's interests, attitudes, special aptitudes, life style, and moral values and standards (e.g., Opinion Research Corp., 1974, pp. 25-31). Research efforts to date have not attempted to incorporate measures of quality other than educational attainment and grade achievement -- although several other characteristics and demographic variables were captured in the associated data bases. Judgmental criteria of quality, therefore, have not been used in this study.

Motivational Evidence

The pioneering work on youth attitudes is the "Youth in Transition" Project by Johnston and Bachman (1970, 1972).[1] Two enlistment incentives were found in this study to be prominent and likely to remain strong: higher pay incentives and paid schooling. Among these two incentives, however, it was found that *paid schooling* was *clearly attractive to more intelligent men* (Johnston and Bachman 1972, p. 183) -- while pay incentives were most attractive to those young men who averaged lowest in intelligence levels and verbal skills. Johnston and Bachman concluded, therefore, that *background*, *ability*, and *personality* differences exist among those attracted by different incentives -- and, that those individuals who were attracted by pay averaged lower on family socio-economic levels, test scores, occupational ambitions, self-esteem, needs for self-development, and self-utilization than did those attracted by paid schooling (p. 188). It should be added, however, that although the *most intelligent* young men were attracted to the Services by paid schooling, they were not attracted enough to actually enlist.

Background. Glickman *et. al.* in their study of "Experimental Incentives as an Influence on Enlistment Intention" also found the high appeal of *tangible* incentives among those at the lower end of the socio-economic continuum. Although there is no distinction of quality based on socio-economic status[2], financial incentives were perceived by lower socio-economic group members as the most effective means for achieving upward mobility (p. 30).

Differing perceptions of the means by which status may be boosted may also account for the similar income-related findings of Fisher (1972). The incentive of a paid college education was also shown to be heavily endorsed by young men from upper-middle income families in this study of enlistment motivators -- while educational benefits were not seen to be as attractive to youth from lower-middle income (under $8000) families (p. 74).

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[1] This study was longitudinal, following young men from the start of tenth grade (Fall, 1966) to the time when most would be expected to have been out of high school for a year (Spring, 1970).

[2] Opinion Research Corporation (1974) did report the incidence of "Quality Men" to be the highest among income groups above $7000 in middle or upper neighborhoods, however -- perhaps a self-explaining situation.

Ability. The theory which relates educational achievement and/or intelligence with higher motivation toward the goals of advanced education has consistently received support from the various administrations of the Armed Forces Entrance and Examination Stations (AFEES) Surveys and the Gilbert Youth Attitude/Omnibus Surveys. Individuals who have finished high school or attended college are more likely than those who have not finished to see the value of G.I. Bill incentives as enlistment motivators (cf. also USAREC Probes, 1975; Opinion Research Corporation, 1974, p.6).

The Opinion Research Corporation Survey of the "Attitudes and Motivations Toward Enlistment in the U.S. Army" also found that *quality*[1] men were not particularly attracted by monetary considerations, training for civilian jobs, or even the opportunity to travel. This interview survey of a nationwide stratified sample also showed a relatively high appeal of "eligibility for G.I. Benefits." Although the benefit considered to be the most attractive by all major sub-groups was the opportunity to learn a trade, the chance to obtain a college-type education (eligibility for G.I. Benefits after 2 year enlistment) consistently ranked among the five top motivators for enlistment among quality men (p.x).

Personality and Ambition. There is also other evidence to support the theory that interest in advanced education is correlated with the various esteem variables of self-development and the drives associated with personal advancement. Past scholastic success is indicative not only of scholastic ability -- but also of the motivations for achievement (high grades) which are complimentary to the standard goals of a college education. In fact, Johnston and Bachman (1972) found that those individuals who were attracted to educational incentives had higher expectations of earnings than those attracted by pay (pp. 183-4).

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[1] UPC defines "Quality" to include individuals who meet the following standards: 1) High School graduate or soon to be; 2) academic standing at top 2/3 of class; 3) has interests and attitudes useful to the Army and suitable for technical and/or combat assignment; 4) has desirable moral standards and values. One-fourth of all non-college men were determined to meet these criteria (ORC, 1974, *piii*).

Quality Deterrents. If the G.I. Bill is so attractive to those who best understand its value -- that is, those who have some college attendance or proven educational attainment -- it should follow that these people would also indicate the least desire to forego education (if the ability to pay is present) by enlisting in the Services. Glickman *et. al.* (1973) found this effect to be true among individuals who did not enlist: 57 percent of all men who decided not to enlist cited *limitations* of educational benefits and the desire to finish their education as a major enlistment deterrent; 60 to 75 percent of Junior College repondents attributed a high negative-enlistment influence on "the desire to finish education" (p. 33). Each group, however, also indicated the relatively high appeal of educational benefits as a "positive factor" affecting the enlistment decision.

Policy Implications. The, issue of *representation* -- that is, the degree to which the Armed Forces are representative of the larger society -- was a major topic of discussion during policy debates on the all-volunteer concept. Fears of a possible "over-representation" of the lower socio-economic unemployed and minorities were expressed. It is also noteworthy that most criticism of the volunteer concept centered on the expected high concentration of enlistees from the "lower" ends of the common demographic scale -- the low-achievers, the low-aptitude scorers, the lower socio-economic strata, etc. -- while little attention was directed at the "highest" levels of quality measurement.

Johnston and Bachman (1972) recognized that the "more able individuals" were "under-represented among enlistees" -- and that the most desirable cross-section of high quality individuals could best be attracted by "either more in the way of educational alternatives or more assistance to individuals to pursue education on their own" (p. 195). Another more recent study of Army incentives made a similar point in reference to the recruitment of quality enlistees:

> To the extent that the Army attempts to attract individuals of high educational achievement, the differences in endorsement of reasons among education levels are important considerations in decisions about recruiting emphasis. The benefits offered by the Army (G.I. Bill and overall benefits) should be emphasized to those of higher education level (at least some college) since these individuals endorsed these reasons higher than any other groups (Kriner, Orend, and Rigg, 1975, p.46).

The implications of previous research on the enlistment motivation of quality individuals suggest that termination of educational benefits will strike hardest at the highest levels of quality. The most commonly used determinant of quality is high school graduation -- a relatively low measure of representation, when compared to the society at large. If educational benefits are most attractive at higher levels of quality, as determined by educational attainment, it may be that losses attributable to decreased benefits will also occur at the highest levels of quality for each subpopulation. By using high school graduation as an uppermost measure of accession quality, however, a major aspect of termination impact may be obscured: quality losses will begin at the highest levels. The Services may, therefore, not just lose a proportion of high school graduates -- but their *best* high school graduates.

The Correlation Between Education and Military Performance. The threat of losing more individuals at higher levels of educational achievement and attainment is, furthermore, disturbing when considerations of the correlation between education and performance are made. A most significant advance in the study of relationships between "quality" and performance was the "Quality Soldier Study" undertaken by U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC, 1975). This elaborate and comprehensive study highlighted the overall superior performance of more intelligent (Mental Category I-III), better-educated (high school graduate) individuals in the three major areas of leadership, discipline, and job proficiency. Losses in quality within the range of 15 to 30 percent were consequently expected to "cause severe impacts" in the several training, resource, and mission requirements studied.

Another recent treatment of this topic was made by Beusse and Dougherty in their study on "Educational Incentives: The Critical Element to the Success of the All-Volunteer Force" (in Hershkowitz, ed., 1974). It was reported here also that promotions were more frequent, training performance higher, disciplinary actions lower, and mean-weekly-earnings after discharge higher for those individuals who achieved high school graduation or an equivalency diploma.

The Enlistment Decision Process

The Influence of the Recruiter. The importance of the recruiter in the enlistment process may not be overstated. As a minimum, he is *at least* a source of information. The precise degree and nature of influence exercised by the recruiter has been the subject of several studies of enlistment attitudes and incentives.

The Research Analysis Corporation (RAC) "Evaluation of the Modern Volunteer Army (MVA) Program" (1972), for example, reported the "paramount importance" of the recruiter as a "source of information" for practically all respondents on the RAC survey of Army personnel (Rae, 1972). In fact, the influence of the recruiter was mentioned as frequently as advertising and friends combined (Rae, 1972, p.19).

In contrast to the findings of RAC, the Opinion Research Corporation (ORC) study of Army attitudes and motivations among young men demonstrated that the Army recruiter was "not among the sources from which young men are most likely to obtain information about the Army" (ORC, 1974, p. *xii*). ORC reported the primary influence to be "news media" and "peers and elders who have had military experience." Although the recruiter was found to have a very high "favorable influence" (among the highest) on young men, and achieved a very good "credibility" rating -- he was, nevertheless, not considered to be of great importance as a source of information (ORC, 1974, p. *xii*).

The American Institutes for Research (AIR) study of Navy Career Motivation Programs also supported the theory of recruiter primacy as a source of information to the inquiring individual -- but remained on middle ground concerning the degree of influence which recruiters may have in the ultimate enlistment decision process (Glickman, *et. al.*, 1973, pp. 11-16). Although the initial contact with the Navy recruiter was hypothesized to be quite critical (from the point of view of an individual's socialization), AIR findings suggested that the typical individual who seeks out the recruiter has, at some time previously, decided in favor of enlistment (Glickman, *et.al.*, 1973, p.13). Accordingly, the individual is merely seeking a sense of direction and/or meaningful knowledge regarding his options -- that is, "grounds for confirmation rather than persuasion or influence from the recruiter as to whether or not he should enlist":

> We are not suggesting that the recruiter has no influence in the enlistment process. On the contrary, our model indicates that the recruiter does have influence on the enlistee that may have important long-range behavioral implications. However, the recruiter's immediate influence is not evident in persuading a man to enlist so much as it is in giving the enlistee information about the Navy (Glickman, *et. al.*, 1973, p.13).

This theory of early decision-making among potential enlistees has found support in various applications of attitude surveys. One result which repeatedly occurs on incentive questions is the generally higher appeal of incentives (real and hypothetical) among youth predisposed to enlist than those reluctant to join the services. (Fisher and Rigg, 1974, pp. 5-6). If the potential enlistee does, in fact, already possess a high predisposition toward enlistment, there is reason to believe that his final decision may be affected more by the relative influence of *negative factors* rather than positive reinforcers. If this is true, it should take less to push the individual into a commitment of service than it would be to pull him away.

Fisher also found that the same incentives which appealed to potential enlistees were more attractive to men who were not initially predisposed to enlist (Fisher and Rigg, 1974). Again, the effect of incentive impact is reversed: although the attractiveness of certain incentives may elicit positive response, there is little likelihood of convincing an individual with a high predisposition against enlistment that he should, in fact, enlist. Nevertheless, in order to increase the pool of men available for recruitment, there must be an incentive mechanism of considerable attraction for those individuals who express indifference or who fluctuate between positive and negative attitudes toward enlistment.

Awareness of Incentives. An important question for policymakers should also be the extent to which current or future benefits are exploited in the recruiting marketplace. Surveys are notoriously weak in indicating actual knowledge of questionnaire items by survey respondents. Although it is not always important to know more than the simple fact that a certain incentive or reason interacts to cause enlistment motivation, it is necessary to probe the underlying factors by which such decisions are made if management policy seeks to change the status quo.

The lack of knowledge of the extent of benefits, pay and Service-related incentives by new recruits is fairly common. This is probably no less true of many individuals who express interest in enlisting for "educational benefits." Although there has been little work done to examine true knowledge of incentives, there are indications that few enlistees are aware of the extent and amount of benefits available under the G.I. Bill. For many individuals, "going to school on the G.I. Bill" is automatically associated with service in the Armed Forces -- with perhaps minimal concern or immediate preference for this far-removed benefit. As a "future veterans' benefit" -- or post-service benefit -- it is likely that awareness of the actual entitlement is limited to a total picture or conceptualization of the G.I. Bill as an important investment in readjustment. Knowing more than just that the G.I. Bill is "important" and "valuable" may not be considered to be critical information by the new or potential enlistee.

This theory might explain why instances of low awareness by potential users of the G.I. Bill occur. On the "Youth in Transition" survey, for example, only 27.3 percent of all those who said they would enlist, given the education incentives, actually *knew* anything about what the military presently offered in respect to education (Johnston and Bachman, 1972, p.233). A more recent survey of the attitudes of youth toward military service resulted in a 16 percent lack of previous knowledge response to V.A. educational benefits (fifth least-known on a list of seven benefits). And, surprisingly, there was a greater awareness of V.A. education allowances among the low probability (less than 40 percent) of enlistment respondents (MARDAC, 1975, pp. 11-12).

Even among potential groups who might "influence" enlistment decisions, research shows low awareness of benefits. ORC, for example, found a substantial majority of educators placing the highest importance (on a scale of enlistment facts for a young man) on "eligibility for G.I. Benefits after a two-year enlistment" -- with 89 percent considering it "very important" (ORC, 1974, pp. 130-131). This same sample of educators frequently expressed the opinion that one way to upgrade the quality of Army enlistees would be to "educate young men and the public" about the applicability of the G.I. Bill (p. 132). Yet, three educators in ten were not even aware that the G.I. Bill still applied to enlistees in the military service (p. *xix*).

With increased societal emphasis on education, an effective *marketing strategy* is apt to be one which: (1) seeks to create an association of service in the Armed Forces with education and educative experience -- to complement socialization and early predispositions toward enlistment among quality young people; and (2) provides the marketing strength of educational advisement, information, and direction through the resources of recruiter contact.

The G.I. Bill has institutionalized a process of educational assistance. For many young people, enlistment may be one alternative source of scholarship aid for advanced education and training. Others may view it as the interest paid on an investment of time in the military service -- or an insurance policy on personal development. In all cases, however, it is a part of the socialization and introduction of a young person to the possibilities of military service. Loss of this valuable association of enlistment with the opportunities for advanced education could be more damaging over time than any immediate losses in quality accessions might indicate.

Appendix C.

Data Base

This Appendix presents an overview of the data base used in the Educational Benefits Study.[1] Because the measurements and inferences made in this study have necessarily depended on the available information, an appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses of the underlying data base is crucial to an understanding of this work. Overall, the surveys available were sufficiently well-sampled to justify the extrapolations made from them. This claim will be documented in what follows. Additionally, a detailed listing of the errors that were detected will be given and will be accompanied by an explanation of how these inconsistencies were handled.

From a conceptual perspective, much of the Educational Benefits Study fits into a broader setting, that of an accession analysis. The work has focused on the resolution and measurement of the key influences underlying enlistment flow[2] and has placed particular emphasis on those influences that relate to educational benefits.

It follows from this that the informational needs of this study have paralleled those of previous researchers in accession analysis: data identifying the civilian market, data characterizing the in-service 'buyers' group, and data detailing the flow from the first group into the second. Traditionally, data on each of these groups has been plentiful. On one side is the multitude of readily available educational and youth surveys; on the other is an equally voluminous stack of in-service surveys and Master File statistics. Information linking these two groups, however, has been both scarce and somewhat unreliable and this deficiency has necessarily affected the accuracy of previous force-strength forecasts.

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[1] The term data base here is restricted to mean the set of survey tapes used in the course of this work. Much additional information, ranging from Census data to previous research, played an active role in the quantitative aspects of this study but has been listed separately in the Bibliography.

[2] Key influences were chosen from a broad range of possible considerations: the presence or absence of particular benefits, the demographic geography of the 17-25 year old segment of the population and the educational aspirations of the same are some that were found to be particularly significant. In fact, the isolation of all variables showing a high correlation with enlistment rate would have been an impossible task. This was circumvented by use of the 'proclivity vector'. The method of application and assumptions underlying this device are explained on page 43.

This study has had the good fortune of working with both the National Longitudinal Study, the virtues of which will be extolled below, and the battery of Gilbert Surveys administered since May 1972. These two surveys provide what is undoubtedly the most reliable, currently available data on transitions from the civilian youth population into the military. The information derived from these files provides the input to the EBM simulation (pp.41 to 45) as well as the source material for the econometric estimate of enlistment losses due to G.I. Bill termination (pp. 48 to 57). It is expected that the reliability of this data will reflect itself in the accuracy of these forecasts.

These two surveys satisfied the first and third needs of this research, but did not provide sufficient information about the in-service population itself. This difficulty was overcome by procuring copies of the May 75 AFEES survey and of the 1973 DoD Personnel Survey, form A. Data from these was then used in several of the micro analyses described in Chapter 2 as well as in the self-declared estimate of G.I. Bill termination impact included in Chapter 3.

What follows is a description of these four surveys followed by a summary of the analyses conducted on each of them. In reading through this, it is important to remember that each of the NLS, the Gilberts, the AFEES, and the DoD In-service Surveys is actually an aggregate data base consisting of several, different editions, whence the reference to the 1973 Gilbert, the Base Year NLS, etc.

A final note with regard to the questionnaire forms. The inclusion of the relevant questionnaire sheets is a traditional and commendable practice in the analysis of survey data. The number of questionnaires involved in this study, however (8 of them and voluminous ones at that), introduced a practical problem: the sheer size of the final report.

Accordingly, rather than make arbitrary choices about what should be included and what should be left out, the reader is provided in each case with the name and address of the agencies responsible for administering the survey. Questions or requests for copies can be directed to this source.

National Longitudinal Study/The Survey:

In the Spring of 1972, the original Base Year NLS Questionnaire was given to 18,143 high school seniors throughout the U.S. Measurements were taken from the students and from their schools as to demographics, achievements, attitudes and motivations. In October of 1973, thanks to an extensive follow-up operation, 86% of the original respondents were recontacted (and some new ones were picked up) and asked to fill out questionnaires asking them what they were doing now, whether and how their plans had changed, and so forth.

The survey was administered by the National Center for Educational Statistics of the Office of Education and was preceded by four years of planning and an extensive investigation into the data needs of the research community. The sample, designed as a random, stratified representation of the entire Senior High School Class of 72, was carefully executed and involved the participation of 1200 secondary schools across the country.

Deviations from this sampling technique were corrected by appropriately constructed weights.[1/] These were also used to weight the sample 'up' to national size, i.e., to permit direct comparison between the survey figures and national Census data. Checks of this sort were carried out at the outset of this project and showed that the weighted cell sizes were close enough to Census Bureau estimates of comparable groups to justify the use of NLS numbers as nationally representative.

[1/] A description of the method by which these weights were constructed as well as copies of the questionnaires and other information relevant to the NLS can be found in the "Base Year and First Follow-Up Data File Users Manual" available from the National Center for Education Statistics, 400 Maryland Avenue, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20202.

National Longitudinal Study/The Analysis

Results derived from the NLS appear throughout these pages, principally in the Organization of Individuals section in Chapter 2 and in the EBM analysis of Chapter 3.

The uses of the NLS in the EBM simulation are best explained by the 'Model Logic' diagram on p. 44. More generally, the NLS was used to measure the relationship between a respondent's intentions and his actual behavior. The combination of Base Year and first Follow-Up Surveys made the identification of these transitions a matter of certainty. For example, by considering the Follow-Up file it was possible to find the exact number of Black, 18 year-old high school seniors with grades in the B to C range who had enlisted. Then, by going back to the Base Year survey, it was possible to find how many of these had planned to enlist as far back as a year prior to their accession, how many had thought they would definitely not enlist and so on. These numbers gave an estimate, and a reasonably accurate one, of the corresponding national behavior. An analogous identification procedure was used to measure the extent of transitions between 'first-choice' intended branch of service and the service actually joined. The way in which the probabilities derived from these numbers were fit into the accession queue model is detailed on pages 41 to 43.

Besides its focal role in the simulation analysis, the NLS played an important part in the identification of the groups which are most affected by the G.I. Bill as an enlistment incentive. The variable used to discriminate between different levels of G.I. Bill 'pull' was Base Year question 46C: "How important was earning money for your education or becoming eligible for educational incentives under the G.I. Bill in your decision to enter the military?" Groups were isolated from a variety of demographic indicators: Age, Race, Intended Branch of Service, etc. The results of this analysis appear on pp. 27-33.

The Gilbert Youth Attitude/The Survey

The Gilbert Youth Attitude Surveys were conducted for the Department of Defense by Gilbert Youth Research, Inc. They have been administered in 6-month intervals, usually November and May, since 1971. The samples, each of which consisted of about 2,000 sixteen to twenty-one year old civilian males, were designated to be nationally representative and were weighted accordingly.[1] Some inconsistencies in the weights were detected and will be discussed below.

The actual data was obtained by extensive personal interviews conducted by a member of the respondent's immediate peer group. Though the actual questions have differed from one survey to another, the overall objective for DoD has remained the same: to determine the American youth's attitude toward the military, his disposition toward enlistment, knowledge of currently available benefits and options, reaction to these incentives and his response in the event of the termination of a given (e.g., G.I. Bill) benefit. Besides these attitudinal questions, the usual demographic and socio-economic information was collected as well as some data about the respondent's personal history: had any of his family enlisted, what did his friends think of the service, etc.

In May of this year, rather than sponsor a new edition of the survey, the Department of Defense purchased six questions in the 1975 Gilbert Omnibus Survey. This is a poll conducted by the Gilbert organization independently of the Youth Attitude Surveys. The six questions, which were of the usual attitude-towards-enlistment type, were accompanied by forty-seven demographic variables.

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[1] Information concerning the technical aspects of the weighting and of the survey administration, as well as copies of the questions, can be obtained from Gilbert Youth Research's parent organization: Gilbert Marketing Group, Inc., 515 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y.

This study has made use of the May 72, 73, 74, and 75 (omnibus excerpt) editions. The analysis outlined below was replicated on each of these surveys. First, the relevant demogrpahic variables were used to stratify the sample into appropriate cells (age by race by High School grades). Next, the likelihood of enlistment question was used to find the percentage within each cell associated with each of the codes: definitely enlist, probably enlist, probably not enlist, definitely enlist, and don't know. These cell distributions, which gave an approximation to the probability that a youth with a particular set of demographic characteristics would have a certain disposition towards enlistment, were then input into the EBM (see the Model Logic diagram on page 44).

The 1975 Omnibus included two likelihood-of-enlistment questions -- one under existing circumstances, the other in the event of G.I. Bill termination. The distributions of disposition towards enlistment corresponding to these two questions were the basis of the two queue forecasts that measured the impact of G.I. Bill termination. It is important to note at this point that the numbers derived from Gilbert were a percentage distribution rather than actual numerical counts. Examination of the Gilbert weights showed that they were not in agreement with reliable estimates[1] of the national population. In view of this difficulty, it was assumed that such discrepancies were at least systematic, i.e., that though numerical counts might not match, corresponding cells should be of approximately the same relative size (percentage). This assumption appears reasonable in light of the effort made by Gilbert Youth Research to poll a nationally representative sample. Census data was used to convert this percentage distribution into the numerical one which underlies the actual queue estimates. The way in which this was done is explained on page 41.

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[1] Derived from the Census Bureau and from the National Center for Education Statistics.

Armed Forces Entrance and Examination Stations (AFEES)/ The Surveys

The Department of Defense first began to collect survey data from its enlisted accessions in October of 1970. Enlistees were asked to complete an anonymous[1] questionnaire at the time of their Armed Forces Entrance and Examination Stations (AFEES) processing. They were asked questions about their background, about the influences behind their enlistment decision and about their reaction to hypothetical changes in the recruiting environment, e.g., "would you have enlisted if post-Service educational benefits were cancelled?" Though the 6 surveys administered since that time have differed considerably in sample size, content, and timing, the AFEES questionnaires have remained a unique source of detailed information regarding the changing attitudes and demographics of the accession pool. In particular, their applicability to a study of educational incentives became readily apparent from the very beginning of this project.

Because it was felt that the impact of G.I. Bill termination needed to be examined within the setting of an all-volunteer force, only the 3 surveys given since 1973 were considered: the April - December 73, the September 74, and the May 75 AFEES.

Copies of each of these were obtained and examined, but only the results from the most recent survey, the May 75 edition, appear in this report. It was felt that the timeliness of this data (the questionnaire was administered between April 28 and May 9 of this year make it the most useful to the forecasting problem that has been the crux of the Educational Benefits Analysis.

The questionnaire was completed by 13,299 respondents from 65 (AFEES) stations across the country. The number of forms assigned to each station was intended to be proportional to the percentage of total accessions -- January to May of 75 -- processed by that station. In this way, the sample was designed to be representative of the overall accession pool. Deviations from this design were corrected by constructing normalized weights which mimicked the composition of the March 75 accessions.[1]

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[1] Though names and addresses have never been asked, the last two editions of the survey have requested Social Security numbers.

Armed Forces Entrance and Examination Stations (AFEES)/The Analysis

Three of the analyses described in this study are based on the May 75 AFEES. The work on grouping incentives presented on pages 15 - 22 used the measure of importance assigned to each of fourteen incentives (item 17A - 17W on the questionnaire) to study the underlying structure of enlistment motivation. The table on page 51 which presents the proportion of "self-declared" losses[1] in various sub-groups within the accession pool, was obtained by crosstabulating the "importance of educational benefits" questions (items 17B and 25B) with demographic variables (items 1, 2, 3 and 4). Finally, the tables on page 26 rank the fourteen incentives and seven enlistment deterrents listed on the survey in order of the importance assigned to them by the respondents. These values are derived from questions 17A-W and 25 A-I.

1973 DoD Personnel In-Service/The Survey

The 1973 DoD Personnel Survey was administered as part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Manpower and Reserve Affairs research program. It was the third in a series of omnibus surveys administered in 1969 and 1971. The main purpose of the survey was to provide information on the attitudes of servicemen toward a number of DoD-wide programs and policies. This list of issues to be examined included in-Service education, and it is in this respect that the survey is germane to the Educational Benefits Analysis.

A total of 24,569 enlisted men and women completed the form A version of the survey. (An enlisted form B and Officer forms C and D were also distributed but were not used in this study). The respondents were chosen by a standard, stratified random-sampling technique. Selection used the last field of the social security number as an approximation to a uniform random variable. Weights were assigned by comparing the pay grade distribution in the sample with each Service's pay grade frequencies.

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[1] Information regarding the details of the weighting technique and about other aspects of the survey as well as copies of the questionnaire themselves can be obtained from the Survey Research Division of MARDAC, 300 N. Washington St., Alexandria, VA 22314

[2] A "self-declared loss" is an individual who endorsed the G.I. Bill incentive as 'very important' in his enlistment decision and also claimed that he would 'definitely not have enlisted' in the event of G.I. Bill termination.

1973 DoD Personnel In-Service/The Analysis

Work done on the 1973 Personnel survey appears on pages 37 through 40 under the heading "Reenlistment Intent versus Original Reenlistment Motive". The section addresses itself to the reenlistment behavior of recruits who listed the G.I. Bill as their strongest accession incentive. This behavior is investigated by application of Exploratory Data Analysis techniques to the distribution of enlisted personnel across a 4 X 2 X 7 table giving years of service by reenlistment intent by first reason for entry into the military. The three variables correspond to items 12, 22 and 44 respectively on the Form A questionnaire.

APPENDIX D

EBM Computer Program

The Educational Benefits Model was written in BASIC for the Honeywell 635 system. The model requires 6 input files:

TRANSITN	contains a 12 X 5 matrix of transition probabilities from the NLS.
BRANCH	contains a 48 X 5 matrix which distributes the input data into the 4 Services.
FACTOR	contains alphanumeric information used in printing the scenario.
ACTUAL	contains a 4 X 4 matrix which distributes from intended to actual branch of Service.

The other 2 files are variable and their names are entered during execution. These files each contain a 12 X 5 matrix from the Gilbert Survey data. The total storage requirement for the model and its associated files is 16 LLINKS. A run takes 5.5 minutes and costs $1.37.

Program Listing

```
100 DIM [illegible]
101 DIM [illegible]
110 REM      [illegible]
120 REM      TOTAL [illegible]
130 REM      I IS INITIAL [illegible]
140 REM      [illegible]
150 REM      [illegible]
160 REM      J=[illegible]
170 REM      [illegible]
180 REM      [illegible]
190 REM      [illegible]
200 PRINT"           [illegible]
210 INPUT [illegible]
220 FILES [illegible]
230 FILE -1,[illegible]
240 FILE -1,[illegible]
250 MAT READ [illegible]A
260 MAT READ [illegible]
270 MAT READ [illegible]B
310 MAT READ [illegible]D
311 PRINT"[illegible]
312 INPUT C7
313 IF C7 =0 GOTO 325
315 PRINT"[illegible]
316 PRINT"1[illegible]
317 PRINT"2[illegible]
318 PRINT"[illegible]
319 PRINT"[illegible]
320 PRINT"[illegible]
321 FOR Y=1 TO C7
322 INPUT C(Y)
323 NEXT Y
324 GOSUB 3310
325 GOTO 3[illegible]
330 REM [illegible]
340 REM        [illegible]
350 FOR Z=1 TO 4
360 FOR X=1 TO 12
370 C2=C2+1
380 FOR Y=1 TO 7
390 J(C2,Y)=I(C2,Y)*[illegible]
400 Z(C2,Y)=[illegible]
410 NEXT Y
420 NEXT X
430 NEXT Z
440 REM        [illegible]
450 FOR Z=1 TO 48
460 FOR X=1 TO 7
470 F(Z)=F(Z)+J(Z,X)
480 G(Z)=G(Z)+Z(Z,X)
490 NEXT X
500 NEXT Z
510 REM        [illegible]
520 FOR Z=1 TO 1[illegible]
530 FOR X=[illegible]
540 V(Z)=V(Z)+[illegible]
550 [illegible](Z)=[illegible]
560 NEXT X
570 NEXT Z
```

```
1340 :                    * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
1350 :                    *
1360 :                    *                    SCENARIO A
1370 :                    *                    ----------
1380 :                    *          POLICY [illegible]
1390 :                    *               1. [illegible]
1400 :                    *               2. [illegible]
1410 :                    *          [illegible]
1420 :                    *               1. [illegible]
1430 :                    *               2. [illegible]
1440 S$(1)="[illegible]"  *
1450 S$(2)="[illegible]"
1460 S$(3)="[illegible]"
1470 S$(4)="[illegible]"
1480 A$(1)="[illegible]"
1490 A$(2)="[illegible]"
1500 B$(1)="[illegible]"
1510 B$(2)="[illegible]"
1520 C$(1)="[illegible]"
1530 C$(2)="[illegible]"
1540 C$(3)="[illegible]"
1550 D$(1)="----"
1560 E$(1)="[illegible]"
1570 E$(2)="[illegible]"
1571 E$(3)="[illegible]"
1573 E$(4)="[illegible]"
1574 E$(5)="[illegible]"
1610 FOR Y=1 TO 4
1620 T3=0
1630 T4=0
1640 PRINT
1650 PRINT
1660 PRINT USING 2160,S$(Y)
1670 PRINT
1680 PRINT USING 2170
1690 PRINT USING 2180
1700 PRINT USING 2190
1710 FOR B=1 TO 2
1712 PRINT USING 1720,A$(B);
1720 :'LLLL
1730 : [illegible]
1740 D=1
1750 PRINT USING 1751,B$(D);
1751 :'LLLLLLL
1752 IF D=2 GOTO 1912
1753 FOR V=1 TO 3
1770 PRINT USING 1780,D$(V);
1780 :'LLL
1790 C3=C3+1
1800 IF T(C3)=0 GOTO 1830
1810 PRINT USING 1840,F(C3),[illegible]
1820 GOTO 1850
1830 PRINT USING 1840,F(C3),[illegible]
1840 :              [illegible]
1850 T3=T3+F(C3)
1860 T4=T4+T(C3)
1870 IF V=3 GOTO 1900
1880 PRINT"                ";
1890 NEXT V
1900 PRINT"       ";
1910 D=2
1911 GOTO 1750
1912 FOR [illegible] TO 3
1913 C3=C3+1
1914 [illegible]
```

[illegible]

```
3560 REM [illegible]
3570 FOR Z=1 TO 9
3580 FOR Y= 1 TO 9
3590 S(Y) =I(Z,Y)
3600 R(Y)=P(Z,Y)
3610 NEXT Y
3620 I(Z,1)=[illegible]
3630 P(Z,1)=[illegible]
3640 I(Z,2)=[illegible]
3650 P(Z,2)=[illegible]
3660 I(Z,3)=[illegible]
3670 P(Z,3)=[illegible]
3680 I(Z,4)=[illegible]
3690 P(Z,4)=[illegible]
3700 I(Z,5)=[illegible]
3710 P(Z,5)=[illegible]
3720 I(Z,6)=[illegible]
3730 P(Z,6)=[illegible]
3740 I(Z,7)=[illegible]
3750 P(Z,7)=[illegible]
3760 NEXT Z
3770 REM
3780 RETURN
3790 REM
3800 REM
3810 REM
3820 REM
3830 REM
3840 END
```

Conclusions and Implications from the Analysis of Educational Benefits

2307

Management Sciences Group

February 1976

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CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FROM THE ANALYSIS OF EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS

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FEBRUARY 1976

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EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS ANALYSIS

- Outline -

1. Historical Perspective and The Current Environment
2. The Effects of G.I. Bill Educational Benefits on Service Accessions
3. The Implications of Current Research for Policy Planning

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This presentation describes the environment of the G.I. Bill debate, and summarizes the conclusions and implications developed in HumRRO SR-ED-75-25: "Educational Benefits Analysis."

"Benefits" have always been provided to both disabled and able-bodied veterans throughout American History. The colonial legislatures and British Parliament first established the practice of granting benefits to veterans in this country. No Congress has since ever failed to provide some fashion of added remuneration -- whether in the form of land grants, direct cash bonuses, pensions, housing loans, or educational benefits -- as a "reward" for faithful service and the interruption of civilian life.

G.I. BILL BACKGROUND

ENTITLEMENTS	USAGE
* Up to 45 mos. at $2700-3660 yearly rate	* 58% of eligible vets make some use
* This is twice any non-DoD federal college program	* More than half the users are fulltime students
* Full eligibility after 180 days service, and expires 10 years after discharge	* Usage increased by 14% in FY75
* Total spending level is $4-6B yearly	* 15% of all higher education students are VA funded

The original "G.I. Bill of Rights" was created through the "Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944" and covered service in the Armed Forces between 1940 and 1947. There has since been a "Korean Conflict Bill" (covering service between 1950 and 1955) and a post-Korean, "Cold-War G.I. Bill" or "Vietnam Era Bill" which was enacted in 1966 (covering service from 1955 to present). Including retroactive entitlements, only those who served between the years 1947 and 1950 -- with no previous or subsequent service -- have been denied entitlement to G.I. Bill educational benefits over the last 36 years.[1]

By the end of 1976, it is estimated that over seven million people will have taken advantage of the current G.I. Bill at a cost of $23 billion.

The G.I. Bill is a very large program whether viewed in terms of its entitlements, in terms of its usage, or in terms of its relative position in federal agency investments. Entitlements which appear in current legislation are shown in this exhibit. The usage figures which appear on the right make it clear that the G.I. Bill has become an important national institution.

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[1] Ilona Rashkow's "The G.I. Bill: 1944-1975" (Congressional Research Service #77-251ED; December 3, 1975) provides additional details.

FEDERAL AGENCY INVESTMENTS IN COLLEGE "SCHOLARSHIPS"

YEAR	TOTAL $B	VA	HEW	DoD	NSF	OTHER	TOTAL
1974	8.1	52.6%	41.2	4.1	0.4	1.8	100%
1975	10.5	47.7%	46.8	3.6	0.2	1.6	100%
1976	10.8	43.9%	51.2	3.4	0.2	1.3	100%

THIS EXHIBIT PROVIDES ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE G.I. BILL BY RELATING THE V.A. FUNDED G.I. BILL TO THE FULL SYSTEM OF FEDERAL AGENCY INVESTMENTS IN COLLEGE SCHOLARSHIPS. ALTHOUGH H.E.W. FUNDING HAS NOW MOVED INTO FIRST PLACE, G.I. BILL STILL ACCOUNTS FOR NEARLY HALF THESE EXPENDITURES AND THE ESTIMATED COST FOR THIS FISCAL YEAR IS IN THE ORDER OF 5 BILLION OR MORE DOLLARS.

IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT BOTH V.A. AND DOD "INVESTMENTS" HAVE DECREASED -- PROPORTIONAL TO EACH OTHER AND PROPORTIONAL TO INCREASE IN H.E.W. OUTLAYS -- OVER THE LAST THREE YEARS. BUT, ALTHOUGH G.I. BILL TERMINATION WILL FURTHER CUT V.A. EDUCATIONAL SPENDING LEVELS, THERE IS NO PROPORTIONAL INCREASE EXPECTED IN EITHER H.E.W. OR "OTHER" FEDERAL AGENCY SUPPORT FOR EDUCATIONAL "SCHOLARSHIPS." THIS IS ALSO EXPECTED TO RESULT IN A SHARPLY REDUCED DOLLAR FLOW THROUGH THE VETERAN TO INSTITUTIONS AND COMMUNITIES -- AS THE PROPORTION OF VETERANS WHO DECIDE TO FOREGO CONTINUED EDUCATION INCREASES IN RELATION TO THE AMOUNT OF ASSISTANCE AVAILABLE. FOR EXAMPLE, PROJECTIONS OF THE TERMINATION "MULTIPLIER EFFECT" ON THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SHOWS LOSSES TO THE ECONOMY IN EXCESS OF $1.2 BILLION STATEWIDE, AND $425 MILLION ALONE TO THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO. THE EFFECTS OF THIS DECREASED DOLLAR FLOW ON COLLEGES, LOCAL AND STATE GOVERNMENT BUDGETS, AND BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY HAVE NOT BEEN ADEQUATELY EXPLORED.

Future Patterns of Participation -- With and Without Termination

Projections of Veterans Educational Benefits Usage Under "Chapter 34"

	Number In Training	Number In Higher Learning	Total Outlay	Outlay for Higher Learning
1975 Actual:	2,691,566	1,695,575	$4,164,775,000	$3,206,043,000
1976	3,300,000	2,111,000	5,663,851,000	4,296,818,000
TQ*	1,673,000	1,044,000	930,004,000	719,174,000
1977	2,737,000	1,713,000	4,650,720,000	3,483,207,500
1978	2,517,000		4,275,699,000	
1979	2,354,000		3,999,336,000	
1980	2,195,000		3,728,899,000	
1981	2,025,000		3,440,359,000	

Projection of Savings Due to GI Bill Termination Effective January 1, 1976

	"Would-Be" Trainees	Savings
1976	13,400 Trainees	$ 4.4 Million
TQ*	13,600 Trainees	4.0 Million
1977	95,100 Trainees	91.4 Million
1978	215,000 Trainees	234.9 Million
1979	352,400 Trainees	436.8 Million
1980	498,000 Trainees	668.4 Million
		$1,449.9 Cumulative Total

*Transition Quarter to facilitate new fiscal years.

The biggest savings would occur in 1981 through 1985 which is beyond the scope of VA projections.

Sources: Veterans Administration and American Council on Education

This exhibit was prepared by the Veterans Administration to project G.I. Bill usage into 1980. Original FY76 estimates have been revised from $4 Billion to an anticipated budget of over $6 Billion. This is to a large extent the result of increasing usage. Note also that the 1977 OMB budget reflects several proposed G.I. Bill revisions -- one of which is a cut-back in entitlement from 10 to 8 years of eligibility.

The lower portion of the exhibit should be considered a crude estimate of 5-year cost avoidance in the event the G.I. Bill were terminated.

In the four Services branches, PREP currently accounts for most of the ongoing high school completion and remedial education programs. PREP savings over the next five years are expected to total $131.2 Million.

On October 6, 1975 the House of Representatives approved legislation which would terminate G.I. Bill eligibility for new enlistees on December 31, 1975, by a vote of 298 to 106. The Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee has held hearings on termination legislation. Further action has not yet been taken by the Senate Committee, pending independent study of the resolution.

10

THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

March 7, 1974

The Honorable James R. Schlesinger
Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Jim:

Last week I met with Don Johnson, Administrator of the Veterans Administration, who outlined to me the current Veterans' program.

In our discussion about Veterans' educational benefits, I raised the question as to whether the current enlistees were eligible for GI Bill benefits including college training. Don Johnson advised me that they were and that there was a need to come up with a cut-off date for a number of reasons. There was a question in my mind about the impact on the all-volunteer forces because, as I understand from Don, the GI Bill benefits were being used as an enlistment inducement by recruiters, which, I would think, is counter-productive to our goal to achieve the greatest number of re-enlistments.

Rather than staffing this letter for a formal report, I would be grateful if you would talk to Jack about this question so that I might have the benefit of your views and what Defense has in mind on this question.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

GRF:jom

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WH 8224

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The initiative for termination of G.I. Bill educational benefits comes from President Ford and is based on his considerations since the time of his Vice-Presidency. This exhibit represents the first Executive Branch formal challenge to the G.I. Bill.

The effects of G.I. Bill termination in the All-Volunteer environment had not been studied in depth -- in fact, termination as an issue related to recruitment was not even considered until the 1973 Interagency Task Force study (which was never published). The Gates Commission did not include the G.I. Bill in its study.

DoD had opposed the reinstitution of "Cold War G.I. Bill" benefits in 1963-1966 on the basis of its expected effect on retention programs. Yet, the Post-Korean ("Cold War") G.I. Bill included "enhancing and making more attractive Service in the Armed Forces" as a purpose for the creation and granting of educational benefits -- a point which is frequently overlooked in termination discussions (cf. 38 USC § 165). Only last year the basic G.I. Bill entitlement was increased by 23 percent, and the period of both usage and eligibility was extended.

President Ford's May 1975 proclamation of the end of the Vietnam Era included his request to Congress for a delimiting period of G.I. Bill eligibility. In evaluating the effects of termination, a major policy issue for the Department of Defense is the possible losses (in quality, number, and representativeness) in new enlistments. Related issues are the effect of varying employment levels, the effect on reenlistments, education in context with other incentives, the costs and comparative benefits of alternative programs, and the best offsetting management policy options. Information has been made available to assess these issues.


Demographic, proclivity, transition of proclivity, econometric, statistical analyses.
MACRO MODEL
Termination Impact Statements
MICRO MODEL
Social, Motivational, & Behavioral Science Theory, Surveys, and Statistical Analyses
Individual Characteristics, Expectations, Motivation, and Enlistment Behavior
COST
Extent of Need for Offsetting Management Policy Actions
Insight into which Offsetting Actions Will be the Most Effective
Development of Cost/Effective Offsetting Management Policy Actions

Interdependence of Macro and Micro Models in
The Educational Benefits Analysis

In the Spring of 1975 the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs agreed to the recommendation of HumRRO's Management Sciences Group that a comprehensive evaluation of educational benefits be undertaken. A systems perspective was adopted. This exhibit depicts the logic and interdependent nature of the macro and micro models used in the educational benefits analysis.

It is important to recognize that this first phase concentrated almost exclusively on the impact of post-service G.I. Bill benefits. Two additional phases of analysis are now under discussion. They would complete the picture of G.I. Bill alternatives by modeling the system of in-service education and by assessing the national impact of the G.I. Bill.


ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
Economic Indicators
- Unemployment
- [illegible]
- Income Levels
- Attitudes Toward Education
1 THE "QUEUE"
Age
Race
Quality
Intended Branch of Service
Propensity To Enlist
2 ACCESSIONS
3 FIRST TERM ACTIVE MILITARY
Age
Race
Quality
Branch of Service
Propensity To Enlist
PREMATURE TERMINATION
LEAVE SERVICE
ETS TERMINATION
4 CAREER MILITARY
Age
Race
Quality
Branch of Service
Propensity To Enlist
RETIREMENT
DECISION FACTORS
Educational Benefits Policy Options
- G.I. Bill Termination
- In-Service Program
- Post Service Program
Other Management Policy Options
- Marketing
- Other Pay Increases
- [illegible]
POLICY EVALUATION
Measure Impact On Current Status Dimensions
Measure Cost Of Policy Implementation

EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS MODEL

A major phase of the Educational Benefits Analysis was the creation and operation of the computerized Educational Benefits Model (EBM), shown in this exhibit. This model first processed census estimates into enlistment proclivity groups and then into "queue" estimates, distinguishing enlistee populations by age, race, quality, and intended branch of Service. Validation of estimates of termination impacts was undertaken through four independent methods.

Data sources for both the micro and macro models included Census Bureau information, The National Longitudinal Study (from the Office of Education), Gilbert Youth Surveys, Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations (AFEES) surveys and the 1973 DoD Survey of Personnel.

In addition to analyses through these models, assessment of costs and benefits was made -- with a focus on several specific DoD alternatives to the G.I. Bill.

We turn, then, to the conclusions and implications of this systems perspective and the accession impact of terminating post-service benefits.



The G.I. Bill as a Proportion of Military Compensation

THE G.I. BILL HAS BEEN DECLINING AS A PROPORTION OF AN ENLISTEE'S COMPENSATION

1/ Developed from V.A. Information Bulletin (DVB IB 20-75-5) except for the 1972-74 figures which were provided by DoD.

2/ Provided by H.A.S.C. No 94-5, Pay and Allowances of the Uniformed Services, pp. 99-102. Includes Pay and Housing Allowance.

Prov by ure the us.

General Role of the G.I. Bill

Since 1947, the proportion of an enlistee's compensation which is represented by the G.I. Bill has declined from 31% to 20%. During the transition to a volunteer force, in-service compensation became comparable with median civilian incomes. The G.I. Bill post-service benefit provided a 20% "bonus" attraction in the volunteer enlistment incentive package, and this role went relatively unchallenged during the period of transition to the All Volunteer Force.



Estimated Accession Queue for Male HS Graduates vs. Stated Requirements for July 1975-June 1976

THE ARMY WILL BE BORDERLINE FOR HS GRADS EVEN WITH THE G.I. BILL, WHEREAS OTHER SERVICES HAVE ADEQUATE QUEUES EVEN WITHOUT THE G.I. BILL.

LOSSES IN NEW ENLISTMENTS

IF THERE IS ANY SERIOUS CONCERN FOR LOSSES, IT CAN BE NARROWED DOWN TO NEW ENLISTMENTS OF HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES INTO THE ARMY. ALTHOUGH NON-GRADUATES ARE SOMEWHAT MOTIVATED BY THE G.I. BILL, THE SUPPLY EXCEEDS THE DEMAND BY MORE THAN ENOUGH TO COMPENSATE FOR ANY NON-GRADUATE LOSSES. (THE NON-HS-GRADUATE QUEUE IS ESTIMATED TO CONSIST OF ABOUT 231 THOUSAND AVAILABLE MALES, OF WHOM THE ARMY COULD ATTRACT ABOUT 111 THOUSAND.) SIMILARLY, THE QUEUE OF HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES EXCEEDS THE SERVICE-STATED REQUIREMENTS (FY1976) FOR THE NAVY, MARINE CORPS AND AIR FORCE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE ARMY IS NOT EXPECTED TO MEET ITS SELF-STATED HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE REQUIREMENTS EVEN WITH THE G.I. BILL.

[illegible]timated % Drops if G.I. Bill
Were Terminated: Best Estimate

Male HS Graduate Subgroup			Army	Navy	MC	AF	DoD
Age	Race	HS Grades					
17-18	Caucasian	A&B	19%	15%	16%	16%	16%
		B&C	11	11	12	11	11%
		≤D	21	21	21	20	21%
	Other	-	16	18	9	16	16%
19-25	Caucasian	A&B	22	36	4	37	30%
		B&C	2	3	4	2	3%
		≤D	7	7	7	7	7%
	Other	-	26	21	7	38	21%
Total			16%	14%	9%	19%	15%

TRANSITION WILL DETER 19-25 YEAR OLDS WHO HAD HIGH GRADES AND 17-18 YEAR OLDS WHO HAD HIGH AND LOW GRADES.

ALL IN ALL, THE BEST ESTIMATE IS THAT G.I. BILL TERMINATION WOULD DEPLETE 15% OF THE HIGH SCHOOL QUEUE -- IF NO COMPENSATING MANAGEMENT ACTIONS WERE TAKEN. THIS EXHIBIT RE-EXPRESSES THE ESTIMATED IMPACT OF TERMINATING THE G.I. BILL IN TABLE FORM, AND ATTEMPTS TO FURTHER SUBDIVIDE ACCORDING TO AGE, RACE AND HIGH SCHOOL GRADES.

ONE IMPORTANT QUESTION IS WHETHER THE LOSS IN *QUALITY* WOULD BE EVEN MORE SEVERE THAN THE LOSS IN NUMBERS. THERE ARE SOME INTERESTING CHANGES IN IMPACT WITH HS GRADES, ESPECIALLY FOR THE CARRYOVER CLASSES WHO ARE NOW 19-25 YEARS OLD. HOWEVER, WE WOULD NOT VIEW THIS AS CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE THAT G.I. BILL SEEKERS MAKE MORE DESIRABLE PROSPECTS. THERE IS A MORE IMPORTANT FACT ABOUT THE IMPACT ON QUALITY -- THAT *ANYONE* LOST BY G.I. BILL TERMINATION IS LIKELY TO BE REPLACED BY A PERSON OF LOWER QUALITY, SINCE THE QUEUE OF HIGH QUALITY PROSPECTS IS ALREADY BEING STRAINED.

ANOTHER IMPORTANT QUESTION IS WHETHER THERE IS A DIFFERENT IMPACT FOR MINORITY RACES THAN FOR CAUCASIANS. IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO DISTINGUISH *TWO TYPES OF IMPACT*. IN TERMS OF ACTUALLY REFUSING TO ENTER ACTIVE DUTY, ALL RACES --

- Block WIDTH corresponds to the number of people (shown in lower right hand corner of block).
- Block HEIGHT corresponds to the percentage of people expressing interest in the G.I. Bill (shown above block).


35% CONSIDER
THE G.I. BILL VERY IMPORTANT
TO THEIR ENLISTMENT DECISION
High School Seniors
Who Plan to Enlist
100
53%
Plan Jr. College or More
29
35%
Plan Technical School or Less Education
71
63%
Parents Make Below $15K
21
25%
Parents Make Above $15K
8
82%
Plan to Army
3
60%
Plan to Navy MC AF
18
55%
El or ...
15
29%
White
56
63%
Friends go to Military or Industry
6
47%
Friends go to College
9
41%
Friends go to Military
16
25%
Friends go to College or Industry
40

Importance of G.I. Bill in the Decisions of High School Seniors Who Plan to Enlist (All Services Combined)

* THE LARGER GROUPS ARE LESS G.I. BILL MOTIVATED (THE WIDER RECTANGLES ARE SHORT)

** SERVICE DIFFERENCES ARE MINIMAL

appear alike in our queue-depletion estimates. *However* there is an important racial difference in *strength of interest* in the G.I. Bill opportunity, with minorities suffering a measurably greater loss in social mobility, even though they may still enlist.

The "tree" in this exhibit was developed by a statistical routine designed to ferret out groups which show the biggest differences in G.I. Bill importance. A few small homogeneous groups are strongly interested in G.I. Bill benefits while larger groups are less so. The distinguishing features are educational aspirations and age; secondary features are family status and race; unimportant is the intended branch of Service. Among high school seniors who are potential enlistees, only 29% plan Junior College or more -- and therefore express strong G.I. Bill interest.

Again, observe that *perceived importance* is quite different from *refusal to join*. The fact that the G.I. Bill would mean a lot to a person does not imply that he could or would refuse to join without it; and conversely, the fact that a person views other incentives even above the G.I. Bill does not imply that he would *not* refuse to join without the G.I. Bill.

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

- NON-MILITARY INCLINATION HAS DECREASED
- FY76 ENTRANTS W/O G.I. BILL ARE COMPARABLE TO FY74 ENTRANTS WITH THE G.I. BILL
- THE GROWTH IN INTEREST IS STRONGER WITH THE G.I. BILL THAN WITHOUT

SOURCE: May 1973 & May 1975 Gilbert Surveys
(See text for exact interpretation)

EFFECT OF VARYING EMPLOYMENT LEVELS

MAJOR CHANGES IN LEVELS OF UNEMPLOYMENT OR THE INFLUENCE OF OTHER EXOGENOUS FACTORS WOULD ALTER IMPACT PREDICTIONS. DISINCLINATION FOR MILITARY ENLISTMENT HAS GENERALLY DECREASED OVER TIME. IN FACT, THE QUEUE NOW WITHOUT THE G.I. BILL WOULD BE COMPARABLE TO THE QUEUE OF A FEW YEARS AGO WITH THE G.I. BILL. SUBSTANTIAL DROPS IN 16-24 YEAR-OLD POPULATIONS AFTER 1980 (AS INDICATED BY CURRENT CENSUS FORECASTS) COULD ALSO IMPACT SIGNIFICANTLY ON THE ABSOLUTE NUMBER OF POTENTIAL ENLISTEES.

Empirical Impact of G.I. Bill Termination

Statistical Result

- The G.I. Bill "dummy" has a coefficient of 1.602 with an average (dependent variable) enlistment rate of 5.891.
- The coefficient of determination increased from 0.58 to 0.72 through introducing the G.I. Bill variable.
- When the G.I. Bill variable was introduced, the set of significant variables picked up unemployment but dropped relative civilian pay and the Berlin crisis.

INTERPRETATION

- IN THE 60'S, G.I. BILL TERMINATION IMPACT WAS ABOUT 25%.
- THE G.I. BILL VARIABLE (THOUGH NOT USED IN THE GATES STUDY) CONTRIBUTES SUBSTANTIAL EXPLANATORY POWER.
- CONSIDERATION OF THE G.I. BILL IMPACT WOULD HAVE CONCURRENTLY SUGGESTED THE IMPORTANCE OF UNEMPLOYMENT.

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Source: The data base of Alan Fechter appearing in "Impact of Pay and Draft Policies on Army Enlistment Behavior," Study 3, Volume I, Studies Prepared for the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, November 1970.

PROCEDURE: Addition of a G.I. Bill dependent variable with value 0 for the termination period of the 3rd quarter of CY 1964 through th[illegible]rd [illegible]ter [illegible] CY [illegible]8 [[illegible]re[illegible]er [illegible]].

The G.I. Bill termination impact in the 1960's was about 25%. It is important to note that pay and the G.I. Bill are overlapping, rather than independent influences. Many of those potential enlistees who would be lost as a result of an increase in employment are the same individuals who would be lost in the event of G.I. Bill termination. Measuring the G.I. Bill influence in dollars is consistent with our finding that no other incentive correlates as highly with pay as does the G.I. Bill, and vice versa.

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Reenlistment Intent vs First Reason for Entry into the Military

a. Counts. **First Reason for Entry Into the Military (Retrospective Appraisal)**

YOS	Probably Reenlist	G.I. Bill	Skill	Travel	Like Guns	Patriotism	Advanced Education	Pay	Total
0-1	Yes	20	139	89	17	67	169	32	533
	No	97	208	140	26	54	131	18	674
1-2	Yes	36	136	98	28	111	145	43	597
	No	355	396	272	44	146	203	51	1,467
2-3	Yes	35	101	116	14	119	114	35	534
	No	238	300	214	40	176	103	16	1,087
3-4	Yes	10	39	75	12	76	65	24	301
	No	88	165	161	21	96	67	7	600
		879	1,484	1,165	202	845	992	226	5,793

b. Odds of not reenlisting

0-1	4.85:1	1.50:1	1.57:1	1.53:1	0.81:1	0.78:1	0.56:1	1.26:1
1-2	9.86:1	2.91:1	2.78:1	1.57:1	1.32:1	1.40:1	1.19:1	2.46:1
2-3	6.80:1	2.97:1	1.84:1	2.86:1	1.48:1	0.90:1	0.46:1	2.04:1
3-4	8.80:1	4.23:1	2.15:1	1.75:1	1.26:1	0.95:1	0.29:1	1.99:1

c. Row & Column Effects & Residuals (Effect Analysis)

								Row Effect	Row Fit
0-1	-1.91	-0.53	+0.30	+0.42	+0.41	+0.59	+0.75	-0.82	1.66
1-2	+1.76	-0.52	+0.17	-0.88	-0.42	-0.11	+0.09	+0.52	3.00
2-3	-0.77	+0.08	-0.24	+0.94	+0.27	-0.19	-0.16	-0.01	2.47
3-4	+0.52	+1.02	-0.24	-0.48	-0.26	-0.36	-0.61	+0.30	2.78
Column Effect:	+5.10	+0.43	-0.39	-0.55	-1.26	-1.47	-1.85	2.48 (Common value)	
Column Fit:	7.58	2.90	2.09	1.93	1.22	1.01	0.63		

Source: 1973 DoD InService Survey Form B.

- SOME 15% OF FIRST-TERMERS RECALL THE G.I. BILL AS A FIRST REASON FOR ENTRY
- THE ODDS AGAINST REENLISTMENT ARE 2.5:1 OVERALL, BUT 7.6:1 FOR G.I. BILL SEEKERS

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Effect on Reenlistments

Although G.I. Bill-motivated enlistees do have greater odds against reenlisting, and termination of the post-service G.I. Bill might eventually increase the reenlistment pool by 12%, this increase is probably not needed. Post-service G.I. Bill seekers are also diametrically opposed to in-service education seekers insofar as reenlistment is concerned.

Estimated Costs of G.I. Bill Post Service Education and Alternative Programs

Program[1]	Numbers of New Users (per annum)	Average Cost/User[4] (1975 Data)	Obligation Cost of Program (per annum)
G.I. Bill	259,920	$4,815	$1,252M
Reservist G.I. Bill	114,000	4,815	549M
Reservist and High School Graduate G.I. Bill	81,478	4,815	392M
Reservist and Critical Skills G.I. Bill	5,000	4,815	24M
Clements Alterrative	228,000	2,650	604M
Clements Modified	37,735	2,650	100M
Critical Skill Scholarship	15,000	4,000	60M
Scholarship Insurance	15,000	4,000	53.8M[2]
Critical Skills Bonus	20,000	1,200-1,640[3]	24M-33M[3]
High School Graduate Bonus	325,910	1,200-1,640[3]	391M-550M[3]
Scholarship Bonus	46,666	3,000	140M
Clements Scholarship Bonus	22,651	4,415	100M

FEASIBLE POST-SERVICE G.I. BILL
ALTERNATIVES RANGE IN COST FROM
$24M TO $1,252M YEARLY

1/ See text for program details and assumptions

2/ Cost incurred by DoD; the cost incurred by the insurance firm would be $60M (excluding risk and administrative costs), the same as the Critical Skills Scholarship.

3/ The lower extreme assumes a shortfall (from G.I. Bill termination) of 10.3% (total DoD(, while the higher extreme assumes a shortfall of 21.0%.

4/ The FY76 figure of $6B was considered inflated by unemployment, so that the FY75 figure was used as a best estimate.

The Costs and Comparative Benefits of Alternative Programs

A number of substitutes for the post-service G.I. Bill as an enlistment incentive are feasible. Alternative programs could range in cost from $24 M yearly to $1,252 M yearly. Considerable attention has been given to the reduction of costs by restricting the number of new users (15,000-260,000) and, to a lesser extent, the entitlement per user ($1,200-$4,400). Attention has also focused on increasing the returns which the Department of Defense will gain -- e.g., by requiring participation in the Reserves. Finally, attention has been given to the reduction of administrative burdens -- e.g., through a commercially-administered scholarship insurance program.

Position of Educational Benefit Incentives Within Factors

Enlistment Incentive Factor (Interpretive Labels)	POSITION OF EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS INCENTIVES WITHIN FACTORS							
	ARMY		NAVY		MARINE CORPS		AIR FORCE	
	GI Bill	In Service College	GI Bill	In Service College	GI Bill	In Service College	GI Bill	In Service College
Travel and Excitement	6	7	4 *Highest Loading*	6	5	7	4	7
Career Development	4 *Highest Loading*	3 *Highest Loading*	6	5	6	5 *Highest Loading*	5	3
Job Dissatisfaction	6	4	5	3 *Highest Loading*	10	6	4	3
Civilian Insecurity	10	13	13	14	2 *Highest Loading*	7	12	13
Monetary	4	6	5	4	N/A	N/A	3 *Highest Loading*	4 *Highest Loading*

EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS ARE
NOT A MAJOR INCENTIVE FACTOR

EDUCATION IN CONTEXT WITH OTHER INCENTIVES

IN-SERVICE EDUCATION CORRELATES WITH THE POST-SERVICE G.I. BILL AS AN ENLISTMENT INCENTIVE, AND EACH IS MOST OFTEN CITED IN A PACKAGE WITH THREE OR MORE OTHER INCENTIVES. THEREFORE, IT CAN BE SAID THAT EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS, IN-SERVICE AS WELL AS POST-SERVICE, ARE NOT IN THEMSELVES MAJOR INCENTIVE FACTORS, BUT ARE RATHER SECONDARY MOTIVATORS. PUTTING THIS FACT IN CONTEXT WITH THE ESTIMATED 15% LOSS IN THE EVENT OF G.I. BILL TERMINATION, SIMPLY MEANS THAT THE G.I. BILL IS PERCEIVED AS A CRUCIAL PARTNER IN THE INCENTIVE PACKAGE. THE EXHIBIT SHOWN IS BASED UPON THE STATISTICAL TECHNIQUE OF FACTOR ANALYSIS. THE ALTERNATE STATISTICAL METHOD OF GUTTMAN SCALING REINFORCES THESE RESULTS:

GUTTMAN SCALING: STATISTICAL RESULTS

- G.I. BILL WAS 5TH MOST CITED OF 12 INCENTIVES.
- COLLEGE-IN-SERVICE WAS 6TH MOST CITED.
- 3% CITED G.I. BILL BUT 0 OTHER INCENTIVES
  8% CITED G.I. BILL WITH 1 OR 2 OTHER INCENTIVES.
  15% CITED G.I. BILL WITH 3 OR 4 OTHER INCENTIVES.
  13% CITED G.I. BILL WITH MORE THAN 4 OTHER INCENTIVES.
  39%
- MINIMUM MARGINAL REPRODUCIBILITY = .7247.
- PERCENT OF SCALING IMPROVEMENT = .0821.
  - COEFFICIENT OF SCALABILITY = .2982.

GI Bill Intended Use



* 15% are induced to enlist by the GI Bill

Management Options

Whatever decision is to be made concerning post-service educational benefit programs, it is clear that the current G.I. Bill entails substantial economic rent. The post-service G.I. Bill induces 15% of *potential enlistees* (including those surplus to requirements); of *those who plan to enter service,* 23% anticipate G.I. Bill usage; *of those on active duty,* *68%* anticipate G.I. Bill usage; of *veterans,* *58%* actually use post-service G.I. Bill benefits. It could be argued that, viewed as an enlistment incentive, the post-service G.I. Bill provides at most 20,000 Army high school graduates and costs at least $1 B (or $50,000 per enlistee).

A feasible alternative is to market the in-service educational package. The best management options for this purpose are (1) to develop new approaches to the 19-25 year-old high school graduates; (2) to organize and publicize a revitalized set of in-service education motivators; and (3) to settle the contingency planning for a post-service alternative to the G.I. Bill.

Three actions are urgent:

(1) A judgment must be made as to whether further depletion of Army high school graduate enlistees is tolerable;

(2) A full description of the costs and benefits of *in-service* education should be modeled; and

(3) An evaluation should be made concerning the *national* impact of G.I. Bill termination.

Chairman HARTKE. Do you have any additional studies which are ongoing at the present time?

Secretary BROTZMAN. Let me answer that generically first. We, being in charge of manpower and womanpower, continually study what motivates people to enlist. For example we find that among the young people of the country right now, and I know you've found this yourself, personal challenge is a very significant thing. Personal challenge is most significant because we find these young people want to make their life count. They want to make it matter. And education is important.

We have been looking at the effect of education and high quality. We believe that it's a cost effective thing.

Without talking about a specific study, we watch this all the time. As I have said at the outset, if you do terminate the GI bill then, of course, we are going to emphasize inservice educational opportunities.

I know the Senator is aware of the prospects of this. We are still going to try to make education the cornerstone of our recruiting effort because we think this is what young America is interested in.

Chairman HARTKE. There's no question about that. You use it in your advertisements do you not?

Secretary BROTZMAN. Yes.

Chairman HARTKE. I have here one that was advertised in Reader's Digest. It says, "A college president and an Army General want to tell you about a new plan that lets you enlist in the Army and start college at the same time."

They say, "After your enlistment's over, you'll be eligible for 36 months of financial assistance under the GI bill."

It happens to be by a very distinguished president, by the way, of a very distinguished university—Purdue University in Lafayette, Indiana.

It says here, "You'll find that although a few years in the Army isn't the easiest way to earn a college education, it may be the most rewarding."

I'm not in any way critizing this. I'm just pointing out the emphasis your recruitment brochures place on the GI bill.

I will insert into the record at this point a copy of the ad.

[The Reader's Digest ad follows:]

FROM THE READER'S DIGEST

A college President and an Army General want to tell you about a new plan that lets you enlist in the Army and start college at the same time.

800 schools and the Army are making college a reality for more young people.

"About eighteen months ago, the Army began to develop a bold, new concept in cooperative education. Project Ahead.

"The program began at one university in the Midwest. Interest was so great the Army decided to expand it across the country. Today, the program involves more than 800 colleges and universities. And it's still growing.

"Project Ahead's structure is basically simple. But its benefits to young people and their parents are enormous.

Introduc Pr ct Ahead:

"First of all, it is a unique individualized education plan. One that allows you to choose, if you qualify, an "alma mater" before you enlist. (Normally a participating school in your home area.) So no matter which college or colleges you attend while in the Army, you'll know beforehand the courses you'll need for credit at the school you want to graduate from.

"Secondly, the Army provides financial aid. College courses are available to you while you're in the Army. And the Army will pay up to 75% of the tuition for these courses. **(After your enlistment's over, you'll be eligible for 36 months of financial assistance under the G.I. Bill.)**

"We, in the educational community, are enthusiastic about this new plan. In fact, many of us believe Project Ahead will be as important to young people entering the Army as the G.I. Bill has been to veterans."

Dr. Arthur G. Hansen
President,
Purdue University

Gen. Fred C. Weyand
Chief of Staff,
U.S. Army

Now you don't have to choose between serving your Country and continuing your education.

"Project Ahead is the most exciting idea in education that the Army has ever offered.

"Too often people in the service have taken college courses from one school, only to learn later those courses would not apply toward their degrees. Project Ahead intends to change all that.

"The Army, together with over 800 colleges and universities, has a plan. A cooperative system that lets you know ahead of time which courses you'll need for credit at the school you've applied to and want to graduate from.

"You'll be receiving up to 75% of the tuition for college courses you take while in the Army. And now you can make sure you get credit for the college courses you successfully complete.

"Project Ahead is by no means a free ride. Because while you're working toward a college degree, you'll be serving your country.

"You'll be a soldier full time. A student part time. You'll train hard, you'll work hard. **And you'll find that although a few years in the Army isn't the easiest way to earn a college education, it may be the most rewarding."**

Here's how Project Ahead works.

1. Let's suppose you live in Indianapolis, Indiana. You're interested in Project Ahead and decide to talk to your local Army Representative about it. He'll give you a list of participating colleges in your home area. Here are just a few examples: Purdue, Indiana State, Ball State, Indiana, Valparaiso and Marian College.

2. You can then contact the school that best satisfies your educational goals. If you decide on Purdue and are accepted, you'll be assigned an advisor at Purdue who will help you plan your educational program. You'll correspond with him throughout your Army enlistment.

3. Next, you enlist in the Army, complete your training, and are assigned to an Army post. There'll be an Education Center Counselor who will help you start your program right on post. For instance, if you're stationed at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, you can take courses from the University of Oklahoma, Oral Roberts, Tulsa, Langston, Murray State, among others.

4. Your advisor at Purdue can tell you which college courses offered on post at Fort Sill will be accepted for credit.

5. Your Education Center Counselor can help you enroll in these courses. And the Army will provide up to 75% tuition assistance for approved courses.

6. After you successfully complete a course, you can notify your home school. You can have all of your credits accumulate to count towards your degree. This will continue throughout your Army enlistment.

7. When your enlistment's over, you return home to finish college. Your home school will review your records of all the college credits you've earned while in the Army. Then you can continue your education under the G.I. Bill.

Note to High School Seniors.

As a program in cooperative education, Project Ahead is for high school graduates. However, if you are a high school senior about to graduate, Project Ahead is for you, too.

Under the Army's Delayed Entry Program, you can enlist in the Army now. Start under Project Ahead in a participating college. And not have to report into the Army until after you graduate from high school. (In fact, you have up to nine months to report from the time you enlist.)

Which one of these schools would you like for your alma mater?

In Project Ahead you can choose, if you qualify, your "alma mater" before you enlist in the Army.

Here is a list of schools that are participating in Project Ahead. It is by no means a complete list. More colleges and universities are being added every day.

ALABAMA

Alabama Aviation and Technical College
Alabama State University
Auburn University
*Auburn University at Montgomery
Douglas MacArthur State Tech College
Enterprise State Junior College
*Gadsden State Junior College
George C. Wallace State Community College
Huntingdon College
Lurleen B. Wallace State Jr. College
Snead State Jr. College
*Troy State University
Tuskegee Institute
University of Alabama
University of Alabama in Birmingham
University of Montevallo

ALASKA

*University of Alaska

ARIZONA

*Cochise College
*Glendale Community College
*Maricopa Technical College
*Mesa Community College
*Phoenix College
*Scottsdale Community College
University of Arizona

ARKANSAS

*Arkansas State University
Henderson State College
John Brown University
Phillips County Community College
State College of Arkansas
University of Arkansas – Little Rock
Pine Bluff
Westark Community College

CALIFORNIA

American River College
Bakersfield College
Canada College
Cerritos College
Chabot College
*City College of San Francisco
*College of the Desert
College of the Redwoods
College of San Mateo
Compton College
Cosumnes River College
*Diablo Valley College
El Camino College
Fresno City College
*Gavilan College
*Golden Gate University
*Golden West College
Grossmont College
*Hartnell College
*Humphreys College
Imperial Valley College
Johnston College at University of Redlands
*Long Beach City College
*Los Angeles City College
Los Angeles Harbor College
Los Angeles Pierce College
Los Medanos College
Mendocino College
*Merced College
Modesto Junior College
*Monterey Peninsula College
Moorpark College
Mt. San Antonio College
Ohlone College
*Orange Coast College
Pasadena City College
Pepperdine University
Los Angeles Campus
Malibu Campus
*Sacramento City College
Saddleback College
*San Joaquin Delta College
San Jose City College
*Santa Ana College
Santa Barbara City College
Santa Monica City College
Shasta College
Skyline College
University of California
Berkeley
Davis
Irvine
Los Angeles
Riverside
San Diego
San Francisco
Santa Barbara
Santa Cruz
Yuba College
West Los Angeles College

COLORADO

Adams State College
Aims College
Colorado Northwestern Community College
Colorado School of Mines
*Community College of Denver –
Auraria College
North Campus
Red Rocks Campus
*El Paso Community College
Lamar Community College
Mesa College
*Metropolitan State College
Morgan County Community College
Northeastern Junior College
Otero Junior College
*Southern Colorado State College
Trinidad State Junior College
University of Denver
University of Northern Colorado

CONNECTICUT

*Asnuntuck Community College
Greater Hartford Community College
Housatonic Regional Community College
Manchester Community College
Mattatuck Community College
Middlesex Community College
*Mohegan Community College
Northwestern Conn. Community College
Norwalk Community College
*Quinebaug Valley Community College
South Central Community College
Tunxis Community College
University of Bridgeport
University of Hartford
University of New Haven

FLORIDA

*Brevard Community College
Central Florida Community College
Daytona Beach Community College
Eckerd College
*Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Florida A&M University
*Florida Institute of Technology
*Florida Junior College at Jacksonville
Florida Keys Community College
Florida Southern College
Florida State University
Florida Technological University
Jones College
Lake-Sumter Community College
Manatee Junior College
*Miami Dade Community College –
Downtown Campus
North Campus
South Campus
Palm Beach Junior College
Polk Community College
*Rollins College
Seminole Community College
Stetson University
St. Petersburg Junior College
University of Miami
*University of North Florida
*University of South Florida
University of Tampa
Valencia Community College

GEORGIA

Abraham Baldwin Agricultural College
Albany Junior College
Armstrong State College
Berry College
Brunswick Junior College
*Clayton Junior College
Columbus College
Floyd Junior College
Gainesville Junior College
Georgia Southwestern College
Georgia State University
La Grange College
Middle Georgia College
Oglethorpe University
South Georgia College
Truett McConnell College
*University of Georgia
Valdosta State College
West Georgia College

HAWAII

*Chaminade College of Honolulu
Hawaii Loa College
University of Hawaii – Hilo
Winward Community College

IDAHO

Boise State University
*Idaho State University
North Idaho College
Northwest Nazarene College
*University of Idaho

ILLINOIS

Belleville Area College
Black Hawk College
Black Hawk College – East Campus
Carl Sandburg College
Chicago State University
City College of Chicago –
Kennedy-King Campus
Loop Campus
Malcolm X Campus
Mayfair Campus
Olive-Harvey Campus
Southwest Campus
Wright Campus
Columbia College
Danville Community College
Decatur Community Junior College
*Eastern Illinois University
Elgin Community College
Elmhurst College
George Williams College
Illinois Central College
Illinois College
Illinois Valley Community College
John A. Logan Community College
Joliet Junior College
Kishwaukee College
Lake Land College
Lewis and Clark College
Lewis University
Lincoln College
Lincoln Land Community College
Lincoln Trail College
Loyola University
McHenry County College
*McKendree College
Morton College
Northwestern University, Evening Division
Quincy College
Rock Valley College
*Roosevelt University
*Sangamon State University
Shawnee Community College
Southern Illinois University,
Carbondale
Edwardsville
Spoon River College
Springfield College
Triton College
Waubonsee Community College
Western Illinois University

INDIANA

Ball State University
Indiana-Purdue Universities, Fort Wayne
Indiana State University
Indiana State University Evansville
*Indiana University
Indiana University – East
Indiana University – Southeast
Marian College
Purdue University
Valparaiso University
*University of Evansville

IOWA

Buena Vista College
Morningside College
University of Dubuque
University of Iowa
University of Northern Iowa
Upper Iowa University
Westmar College

KANSAS

*Benedictine College
Colby Community College
Fort Hays State College
*Garden City Community College
Kansas State College at Emporia
Kansas State College of Pittsburg
*Kansas State University
*Ottawa University
University of Kansas
Washburn University
*Wichita State University

KENTUCKY

*Eastern Kentucky University
*Hopkinsville Community College
Kentucky Wesleyan College
*Morehead State University
*Murray State University
Western Kentucky University

LOUISIANA

Centenary College
Louisiana Tech University
Loyola University
Nicholls State University
*Northwestern State University

MAINE

*St. Francis College
St. Joseph's College
University of Maine at Augusta
Westbrook College

MARYLAND

Loyola College
University of Baltimore
University of Maryland,
Baltimore County Campus
Eastern Shore
*University of Maryland, University College
Western Maryland College

MASSACHUSETTS

Berkshire Community College
*Boston University – Metropolitan College
Bristol Community College
Bunker Hill Community College
Cape Cod Community College
Greenfield Community College
Holyoke Community College
Massachusetts Bay Community College
Massasoit Community College
Middlesex Community College
*Mt. Wachusett Community College
Northeastern University
Northern Essex Community College
*North Shore Community College

- Quinsigamond Community College
- Roxbury Community College
- *Springfield Tech. Community College

MICHIGAN

- Aquinas College
- Bay De Noc Community College
- *Central Michigan University
- Delta College
- *Eastern Michigan University
- Gogebic Community College
- Lawrence Institute of Technology
- Macomb Community College –
  - Center Campus
  - South Campus
- Mid-Michigan Community College
- Monroe County Community College
- *Northern Michigan University
- *Siena Heights College
- Washtenaw Community College
- Western Michigan University

MINNESOTA

- Augsburg College
- *Bemidji State College
- College of St. Benedict
- College of St. Scholastica
- College of St. Theresa
- Concordia College at Moorhead
- Fergus Falls Community College
- Mankato State College
- Minnesota Metropolitan State College
- *Moorhead State College
- Northland Community College
- St. Cloud State College
- St. John's University
- Southwest Minnesota State College
- University of Minnesota –
  - Duluth
  - Morris
  - Twin Cities
- University of Minnesota – Technical College – Waseca
- University of Minnesota – Technical Institute – Crookston
- Willmar Community College
- Winona State College

MISSISSIPPI

- Alcorn State University
- Coahoma Junior College
- Copiah-Lincoln Junior College
- Delta State University
- East Central Junior College
- East Mississippi Junior College
- Hinds Junior College
- Holmes Junior College
- Itawamba Junior College
- Jackson State University
- Jones Junior College
- *Meridian Junior College
- Mississippi College
- Mississippi Delta Junior College
- *Mississippi Gulf Coast Junior College, Perkinston
- Mississippi Southern University
- Mississippi State University
- Mississippi Valley State University
- Northeast Mississippi Junior College
- Northwest Mississippi Junior College
- Pearl River Junior College
- Rust College
- Southern Mississippi University
- Southwest Mississippi Jr. College
- Tougaloo College
- University of Mississippi
- Utica Junior College
- William Carey College
- Wood Junior College

MISSOURI

- Central Missouri State University
- Columbia College
- *Drury College
- Florissant Valley Community College
- *Longview Community College
- Missouri Southern State College
- Missouri Western State College
- Northeast Missouri State University
- Northwest Missouri State University
- Park College
- Southeast Missouri State University
- Southwest Missouri State University
- University of Missouri, Rolla

MONTANA

- Carroll College
- *College of Great Falls
- Dawson College
- Eastern Montana College
- *Flathead Valley Community College
- Miles Community College
- Montana College of Mineral Science and Technology
- Montana State University
- Northern Montana College
- Rocky Mountain College
- Western Montana College

NEBRASKA

- Bellevue College
- Chadron State College
- *Kearney State College
- McCook Community College
- Midland College
- Peru State College
- *University of Nebraska at Omaha
- Wayne State College

NEW HAMPSHIRE

- Keene State College
- New England College
- Notre Dame College
- Plymouth State College
- St. Anselm's College

NEW JERSEY

- Atlantic Community College
- Bloomfield College
- [illegible]dale Community College
- [illegible]urlington County College
- Camden County College
- Cumberland County College
- Drew University
- Edward Williams College of Fairleigh Dickinson University
- Fairleigh Dickinson University
- Jersey City State College
- *Kean College of New Jersey
- *Mercer County Community College
- Middlesex County College
- Monmouth College
- Montclair State College
- *Ocean County College
- Passaic County Community College
- Rider College
- Stevens Institute of Technology
- St. Peter's College
- The William Paterson College of New Jersey
- *Thomas A. Edison College
- Trenton State College

NEW MEXICO

- Eastern New Mexico University
- Eastern New Mexico University at Roswell
- New Mexico Highlands University

NEW YORK

- Academy of Aeronautics
- Adirondack Community College
- Auburn Community College
- Canisius College
- Cazenovia College
- *Clinton County Community College
- College of St. Rose
- Community College of the Finger Lakes
- Corning Community College
- C. W. Post Center, Long Island University
- Dutchess Community College
- D'Youville College
- Elmira College
- Erie Community College
- Fordham University
- Fulton-Montgomery Community College
- Herkimer Community College
- Hofstra University
- Hudson Valley Community College
- Iona College
- Ithaca College
- Marist College
- Marymount Manhattan College
- Mater Dei College
- *New York Institute of Technology
- New York State Ranger School
- *Niagara County Community College
- North Country Community College
- Orange County Community College
- Pace University
- Queensborough Community College
- Queens College
- Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
- Rochester Institute of Technology
- *Rockland Community College
- Rosary Hill College
- Russell Sage Junior College of Albany
- Schenectady County Community College
- Staten Island Community College
- St. Francis College
- Sullivan County Community College
- SUNY Agricultural and Technical College, Cobleskill
- SUNY Agricultural and Technical College, Delhi
- SUNY Agricultural and Technical College, Morrisville
- *SUNY College at Plattsburgh
- Tompkins-Cortland Community College
- Union College
- *Villa Maria College
- Westchester Community College

NORTH CAROLINA

- Atlantic Christian College
- Campbell College
- Catawba College
- Central Piedmo[illegible] Community College
- Chowan College
- Coastal Carolina [illegible]munity College
- Davidson Community [illegible]ege
- *East Carolina University
- *Elizabeth City State University
- *Fayetteville State University
- Kittrell College
- Lees-McRae College
- Lenoir Community College
- Lenoir-Rhyne College
- Louisburg College
- Methodist College
- *Mount Olive College
- North Carolina Central University
- North Carolina State University
- North Carolina Wesleyan College
- Peace College
- Pembroke State University
- *Pfeiffer College
- St. Augustine's College
- Shaw University
- Southeastern Community College
- Surry Community College
- University of North Carolina at Asheville
- Wayne Community College
- Western Piedmont Community College
- Wilkes Community College

NORTH DAKOTA

- Bismarck Junior College
- Dickinson State College
- Jamestown College
- Lake Region Junior College
- Mary College
- Mayville State College
- *Minot State College
- North Dakota State School of Science
- North Dakota State University
- North Dakota State University, Bottineau Branch
- University of North Dakota
- University of North Dakota, Williston
- Valley City State College

OHIO

- Central State University
- Cincinnati Technical College
- College of Wooster
- Columbus Technical Institute
- Edison State College
- Kent State University –
  - Ashtabula Regional Campus
  - East Liverpool Regional Campus
  - Geauga County Regional Campus
  - Kent
  - Salem Regional Campus
  - Stark Regional Campus
  - Trumbull Regional Campus
  - Tuscarawas Regional Campus
- Lorain County Community College
- *Ohio University
- Sinclair Community College
- University of Akron
- University of Dayton
- University of Toledo
- Walsh College
- Xavier University

OKLAHOMA

- American Christian College
- Bacone College
- Bartlesville Wesleyan College
- Bethany Nazarene College
- *Cameron University
- Carl Albert Junior College
- Central State University
- Claremore Junior College
- Connors State College
- East Central State College
- Eastern Oklahoma State College
- El Reno Junior College
- Hillsdale Free Will Baptist Church
- Langston University
- Midwest Christian College
- Murray State College
- Northeastern Oklahoma A&M Junior College
- Northeastern Oklahoma State University
- Northern Oklahoma College
- Northwestern Oklahoma State University
- Oklahoma Baptist University
- Oklahoma Christian College
- *Oklahoma City Southwestern College
- Oklahoma City University
- Oklahoma State University
- Oral Roberts University
- *Oscar Rose Junior College
- Panhandle State University
- Phillips University
- St. Gregory's College
- Sayre Junior College
- Seminole Junior College
- Southeastern State College
- *South Oklahoma City Junior College
- Southwestern Oklahoma State University
- Tulsa Junior College
- *University of Oklahoma
- University of Science and Art of Oklahoma
- University of Tulsa
- Western Oklahoma State College

OREGON

- Eastern Oregon State College
- Lane Community College
- Lewis and Clark College
- Linfield College
- Oregon State University
- Oregon Technical Institute
- Treasure Valley Community College
- Umpqua Community College
- University of Oregon
- University of Portland
- Willamette University

PENNSYLVANIA

- *Bloomsburg State College
- Cabrini College
- California State College
- Delaware County Community College
- Delaware Valley College of Science and Agriculture
- Harrisburg Area Community College
- Holy Family College
- King's College
- LaSalle College
- Lebanon Valley College
- Lehigh County Community College
- Marywood College
- Montgomery County Community College
- Northampton County Area Community College
- *Pennsylvania State University – The Capitol Campus
- Shippensburg State College
- St. Francis College
- *Temple University
- University of Pennsylvania
- *University of Pittsburgh, College of General Studies
- Wilkes College
- Williamsport Area Community College
- York College of Pennsylvania

PUERTO RICO

- College of the Sacred Heart
- Colegio Regional De –
  - Aguadilla
  - Arecibo
  - Bayamon
  - Carolina
  - Humacao
  - Ponce

RHODE ISLAND

- Rhode Island Junior College
- Roger Williams College

SOUTH CAROLINA

- Coker College
- College of Charleston
- Columbia College
- Florence-Darlington Technical College
- Francis Marion College
- Lander College
- *Midlands Technical College –
  - Airport Campus
  - Beltline Campus
- Newberry College
- Presbyterian College
- Trident Technical College –
  - North Campus
  - Palmer Campus
- *University of South Carolina – Main
  - Aiken Regional Campus
  - Beaufort Regional Campus
  - Coastal Carolina Regional Campus
  - Lancaster Regional Campus
  - Salkehatchie Regional Campus
  - Spartanburg Regional Campus
  - Sumter Regional Campus
  - Union Regional Campus
- Wofford College

SOUTH DAKOTA

- Augustana College
- Black Hills State College
- Dakota State College
- Dakota Wesleyan University
- Huron College
- Northern State College
- Presentation College
- South Dakota School of Mines and Technology
- South Dakota State University
- University of South Dakota
- University of South Dakota at Springfield

TENNESSEE

- Belmont College
- Jackson State Community Col
- LeMoyne-Owen College
- Memphis State University
- Shelby State Community College
- *State Technical Institute

TEXAS

- Alvin Junior College
- Amarillo College
- *American Technological University
- Angelina College
- Angelo State University
- Austin Community College
- Baylor University
- *Bee County College
- Blinn College
- Brazosport College
- *Central Texas College
- Clarendon College
- College of the Mainland
- *Cooke County College
- *Eastfield College
- East Texas Baptist College

East Texas State University
*El Centro College
Galveston College
Grayson County College
Hardin-Simmons University
Henderson County Junior College
Hill Junior College
Houston Baptist College
Houston Community College
*Howard College at Big Spring
Howard Payne University
Huston-Tillotson College
Incarnate Word College
Kilgore College
Lamar University
Laredo Junior College
Lee College
Lubbock Christian College
McLennan Community College
Midwestern University
*Mountain View College
Navarro Junior College
North Harris County College
North Texas State University
Odessa College
Pan American University
Paris Junior College
Port Arthur College
Prairie View A&M University
*Richland College
St. Edwards University
*St. Mary's University
*St. Philip's College
Sam Houston State University
San Antonio College
Schreiner College
*South Plains College
Southwestern University
Southwest Texas Junior College
Stephen F. Austin State University
Tarleton State University
Tarrant County Junior College
Temple Junior College
Texas A&M University
Texas Christian University
Texas College
*Texas Lutheran College
Texas Southern University
Texas Southmost College
Texas State Technical Institute –
  Rio Grande Campus
Texas Tech University
Tyler State College
University of Houston –
  Victoria Center
University of St. Thomas
University of Texas – Arlington
University of Texas – El Paso
Victoria College
Weatherford College
West Texas State University
Wharton County Junior College
Wiley College

UTAH

College of Eastern Utah
Dixie College
Southern Utah State College
University of Utah
*Utah State University
*Weber State College

VERMONT

Bennington College
Castleton State College
Champlain College
Ethan Allen Community College
Green Mountain College
Johnson State College
Lyndon State College
Southern Vermont College
Ulster County Community College
Vermont Technical College

VIRGINIA

Blue Ridge Community College
Central Virginia Community College
Dabney S. Lancaster College
Danville Community College
John Tyler Community College
J. Sargeant Reynolds Community
  College
Lord Fairfax Community College
Madison College
Mountain Empire Community
  College
New River Community College
Northern Virginia Community
  College –
  Alexandria
  *Annandale
  Loudoun
  Manassas
  Woodbridge
Radford College
Richard Bland College of William
  and Mary
Southside Virginia Community College–
  Christanna
  Daniel
Southwest Virginia Community College
*Tidewater Community College –
  Chesapeake Campus
  Frederick Campus
  Virginia Beach Campus
University of Virginia
Virginia Highlands Community
  College
Virginia Western Community College
Wytheville Community College

WASHINGTON

*Central Washington State College
*Eastern Washington State College
Grays Harbor College
Lower Columbia College
Pacific Lutheran University
St. Martin's College
*Seattle Central Community College
Seattle Pacific College
Seattle University
South Seattle Community College
University of Puget Sound
Western Washington State College

WEST VIRGINIA

Bluefield State College
Glenville State College
Morris Harvey College
Wheeling College

WISCONSIN

Gateway Technical Institute –
  Elkhorn Campus
  Kenosha Campus
  Racine Campus
Lakeland College
Milwaukee Area Technical College
Milwaukee School of Engineering
Silver Lake College
Southwest Wisconsin Vocational-
  Technical Institute
University of Wisconsin –
  Center-Fox Valley
  Center-Richland Center
  Center-Washington County
  Eau Claire
  *Green Bay
  LaCrosse
  Oshkosh
  Parkside
  Platteville
  Stevens Point
  *Stout
  Whitewater
Waukesha County Technical Institute
Western Wisconsin Technical Institute

WYOMING

Casper College
Central Wyoming College
Eastern Wyoming College
Laramie County Community College
Northwest Community College
Sheridan College
University of Wyoming
Western Wyoming Community
  College

*Servicemen's Opportunity College

Here's what you do next.

Since you're interested in Project Ahead, you may now want to know just how to take the first steps to get moving.

Contact your Army Representative at the address and phone number given you.

Here's what he'll do.

He'll tell you about the schools participating in Project Ahead in your area. He'll know the most recent developments in the program and can give you information on participating Project Ahead schools.

He can also answer any specific questions you may have on Project Ahead and on the many Army opportunities and benefits.

Join the people who've joined the Army.

As advertised in Reader's Digest

Chairman HARTKE. Then, in a publication which you put out called, "Join the people who join the Army", one of the elements there is headlined—"A chance to continue your education in the Army or out". Then there's a quotation, "Then when your enlistment is over, there's a GI bill, 36 months of financial assistance at the college of your choice. You many not want to join the Army to get a college education but it could end up that way."

Further it says, "Joining the Army may be the best way to 'Go to School'. That's good for you and good for us."

I think it would be appropriate to include the ad in the hearing record at this point.

[The Army publication follows:]

Join the people who've joined the Army.

Join for the same good reasons they did.

The people who joined today's Army have joined to get an extra good start in life. They've recognized the opportunities, and they've taken advantage of them.

They start with good pay, but that's just where it begins. While getting that pay, they're learning a job skill and furthering their education. And what they learn, they can keep for a lifetime.

They're finding out who they are and what they can do. They're earning respect, and learning to lead. They're breaking out of the ordinary, seeing new places, meeting new people, making new friends.

And they're enjoying extra benefits no ordinary job can offer.

By joining them, you're getting your chance to look back in 2, 3 or 4 years and know you've learned more about yourself, what you can do, what you can be. You'll be standing tall, confident, and proud. With skills and knowledge you can use, keep, and build on.

The rest of this booklet tells you about the better start you can gain by joining the people who've joined the Army.

Your Army Representative will be glad to tell you more. It's your future. And today's Army is a way to get it moving.

You know where you're headed before you start.

Today's Army offers you many different choices, of skills, of units, of places. We want you to know all about them. Then you can make the choices that are best for you. Here are the facts.

Fact one. You can sit down with your Army Representative and choose the area or station, or specific Army unit you'd like to serve with.

Fact two: You can determine the type of training you'll get.

Fact three. You can choose the number of years you wish to serve.

Fact four. You can choose when you wish to go on active duty.

Fact five. Choices for women are the same as those offered men, except for choices involving combat-related jobs.

We lay it out for you plain and simple before you enlist, so you can go into it with your eyes open. Your Army Representative will be glad to answer any questions you may have. But a few examples right now might help you see it more clearly.

Job-training Options. Today's Army has hundreds of good job-training courses. If you qualify, we'll guarantee in writing the training you choose. It's not just a vague promise; it's a guarantee.

Area of Choice Options. When you enlist in the Army, you can enlist for Europe, Hawaii, Alaska, the Far East, or Panama.

Continental U.S. Units of Choice and Stations of Choice. If you'd like to serve in the States, you can enlist for one of many units or stations close to home, or 1,000 miles away.



Language Options. If you're a high school graduate and qualify, you can become a foreign language specialist at the Defense Language Institute.

Stripes for Skills Program. If you are a young man or woman with vocational or technical school training in a skill, plus some work experience, you may qualify for a higher pay grade to start with.

2-year Training or Travel Option. You can enlist for only 2 years and choose to train for a job in the U.S. or a job in Europe.

Delayed Entry Program. You can sign up now, and take up to 270 days to report for duty. It's a great way to make sure there's a place for you in the training school class you want.

These are just a few of our enlistment options and programs. Almost all are open to men and women alike, and in many cases, you can combine options.

Your Army Representative will be glad to explain all of the possibilities and help you find the combination that fits you best.

A full guarantee, not an empty promise.

After you've decided what enlistment options and programs you want, the next question is, "will you get them?"

If you qualify, and we make you a promise, we make it binding in black and white.

Everything we guarantee is put down in writing and you get a copy.

The choices can be yours. Job training. Area. Unit. Educational benefits. And many more. In the Army, a promise is a guaranteed promise.

You earn a good salary, and extras that would take you years to earn in a civilian job.

In today's Army, you get a good starting salary and an automatic raise in just four months.

But money is really only a part of the total compensation package. What makes your salary go a lot further than a comparable civilian salary is all the Army benefits.

We provide excellent medical and dental care, and it's all free. Food and housing are provided, and you can save money by shopping at commissary or post exchange facilities rather than at civilian stores. And you are entitled to life insurance at low cost.

Then there's time off. We give everybody 30 days paid vacation their first year and every year.

If you decide you'd like more education, you can get it with the Army paying up to 75% of the tuition. Thousands of Army people are earning advanced credits in this way.

If you decide to make the Army a career, you can get a lifetime retirement income after just 20 years of service.

When you add it all up, you'll have to look a long time for a civilian job with pay and benefits that beat ours.



An opportunity to be in the best mental and physical shape of your life.

The first step takes only eight weeks, and we call it Basic Training. No matter what job or option you sign up for, your first job is to learn how to be a soldier.

You'll go through a gradual build-up of physical training. You'll learn more and more about thinking for yourself, and reacting quickly in situations that call for it.

And you'll develop an added sense of responsibility. Responsibility for yourself as well as for others.

Before you know it, your eight weeks will have flown by. You'll look back to the day you joined and realize you're not the same person. You'll be more determined, and feel more confident. And you'll like that feeling.

We also encourage voluntary participation in some sport for every man and woman in the Army. You can continue to develop your appetite for physical coordination, discipline, and competition.

In addition to sports, you may qualify for a new program of outdoor physical challenge called Adventure Training.

It's the type of meaningful training with a purpose we encourage in today's Army.

Learn a skill that could last a lifetime.

Once you've completed Basic Training, you've mastered the basics of soldiering. The next step is Advanced Individual Training (AIT), where you will learn the skills of the job you enlisted for.

If you're a young man who has enlisted for a branch of Combat Arms, you'll spend the next eight weeks learning the specific skills of an infantryman, artilleryman, or tanker.

If you're a young man or woman who has enlisted for training in a specific skill, such as electronics, AIT is where you learn it.

Today's Army has hundreds of school courses, lasting from 8 to 52 weeks, to train you for over 300 Army jobs.

Our courses include classroom, laboratory, and "hands-on" training that lets you practice with the equipment your skill involves. You learn to use the most modern equipment and technology, under the guidance of expert instructors.

Take a look at the list at the back of this booklet. There will be some jobs you didn't know we had. Some that will fit right in with your best skills and interests. Some that could mean a lifetime career for you. And remember, you don't pay for learning. We pay you.



U.S.AR
MILITARY POLICE

A chance to continue your education, in the Army or out.

We strongly believe that continuing your education is an essential part of reaching your full potential. This belief is the foundation for such complete support of your educational advancement. The Army regards this as a vital mission.

Among programs open to you are High School Equivalency, Job-related Training, and College and Junior College Programs with up to 75 percent of your tuition paid by the government. **Then, when your enlistment is over, there's the G. I. Bill – 36 months of financial assistance at the college of your choice.**

If you're serious about continuing your education, we're behind you all the way.

You may not want to join the Army to get a college education, but it could end up that way.

You may not be aiming for a Ph.D., but if that's your goal, the Army will help you get there.

You'll find an Army Education Center at most posts, camps, and stations, where you can get detailed information about the many General Education Development programs available. **Joining the Army may be the best way to "go to school". That's good for you, and good for us.**

See more of the world than hometown U.S.A.

Because the Army is the largest branch of the military, we have the largest number of posts and duty stations around the world.

Which means more locations for you to choose from.

You may be stationed near big cities like New York, Seattle, or Dallas. Or in the mountains of Colorado, or near a California beach.

You may be stationed in Alaska, Hawaii, Korea, Europe, or Panama.

You'll have a chance to get to know the people, learn a language, and gain experiences to remember throughout your lifetime.

With the 30 days paid vacation we give you each year, you'll have plenty of time to visit places farther away than the area around your post.

And we'll put them all within reach of your budget, too, with low cost military travel opportunities.

The Army is no ordinary place to work.

Seeing new places, including places most people only dream about, is just one of the unusual opportunities.

As you think about the places you'd like to live and work in, remember that your choice can be guaranteed in writing.

A constantly improving standard of living.

Today, you don't hear the same old jokes about Army chow. The food we're serving is prepared by school-trained professional cooks. It's good tasting, nutritional, and varied.



We're also continually upgrading our living quarters. With newer and better barracks that respect the individual's need for privacy. And better family housing conditions, too.

We're providing more and better medical and dental care, including comprehensive health care for dependents of Army men and women. Modern post exchange and commissary facilities. Better service clubs, hobbyshops, libraries, and recreational centers.

And we're letting you provide the answers to so many of the important areas of life. You can make so many choices about job training, continuing education, the leadership challenges you want to accept, the ways to shape your own future.

In short, we're providing a finer quality of life. One that respects the dignity of the individual and his or her family.

Join the people who've joined the Army.

A lot of young people are discovering a good place to invest their time. The Army. They've come, hundreds of thousands strong, for things they may not have found anywhere else.

Some came for the job training. Some for travel. Some for experience. Some for education. And some came because they wanted to do something positive for their Country.

Should you join the people who've joined the Army? Think about it. You could be a better person for it, and we a better Army.

Here's where you can earn rewards as exciting as the job.

Here's where you can develop your knowledge, skills, and confidence. And then, what you gain is all yours to keep. Today's Army could be a great place for you to get started.

Before you join the people who've joined the Army, make it a point to talk to one of our Army Representatives. He or she can answer any questions you might still have, and help you decide on the best course of action. You'll find your local Army Representative listed in the Yellow Pages under "Recruiting."

Hundreds of good, steady jobs to choose from.

Accounting Specialist
Administrative Specialist
Airborne Sensor Specialist
Airborne Surveillance Radar Repairman
Airbrake Repairman
Aircraft Armament Repairman
Aircraft Armament Subsystem Mechanic
Aircraft Electrician
Aircraft Fire Control Repairman
Aircraft Hydraulics Repairman
Aircraft Powertrain Repairman
Aircraft Repair Parts Specialist
Aircraft Rotor and Propeller Repairman
Aircraft Turbine Engine Repairman
Air Defense Artillery Operations and Intelligence Assistant
Air Defense Radar Repairman
Airframe Repairman
Airplane Repairman
Air Traffic Control Chief
Air Traffic Control Tower Operator
Ammunition Foreman
Ammunition Inspector
Ammunition Maintenance Specialist
Ammunition Storage and Operations Specialist
Ammunition Helper
Amphibian Engineer
Amphibian Operator
Antennaman
Anti-Ballistic Missile Maintenance Specialist
AN/TSQ-51 System Repairman
Approach Control/En Route Specialist (ATC)
Area Communications Chief
Area Intelligence Specialist
Armament Maintenance Apprentice
Armor Crewman
Armorer/Unit Supply Specialist
Armor Reconnaissance Specialist
Artillery Calibration Specialist
Artillery Repairman
Artillery Surveyor
Arts and Crafts Specialist
Asphalt Equipment Operator
Assistant Criminal Investigator
Atomic Demolition Munitions Specialist
Attache Specialist
Audio Specialist
Audit Specialist
Automatic Data Processing System Machine Operations Specialist
Automatic Data Processing System Repairman
Automatic Data Processing Systems Analyst
Automatic Digital Message Switch Equipment Repairman
Automatic Digital Message Switching Peripheral Equipment Repairman
Automotive Repairman
Automotive Repair Parts Specialist
Avionic Communications Equipment Repairman
Avionic Flight Control Equipment Repairman
Avionic Navigation Equipment Repairman
Avionic Radar Equipment Repairman
Avionics Mechanic
Ballistic Meteorology Crewman
Baker
Band Group Leader
Bandsman
Biological Sciences Assistant
Boiler Repairman
Brace Specialist
Brass Group Leader
Bridge Specialist
Broadcast Specialist
Cable Splicer
Calibration Specialist
Camera Repairman
Camouflage Specialist
Canvas Repairman
Carbon Dioxide-Hydrogen Production Specialist
Card and Tape Writer
Cardiac Laboratory Specialist
Cargo Handler
Carpenter
Cartographic Draftsman
Central Office Operations Specialist
Chaparral Crewman
Chaparral System Mechanic
Chaparral/Vulcan Air Defense Systems Repairman
Chaplain's Assistant
Chemical Engineering Assistant
Chemical Equipment Repairman
Chemical Laboratory Specialist
Chemical Operations Assistant
Chemical Operations Specialist
Chemical Staff Specialist
Civil Engineering Assistant
Clerk Typist
Clinical Specialist
Club Manager
Combat Area Surveillance Radar Repairman
Combat Engineer
Combat Engineer Tracked Vehicle Crewman
Combat Surveillance and Target Acquisition Crewman
Combat Surveillance and Target Acquisition Non-commissioned Officer
Command Sergeant Major
Communication Electronics Repair Parts Specialist
Communications Center Specialist
Communications Security Specialist
Computer Programmer
Computer Systems Operator
Concrete Paving Equipment Operator
Construction and Utilities Worker
Construction Draftsman
Construction Foreman
Construction Surveyor
Correctional Specialist
Counterbattery/Countermortar Radar Crewman
Counterintelligence Agent
Court Reporter
Crane Operator
Crawler Tractor Operator
Cryptanalytic Specialist
Cryptographic Center Specialist
Data Analysis Specialist
Data Communications Switching Center Specialist
Data Communications Terminal Specialist
Data Processing Non-commissioned Officer
Decontamination Specialist
Defense Acquisition Radar Crewman
Defense Acquisition Radar Mechanic
Dental Fixed Prosthetic Specialist
Dental Removable Prosthetic Specialist
Dental Specialist
Dial Central Office Repairman
Diesel-Electric Locomotive Electrician
Diesel-Electric Locomotive Repairman
Digital Subscriber Terminal Equipment Repairman
Diver
Dog Trainer
Duty Soldier
ECM/DF Systems Repairman
Electrical/Electronic Engineering Assistant
Electrician
Electroencephalograph Specialist
Electronic Instrument Repairman
Electronic Warfare Equipment Repairman
Engineer Equipment Repairman
Engineer Missile Equipment Specialist
Enlisted Aide
Enlisted Bandleader
Equal Opportunity Specialist (Race Relations)
Equipment Maintenance Clerk
Equipment Storage Specialist
Expert Linguist
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Specialist
Eye, Ear, Nose and Throat Specialist (EENT)
Fabric and Leather Repair Foreman
Field Artillery Basic
Field Artillery Crewman
Field Communications–Electronics Equipment Mechanic
Field General COMSEC Repairman
Field Illumination Crewman
Field Radio Repairman
Field Systems COMSEC Repairman
Field Wireman
Film Library Specialist
Finance Specialist
Fire Control Computer Repairman
Fire Control Instrument Repairman
Fire Distribution System Crewman
Fire Distribution Systems Maintenance Chief
Firefighter
Fixed Ciphony Repairman
Fixed Cryptographic Equipment Repairman
Fixed Plant Carrier Repairman
Fixed Station Attendant
Fixed Station Chief
Fixed Station Radio Repairman
Fixed Station Technical Controller
Flash Ranging Crewman
Flight Operations Coordinator
Flight Simulator Specialist
Food Inspection Specialist
Food Service Helper
Food Service Specialist
Fuel and Electrical Systems Repairman
General Construction Machine Operator
General Draftsman
Grader Operator
Ground Control Approach Radar Repairman
Ground Control Approach Specialist (ATC)
Ground Surveillance Radar Crewman
Hawk Continuous Wave Radar Mechanic
Hawk Continuous Wave Radar Repairman
Hawk Fire Control Crewman
Hawk Fire Control Mechanic
Hawk Fire Control Repairman
Hawk Maintenance Chief
Hawk Missile and Launcher Repairman
Hawk Missile Crewman
Hawk Missile-Launcher Mechanic
Hawk Pulse Radar Repairman
Heating and Cooling Specialist
Heating and Ventilating Specialist
Helicopter Repairman
Helicopter Technical Inspector
Hercules Electronics Mechanic
Hercules Fire Control Crewman
Hercules Missile Crewman
Honest John Rocket Crewman
Hospital Food Service Specialist
IBM 360 Repairman
Illustrator
Image Interpreter
Improved Hawk Continuous Wave Radar Repairman

Improved Hawk Fire Control Mechanic
Improved Hawk Fire Control Repairman
Improved Hawk Firing Section Mechanic
Improved Hawk Information Coordination Central Mechanic
Improved Hawk Maintenance Chief
Improved Hawk Mechanical Systems Repairman
Improved Hawk Pulse Radar Repairman
Infantry Direct Fire Crewman
Infantry Indirect Fire Crewman
Infantry Operation and Intelligence Specialist
Information Specialist
Intelligence Analyst
Intercept Demultiplex Systems Repairman
Intercept Receiving Systems Repairman
Intercept Recording Systems Repairman
Interceptor-Analyst (Non-communications) Interrogator
Lance/Honest John Operations/Fire Direction Assistant
Lance Missile Crewman
Lance Missile System Repairman
Land Combat Support System Test Specialist
Laundry, Bath and Impregnation Specialist
LCSS-Missile Maintenance Chief
Legal Clerk
Light Air Defense Artillery Crewman
Light Weapons Infantryman
Lineman
Locomotive Operator
Machinist
Manual Central Office Repairman
Map Compiler
Marine Engineer
Marine Hull Repairman
Mason
Mathematics/Statistics Assistant
Mechanical Engineering Assistant
Mechanical Maintenance Helper
Medical Corpsman
Medical Equipment Repairman
Medical Laboratory Specialist
Medical Records Specialist
Medical Senior Specialist
Medical Specialist
Medical Supply and Parts Specialist
Memorial Activities Specialist
Metal Body Repairman
Metalworking Assistant
Metalworking Foreman
Meteorological Equipment Repairman
Meteorological Observer
Military Intelligence Coordinator
Military Policeman
Missile Repair Parts Specialist
Missile System Electrical/Mechanical Repair Apprentice
Missile Tank Turret Mechanic
Mobile ADCP Monitor Repairman
Model Maker
Morse Interceptor
Motion Picture Photographer
Motor Transport Operator
Movements Specialist
Multichannel Communications Equipment Operator
Multichannel Communications Equipment Repairman
Musician
NCR 500 Computer Operator
Neuropsychiatric Specialist
Nike Hercules Fire Control Mechanic
Nike High Power Radar-Simulator Repairman
Nike Launcher System Repairman
Nike Maintenance Chief
Nike Missile Repairman
Nike Test Equipment Repairman
Nike Track Radar Repairman
Nuclear Power Plant Chief
Nuclear Power Plant Electrician/Operator
Nuclear Power Plant Instrumentman/Operator
Nuclear Power Plant Mechanic/Operator
Nuclear Power Plant Process Control Specialist/Operator
Nuclear Weapons Electronics Specialist
Nuclear Weapons Maintenance Specialist
Occupational Therapy Specialist
Office Machine Repairman
Offset Pressman
Operating Room Specialist
Operations Central Repairman
Operations/Fire Direction Assistant
Optical Laboratory Specialist
Orthopedic Specialist
Oxygen-Acetylene Production Specialist
Parachute Rigger
Percussion Group Leader
Performing Arts Specialist
Pershing Communications Specialist
Pershing Electrical/Mechanical Repairman
Pershing Electronics Material Specialist
Pershing Electronics Repairman
Pershing Missile Crewman
Personnel Actions Specialist
Personnel Management Specialist
Personnel Psychology Specialist
Personnel Records Specialist
Petroleum Laboratory Specialist
Petroleum Storage Specialist
Pharmacy Specialist
Photographic Equipment Repair Chief
Photographic Laboratory Specialist
Photolithography Chief
Physical Activities Specialist
Physical Sciences Assistant
Physical Therapy Specialist
Pioneer
Pipeline Specialist
Platemaker
Plumber
Postal Clerk
Powered Bridge Specialist
Power Generation Equipment Operator/Mechanic
Power Generation Equipment Repairman
Powerman
Power Pack Specialist
Power Station Operator
Preventive Medicine Specialist
Printer's Apprentice
Process Photographer
Projector Repairman
Quarryman
Quartermaster Heavy Equipment Repairman
Quartermaster Light Equipment Repairman
Radar Data Processing Equipment Repairman
Radio Operator
Radio Propagation Specialist
Radio Repairman
Radio Teletype Operator
Radio Teletype Operator (Non-Morse)
Railway Car Repairman
Railway Maintenance and Operations Apprentice
Railway Movement Coordinator
Recovery Specialist
Recruiter and Career Counselor
Redeye Missile System Repairman
Reproduction Equipment Repairman
Respiratory Specialist
Rodman and Tapeman
Rough Terrain Forklift and Loader Operator
Satellite Communications Ground Station Equipment Repairman
Sawyer
Seaman
Sergeant Electrical/Mechanical Repairman
Sergeant Firing Set Repairman
Sergeant Maintenance Chief
Sergeant Missile Crewman
Sergeant Missile Guidance Repairman
Sergeant Test Equipment Repairman
Sheridan Turret Mechanic
Shillelagh Missile System Repairman
Shoe Repairman
Signal Identification Operator
Signal Intelligence Operations Chief
Signal Security Specialist
Small Arms Repairman
Smoke and Flame Specialist
Social Work/Psychology Specialist
Soils Analyst
Sound Ranging Crewman
Special Bandsman
Special Duty Assignment
Special Electrical Devices Repairman
Special Identification Operator
Special Purpose Equipment Repair/Parts Specialist
Steam Locomotive Repairman
Stenographer
Still Photographer
Stock Control and Accounting Specialist
Strategic Microwave Systems Repairman
Structures Specialist
Subsistence Storage Specialist
Supplyman
Surveillance Infrared Repairman
Surveillance Photographic Equipment Repairman
[illegible]lating Equipment Repairman
Tactical Circuit Controller
Tactical Communications Chief
Tactical COMSEC Maintenance Chief
Tactical Electronics Maintenance Chief
Tactical Microwave Systems Repairman
Tactical Wire Operations Specialist
Tank Turret Mechanic
Tank Turret Repairman
Target Aircraft Control System Mechanic
Target Aircraft Crewman
Telephone Installer and Lineman
Telephone Switchboard Operator
Teletypewriter Interceptor
Teletypewriter Repairman
Television Equipment Repairman
Terminal Operations Specialist
Terrain Analyst
Textile and Leather Repair Assistant
Textile Repairman
Tire Repairman
Topographic Computer
Topographic Instrument Repairman
Topographic Surveyor
Track Vehicle Mechanic
Traffic Analyst
Trainman
Translator-Interpreter
TV Cameraman
TV Production Specialist
Unattended Ground Sensor Specialist
Unattended Ground Sensor Systems Repairman
Unit Clerk
UNIVAC 1004/1005, DCT-9000 System Repairman
Utilities Foreman
Veterinary Specialist
Voice Interceptor
Voice Radio Operator
Vulcan Crewman
Vulcan System Mechanic
Watercraft Operator
Water Supply Specialist
Weapons Support Radar Repairman
Welder
Wheeled Tractor Operator
Wheel Vehicle Mechanic
Wire Guided Missile Systems Repairman
Woodwind Group Leader
X-Ray Specialist

Join for the same good reasons they did.

RPI 212 November 1974 U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975 511-498

Chairman HARTKE. I think that's, in substance, what you've been saying. If it is true that only 57 percent of the people volunteering for the Army are high school graduates and your goal is 65 percent, then the net result of the termination of the GI will would be a loss of 15 percent which would take you down to 42 percent. That's not exactly the direction you are interested in going.

I can see that termination presents some real difficulties for you. The losses are not easily put into one statement. What you're going to see is a loss of discipline, loss of training or loss of leadership, increased. AWOL, increased nonjudicial punishment and additional courts-martial.

What you're saying in substance is education is not only an asset to the younger people but a very valuable resource to the military services.

Let me also clarify one point which I think is a little misleading in your statement when you talk about the present cost of the GI bill. The future cost of the GI bill would substantially, reduce would it not, even if the GI bill were continued?

Secretary BROTZMAN. I'm going to be completely honest with you. It would depend, really, on what bill you passed and how you did it.

For example, I could see how it would vary according to how you handle PREP, to take a simple case.

Chairman HARTKE. As I think Senator Stafford indicated, the shortfall you would have in recruiting would be more noticeable in the quality than it would in the quantity of recruitment; isn't that true?

Secretary BROTZMAN. Which is true.

Chairman HARTKE. Which is exactly the direction you do not want to go.

Secretary BROTZMAN. It will be my responsibility and my staff's, depending on what occurs of course, to try to utilize the educational opportunities that we will have available to try to maintain this quality. This, we intend to do.

Chairman HARTKE. Let me ask you, Mr. Secretary. Some people have said that the existence of what we call post-service educational benefits defeats the purpose of the all volunteer Army because it encourages men and women to leave the service.

Isn't it true that you want to keep your military service fairly young? You're not trying to keep them there to eternity, or until they reach eternity, are you?

Secretary BROTZMAN. That's a perceptive question and you have to look at force structure and things like upward mobility and a lot of these different factors.

Let me lay it out for you the way I see it from the Army's standpoint and as I have learned it. We need to get one out of four to reenlist. We need that because we need to build our NCO's through reenlistments. When that person reenlists, he or she will have the opportunity to move up.

The other three—these are individuals of lower rank. These are people that will be in our rifle squad, in our tank units and things like that. When I say lower rank, it doesn't minimize their dedication or their ability. I want to say that clearly.

We need to retain in the career force about one out of four first term enlistees. Of course, you imply by your question that a person would retire early, I would assume, to take advantage of a post-service educational opportunity and I can say that it's working well now. We're keeping our ratios about as indicated. It's always difficult to lay these things right on the specific point, but I think we're keeping about to that 1 to 4 ratio.

Senator STAFFORD. Mr. Chairman, if I could ask the Secretary. Your problems in the Army, with respect to retention of people are somewhat different than those in the other sister services, are they not?

Secretary BROTZMAN. Yes; that's true.

Senator STAFFORD. You're only commenting on this from the standpoint of the Army.

Secretary BROTZMAN. I just have to reply in that regard, that I think that was the way the Senator asked me. Although I've talked to my counterparts in the other services and we get together and talk about things like this, I must confess I just don't know the figures well enough to testify before this Committee.

Senator STAFFORD. Thank you.

Chairman HARTKE. You're not looking for career privates?

Secretary BROTZMAN. No.

Chairman HARTKE. In other words, a private should not want to make a career out of being a private?

Secretary BROTZMAN. We're trying, and I don't want to stray away from the question, but it gives me an opportunity to talk about things we're trying to do in the Army. We're trying to cut out deadwood. We're trying to close unnecessary bases. We're trying to streamline it. We're trying to have it combat ready and combat effective.

I'm pleased to say, if I could just add, that we have 13 active divisions now that are, in fact, combat ready. We're trying to get our Reserves up to speed to get them equipped.

Chairman HARTKE. As a result, I'm certain that the Defense Department must be looking for some alternate proposals to deal with the educational problem if the President's proposal to terminate the GI bill becomes effective. Isn't that true?

In other words, you're going to be looking for something to fill this educational gap?

Secretary BROTZMAN. This will be a Defense position, Senator, and I must not try to speak in behalf of Mr. Brehm, who is my counterpart in the Defense establishment at the DOD level, but yes, I should say we'll all be looking at the result of what you do and we will try to gage that so we will not lower either the numbers or the quality of our recruits.

Chairman HARTKE. But there's no alternative proposal which you know about at this moment, is there?

Secretary BROTZMAN. No, sir.

Chairman HARTKE. And there's no date fixed when an alternate proposal would be available, isn't that true?

Secretary BROTZMAN. I know of no specific date as of now. No, sir.

Chairman HARTKE. Wouldn't it be better then to have the Defense Department conduct a comprehensive survey before we terminate the GI bill to make sure we would have an acceptable alternative proposal that could be completed and ready in the next fiscal year. Wouldn't that make better sense?

Secretary BROTZMAN. I would have to weigh that, Mr. Chairman. I'm supporting, as you know, the position to go ahead and terminate the GI bill. So I think I would be getting out of the scope of my authority to agree with that but I understand what you're saying.

Chairman HARTKE. If the Congress did make such a suggestion, you would follow that procedure, could you not?

Secretary BROTZMAN. Having been a member of the Congress of the United States, and now as a member of the executive branch, I would be prepared to do what the Congress directs.

Chairman HARTKE. That's all the questions I have. I want to thank you for coming.

Secretary BROTZMAN. Thank you very much.

[Subsequently the following materials and excerpts concerning the All Volunteer Force were ordered placed in the record at this point:]

EXCERPTS FROM

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

DECEMBER 13 AND 14, 1973

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM K. BREHM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS

* * * * * * *

ATTRACTING FULL-TIME COLLEGE STUDENTS

With few exceptions, the Services do not need enlisted men with college degrees, although they do need high-aptitude personnel in a number of occupational fields. The junior college market is appropriate and the use of educational incentives in return for a longer enlistment is under study. The GI Bill offers substantial educational benefits, and one-quarter to one-third of high school graduates state their primary reason for enlistment is to further their education through the opportunities provided by this program.

As the Armed Forces approach a more stable state in the post-Vietnam era, many more service people can be attracted to pursuing a full military career. We believe that the satisfactions of military service, properly presented alongside other job options, will result in higher rates of retention through reenlistment than those experienced in past years.

We know it is in our own best interest to reduce personnel turnover, because experienced personnel are more productive than new personnel, and a smaller proportion of our force will be employed in receiving and conducting training.

Notwithstanding these and other initiatives, we remain at a disadvantage in competing for enlisted specialists whose skills and potential are in demand in the civilian labor market. In order to operate and maintain today's sophisticated weapons systems, the Armed Forces must attract personnel who can master complex technical training, and we must retain a sufficient number of those who possess these skills. Excessive turnover of expensively trained specialists lowers the effectiveness of our military units and imposes heavy repetitive training costs. To correct this problem, the most suitable and cost effective alternative is a flexible compensation incentive paid to specific volunteers in return for a service commitment for a stipulated number of years. These incentives can be readily started, stopped or modified to reflect changing needs of the personnel management system in regard to quantity, quality, and experience level in specific skills. They are attractive to the personnel concerned and they provide a guaranteed payment which may be offered in either a lump sum or in installments. As emphasized earlier in my statement, the incentives requested are nothing more than prepaid wage differentials based on the qualifications of the available personnel and the requirements of the personnel management system.

A related aspect of this problem is that some jobs in the military are not popular among young men who are contemplating military service. For example, it is difficult to attract some men to serve as infantry soldiers because of the physical rigors and risks of the occupation. Many refuse reenlistment in the Navy because of long separations from family caused by extended sea duty. Because of these service career demotivators, a level of compensation which attracts and retains personnel in some military occupations may be insufficient in others. It is for reasons such as these that flexible differential pays or premiums are necessary.

* * * * * * *

EXCERPTS FROM

MARTIN BINKIN

THE MILITARY PAY MUDDLE

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
Washington, D.C.

* * * * * * *

Educational Assistance

By virtue of their active service, military personnel are entitled to a broad range of veterans' benefits. Chief among these is the educational assistance provided by the GI Bill, ranging from college courses to vocational and on-the-job training. Each eligible veteran is entitled to assistance for a period of one and one-half months (or the equivalent in part-time training) for each month of service on active duty. The maximum period of training depends on a variety of factors, but in no case can it exceed forty-eight months. Monthly payments for those in full-time programs are $270 for a single veteran, $321 for a married veteran, $366 for a married veteran with a child, and $22 for each additional dependent. Tuition, books, fees, and other educational expenses are paid for by the beneficiary. Low-interest loans of up to $600 yearly are also made available; repayments are not due until nine months after the borrower ceases to be a student and can be made over a period of ten years.[8] The future of the GI Bill, however, is uncertain. Pressure apparently is building up to terminate eligibility for people entering the armed services sometime in the future, on the grounds that such benefits should be connected with wartime service only.

Military personnel, while still in the service, are provided tuition assistance to attend classes offered by accredited civilian schools and colleges and to participate in correspondence study. The total cost of these programs has not been disclosed.

Table 2-5. Components of Military Pay, Allowances, and Benefits and Their Costs, Fiscal Year 1975

Component	*Cost (millions of dollars)*
Regular military compensation	20,245
Basic pay	15,142
Quarters allowance (cash and in kind)	2,535
Subsistence allowance (cash and in kind)	1,598
Tax advantage (estimated)	970
Special and premium pays	966
Special and continuation pay for medical officers	76
Pay for sea duty and duty at certain places	67
Incentive pay for hazardous duty	291
Reenlistment bonus	322
Enlistment bonus	70
Proficiency pay	126
Other[a]	14
Noncompensation personnel costs	578
Clothing issue and allowance	293
Overseas station allowance	171
Family separation allowance	42
Dislocation allocation	59
Life insurance (extra hazard premium)	6
Burial costs	7
Supplemental benefits	15,580
Retired pay[b]	6,276
Medical care	3,265
Veterans' education[c]	4,042
Social security	845
Unemployment compensation[d]	210
Commissary and exchange[e]	303
Separation pay	496
Death gratuity	11
Dependent's indemnity accrual[f]	128
Mortgage insurance premiums	4
Total	37,369

Sources: Based on data included in the President's budget for fiscal year 1975 provided by the Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, March 1974. Costs of medical care obtained from *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1975*, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 93 Cong. 2 sess. (1974), pt. 6, p. 130. Cost of veterans' benefits obtained from *The Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1976* (1975), p. 144.

[a] Includes personal money allowances for flag and general officers, pay for diving duty, and continuation pay for submarine officers.

[b] Reflects the estimate of the retired pay appropriation—the amount paid to retirees in fiscal year 1975. On an accrual accounting basis, the costs of the military retirement system for fiscal year 1975, based on actuarial valuation, was estimated to be $3.9 billion, assuming 3.5 percent interest, with no allowance for future pay or price increases.

[c] The costs shown for veterans' benefits are estimated expenditures; accrual costs are not available.

[d] Budgeted by the Department of Labor. Figures shown are estimated payments to ex-servicemen in fiscal year 1974 and are the latest data available.

[e] Excludes military pay, construction (commissaries), and costs of transportation overseas and overseas utilities (exchanges).

[f] These are one-year term insurance costs to cover the present value of future benefits to survivors of persons dying or retiring from active duty in one year. The figure excludes combat deaths and disability retirements.

Educational Benefits

Evaluating GI Bill benefits, which are both contingent and deferred, presents particularly difficult problems because of the many options that are available and the uncertainty surrounding the extent to which each might be used. According to the most recent Department of Defense estimates based on data for fiscal year 1973, about 55 percent of personnel leaving the service can be expected to enter a training program within the entitlement period, and those entering training can be expected to remain for an average of 1.75 years. At a cost per trainee year of $2,262, the average cost for each person leaving the service was calculated to be $2,165.[8] This estimate is quite conservative, however, since benefits have been increased substantially since 1973.

Table 3-4. Total Annual Military Compensation under Specified Conditions, Selected Examples by Grade and Rank, January 1975

	Officers			*Enlisted personnel*		
	O-6 Colonel	*O-4 Major*	*O-2 Lieutenant (junior grade)*	*E-8 Senior chief petty officer*	*E-5 Staff sergeant*	*E-1 Private*
Years of service	26	14	2	20	4	0
Number of dependents	3	3	2	3	2	0
Duty assignment	Staff officer	Flight surgeon	Submarine	Flight deck	Munitions specialist	Basic training
Location	Germany	United States	Sea duty	Mediterranean	Thailand	United States
Compensation (dollars)						
Regular military compensation	33,743	22,132	12,984	15,171	9,348	6,156
Basic pay	27,727	17,640	9,580	11,380	6,156	4,129
Quarters allowance	3,272	2,729	2,225	2,182	1,757	760[a]
Subsistence allowance	606	606	606	880	880	880[a]
Tax advantage (average)	2,137	1,157	573	730	555	387
Special and premium pay	...	7,140	1,500	930	192	...
Medical officers						
Special pay	...	4,200	...	...	...	...
Bonus	...	(13,500)[b]	...	...	...	...
Sea and foreign duty	...	...	...	270	192	...
Selective reenlistment bonus	...	...	...	...	(2,052)[b]	...
Enlistment bonus	...	...	...	...	...	(625)[b]
Incentive pay	...	2,940[c]	...	...	...	...
Hazardous duty	...	...	1,500	660	...	...
Other pay	2,376	...	180	360	461	...
Clothing allowance	...	...	...	...	101	...
Overseas station allowance	2,376[d]	...	...	...	...	...
Family separation allowance	...	...	180[c]	360	360	...
Benefits	7,312	8,591	1,594	4,786	4,766	990
Retirement[e]	6,292	7,311	...	3,702	4,051	...
Health care[f]	750	750	500	750	500	...
Commissary[g]	270	530	104	334	215	...
G.I. Bill benefits[h]	...	...	990	...	...	990
Total military compensation	43,431	37,863	16,258	21,248	14,767	7,146

Source: Author's estimates.

Note: Because of rounding, detail may not add to totals.

a. Allowances for the recruit are based on cash rates.

b. Figures in parentheses are illustrative bonus payments and are not included in totals.

c. Flight surgeon's assignment calls for regular participation in flying duties, and submarine officer is under way half of the time.

d. Colonel is accompanied by his family and lives in private accommodations in Frankfurt, Germany. Rate shown, effective February 1975, includes a housing allowance of $4.55 a day and a cost of living allowance of $2.05 a day.

e. Retirement benefits calculated as follows:

Present grade	*Present years of service*	*Grade at retirement*	*Years of service at retirement*	*Level annual deposit needed to accumulate commuted value*
O-6	26	O-6	30	6,292
O-4	14	O-5	20	7,311
O-2	2	does not serve to retirement		...
E-8	20	E-9	30	3,702
E-5	4	E-8	20	4,051
E-1	0	does not serve to retirement		...

f. Health care benefits based on average per capita cost of providing health care to dependents.

g. Commissary benefits calculated as a percentage of RMC, using data presented in tables 1-1 and 3-3.

h. Annual accruals of GI Bill benefits based on assumption that O-2 and E-1 would each undertake educational programs for 1.75 years after serving four years in the armed forces and that others shown would serve until retirement and not use the GI Bill.

The Implications

As the previous discussion illustrated, assigning a dollar value to many of the elements of military compensation is no mean task. The sheer number of benefits, the issue of whether certain job-related goods and services provided by the government should even be considered a form of compensation, and the fact that some entitlements are conditional and that some benefits are accrued rather than immediately consumable—all combine to place the measurement of the real value of military compensation outside the reach of almost everyone except a handful of professional pay analysts.

The Department of Defense apparently places little emphasis on conveying to prospective volunteers what their total income would be or in assisting those already in the military to evaluate their true total earnings. This may be due in part to the difficulties in value measurement discussed previously. Of equal significance, perhaps, is the incentive to play down the value of military compensation lest administration officials and legislators take a less benevolent stance with respect to pay and benefit legislation.[14]

Explaining military pay concepts to prospective recruits, all of whom will initially receive quarters and subsistence in kind, generally has been left to recruiters. In the absence of a uniform, orderly approach to evaluating allowances and benefits, the principal focus of necessity has been placed on basic pay. To the potential enlistee, expected military income, expressed as basic pay only, fares poorly in comparison with possible civilian pay opportunities.

Pay and the Quality of All-Volunteer Forces

Compensating military personnel by an amount that is larger than they are aware of could have potentially important implications for the future of the all-volunteer services. Despite the encouraging recruiting experience since the end of conscription, many participants in the decision process, concerned that this successful experience may be closely

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14. Before legislation adjusted military pay to a level comparable to that of federal civilian employees, and in the absence of labor-management negotiating machinery, the military had to lobby strongly for its pay increases. Over the years, a standard strategy has developed. The Department of Defense study group directed by Admiral Lester E. Hubbell, described this strategy as follows: "In the process of trying to convince others of how bad pay was so it could get raised—because that was the only way it could get raised in the absence of any accepted standard for what it ought to be—the military sold its own career members on how poorly paid they were. Much of this bad psychology remains as an integral part of the military folklore." (Department of Defense, "Modernizing Military Pay," vol. 1, pp. 57–59.)

related to higher unemployment rates, continue to take a wait-and-see attitude with respect to the ultimate outcome of the volunteer experiment. Until recently, principal attention centered on the "quality" of the armed forces—which is difficult to define, and no adequate yardsticks exist for measuring it. The major cause of this concern had been the declining proportion of volunteers who had completed their high school education and had scored above the 30th percentile on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT).[15] Among concerned groups, the House Appropriations Committee has been one of the most vocal. As a demonstration of its anxiety, the committee included in the defense appropriation act for fiscal year 1974 a provision requiring that at least 55 percent of total new entrants in fiscal year 1974 be high school graduates and that at least 82 percent score above the 30th percentile on the AFQT.[16] With the exception of the Marine Corps, all services met their quantitative goals under these restraints in fiscal year 1974. And although these legislative limitations were not renewed in fiscal year 1975, all services strive to abide by them.

Nonetheless, some military leaders continue to voice concern over the deterioration in discipline and performance that might accompany the transition to an all-volunteer force. The issue of whether or not this concern is legitimate is beyond the scope of this paper.[17] What is important for present purposes, however is the possibility that judgments of the success or failure of the volunteer concept could ultimately rest

[15] Standardized tests are administered to all new personnel. The most commonly used standard is the mental group designation based on the scores of the Armed Forces Qualification Test. This test encompasses word knowledge, arithmetic reasoning, tool knowledge, and pattern analysis. On the basis of test scores, examinees are divided into the following groups representing the range from very high military aptitude (category I) to very low military aptitude (category V):

Mental category	*Percentile score*
I	93–100
II	65–92
III	31–64
IV	10–30
V	9 and below

[16] *Report on Department of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1974*, House Committee on Appropriations, 93 Cong. 1 sess. (1973), p. 19.

[17] Moreover, it is not clear that the measures now available to measure quality are as directly related to job performance as adherence to them might imply. For further discussion of this matter, see Martin Binkin and John D. Johnston, *All-Volunteer Armed Forces: Progress, Problems, and Prospects*, Report prepared for the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 93 Cong. 1 sess. (1973).

on this issue. It is conceivable that, as the nation returns to full employment levels, recruitment could suffer and greater pressures might develop to "solve" the quality problem by offering additional incentives, by reducing military manpower, or perhaps by returning to conscription. Within limits, however, the quality of the armed forces might be improved by increasing the extent to which military pay is recognized, thus avoiding the possible financial, national security, and social costs associated with the alternatives.

This conclusion is based on the relation between pay and enlistments; that is, the number of people in a given population who would choose to enlist in the military services depends in some measure on the level of military pay. That such a relationship exists is widely accepted; the shape of the curve that represents the relationship, however, has been and continues to be a subject of controversy. At issue is the magnitude of the "elasticity factor" (the percentage increase in volunteers that can be expected for a given percentage increase in pay) and the range over which it may be appropriate (the extent to which results based on empirical data can be extrapolated).[18]

Nevertheless, the interaction of pay perception, elasticity, and the quality of volunteers can be illustrated. In fiscal year 1974, for example, 26 percent of all Army recruits had both completed high school and scored above the 50th percentile on the AFQT. The percentage that could be expected to be in that select group under a range of elasticity factors and of increases in pay perception is shown below:

	Percentage of enlistees who would be high school graduates scoring above 50th percentile if pay were perceived to be:		
Elasticity factor	*10% higher*	*20% higher*	*30% higher*
0.5	27.3	28.6	29.9
1.0	28.6	31.2	33.8
1.25	29.3	32.5	35.8

Thus, if the target population—in this case males between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one who had completed high school and who had the ability to score above the 50th percentile on the AFQT—had perceived military pay to be 20 percent larger and if the elasticity factor for this group had been 1.0, volunteers from that population would have accounted for 31 percent of total Army recruits in fiscal year 1974, rather than 26 percent. The assumption, of course, is that those volunteers who met the highest standards would have been the first selected by the Army.

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[18] The task of measuring pay elasticity has been made difficult by several factors. Obviously, pay is not the only influence on a person's decision to enlist. In addition to general increases in military pay and allowance rates, several other factors simultaneously influenced recruitment during the transition to an all-volunteer force: recruiting and advertising campaigns had been put into high gear; special enlistment bonuses had been offered; enlistees were given a wider choice of

In practice, the extent to which this particular group of prospective volunteers would have been influenced by increased pay visibility is hard to predict. On balance, research results, though sparse and inconclusive, do suggest that the quality of the armed forces could be improved by increasing pay perception. To estimate the extent to which it could be improved will require further analysis.[19]

Improvements in quality could obviously be obtained through other means, such as intensified recruiting and advertising, additional financial incentives, or increased options. Additional costs would be associated with each. However, before attempting to "buy" quality in these ways, or reducing combat forces, or returning to conscription, efforts should first be made to get the maximum return from the current investment in military pay.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

27 May 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF THE ARMY STAFF

SUBJECT: The Value of Quality Soldiers to the Army

Attached is the report of the Quality Soldier Study prepared by TRADOC. In reviewing the report, Mr. Callaway commented that he was pleased with the work done thus far, but would like to continue to work on quantifying costs. For example, the 15% reduction in quality accessions (TRADOC's "best estimate" of impact of loss of the GI Bill) results in an additional 1375 AWOL's, 1503 Article 15's, 430 CM's and 580 occasional users of hard drugs. It would be useful if the dollar costs of these increased disciplinary problems could be quantified. Similarly, it would be valuable to attempt to quantify the dollar costs of the reduction in leadership quality. The purpose of quantifying the dollar value of quality accessions is to demonstrate the cost effectiveness of maintaining the recruiting effort and recruiting incentives (to include bonuses, in-service education, and post-service education) which will attract quality enlistees, as measured by educational achievement, mental and physical ability, and moral and social standards.

Mr. Callaway also commented that in obtaining an alternative to the GI Bill, we will have to demonstrate the impact of its loss on maintaining representation within the Army, as well as recruiting our best soldiers. In this regard, the Project AHEAD enlistees represent a particularly high quality group which would be lost without the GI Bill. It would be very useful if these enlistees could be tracked through BCT and AIT and their performance compared against the performance of other enlistees.

Request your comments on the feasibility of further quantifying the dollar costs associated with quality accessions; and, tracking the Project AHEAD enlistees through BCT and AIT.

Leonard P. Wishart, III
LTC, GS
Military Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army

cc:
USA
ASA(M&RA)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL
WASHINGTON D.C. 20310

[illegible]

MEMORANDUM THRU: CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS)

FOR: SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Effect of Possible Loss of GI Educational Benefits on Army Enlistments--INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

1. On 23 October 1975, during a meeting with the DCSPER, the following statement was made, "Regarding the potential loss of the GI Bill, we need to look carefully at this. We may already be getting increased enlistments from those who anticipate the impending loss of GI educational benefits."

2. USAREC was asked to consider the issue. On 12, 13, and 25 November surveys were taken at selected AFEES. The results are attached at TAB A. They indicate:

-- More than 8 out of 10 enlistees plan to use the educational benefits of the GI Bill.

-- Recruits are being advised of loss of GI Bill.

-- Approximately half believe that they must be on active duty by 31 December 1975.

-- Possible loss of these benefits influencing the enlistment date of roughly 4 out of 10.

3. These data are consistent with finding of the other Services.

FOR THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL:

1 Incl
as

LTC Clifford/75150

Results of Army Recruit Probe Survey (10)

	[illegible]		25 Nov	
1. Total Population	1,[illegible]		75	
2. Education Level				
a. NHSG	46%		52%	
b. HSG	54		48	
	100%		100%	
3. Do you plan to use educational provisions of GI Bill?	NHSC	HSC	NHSC	HSC
a. Definitely Yes	54%	58%	56%	50%
b. Probably Yes	33	33	33	28
c. Indifferent at This Time	2	4	3	10
d. Probably No	8	4	8	6
e. Definitely No	2	1	0	6
	100%	100%	100%	100%
4. What is your understanding of a recruit's eligibility for the educational behefits of the GI Bill?				
a. Limited to those on active duty by 30 June 1976	4%	5%	3%	0%
b. Limited to those on active duty by 31 December 1975	53	58	55	66
c. Not limited by any date, but may be in the future	10	14	6	9
d. Not limited by any date and is not being considered by Congress or the Administration	2	3	3	0
e. I do not know	20	20	33	25
	100%	100%	100%	100%
5. Is your date for entering active duty influenced by the possibility that the educational benefits of the GI Bill may be terminated?				
Yes	42%	47%	43%	44%
No	58	53	57	56
	100%	100%	100%	100%

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA 23651

ATCG 14 MAY 1975

Dear Fred:

Inclosed is the report of the Quality Soldier Study which you and the Secretary asked me to make in determination of the impact of loss of the GI Bill.

The statistics clearly illustrate the value of the high school graduate versus the non-high school graduate. High school graduates and soldiers in the upper mental categories contribute substantially more to unit mission accomplishment; they are more likely to be assigned to leadership positions; they demonstrate a higher level of job proficiency whether in a leadership position or other; and they pose fewer disciplinary problems.

Statistics aside, our discussions with commanders at all levels establish that high quality men mean high quality unit readiness and unit performance. The GI Bill is an important factor in providing us with that quality now. It is certain that we will be outnumbered and perhaps outgunned in the next war. If that unfavorable posture is combined with a force made up of soldiers of lesser quality than those we are now recruiting, our chances of winning the first battle of the next war are substantially reduced.

I hope that this report will provide sufficient justification for support of continuation of the GI Bill. Bill Fulton and his people have worked closely with us on the study.

Respectfully,

W. E. DePUY
General, United States Army
Commanding

1 Inclosure
As stated

General Fred C. Weyand
Chief of Staff
United States Army
Washington, DC 20310

QUALITY SOLDIER STUDY

A. PURPOSE. To provide information to support continuation of the GI Bill.

B. METHODOLOGY. The study encompassed training, combat, combat support and combat service support units in TRADOC and FORSCOM and investigated four primary areas of interest: resources, leadership, discipline and job proficiency (TAB A). For purposes of the study, the quality soldier was defined as a high school graduate or in Mental Category I-III.

1. The initial phase of the study involved a complete and exhaustive literature search to collect information from previous studies and research conducted in related areas. This was followed by the extraction of selected data from current reports prepared at various levels throughout the Army relating to quality. Data included extracts from the Enlisted Master File and reports prepared by DA and USAREC relating to the quality soldier.

2. The second phase of the study involved a comprehensive survey of 70 company size units assigned to FORSCOM and trainees assigned to BCT and AIT Brigades in TRADOC. This permitted the establishment of a statistical base down to squad level to determine the contribution of the quality soldier serving with units in the field and being trained within TRADOC. Data was also collected from tank gunnery programs conducted at Ft Hood and Ft Carson to correlate quality with tank gunnery performance.

3. The data collected during the first two phases was collated and analyzed in three major areas:

a. The characteristics of the quality soldier in terms of leadership, discipline and job proficiency.

b. The impact of the quality soldier on unit mission accomplishment.

c. The effects resulting from decreasing the number of quality soldiers assigned to a unit.

4. The effects resulting from a decrement in quality were examined at three levels in terms of resource impact, degradation of the leadership base, increase in disciplinary problems and decline in job proficiency. The three levels were established based on HQ USAREC optimistic, pessimistic and best estimate of the decrement in quality resulting from loss of the GI Bill.

C. MAJOR FINDINGS. The study resulted in findings in nine areas of investigation summarized below. Supportive data related to each finding is at TAB A.

1. Loss Rates in Training. (incl 1, TAB A)

a. Trainee Discharge Program (TDP). The TDP loss rate for non-high school graduates (NHSG) is 1.8 times greater than the high school graduate (HSG) loss rate. The Mental Category IV loss rate is higher than any other Mental Category loss rate and 2.9 times higher than the Mental Category I rate.

b. Adverse Losses in Training. (Adverse losses include discharge for unsuitability, unfitness, misconduct and good of service). The NHSG loss rate is 2.2 times greater than the HSG loss rate in BCT and 1.5 times greater in AIT.

2. Academic Failures. (incl 2, TAB A)

a. MOS Courses Conducted at TRADOC Service Schools. The Mental Category IV is 2.8 times more likely to fail an MOS producing course than the Mental Category I-III.

b. MOS Courses Conducted at TRADOC Training Centers. The Mental Category IV is 3.7 times more likely to fail than the Mental Category I-III.

c. Combat Arms MOS Courses Conducted at Ft Knox, Ft Polk and Ft Sill (MOS 11B, 11C, 11E and 13B). The NHSG is 1.8 times more likely to fail than the HSG.

3. Self-Paced Instruction (incl 3, TAB A). The NHSG required 10.9% more time to complete a self-paced course in AIT than the HSG, based on limited data available.

4. Accelerated Promotion in Training (incl 4, TAB A). The HSG is 1.5 times more likely to receive an accelerated promotion to PVT E2 upon completion of BCT than the NHSG.

5. Disciplinary & Loss Rates in Units. (incl 5, TAB A)

a. Adverse Losses in Units. (Adverse losses include discharge for unsuitability, unfitness, misconduct and good of service). The NHSG loss rate is 1.6 times greater than the HSG loss rate. The Mental Category IV loss rate is 1.3 times greater than the Mental Category I-III rate.

b. AWOL in Units. The NHSG AWOL rate is 2.6 times greater than the HSG rate. The Mental Category IV AWOL rate is 1.4 times the Mental Category I-III rate.

c. Article 15 in Units. The NHSG is 1.7 times more likely to receive non-judicial punishment than the HSG.

d. Courts-Martial in Units. The NHSG is 2.8 times more likely to receive a court-martial (general or special) than the HSG.

e. Use of Hard Drugs. The NHSG is twice as likely to be an occasional user of hard drugs than the HSG.

6. MOS Proficiency Test Failures (incl 6, TAB A). The NHSG MOS test failure rate is 1.6 times the HSG rate. The Mental Category IV failure rate is 1.6 times the Mental Category I-III rate.

7. Tank Gunnery Performance (incl 7, TAB A). Two sets of data were collected; one set from Ft Hood on individual tank gunnery performance and one set from Ft Carson on crew tank gunnery performance.

a. The Ft Hood data revealed that the NHSG performance was better than the HSG performance.

b. The Ft Carson data showed no significant difference in the performance of the HSG and NHSG.

c. The data does not indicate a positive correlation between education level and performance in manual skills such as the eye/hand coordination involved in tank gunnery.

8. Leader Performance in Units. Data based on survey of commanders and supervisors in 70 company-size units. (incl 8, TAB A)

a. The HSG is 1.4 times more likely to be selected to fill a key position than the NHSG. The Mental Category I-IIIA is 1.5 times more likely to be selected than the Mental Category IV. There is no significant difference between Mental Category I-IIIB and IV selection rate.

b. The NHSG is 3.7 times more likely to perform unsatisfactorily than the HSG when serving in a key position. The Mental Category IV is three times more likely to perform unsatisfactorily than the Mental Category I-IIIA and twice as likely to perform unsatisfactorily than the Mental Category I-IIIB.

c. The NHSG is twice as likely as the HSG to lack the leadership qualities of accepting responsibility, communication, and having a favorable influence on others. The NHSG is 3 times more likely than the HSG to be undependable when filling a key position in a unit.

d. The HSG leader is 1.5 times more likely to be considered as absolutely essential to accomplishment of the unit mission than the NHSG.

9. Job (MOS) Proficiency in Units. Data based on survey of commanders and supervisors in 70 company size units. (incl 9, TAB A)

In all positions, including leadership positions, the NHSG is 2.8 times more likely to receive an unsatisfactory rating in job proficiency than the HSG. The Mental Category IV is 1.6 times more likely to receive an unsatisfactory rating in job proficiency than the Mental Category I-IIIA.

10. GED In-Service Costs. (incl 10, TAB A). The termination of the GI Bill will result in the loss of approximately $25M dollars annually provided by the Veterans Administration for support of the Predischarge Education Program (PREP) and tuition assistance for college level program. This loss will require the Army to support from the GED funds the administration and conduct of a similar high school diploma program and the tuition assistance costs for in-service personnel participating in college level programs.

D. USAREC ESTIMATE OF QUALITY DECREMENT. (TAB B) Estimates of the decrease in the percentage of HSG enlisted as a result of the loss of the GI Bill were developed by analysis of statistical models and surveys of enlistees. The Secretary of Army's quality accession goal for FY 76, 70% NPS HSG input, was used as a base from which to decrement. Three decrement estimates were developed.

1. Optimistic: A 5% decrement in the percentage of NPS HSG accessions was developed based on the OMB 1973 study of the GI Bill.

2. Pessimistic: A 30% decrement in the percentage of NPS HSG accessions was developed from a September 1974 AFEES Survey.

3. Best Estimate: The best estimate of what USAREC considers to be a realistic decrement from the 70% HSG goal is 10-15%. This decrement is based on analysis of all data, including a survey of Project Ahead initial enrollment which showed that 9% of 3d Qtr FY 75 HSG accessions enlisted because of educational benefits provided by the Project Ahead program.

E. IMPACT OF QUALITY DEGRADATION. The impact of the findings presented in paragraph C will vary according to the magnitude of the decrement of quality accessions. The following impacts upon resources, leadership, discipline and job proficiency are based on the USAREC estimates of quality accession decrement presented in paragraph D.

1. OPTIMISTIC (5% decrement in quality accessions--No significant impact on the Army)

Resources (incl 11, TAB A)

- Increased annual losses require 1,194 additional accessions.
- Expansion of training load resulting from increased accessions and academic recycles is 528 trainee man-years, the equivalent of a tank battalion.
- Added annual training and accession costs of $2.0 million.
- Added OMA costs of $3.7 million to support high school and college level in-service education programs during the first year and $18 million per year thereafter.

Leadership

- Insignificant impact on availability and performance of quality leaders in units.

Discipline

- 463 additional AWOL per year in units.
- 510 additional Article 15 per year in units.
- 147 additional court-martials per year in units.
- 197 additional occasional users of hard drugs per year in units.

Job Proficiency

- 416 additional MOS proficiency test failures each year.
- No significant decline in individual job proficiency in units.

2. BEST ESTIMATE (15% decrement in quality accession)

Resources (incl 11, TAB A)

- Increased annual losses require 3,818 additional accessions.
- Expansion of training load resulting from increased accessions and academic recycles is 1,661 trainee man-years, the equivalent of two armored cavalry squadrons.
- Added annual training and accession costs of $7 million.
- Added OMA cost of $4.4 million to support high school and college level in-service education programs during the first year and $22.5 million per year thereafter.

Leadership

- A 6.6% decrease in the number of personnel who perform satisfactorily in key positions in units.
- A 2-3% decrement in the overall quality of unit leaders.
- A 1-2% decrement in the leadership traits of key personnel in the areas of dependability, communication, responsibility and influence.

Discipline

- 1,375 additional AWOL per year in units.
- 1,503 additional Article 15 per year in units.
- 430 additional court-martials per year in units.
- 580 additional occasional users of hard drugs per year in units.

Job Proficiency

- 1,224 additional MOS proficiency test failures each year.
- A 6.0% decrease in the number of personnel serving in key positions in units who will be proficient in their job skill.

3. PESSIMISTIC (30% decrement in quality accessions)

Resources (incl 11; TAB A)

- Increased annual losses require 7,777 additional accessions.
- Expansion of training load resulting from increased accessions and academic recycles is 3,368, the equivalent of four mechanized infantry battalions.
- Added annual training and accession costs of $15 million.
- Added OMA costs of $5.4 million to support high school and college-level in-service education programs during the first year and $28 million per year thereafter.

Leadership

- A 12.9% decrement in the number of personnel who will perform satisfactorily in key positions in units.
- A 7-8% decrement in the overall quality of unit leaders.
- A 4-5% decrement in the leadership traits of key personnel in the areas of dependability, communication, reliability and influence.

Discipline

- 2,838 additional AWOL per year in units.
- 3,105 additional Article 15 per year in units.
- 887 additional court-martials per year in units.
- 1,198 additional occasional users of hard drugs per year in units.

Job Proficiency

- 2,629 additional MOS proficiency test failures each year.
- A 9.0% decrease in the number of personnel serving in key positions in units who will be proficient in their job skill.

F. ANNUAL IMPACT AT BATTALION LEVEL. Impact is applied to E3 and E4 positions authorized in "H" series TOE. Decrement is based upon FY 76 recruiting goal of 70% NPS HSG.

1. Mechanized Infantry Battalion: consists of 39 officer/WO and 811 enlisted positions of which 533 are E3-E4. (incl 12, TAB A)

	DECREMENT		
	5%	15%	30%
Education Profile	-26 HSG	-77 HSG	-169 HSG
Annual Adverse Losses	+1	+3	+6
Annual AWOL	+2	+5	+10
Article 15	+2	+6	+11
Courts Martial	No change	+1	+3
Hard Drug Use	+1	+3	+6
MOS Test Failures	+2	+5	+10
HSG in Key Position	-8 HSG	-12 HSG	-48 HSG
Satisfactory Performance in Key Position	-1	-3	-6
Satisfactory Performance in all Positions	-3	-8	-15

2. The impact on the battalion does not appear, on the surface, to be significant. However, each individual serving in a key position influences the actions of his subordinates and peers. A mechanized rifle battalion operating in sustained combat operations acts as a team, relying on the individual to perform his job as well as his role as a member of that team. If the individual does not measure up to required standards, the performance of the team and accomplishment of its mission is jeopardized.

a. Additional adverse losses result in premature departure of individuals from a unit. Their replacements must be recruited, trained and integrated into the unit as team members. This process takes 6-9 months.

b. Increased disciplinary problems such as AWOL, Article 15, courts-martial and hard drug use require the unit commander to devote additional time to resolve these matters which detract from his primary goal of directing his unit toward mission accomplishment.

c. Increased MOS test failures necessitate additional individual remedial training which detract from unit training.

d. A decline in the number of individuals who perform their assigned jobs satisfactorily places an increased workload on the more competent individuals in the unit.

G. CONCLUSIONS

1. The loss of the GI Bill will result in a decrement of 5% to 30% in high school graduate accessions.

2. A 5% decrement will not have a significant effect on the Army.

3. A 15%-30% decrement will cause severe impacts in the following areas:

Resources

- Savings attained by elimination of the GI Bill will be partially offset by funds expended to support Army in-service education programs and increased training costs. ($5 to $20 million per year).
- Increased student load will cause concomitant decrease in annual trained strength (from 528 to 3,368).

Leadership

- The number of quality personnel available to fill key positions will drop.
- Leadership abilities of personnel in key positions will decline with a consequential reduction in combat capability.
- Commander's job will be complicated by the decrease in the number of dependable leaders.
- Although long term impacts have not been addressed in this study, a quality decrement will have far-reaching effects on the senior enlisted corps of the future.

Discipline

- Increased premature losses in a unit as a result of disciplinary administrative discharges will result in increased vacancies that may remain unfilled for up to nine months.

Job Proficiency

- Significant decline in overall job proficiency.
- Significant decline in the job proficiency of leaders.
- Decreased ability of individuals to perform their job will have an adverse effect on unit mission accomplishment in peace and war.
- The expanding technology of the Army can ill-afford any decrement in individual job proficiency.

Unit Mission Accomplishment

- The ability of a maneuver battalion to accomplish its mission will be reduced through the adverse impact in leadership, discipline and job proficiency. The commander will find fewer quality personnel available to accomplish the multitude of tasks and missions demanded of his unit. In effect, he will be asked to do more with less in an environment where readiness of the Army is of paramount importance.

INCL 1, TAB A

LOSS RATES IN TRAINING

TYPE DISCHARGE	EDUCATION LOSS RATES		MENTAL CATEGORY LOSS RATES				
	HSG	NHSC	I	II	IIIA	IIIB	IV
Trainee Discharge[1] Program	7.2%	12.8%	4.2%	6.6%	9.8%	11.2%	12.1%
Adverse (BCT)[2]	.6%	1.3%	*	*	*	*	*
Adverse (AIT)[2]	.8%	1.2%	*	*	*	*	*

NOTES:

[1] Trainee Discharge Program data collected from NPS male Regular Army losses during period 1 Sep 73 - 31 Mar 75. Source: HQ TRADOC

[2] Adverse losses include discharge for unsuitability, unfitness, misconduct and good of service. Data collected from losses occurring in training during period 1 Sep 73 - 1 Jul 74. Source: HQ TRADOC

*Data not available by Mental Category.

INCL 2, TAB A

ACADEMIC FAILURES

	EDUCATION FAILURE RATES		MENTAL CATEGORY FAILURE RATES	
	HSC	NHSC	I-III	IV
Service School MOS[1] Courses	*	*	10%	28%
ATC MOS Courses[2]	*	*	3.8%	14.1%
Combat Arms MOS[3] Courses	2.8%	5.1%	**	**

NOTES:

[1] Sample from data available in 18 of 240 (7.5%) MOS courses taught at TRADOC service schools.

[2] Based on failure rates in AIT courses taught at TRADOC ATC during FY 74. Sample size of 6300 in 40 MOS courses, Jan-Mar 75 data.

[3] Based on failure rates in MOS 11E (Ft Knox) 11B and C (Ft Polk) and 13B (Ft Sill) Feb - Mar 75.

*Data not available by Education Level.

**Data not available by Mental Category.

INCL 3, TAB A

SELF-PACED INSTRUCTION

1. TRADOC schools were surveyed to determine the amount of time required to complete self-paced instructional courses by education level and mental category.

2. The surveyed schools' sample represented 26 of the 31 courses that are currently self-paced. Four of the 26 courses revealed a significant difference in the amount of time required by education level. The high school graduates completed their courses in 73% of the maximum allowable time; the non-high school graduate required 82% of the course length. For a 9 week course (average length), the HSG will require 6.6 weeks to complete the course; the NHSG will require 7.4 weeks.

3. Based on the results of the sample, self-pace instruction reduced training time required to complete instructional material by 10-20%.

INCL 4, TAB A

ACCELERATED PROMOTION IN TRAINING

	EDUCATION SELECTION RATE		MENTAL CATEGORY SELECTION RATE	
	HSC	NHSC	I-III	IV
Promotion Rate[1]	15.2%	10.2%	13.7%	12.4%

NOTE:

[1] Promotion rate based on sample of 1,503 trainees who received an accelerated promotion to E2 upon successful completion of BCT. Data collected from Ft Jackson, Ft Sill, Ft Polk and Ft Knox in April 1975.

INCL 5, TAB A

ANNUAL DISCIPLINARY AND LOSS RATES IN UNITS

	EDUCATION		MENTAL CATEGORY	
RATES	HSG	NHSG	I-III	IV
Adverse Loss[1]	5.3%	8.7%	6.7%	8.7%
AWOL[2]	4.1%	10.5%	4.7%	6.8%
ART 15[3]	10.0%	17.0%	*	*
Courts-Martial[4]	1.1%	3.1%	*	*
Hard Drug Use[5]	2.8%	5.5%	*	*
Dropped from Rolls[6]	4.7%	7.4%	*	*

NOTES:

[1] Data from DCSPER DA data based on losses during FY 72-73.

[2] Data based on 27,467 personnel in grade E1-E4 assigned to units as of Feb 75 (extract from EMF).

[3] Data from Aug 74 DA DCSPER HRD Survey covering one year period.

[4] Army wide data from DA DCSPER JAG covering period Feb - Oct 74.

[5] Data from Aug 74 DA DCSPER HRD Survey covering one year period.

[6] Rates derived from DA DCSPER data of July 1973.

*Data not available by Mental Category.

INCL 6, TAB A

MOS PROFICIENCY TEST FAILURES[1]

	EDUCATION		MENTAL CATEGORY			
	HSG	NHSG	I	II	III	IV
Failure Rate	9.2%	14.9%	4.0%	5.8%	9.9%	13.7%

I-III combined 8.6%

NOTE:

[1] Based on data of all enlisted personnel (E1-E4) assigned to TRADOC as of Feb 75 who took an MOS proficiency test.

INCL 7, TAB A

TANK GUNNERY PERFORMANCE

FT HOOD, TABLE V[1]

	HSG[2]		NHSG	
	Number	% of all HSG	Number	% of all NHSG
Failed to Qualify	32	40%	12	23.5%
Qualified	48	60%	39	76.5%

FT CARSON, TABLE VIII[3]

CREW COMPOSITION[2]

	ALL HSG	HSG & GED	HSG & NHSG	NHSG & GED
No. Crews Above Median[4]	5	10	4	6
No. Crews Below Median	5	10	5	8

NOTES:

[1] Data collected at Ft Hood, Oct 73 (HQ MASSTER). Individual firing exercise, daylight, moving target. Qualification score = 740 or higher.

[2] Data by Mental Category not available.

[3] Data collected at Ft Carson, Apr 75 (1/77 Arm). Tank crew firing exercise, daylight and night. Qualification score = 1800 or higher.

[4] Median score = 1925.

INCL 8, TAB A

LEADER PERFORMANCE IN UNITS[1]

KEY POSITION SELECTION RATES[2]

	EDUCATION		MENTAL CATEGORY					TOT
	HSG	NHSG	I	II	IIIA	IIIB	IV	
Selected	34%	24.1%	39.4%	41.3%	29.6%	27.7%	24.3%	31.
Not Selected	66%	75.9%	60.6%	58.7%	70.4%	72.3%	75.7%	68.

I-IIIA selected - 35.8% IIIB & IV selected 2

KEY POSITION PERFORMANCE RATES[3]

	EDUCATION		MENTAL CATEGORY			TOT
	HSG	NHSG	I-IIIA	I-IIIB	IV	
Satisfactory	95.4%	83.1%	95.7%	93.8%	85.6%	93.
Unsatisfactory	4.6%	16.9%	4.3%	6.2%	14.4%	7.

KEY POSITION LEADERSHIP QUALITIES

	HSG[4]		NHSG[5]	
QUALITIES	FAVORABLE	UNFAVORABLE	FAVORABLE	UNFAVORABLE
1. MOS Proficiency	93.1%	6.9%	78.4%	21.6%
2. Dependability	91.4%	8.6%	70.3%	29.7%
3. Hard Worker	84.8%	15.2%	62.9%	37.1%
4. Ability to Communicate	86.1%	13.9%	68.3%	31.7%
5. Favorable Influence	82.4%	17.6%	60.2%	39.8%
6. "Take Charge" Attitude	79.4%	20.6%	57.1%	42.9%

LEADER PERFORMANCE IN UNITS (CON'T)

Contribution to Unit Mission Accomplishment[6]

a. Of all HSG filling key positions, 48.5% were rated by their supervisors/commanders as absolutely essential to accomplishment of the unit mission.

b. Of all NHSG filling key positions, 32.5% were rated by their supervisors/commanders as absolutely essential to accomplishment of the unit mission.

NOTES:

[1] Based on TRADOC survey of sampled FORSCOM units, April 1975. Total sample = 2,627 representing 70 different company-size units in combat, combat support and combat service support oragnizations.

[2] Key position is a position defined by the unit commander as essential to sustained combat operation.

[3] Performance measured in terms of a combination of attitude, dependability, motivation and job skill proficiency.

[4] Ratings of all HSG holding key positions based on commander/supervisor subjective evaluation of their performance.

[5] Ratings of all NHSG holding key positions based on commander/supervisor subjective evaluation of their performance.

[6] Commanders and supervisors of key personnel were asked to comment on the degree of contribution of each key individual to the accomplishment of the unit mission. The responses were collated by HSG and NHSG.

INCL 9, TAB A

JOB (MOS) PROFICIENCY IN UNITS[1]

OVERALL JOB PROFICIENCY[2]

	EDUCATION		MENTAL CATEGORY		TOTAL
	HSG	NHSG	I-IIIA	IV	
Satisfactory	94.5%	84.8%	93.4%	89.4%	92.0%
Unsatisfactory	5.5%	15.2%	6.6%	10.6%	8.0%

KEY POSITION JOB PROFICIENCY[2]

	EDUCATION		MENTAL CATEGORY		TOTAL
	HSG	NHSG	I-IIIA	IV	
Satisfactory	97.4%	90.4%	97.7%	91.3%	95.9%
Unsatisfactory	2.6%	9.6%	2.3%	8.7%	4.1%

NOTES:

[1] Data collected during TRADOC Apr 75 survey of sampled FORSCOM units.

[2] Job proficiency evaluated subjectively by supervisors/commanders of FORSCOM sample population. 824 of 2627 in sample were key personnel.

INCL 10, TAB A
GED IN-SERVICE COSTS

The Veterans' Administration provides an approximate $28.M to the Army for in-service program support of the Predischarge Education Program (PREP) and tuition for college courses. The DA estimated share of the VA FY 75 budget for these programs is $19.M and $9.M respectively.

DECREMENT %	ADDITIONAL OMA FUNDS					
	FY 76		FY 77		FY 78	
5	PREP	2.933M	PREP	14.735M	PREP	15.834M
	College	.741	College	2.912	College	4.550
	TOTAL	3.674M	TOTAL	17.647M	TOTAL	20.384M
15	PREP	3.771M	PREP	18.945M	PREP	20.358M
	College	.627	College	2.464	College	3.850
	TOTAL	4.398M	TOTAL	21.409	TOTAL	24.208M
30	PREP	5.028M	PREP	25.260M	PREP	27.144M
	College	.456	College	1.792	College	2,800
	TOTAL	5.484M	TOTAL	27.052M	TOTAL	29.944M

Additional OMA costs were determined from amounts provided by DA TAG-EDUC which were based on an Army NHSG content not exceeding 50%. Straight-line cost estimates were made for each decrement based on the DA determined amounts. Estimates assumed zero PREP cost if all accessions were HSG.

Increasing costs in out-years is due primarily to Army assumption of the full administration and conduct of the HS level programs.

INCL 11, TAB A

RESOURCE DATA

Cause of Loss	Expected Additional Occurrences/year[1] 5%	15%	30%
TDP Loss	600	2003	4006
Training Loss	166	554	1168
Loss in Unit	227	669	1382
DFR	201	592	1221
TOTAL (Additional Accessions)	1194	3818	7777
Academic Failure	785	2355	4710

INCREASE IN TTPP&S STRENGTH

Area	Student Man Years	Student Man Years	Student Man Years
Additional Accessions in Training[2]	387 MY	1,237 MY	2,520 MY
Academic Failures[3]	141	424	848
TOTAL	528 MY	1,661 MY	3,368 MY

NOTE:

[1] Expected additional occurrences computed by applying loss rates of incl 1, 2, and 3 to annual content of accessions (e.g., under 70% HSG accession rate, 174,000 annual accessions would incur 14,000 TDP losses. Under 65% HSG accession rate, TDP losses would be 14,600).

[2] Based on formula: $\frac{\text{(Total Losses)} \times \text{(16.2 weeks)}}{50}$

[3] Based on formula: $\frac{\text{(Academic Failures)} \times \text{(9 weeks)}}{50}$

The following data was used to compute variable costs associated with decrements in quality accessions.

Recruiting	$288 per accession
Transportation from AFEES to BCT	$50 per accession
BCT Mission	$307 per trainee man-year
AIT Mission	$381 per trainee man-year
MPA	$4,300 per trainee man-year
Academic Recycle	$1,149 per trainee man-year
Time to complete BCT & AIT	16.2 weeks
Average time in AIT	9 weeks

INCL 11 (CONT)

DETAILED COST ANALYSIS

COST AREA	DECREMENT IN HSG ACCESSION		
	5%	15%	30%
Recruiting 1/	$404,000	$1,290,000	$2,629,000
BCT Losses 2/	49,000	162,000	363,000
BCT Mission 3/	47,000	149,000	300,000
BCT MPA 4/	656,000	2,085,000	4,205,000
AIT Losses 5/	24,000	81,000	174,000
AIT Mission 6/	68,000	243,000	434,000
AIT MPA 7/	771,000	2,742,000	4,896,000
Academic Failure 8/	87,000	260,000	520,000
TOTAL	$2,106,000	$7,012,000	$13,521,000

Formulas: (See next page for variable definitions)

1/Recruiting Cost = $\mathrm{IA} \times \mathrm{RT}$

2/BCT Losses = $\frac{\mathrm{IA} \times \mathrm{HA} \times \mathrm{HL} \times \mathrm{BL} \times \mathrm{BM}}{50} + \frac{\mathrm{IA} \times \mathrm{HA} \times \mathrm{HL} \times \mathrm{BL} \times \mathrm{MPA}}{50} +$

$$\frac{\mathrm{IA} \times \mathrm{NA} \times \mathrm{NL} \times \mathrm{BL} \times \mathrm{BM}}{50} + \frac{\mathrm{IA} \times \mathrm{NA} \times \mathrm{NL} \times \mathrm{BL} \times \mathrm{MPA}}{50}$$

3/BCT Mission = $\frac{\mathrm{TB} \times \mathrm{BM} \times \mathrm{LB}}{50}$

4/BCT MPA = $\frac{\mathrm{TB} \times \mathrm{MPA} \times \mathrm{LB}}{50}$

5/AIT Losses = $\frac{\mathrm{TB} \times \mathrm{HA} \times \mathrm{HL} \times \mathrm{AL} \times \mathrm{AM}}{50} + \frac{\mathrm{TB} \times \mathrm{HA} \times \mathrm{HL} \times \mathrm{AL} \times \mathrm{MPA}}{50} +$

$$\frac{\mathrm{TB} \times \mathrm{NA} \times \mathrm{NL} \times \mathrm{AL} \times \mathrm{AM}}{50} + \frac{\mathrm{TB} \times \mathrm{NA} \times \mathrm{NL} \times \mathrm{AL} \times \mathrm{MPA}}{50}$$

6/AIT Mission = $\frac{\mathrm{TA} \times \mathrm{AM}}{50}$

7/AIT MPA = $\frac{\mathrm{TA} \times \mathrm{MPA} \times \mathrm{LA}}{50}$

8/Academic Failure = $\frac{\mathrm{AF} \times \mathrm{FT} \times \mathrm{FC}}{50}$

VARIABLE DEFINITIONS

IA = Increased Number Accessions

RT = Recruiting & Transportation Cost ($338)

HA = HSG Accession Rate

HL = HSG Loss Rate

BL = BCT Average Time to Loss (4 wks)

BM = BCT Mission Cost ($307/trainee year)

NA = NHSG Accession Rate

NL = NHSG Loss Rate

MPA = Military Pay and Allowances ($4,300/trainee year)

TB = Trainees Completing BCT

AL = AIT Average Time to Loss (4 wks)

AM = AIT Mission Cost ($381/trainee year)

TA = Trainees Completing AIT

LB = Length BCT (7.2 wks)

LA = Length AIT (9 wks)

AF = Academic Failures

FC = Failure Cost ($1,149)

FT = Failure Time (4.8 wks)

INCL 12, TAB A

IMPACT ON BATTALION SIZE UNIT

Impact shown is based on 533 E-3 and E-4 personnel authorized for Inf Bn (MECH) 07047H series TO&E. Distribution of HSG & NHSG within categories based on rates of incl 5, 6, 8 & 9.

CATEGORY	70% HSG-30% NHSG ACCESSION RATE*	55% HSG-45% NHSG ACCESSION RATE**	NET CHANGE	%
EDUCATION PROFILE:	382 HSG 151 NHSG	305 HSG 228 NHSG	-77 HSG	
ANNUAL ADVERSE LOSSES:	20 HSG 13 NHSG 33	16 HSG 20 NHSG 36	+3	+ 9.1
ANNUAL AWOL:	16 HSG 16 NHSG 32	13 HSG 24 NHSG 37	+5	+15.6
ARTICLE 15:	38 HSG 26 NHSG 64	31 HSG 39 NHSG 70	+6	+ 9.4
COURTS MARTIAL:	4 HSG 5 NHSG 9	3 HSG 7 NHSG 10	+1	+11.1
HARD DRUG USE:	11 HSG 8 NHSG 19	9 HSG 13 NHSG 22	+3	+15.8
MOS TEST FAILURES:	35 HSG 22 NHSG 57	28 HSG 34 NHSG 62	+5	+ 8.8
KEY POSITION SELECTION:	130 HSG 36 NHSG 166	108 HSG 58 NHSG 166	-12 HSG	0
KEY POSITION SATISFACTORY JOB PERFORMANCE	124 HSG 30 NHSG 154	103 HSG 48 NHSG 151	-3	- 1.9
SATISFACTORY JOB PERFORMANCE, ALL PERSONNEL	361 HSG 128 NHSG 489	288 HSG 193 NHSG 481	-8	- 1.6
KEY POSITION MOS PROFICIENCY:	127 HSG 33 NHSG 160	105 HSG 52 NHSG 157	-3	- 1.9

*Losses during training considered which adjust 70/30 to 71.6/28.4 in units.
**Losses during training considered which adjust 55/45 to 57.2/42.8 in units.

USAREC ESTIMATE OF QUALITY DECREMENT

1. Determination of the decrement in high school graduate enlistments resulting from the loss of the GI Bill was based on the results of attitudinal surveys, an OMB study produced for the President on 21 September 1973 and the initial results of the Project Ahead enlistment program.

a. Attitudinal Surveys (incl 1). The attitudinal data produced the upper bound for the quality decrement estimate. These data were influenced by several factors which were weighed in the analysis. The primary factor is that responses to survey questions are indicators of sentiment rather than measurements of action. Sources of attitudinal data included the Gilbert Youth Surveys, AFEES surveys and an Opinion Research Survey. The upper bound of 30% decrement was established primarily from the AFEES survey results which showed that 24.2% of all Army enlistees, 25.1% of HSG enlistees and 36.6% of enlistees with some college stated they would not enlist without the GI Bill.

b. OMB Study. The OMB study produced results based on the major assumption that the potential enlistment market views GI Bill benefits as a discounted present cash benefit. While this assumption made arithmetic and statistical manipulation of the GI Bill benefit possible, no attitudinal evidence was developed to support this assumption. No surveys have posed a question as to the absolute value of specific cash benefits to the enlistee, nor has advertising used the cash benefit approach. Since the GI Bill is administered by the Veterans Administration rather than the Department of Defense, the GI Bill has not, in the past, been used as a direct recruiting incentive and has not been featured in recruiting advertising. USAREC used the OMB "potential supply loss factor" of .0771 against the FY 76 goal of 70% HSG to establish the lower bound of 5% decrement in HSG accessions.

c. Project Ahead.

(1) The initial perception of the importance of the GI Bill is directly tied to Project Ahead. Although the strong impact of Project Ahead will not be evident until at least the June-September period, initial response to Project Ahead advertising has been as good or better than other major advertising campaigns. Enlistments tied to this program average 2% of total for the third quarter of FY 75; however, a survey of enlistees in the delayed entry program shows an increased involvement to 9% of total. As Project Ahead continues to gain momentum, these percentages will increase.

(2) These preliminary figures on Project Ahead performance strongly support the USAREC best estimate that 10-15% of all HSG enlistments can be attributed to the GI Bill. While in-service tuition assistance is also a component of this program, the growing appeal of this enlistment incentive is tied closely to utilization of GI Bill benefits both in-service and as a post-service continuation.

2. USAREC considered both the upper and lower bounds to be absolute maximum and minimum. These bounds provided a range in which to determine the most realistic estimate which was, of necessity, based on highly subjective assumptions. The estimate of 10-15% loss of HSG enlistments was based on an attainable goal of 70% HSG enlistments with the GI Bill. As the percentage of attainable HSG enlistment rises, the undecided potential enlistee is assumed to give greater weight to all benefits. Elimination of any one perceived benefit will materially affect his decision to enlist. The current economic environment with heavy unemployment tends to make attainment of enlistments easier without added incentives such as the GI Bill. However, at higher HSG enlistment percentages, the rising costs of a college education will influence the undecided potential enlistee to obtain financial assistance through the GI Bill.

INCL 1, TAB B

SURVEY QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO GI BILL

1. Percent Attributing Strong Influence to CI Bill for Enlistment.

Nov 73	26
May 73	19
Nov 72	24
May 72	19
Nov 71	17
May 71	15

Source: Attitudes of Youth Toward Military Service in the All Volunteer Force (Results of Gilbert Youth Surveys), MARDAC, Report MR 75-1.

2. Importance of GI Bill to Enlisting (%)

By Branch	Most Important	2d Most Important	3d Most Important
Air Force	10	13	16
Army	13	16	18
Marine Corps	18	13	18
Navy	13	14	18

By Educational Level (All Branches)	Most Important	2d Most Important	3d Most Important
NHSG	9	13	17
HSG	14	15	18
Beyond HS	21	19	18
All Levels	13	15	18

Source: Preliminary Results, September 1974 AFEES Survey, MARDAC.

3. Influence of Qualifying for GI Bill on Enlistment (%) (All branches)

	NHSG	HSG	Some College	College Grad	Overall
A Lot of Influence	15.2	18.3	27.4	16.4	18.2
Some Influence	25.9	29.2	33.2	28.2	28.6
No Influence	55.8	50.2	36.5	52.9	50.7
Unfavorable Influence	3.1	2.3	3.0	2.5	2.6
	100.0	100.0	100.1	100.0	100.1

Source: AFEES Survey, April-December 1973, MARDAC

4. Importance of GI Bill Benefits upon Enlistment (%) (All Branches)

Enlist	NHSG	HSG	Some College	College-Grad	Overall
Definitely Yes	26.2	23.7	16.9	29.2	23.9
Probably Yes	32.7	31.8	27.2	29.4	31.6
Probably No	15.9	17.5	23.5	14.1	17.5
Definitely No	8.0	10.8	18.3	11.3	10.7
Don't Know	17.2	16.1	14.2	16.0	16.3
	100.0	99.9	100.1	100.0	100.0

Source: AFEES Survey, April-December 1973, MARDAC

5. Extent of Strong Positive Influence Attributed to GI Bill (%)

	AFEES Surveys		
	Apr 71 to Sep 71	Oct 71 to Apr 72	Apr 73 to Dec 73
Army	30.1	31.8	20.6
Navy	N/A	N/A	16.9
Air Force	N/A	N/A	15.0
Marines	N/A	N/A	16.1
Overall	26.7		17.8

Source: Further Examination of Enlistment Motivation and Disposition of Army Applicants (Draft), by Kreiner, Orend, Rigg HUMRRO. 1975.

6. Knowledge of GI Bill Availability (%)

	Overall	Quality Males	Nonquality Male
Three Market Survey			
(15-21 Yr Old Males)	69	70	69
(17-21 Yr Old Males)	73	N/A	N/A
National Survey 1973			
(17-21 Yr Old Males)	66	N/A	N/A

Source: Attitudes, Motivations, Expectations and Perceptions of 15-21 Yr Olds in Chicago, Cleveland and Detroit Market . Opinion Research Corp., March 1975.

EXCERPTS FROM

Youth in Transition

VOLUME V

Young Men
and Military Service

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CHAPTER 13

MANPOWER FOR AN ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMED FORCE

The feasibility of an all-volunteer armed force rests largely on the ability of various incentives to attract young men to enlist. It is often assumed that the paramount incentive is increased pay, but there is no reason to limit our consideration to that rather obvious approach. Instead, in this chapter we will consider a number of different alternatives, and ask what sort of young men each incentive is likely to attract. But before discussing several incentives, let us take a moment to put the matter in its proper context.

Some discussions of incentives have implied that staffing an all-volunteer force is simply a matter of supply and demand—of setting wages that will be competitive in the marketplace. To put the matter very bluntly, the notion is that enough men can be brought in to do anything provided the price is right. Perhaps it is this way of looking at things which has sometimes led to the criticism that an all-volunteer force would be staffed by "mercenaries."

Our own view is that incentives such as wages are certainly important—indeed, under most conditions some minimal level of such incentives is a necessary condition for military service. But while incentives are *necessary*, they are not *sufficient* to insure service. Thus we must keep clearly in mind the kinds of issues discussed in the preceding chapter. The conditions of military service—the actual activities of being a serviceman—must be sufficiently attractive (or at least tolerable); otherwise, we assume that monetary or other "external" inducements will not be effective.

Still more important, we make the assumption that a man's views about national military policy—about what impact for good or ill the military service is having in the world—will be fundamental to an enlistment decision. During World War II tens of thousands of men volunteered out of their belief in the rightness and necessity of the nation's military action. (We still use that war as a reference point today, when we ask respondents whether they would be willing to serve if the nation were under the kind of attack experienced then.) At that time, the external incentives such as pay were relatively less important and matters of belief, ideology, and patriotism were overriding considerations.

Such matters can work both ways. Just as under some conditions men will give relatively little consideration to personal hardships and dangers, so under other conditions they may refuse an attractive offer because it conflicts with their values (and the values of their friends and associates). Perhaps this represents one of the distinctive characteristics of an all-volunteer force: it must operate within a context of some minimal level of agreement with national military policies; otherwise, incentives are likely to have little value.

Which Incentives Do Young Men Find Attractive?

We made two efforts to measure young men's responses to various incentives designed to make military service more appealing. Our first attempt took place in 1969, when most respondents were about to graduate from high school. In a fairly extensive questionnaire segment, respondents were asked how attractive they would find each of eleven different incentives, assuming that the Vietnam War had ended and the draft had been eliminated. Our preliminary report of these data expressed a number of reservations about some aspects of the findings:

> Nevertheless, we were singularly impressed by one finding. Considering the first choice of the respondents, one incentive stands out above all others: "The government agrees to pay for up to four years of college . . . in return for four years of active duty." This was selected by a margin of 4-to-1 over the second-ranked incentive, military pay comparable to civilian pay. Each of the remaining incentives was selected as first choice by less than ten percent of those who completed this section. If we look at their top three choices combined, the schooling incentives remain on top. More than three-quarter include government payment for college, technical or vocational school among their top three choices. (Johnston and Bachman, 1970, p. 40)

In 1970, we had another opportunity to explore incentives to enlist, this time using an interview segment rather than items in a paper-and-pencil questionnaire. Most respondents were one year out of high school, and had spent the last year in higher education or on a job. (Those who were already in military service were also asked about enlistment incentives, but their responses are not included in the following discussion.) Our second measurement concentrated on just four incentives which had proved to be among the most important in the 1969 data: higher pay, guaranteed assignment, paid schooling, and a shorter enlistment period. The four incentives are shown in Figure 13-1, using exactly the same wording as was presented to the respondents.

There is one other crucial difference between the 1969 and 1970 questions about incentives. In 1969 we asked respondents to imagine that the Vietnam War and the draft had both ended; in other words, we asked them to conceive of the kind of situation in which a volunteer armed force seemed

Figure 13-1

Incentives to Enlist

A. Higher Pay - Military pay starting at $5,000 per year and reaching $7,200 for the fourth and last year. You would pay for your own food and lodging.

B. Guaranteed Assignment - *Before you enlist*, you are given a guaranteed job assignment, including necessary training, in the military specialty of *your choice*. Before enlisting you would be tested to see if you could meet the requirements of your specialty choice. Here are some examples of specialties: draftsman, electronic technician, bulldozer driver, paratrooper, auto or aircraft mechanic, foreign language expert, pilot.

C. Paid Schooling - The government agrees to assume the cost, including living expenses, for up to four years of schooling at a college or technical/vocational school to which you can get accepted. In return, you serve on active duty for four years. You must *enlist first*, but the schooling could come either before or after you serve.

D. Shorter Enlistment Period - An enlistment period of only two years.

most feasible. By 1970 we decided to omit these conditions for two reasons. First, we found the highly hypothetical questions difficult to interpret and were frankly concerned about their validity. Second, and even more important, it seemed clear by early 1970 that the nation would most likely move *gradually* toward an all-volunteer force, testing out incentives during a transitional period with the draft still in force.

The 1970 questions about incentives were asked of 1273 respondents (representing all participants except those already serving in the military and those who felt sure they were permanently disqualified from military service). Respondents were asked to examine the incentives shown in Figure 13-1 and select the one change which would make military service most attractive to them. Then they were asked this question: "Taking into account other things that you are involved in, and given only this change, how likely is it that you would enlist?" Responses ranged on a scale from "definitely enlist in the next six months" to "definitely not enlist in the next 5 years." The first-choice responses to the incentives and the likelihood of enlisting are summarized in Table 13-1. Note that the higher pay incentive was attractive to the smallest number (14.7 percent), while guaranteed assignment was the most frequently chosen (37.3 percent). On the other hand, when we consider whether incentives are attractive enough so that respondents say they would definitely enlist, then the paid schooling seems to be the most effective.

The data in Table 13-1 are presented primarily to indicate the relative attractiveness of different incentives under conditions present in mid-1970; it

Table 13-1

Responses to Incentives

Incentive Chosen as Most Attractive	Likelihood of Enlisting Given First-Choice Incentive*					
	Definitely enlist in the next 6 months 1.	Definitely enlist in the next 5 years 2.	Probably enlist in the next 5 years 3.	Probably not enlist in the next 5 years 4.	Definitely not enlist in the next 5 years 5.	TOTAL
A. Higher Pay	0.8	0.9	3.5	3.9	5.5	14.7 *187*
B. Guaranteed Assignment	1.0	2.1	9.6	12.8	11.8	37.3 *474*
C. Paid Schooling	2.2	2.4	6.2	8.0	5.5	24.5 *312*
D. Shorter Enlistment Period	1.0	1.2	4.7	7.3	9.4	23.6 *300*
TOTAL	5.1 *65*	6.6 *84*	24.1 *307*	32.0 *407*	32.2 *410*	100% *1273*

*Cell entries are percentages based on a total of 1273 young men from the Youth in Transition study (Summer 1970). Italic entries are for frequencies.

is not suggested that the responses are an appropriate basis for projecting *how many* would actually volunteer given one or another incentive. Furthermore, the effectiveness of any incentive will depend heavily upon the context in which it is offered. A shorter enlistment period may be attractive as an incentive only when there is a threat of being drafted; it is difficult to imagine that offering a shorter enlistment period is likely to be a very positive attraction to an all-volunteer armed force. Similarly, it may be the case that the guaranteed assignment incentive would be most appealing to young men who are draft-motivated; a guaranteed assignment no doubt has a special appeal when contrasted with an uncertain (but almost surely less attractive) assignment under the draft. But if the draft were removed the guaranteed assignment might not, taken by itself, prove to be a very effective incentive. Of course, this discussion is necessarily rather speculative; nevertheless, of the four incentives we have examined, it seems reasonable to suppose that two are most likely to retain their attractiveness after the draft is removed—higher pay and paid schooling. Accordingly, we will focus much of our attention on these two alternatives as we examine the differences among young men who are attracted to different incentives.

To Whom Do the Incentives Appeal?

In Chapter 11 we noted that some people fear an all-volunteer force based on higher pay will appeal mostly to the disadvantaged, the less skilled, and perhaps the less ambitious. We can now ask whether those who respond positively and negatively to different incentives really do differ along these and other dimensions; moreover, we can compare them with other respondents in the Youth in Transition study who had already entered military service by the summer of 1970. For each of the four incentives, we will distinguish between "positive responders"—those who said they probably or definately would enlist (in the next five years or earlier) given their first choice incentive, and "negative responders"—those who said they probably or definitely would not enlist even if they were given their first choice incentive.

Background, Ability, and Personality. Would an all-volunteer force appeal primarily to the poor? The data in Figure 13-2 suggest that there may be some truth to that assertion, if the volunteer force is to be attracted primarily on the basis of increased pay. Those who say they would probably or certainly volunteer given the incentive of higher pay are lower in average socioeconomic level than others. (See Chapter 7 for a discussion of socioeconomic level.) On the other hand, their family socioeconomic level is not much lower on the average than that of young men already in military service. Those who respond positively to the schooling incentive are somewhat higher on the average (almost one-half standard deviation) than those attracted by pay or those already serving. For both incentives, it is true that those who respond positively to the incentive average a bit lower than those who think they would not serve. (Table 13-2X in Appendix G presents the data from which this figure was constructed. It includes as well data for positive and negative responders to the other two incentives, guaranteed assignment and shorter enlistment period.)

Test scores of intelligence and verbal skills (measured in tenth grade) are shown in Figure 13-3. It can be seen that the pay incentive attracts those who average lowest in general intelligence, while the schooling incentive attracts those who are much higher. The median for the positive responders to pay is 16, while that for the schooling group is 20. This is a difference of almost two-thirds of a standard deviation.

It may be helpful to translate these distributions into the proportions that fall into the various Mental Groups used by the military to classify servicemen. The appropriate cutoff points are marked below the axis. Those in Group V are unacceptable, while those in Group IV are considered somewhat marginal, because they have proved to be somewhat more difficult to train.[1] Groups I-III are all acceptable. About 16 percent of the positive re-

FIGURE 13-2

Family Socioeconomic Level Related to
Preference for Incentives



5475

NOTE: The height of the bar is proportional to the number of cases in that category. The length of the bar represents the range of scores of those between the 10th and 90th centiles; the length of the shaded portion represents the range of those between the 25th and 75th centiles; the center line corresponds to the median. The inverted triangle (▽) above the main axis is the median for those who responded to the incentives question plus those now serving in the military.

sponders to pay fall in the unacceptable category, Group V. Another 28 percent are in Group IV. By comparison, only six percent of the positive responders to schooling are in Group V, and another 19 percent are in Group IV. Clearly, the schooling incentive is attractive to the more intelligent young men.

Several other characteristics distinguish between those attracted by higher pay and those attracted by paid schooling. It is not surprising to find that a higher proportion of those attracted by paid schooling were already involved in post-high school education (58 percent) than was the case for those attracted by the higher pay incentive (38 percent). Among those who preferred the paid schooling incentive but would not be likely to enlist, the proportion already in higher education was still greater (73 percent).

On measures of ambitious job attitudes and status of aspired occupation, those attracted by paid schooling average one-half standard deviation

FIGURE 13-3

Intelligence Related to Preference for Incentives



5475

NOTE: The height of the bar is proportional to the number of cases in that category. The length of the bar represents the range of scores of those between the 10th and 90th centiles; the length of the shaded portion represents the range of those between the 25th and 75th centiles; the center line corresponds to the median. The inverted triangle (▽) above the main axis is the median for those who responded to the incentives question plus those now serving in the military.

higher than those drawn by higher pay.[2] When asked what they expected to be earning twenty years later (in the civilian occupation to which they aspired), the average response for those attracted by higher military pay was about $10,000, whereas for those attracted by paid schooling the average response was about $15,000. (The expected pay question used a series of dollar ranges rather than exact amounts; thus the figures given here can only be approximations.) The higher long-range financial expectations by the paid schooling group were not reflected in assessments of immediate earning potential; when asked what they could probably earn in the civilian job market next year, the answers of both groups averaged slightly below $6000 for the year.

Some further distinctions may be drawn between those attracted by higher pay versus paid schooling. Self-esteem, needs for self-development, and needs for self-utilization all average about one-third of a standard deviation higher for those who favor paid schooling ($p < .05$). Another difference which falls slightly short of statistical significance is nonetheless interesting; those who are attracted by the higher pay incentive are a bit below average in their feelings of internal control or personal efficacy.

In sum, we find that background, ability, and personality differences do exist among those attracted by different incentives. In particular, those who say they would probably enlist given their first choice incentive of higher pay are a bit lower on the average than those attracted by paid schooling, along the following dimensions: family socioeconomic level, test scores, occupational ambition, self-esteem, and needs for self-development and self-utilization.

For each of the dimensions noted above, the mean scores of those respondents already in military service lie between the means for the two contrasting incentive groups. This suggests that the use of a higher pay incentive might tend to attract those slightly lower in ability and aspirations than the men presently serving, while the use of the paid schooling incentive might lead to average increases along these dimensions. Our data do not suggest large differences; nevertheless, the direction of the differences is consistent with concerns raised by critics of a volunteer force recruited primarily by the incentive of higher pay. The incentive of paid schooling, on the other hand, might lead to an all-volunteer force with higher levels of ability and ambition than is found in our current force. A mixture of both incentives might result in the broadest mix of these characteristics.

Is Response to Incentives Related to "Political" Attitudes? One of the major concerns about an all-volunteer force is that it might encourage a separate military ethos and thus constitute a political threat. Accordingly, it is of some considerable interest to know whether those responding positively and negatively to different incentives show some difference in attitudes about national issues—particularly along dimensions which might indicate a willingness to make critical, independent judgments about our military actions. Certainly one such dimension is the Vietnam Dissent Index discussed in Chapter 5. Figure 13-4 relates responses on that index (in 1970) to preferences for different incentives.

Several conclusions can be drawn from the data in Figure 13-4:

1. There are only small and rather unimportant differences among those who respond *positively* to the pay and schooling incentives.

2. Vietnam Dissent is stronger among those who respond negatively to the incentives; moreover, it is particularly strong among those who list paid schooling as their first-choice incentive but say they still would not enlist.

3. Vietnam Dissent is, as we noted in earlier chapters, lowest among those already serving in the armed forces.

The differences in Vietnam Dissent as of 1969 were not as strong as the 1970 differences shown in Figure 13-4; nevertheless, the 1969 data pattern is essentially the same. Recall from Chapter 12 that while Vietnam Dissent increased somewhat from 1969 to 1970 for the sample taken as a whole, it re-

FIGURE 13-4

Vietnam Dissent (1970) Related to
Preference for Incentives



5475

NOTE: The height of the bar is proportional to the number of cases in that category. The length of the bar represents the range of scores of those between the 10th and 90th centiles; the length of the shaded portion represents the range of those between the 25th and 75th centiles; the center line corresponds to the median. The inverted triangle (∇) above the main axis is the median for those who responded to the incentives question plus those now serving in the military.

mained consistently low for those who were in the military service as of 1970. Since most of these respondents entered the service between the 1969 and 1970 data collections, this suggests that the military has been tending to attract those who are least skeptical about United States policies in Vietnam.

A number of other dimensions are related to Vietnam Dissent, as indicated earlier in Chapter 12; and these dimensions are also related to responses to incentives. As might have been expected, those who (in 1969) considered military spending and influence too high were more likely (in 1970) to say that they would not respond positively to incentives. The measure of Trust in Government also was related to response to incentives, but in a more complex way. The "positive" and "negative" responders showed little overall difference in trust back in 1969 when most were about to graduate from high school. But by 1970 those who were the "negative" responders had experienced a relatively sharp drop on the Trust in Government scale. The largest drop (three-fifths of a standard deviation) occurred among those who picked paid schooling as their first-choice incentive but said that they still would not be likely to enlist. This shift suggests that growing dissatisfaction with the government, caused in large measure by the Vietnam War, may be a major deterrent to enlistment for these young men. Perhaps in a climate of less dissent and dissatisfaction a good many of these young men would react more positively to the incentive of paid schooling.

Higher Pay Versus Paid Schooling—Contrasting Incentives

Of the four incentives considered here—higher pay, paid schooling, guaranteed assignment, and a shorter enlistment period—the first two seemed most likely to retain their attractiveness in a voluntary system in which no one would enlist to avoid the draft. Accordingly, these have been examined in some detail.

It appears that paid schooling would be attractive to a higher percentage of young men than the alternative of higher pay (Table 13-1). Perhaps more important are the differences in the kinds of young men attracted by the two incentives. Those attracted by paid schooling averaged higher in intelligence, verbal skills, occupational ambitions, and self-esteem.

But what about those who were not sufficiently attracted by the incentives to say that they would enlist? As Figure 13-3 indicates, some of the most intelligent respondents preferred the paid education incentive but still said they would not enlist. Must we assume that such individuals will simply be absent from any all-volunteer force? We think that the answer depends to a considerable degree upon existing patterns of military activity and national opinion about that activity. As we stated at the outset of this chapter, we do not expect incentives to be effective when they come into direct conflict with deeply held values. Again looking at those individuals who stated a preference for paid education but said they still would not enlist, we find that they were well above average in their disagreement with U.S. policy in Vietnam. For many of these young men, the education incentive may have been highly attractive, but not attractive enough to override their objections to current military policies and practices.

If this analysis is at all accurate, then it may be that in the future, given a different and less negative climate of national opinion concerning the military and its activities, the paid schooling incentive would be even more appealing than our present findings show—and its appeal would be strong among some of the brightest of our young men, as well as those who are presently most critical of our involvement in Vietnam.

Do we want such individuals in our military service? Insofar as intelligence is concerned, the answer may be fairly straightforward: a modern military force requires many able individuals. But when we come to the matter of potential for dissent, the issue must be decided in terms of our values, and our views on the proper role and character of servicemen. If our aim is to staff the military with individuals who are guided by the "My country, right or wrong" principle, then perhaps it would be just as well to avoid a greater emphasis on educational incentives. On the other hand, if our aim is to raise the likelihood that at least some of our servicemen will be willing to raise questions, to disagree, and perhaps even to refuse to follow orders that they hold to be contrary to conscience or international law, then educational incentives may be of particular value.

Of course, the use of educational incentives in recruitment will not appeal only to potential dissenters; nor can we be sure that many or even a few dissenters will translate their feelings into effective action, should a situation demand it. But if none are disposed to disagree or dissent, then it seems certain that no one will act.

An Experiment With Educational Incentives. The United States is in a transitional period, moving from conscription toward an all-volunteer force. During this transition, a variety of plans for increasing enlistments are being tried. Some such efforts will appear successful and be retained, while others will be discarded.[3] We have urged the expansion of educational incentives for enlistment, and have outlined in Appendix D a specific "four-for-four" plan involving four years of paid education in return for four years of service. There is no reason why this plan, like others, could not be tried out on a small-scale experimental basis (although some new legislation would be required to implement it). Perhaps the "four-for-four" plan could be offered in a few areas of the nation on a limited-enrollment basis (first-come, first-served). Such an experiment would indicate much more clearly and dramatically than any surveys, the types of young men who would in reality be attracted by educational incentives. A few years ago the Army inaugurated "Project 100,000" in which many men (eventually more than 350,000) who fell below the usual minimum mental standards for military service were nevertheless permitted to enlist. A similar effort with the "four-for-four" plan could tell us a great deal about the effectiveness of educational incentives. Such an experiment would, of course, cost some money; but the investment would be relatively small compared with the level of spending routinely devoted to exploring new weapon systems. And even if the educational incentives were not later adopted on a full-scale basis, the experimental funds spent on higher education could hardly be viewed as wasted. Clearly, if we can afford to explore all sorts of new weapons, we should also be able to afford an exploration of new and potentially better ways of staffing our armed forces.

Note . . . Number 1 footnote follows on page 190.

[2] Most of the dimensions mentioned in this section are described extensively in Bachman, et al. (1967) and Bachman (1970). Some are also discussed in Chapters 5-7 of the present monograph.

[3] Of course, there remains the problem of "draft motivation" noted in earlier chapters—the fact that some "volunteers" enlist because they expect otherwise that they will be drafted. The new draft lottery system removes such effects of "draft motivation" for those with high lottery numbers. Thus when these young men (who are certain they will not be drafted) volunteer in considerable numbers, then we can feel confident that the incentives really are effective.

[1] The standards for induction vary somewhat by service, and are changed as the needs of the services change. But these general rules applied in Spring, 1972.

Mental Group	Percentile Distribution on intelligence (AFQT Test)	Approximate Score Range on GATB-J Test	Standards
I-III	31-99	16-44	All are acceptable
IVa	21-30	14-15	Acceptable if a high school graduate; otherwise only if candidate shows special aptitude in one of seven AQB areas such as infantry, electronics, maintenance, clerical, etc.
IVb	16-20	12-13	High school grads must show special aptitude in two AQB areas; others also have to show minimal proficiency in all other areas
IVc	10-15	10-11	All candidates must show special aptitude in two areas and minimal aptitude in the remaining five areas.
V	0-9	0-9	Not acceptable

APPENDIX D

THE "FOUR-FOR-FOUR" PLAN PAID EDUCATION AS AN ENLISTMENT INCENTIVE

The paid schooling incentive discussed in Chapters 13 and 14 was outlined in the 1970 interview in the following words:

> The government agrees to assume the cost, including living expenses, for up to four years of schooling at a college or technical/vocational school to which you can get accepted. In return, you serve on active duty for four years. You must *enlist first*, but the schooling could come either before or after you serve.

The statement is fairly clear—as far as it goes. But what is the likely cost of four years of schooling, and how should it be financed? These are questions which go beyond our interview item; and, indeed, they go somewhat beyond the scope of our research effort. Nonetheless, we have felt some compulsion to specify more clearly what the "four-for-four" incentive plan might look like, if for no other reason than to make our general suggestions more concrete.

What follows, then, is a set of guidelines which would be fully consistent with the interview item cited above, and with our suggestions in the text. It must be emphasized that this is not the only possible form which an educational incentive could take, and it may not prove to be the best. But until a better plan is specified, this one seems to us to meet the basic requirements for an educational incentive, and it does so in a manner which is likely to be accepted by both young people and the tax-paying public.

How Would the Costs be Covered?

Four years of paid schooling including expenses is no small financial matter. Tuition plus room and board can run to $4,000 or more per year in colleges and universities, or a total of more than $16,000 for four years. Would all this represent the cost of "four-for-four" for each serviceman who elected the plan? No indeed, for many would attend less expensive schools, and some would not decide to take advantage of the full four years. Still, we propose that for those who require it there would be approximately $4,000 per year available to cover tuition and living expenses. We propose that the money come from two sources: (a) a modified and expanded G.I. Bill, and (b) savings from military pay (a path made more feasible by the recent pay increases).

A modified G.I. Bill. The G.I. Bill has been a great success. It has provided the benefits of higher education to many veterans who could otherwise never have afforded them. We propose that the tradition of the G.I. Bill be extended and enlarged in three ways:

1. The G.I. Bill should be made a permanent benefit available to anyone serving (four years or more) in the military service, in wartime or peacetime.

2. The funds made available under the G.I. Bill should be increased. The present limit is $175 a month for up to 36 months of full-time education, or $1575 per (9-month) academic year. We propose that the enlarged G.I. Bill should include (a) an allowance of $100 per month to cover a portion of living expenses, and (b) all expenses for tuition, books and fees (up to a limit of perhaps $800 to $1000 per semester) for up to 8 semesters or 36 months.[1]

3. G.I. Bill benefits should be made available *in advance of active duty* for those who enlist and elect the option of four years of college followed by four years of service. Unlike ROTC, the "G.I. Bill in advance" plan would involve no military classes or activities prior to active duty, nor would it commit the enlistee to serve as an officer.

These three modifications would enable the G.I. Bill to cover full tuition, books and fees, and a portion of living expenses, either before or after the required four year period of active duty. The government share of costs would be higher *in some cases*, but the overall expense would be relatively small in contrast to the impact of the recent military pay increases.

Savings from military pay. The paid schooling incentive was offered in our survey of young men as a possible *alternative* to increased military pay. Now that the pay increases are an accomplished fact, it seems reasonable that part of the costs of the paid schooling incentive should be covered by the increased military pay. A serviceman who decided on four years of active duty followed by four years of college under the enlarged G.I. Bill might decide to save $125 per month toward his college expenses, providing a total of more than $6000 (savings plus interest) at the end of his active duty. The amount of $125 might be recommended (but not required) as an automatic payroll deduction and savings program for those entering the service and expecting to go on to college under the G.I Bill. Since this amount is similar in size to the recent pay increase for servicemen, it means that a recruit electing to set aside $125 per month toward his education would be left with a take-home pay roughly the same as the typical take-home pay before the new rates went into effect.

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[1] Assuming an allotment of $800 per semester for tuition and fees, plus a living allowance of $100 per month for nine months, the total yearly cost to the government would be $2500. For a full four years the total would be $10,000, or $3700 more than available under the present G.I. Bill. This cost estimate is probably much higher than the average student would require, given that many students would attend state colleges, junior colleges, and community colleges which have lower rates than private institutions, especially for residents of the state. In addition, many programs of study require less than the full four years allotted.

But what about those who elect the college-first service-later option? How can they use savings from military pay which they have not yet earned? Our proposal is that they be permitted to borrow up to $6000 ($750 per semester or $1500 per academic year) as an interest-free loan to be repaid from their military pay during the four years of active duty that will follow their years in college. Many would not need to borrow the full limit of $6000; those who did would have a repayment rate of $125 per month, an amount which would not represent a great hardship given the new military pay scales.

Advantages of the Plan

Use of existing systems. The G.I. Bill and the idea of regular saving through payroll deduction have both been with us for a long time. Thus the plan proposed here requires no massive new bureaucracy to make it function—it simply uses existing systems in new and slightly expanded ways. Even the idea of getting paid education before military service has been used for some time although it has not been widely applied to those in the enlisted ranks.

Flexibility. The proposed plan is flexible in several ways. There are suggested amounts for savings and an upper limit on loans, but otherwise the amount saved or borrowed is up to the individual to determine according to his educational needs.

For those who serve first and plan to go on to college, there is no loss if they later decide to do something else. Any savings for college set aside from their military pay are available along with interest—there is no requirement that the savings be spent on education.

For those who complete their service and *then* decide to go on to college, the enlarged G.I. Bill benefits remain available and will cover the majority of educational costs. Thus it is possible to decide on using the educational incentive before entering the service, after leaving the service, or any time during service.

Visibility. The idea of four years of fully paid schooling in return for four years of service had strong appeal to many of the respondents in our survey of young men. While we do not wish to encourage a Madison Avenue approach to recruiting ("Today's Army wants to join *you*"), we recognize that some ways of presenting alternatives are more attractive than others. We think the "four-for-four" way of offering an educational incentive for military service is both attractive and honest—and that is the way recruiting efforts ought to be.

Promise of Paid Schooling May be Crucial for Best All-Volunteer Military, Researchers Say

Current proposals to trim the funds available for GI educational programs could have serious effects on the makeup of the new all-volunteer military force and lead toward a more monolithically pro-military "career force." That is the conclusion of two ISR researchers following a series of studies dealing with attitudes toward the military and its role in society.

Despite the enthusiasm with which the public greeted the end of conscription as the Vietnam era drew to a close, there have been persistent concerns about the effectiveness of an all-volunteer force. Would the military be able to compete with civilian employers in recruiting enlistees? Would the program cost too much? Would the military attract the right kind of person? Some observers expressed apprehension about trading a reluctantly dutiful force of "citizen soldiers" for a force comprised largely of career officers and enlistees, which might develop a separate military ethos.

Ideological Balance

Several recent ISR studies have dealt with these issues, and the findings have been summarized by Jerald Bachman and John Blair in an article to appear in a forthcoming issue of the journal *Armed Forces and Society*. The article deals primarily with data collected from a nationwide sample of the civilian population and a representative cross-section of Navy ship and shore personnel.

Bachman and Blair argue that one of the most crucial factors in maintaining an ideological balance in the all-volunteer force could be the offer of paid schooling as an incentive to enlist. Previous ISR studies of young people's attitudes toward the military have shown that higher pay and guarantees of paid schooling are the two most attractive incentives to enlistees (*ISR Newsletter*, Spring 1972).

The evaluation of the military organization was generally favorable, yet there was considerable reluctance to support the use of military force except in self-defense.

"Although the President and Congress may hope to save money by reducing some of the funds available for GI educational programs," Bachman and Blair warn, "they will be doing so at the dangerous expense of this important enlistment incentive which helps to ensure the ideological balance of the all-volunteer military."

Bachman and Blair cite evidence that the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (1970) "may have greatly underestimated the relative size of the 'career force' within the military." As the proportion of career-oriented men in the all-volunteer force increases, they say, that force will be less likely to match the values, perceptions, and preferences concerning the military held by civilians.

Critical of Waste

The researchers have found that citizens view the military with a mixture of positive and negative feelings, depending upon the dimension being considered. "The evaluation of the military organization was generally favorable," Bachman and Blair say, "yet there was considerable reluctance to support the use of military force except in self-defense (even though those individuals *most* favorable toward the military organization were also more willing to support the use of military force under a wider range of circumstances).

"In the area of civil-military relations, we found mostly positive ratings of the role of the military in society and the level of military versus civilian influence; nevertheless, a majority of respondents were critical of waste, inefficiency, and excess spending in the military."

Strong Support

Results from the questionnaire and an interview administered only to civilians indicated strong majority support for the concept of the all-volunteer force and relatively little concern about some of the issues which have been raised as potential problems, Bachman and Blair report. "The nationwide civilian sample supported the all-volunteer approach rather than the draft by nearly a two-to-one margin." There was also very strong support for the higher military pay levels considered necessary under a volunteer system.

There was a slight tendency for people to favor citizen soldiers over career men, but the views seemed rather mixed, Bachman and Blair report. "Civilian responses to open-ended interview items about the all-volunteer force left a dominant impression that most people have not thought much about the question of what kinds of servicemen will, or should, staff an all-volunteer armed force. The

(continued on next page)

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make-up of an all-volunteer force has been of considerable concern to us, however."

Bachman and Blair point to several research findings on which their concern for this issue is based:

- First-term enlistees were more like the civilian population in values, perceptions, and preferences; re-enlistees and officers were detectably more pro-military.
- Young men attracted to the armed forces by the higher pay incentives were slightly below average on socioeconomic background and ability ratings.
- Young men attracted by the promise of paid schooling were slightly more intelligent, showing greater ability and leadership potential.

. . . The promise of paid schooling for military service is one of the most effective means available for ensuring an ideological balance in the military, thus allaying the vague but no less threatening prospect of growth in military power, autonomy, and adventurism.

To Bachman and Blair, the most striking finding is that the career-oriented first-termers were remarkably similar ideologically to their later-term colleagues, with virtually all scores averaging on the pro-military side of the ledger. But those young men who planned to leave the military after their first term were rather similar to their civilian peers in most matters of ideology about the military — "both tended to be critical of the military," the researchers say, "sometimes quite strongly."

Bachman and Blair contend that one of the most attractive incentives to prospective young enlistees — the promise of four years of paid schooling for four years of military service — is also one of the most effective means available for ensuring an ideological balance in the military, thus allaying the vague but no less threatening prospect of growth in military power, autonomy, and adventurism. The educational incentive, they claim, will encourage greater turnover among the military ranks — even among the officer corps. By attracting a wide cross-section of citizens into its armed forces for relatively short terms of duty, the nation can be assured of having an able military that is responsible and responsive to civilian interests. ■

[5] *Very recently this program of research was extended to include a cross-section of Army personnel; preliminary analyses show most of the same basic patterns which were found for the Navy cross-section. For further information about these studies, contact Jerald Bachman at the Institute.*

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United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON VETERANS' AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

December 23, 1975

Mr. Jerald Bachman
Institute for Social Research
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan

Dear Mr. Bachman:

Recently an article in the Institute newsletter for Autumn, 1975 came to my attention. The summary of your forthcoming article in the Journal of Armed Forces and Society raised issues which the Senate Veteran Affairs Committee, which I chair, is examining at this time.

I found your article informative. In accordance with the note following the article, any information which you could provide the Committee would enhance our study of the implications of terminating educational benefits.

Sincerely,

Vance Hartke
Vance Hartke
Chairman

ISR

SURVEY RESEARCH CENTER / INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH / THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN / ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN 48106

January 9, 1976

The Honorable Vance Hartke
Chairman
Committee on Veterans' Affairs
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Hartke:

Thank you for your letter of December 23, in which you inquired about our research dealing with military matters--particularly the issue of educational benefits. I have enclosed several reports of our research, and will say more about the enclosures in just a moment. First, let me offer a few comments which I hope bear directly on the Senate Veteran Affairs Committee's consideration of the implications of terminating educational benefits.

Very briefly, our research suggests that under the new all-volunteer system there is some drift toward greater proportions of military personnel who plan a career in the armed forces, and this increase in careerism heightens the likelihood of what has been called "a separate military ethos." This situation is not inevitable under an all-volunteer system; but avoiding it is likely te require a positive effort, including some changes in our present system for recruiting and retaining military personnel. In particular, we need to attract some of our most capable young men and women to serve for a single tour; such "in-and-outers" are essential to maintain a proper proportion of "citizen soldiers" in the U.S. military.

The offer of paid education in return for a single tour of military service seems especially well suited as a means of encouraging some of these "in-and-outers." Those who enter the service with the idea that they are "earning their way through college," in contrast to those with military career aspirations, are less likely to be "organizational men" in the military--because their long-term career plans will not be jeopardized if they speak out about waste, inefficiency, or other abuses that they might observe.

I don't think it follows from this that educational benefits offered to new recruits need to be identical to those we have provided in the past. For example, it would be quite possible to limit educational incentives to those who entered the military with specific plans for one tour of duty to be followed by college (or the equivalent). The educational incentive could consist of a mix of government subsidy plus savings from the rather substantial pay which new recruits now earn. It would also be possible to limit the number of such "scholarship" offerings, and perhaps tie them to particular specialties within the service.

An additional possibility would be to offer paid education prior to military service, by permitting an educational subsidy in advance plus a system of borrowing against future pay (at low or zero interest rates). I see this as distinctly different from the ROTC system, in that there would be no military training or indoctrination during college. If we were to have a supply of such college-educated men and women entering the service for what would in most cases be a three or four year tour, it might go a long way toward introducing an increased number of "in-and-outers" in the officer corps--and that is the place where "citizen soldiers" are most urgently needed.

In sum, my feeling is that the present educational benefits for veterans are much better than nothing, and that we would be unwise simply to drop them in an economy move. On the other hand, I think it is quite possible that we could improve upon the present educational incentives, both reducing overall costs and also increasing their effectiveness in meeting our military personnel objectives. And one of these personnel objectives should be a substantial number of non-career people within our all-volunteer force.

In response to your request for further research data, I am enclosing (a) a copy of the Autumn, 1975 issue of the ISR Newsletter; (b) a reprint of our recent article in Armed Forces and Society; (c) a copy of our latest research report entitled Soldiers, Sailors and Civilians: The "Military Mind" and the All-Volunteer Force; and (d) a copy of an earlier (1972) monograph dealing with Young Men and Military Service. I am also sending copies of the first three enclosures, plus a copy of this letter, to the other members of your Committee on Veterans' Affairs. (A somewhat different letter, with the same enclosures, has been prepared for members of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees.)

I recognize that reading time is likely to be limited, so let me offer a few shortcuts. The journal article reprint presents some of our most important findings, while the book on Soldiers, Sailors and Civilians provides somewhat greater detail. A very short section on "Policy Implications and Recommendations," which begins on page 90 of the reprint and also on page 16 of the book, provides a capsule summary of our findings and recommendations. The earlier monograph on Young Men and Military Service also has a brief "Summary and Policy Implications" chapter, beginning on page 193.

Let me include one other reprint--an article by Morris Janowitz and Charles Moskos which focuses primarily on "Racial Composition in the All-Volunteer Force," but which also deals with the role of educational incentives and the need for "in-and-outers" in the volunteer military. I recommend the entire article, but I've marked the portions which I think are especially relevant for your committee.

I hope the enclosed material is of use to you and your colleagues. We have been concerned that our research be policy-relevant, and thus I appreciate the opportunity to communicate our findings to policy-makers. Please call on me if you think I can provide any further help.

Sincerely,

Jerald G. Bachman, Ph.D.
Program Director/Research Scientist

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Encls.

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EXCERPTS FROM

SOLDIERS SAILORS & CIVILIANS

The "Military Mind" & the All-Volunteer Force

Jerald G. Bachman
John D. Blair

Survey Research Center • Institute for Social Research
The University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan
November, 1975

Why Career Military Men Are Different: Attitude Change or Self-Selection

We have noted that career military men are, on the average, ideologically different from their civilian counterparts and also from non-career military men. It is important to consider why this pattern of differences in attitudes occurs. In Chapter 3 we distinguish two possible explanations--each of which may be true, to some degree:

1. During the early years of military experience, those individuals who will later reenlist undergo attitude change in a more pro-military direction--a process of "socialization into the military."

2. Prior to enlistment, some individuals are more pro-military than others, and these differences are influential in the self-selection process reflected in the decision to reenlist.

Our data did not permit a thoroughgoing test of these two alternative explanations; however, we were able to shed some light on the matter. The analyses in Chapter 3 suggest that the dominant role is played by self-selection--individuals on the pro-military side of the ideological spectrum are the ones most likely to pursue careers in the military. If we may anticipate our discussion of policy implications for just a moment, it would seem that if we are concerned about maintaining some degree of ideological balance in the all-volunteer force, we may need to take special pains to insure that military recruits represent a broad ideological cross-section. In the following section we suggest some ways in which this might be done.

Policy Implications and Recommendations[1]

The research summarized here, based on a comparisor of Army, Navy and civilian samples, has shown important ideological differences between career military men and their non-career or civilian counterparts. We think these differences may have implications for the all-volunteer force of the future.

Under present conditions, an all-volunteer force is likely to recruit and retain personnel from only part of the ideological range found in the civilian population. The very individuals who are needed to broaden the ideological balance are probably the least likely to enlist--or reenlist. Present conditions in the services are changing, and such changes may help to obtain a representative cross-section of volunteers. But if the nation's leaders value the concept of the citizen soldier or sailor, they would do well to broaden the incentives in ways that are especially attractive to those presently underrepresented among volunteers. And, in spite of the additional costs involved, it would be wise to seek out some kinds of enlistees who are likely to serve for one term only and then return to civilian life.

What Kinds of Recruits and How to Recruit Them?

Career military men--and those most likely to become career men--tended to be more zealous about the military than their civilian age-mates. This is one of the strongest and most consistent findings in our research. There is much to indicate that these differences were due, at least in part, to processes of selection--the more "pro-military" were likely to re-enlist in the Navy. These findings on reenlistment, which held true for a Navy cross-section in 1972-73, and for an Army cross-section in 1974-75, are more and more likely to apply to first enlistments, now that we are in an all-volunteer system.

How should military recruiting efforts respond to this finding that its enlistees and especially its career men are likely to come from only a limited ideological range? One approach is to embrace this state of affairs enthusiastically, recognizing that the more pro-military individuals are likely to be less troublesome and more in agreement with traditional military values and practices than some of their less "gung ho" contemporaries. Indeed, the idea of concentrating recruitment efforts on those most favorably disposed toward the military is one of the specific recommendations in a recent report to the Army that introduced the concept of the "quality man"--an individual who, among other things, says that he places high importance on patriotism, is proud of being an American, would be among the first to defend the country if it were attacked, and is generally more favorable toward military service (Opinion Research Corporation, 1974).

The approach of aiming recruitment efforts toward the more gung ho is understandably tempting to recruiters and perhaps to many others in the military. And it may appear to be successful in the short run. But in our view such a recruiting approach would be unwise in the long run. It would tend to reenforce and heighten the tendencies we have already observed for career military men to be less than fully representative of the cross-section of civilian viewpoints. By strengthening support for some unnecessary and perhaps counterproductive military traditions and practices--or at least reducing resistance to them--this approach could gradually widen the gap between the military and the civilian world. We suspect that this gap would eventually reduce the supply of recruits below an acceptable level. Such a gap would also increase the risk of developing a "separate military ethos."

An alternative approach, and the one we recommend, is to develop recruitment efforts designed to obtain a broader and more fully representative cross-section of individuals among first-termers and also among career personnel in the military. The primary advantages of such an approach is that it tends to avoid the problems and pitfalls mentioned above. An additional advantage is that extending recruiting efforts beyond the more gung ho may help to attract some of our brightest and most ambitious young people to a period of military service. (Our findings in this study are that pro-military attitudes are somewhat negatively related to education, and findings in other studies of young people suggest that those who go to college are more likely to express critical views of the military in its present form. Thus an effort to increase recruiting among those who are presently skeptical about military service is likely to involve some of the most able of our young adults.)

How could the military services go about implementing this approach of seeking a broader and more representative cross-section in its recruits? Two types of strategy may be distinguished, and we recommend both. First, the extrinsic incentives to enlistment--those rewards or inducements which are not directly linked to actual performance in the work role--should be geared toward a broader cross-section of individuals, especially those who have relatively high educational abilities and interests. We will say more about this approach in a moment. The second strategy is to modify intrinsic characteristics of military work roles so as to make them more broadly attractive. Elsewhere Bowers and Bachman (1974) have offered a number of specific recommendations for improving military work roles and effectiveness.

Probably the most obvious extrinsic incentive that comes to mind when considering any work role--military or civilian--is pay. The higher the level of pay, the more attractive the work role is assumed to be. In discussions about the feasibility of converting to an all-volunteer force, primary attention was directed to increasing military salaries, and efforts were made to estimate exactly how much money would be required to induce enough men to enlist under volunteer conditions (President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, 1970). The recent pay increases were surely a necessary condition to establishment of an all-volunteer military force, but in our view the higher salaries do not constitute sufficient conditions--and in some respects the emphasis on pay increases may have led us to overlook other important incentives to military service.

Educational Incentives to Enlistment

One set of incentives which are worth greater attention and emphasis are the educational benefits available to servicemen during and after their tour of duty. Although the young men (and women) bound for college represent a group especially high in ability and ambition, military recruiting policy has to a large degree treated them as unlikely prospects (Binkin and Johnston, 1973). And in its recent report to the Army, the Opinion Research Corporation (1974, p. viii) advised that, "While college students do not express strong opposition any longer to the military as an institution, enlistment still does not appeal to them. Noncollege men remain the Army's major market." But in that same report it is noted that educators rate "interference with education" as a primary deterrent to military service, and feel that this drawback could be offset by greater emphasis on the GI Bill as a source of support for a college education. Some of our own research and writing has also stressed the value of increased emphasis on educational benefits as an important means of maintaining a broader balance in both ability and ideology among military recruits (Johnston and Bachman, 1972).

In sum, under present conditions the typical high school student planning for college tends to view military service as an unwise interruption of his educational development. Given no change in present conditions--or, worse yet, given any reduction in educational benefits for veterans--it is probably quite accurate to conclude that noncollege men will remain the primary source of military personnel. But we think it would be unwise to leave present conditions as they are. On the contrary, we recommend that the educational benefits in return for military service be retained and enhanced, and that these benefits be publicized more widely. In particular, we would suggest the establishment of specific "pay your way through college plans" that stress the opportunity to qualify for veterans' benefits, amass substantial savings, and accumulate some college credits during a tour of military service following high school.

But why should the military seek out individuals who are likely to serve only one term and then go on to college as civilians? Why should it deliberately recruit those who have such a low liklihood of reenlistment? Some of the advantages in terms of high ability levels and broader perspectives have been noted above, and these help to balance out the costs of higher turnover among those who enter the military in order to work their way through college. But it should be added that a considerable degree of turnover is necessary and desirable in an organization that has only limited positions of leadership at the top. The "college in exchange for service" formula is a means of attracting able individuals who can learn quickly, serve effectively, and then leave to make room for other fresh recruits. Moreover, high rates of turnover among these individuals would not be a sign of organizational failure, and those who left would not be spending their final years of service frustrated and disillusioned because the military had not lived up to their expectations. We agree with Friedman (1967) that some proportion of "in-and-outers" is desirable in the military services, and we view the use of educational incentives as a particularly effective means for ensuring this sort of turnover.[2]

The "college in exchange for service" approach need not require that military service precede college. On the contrary, there would be substantial advantages for some to complete college first and then enter the service. This would help meet military needs for skilled and educated personnel. Moreover, it seems likely that the broadening and liberalizing effects of higher education, plus the maturity of additional years, would make the college graduates less malleable, more confident and self-reliant, and better able to handle responsibilities than those recruited at an earlier stage of education and maturity.[3]

We view the characteristics listed above as distinct advantages to the military services, but this viewpoint is not universally shared. Some military leaders have stated a preference for the young and impressionable high school graduate rather than the older, cautious, more questioning college graduate. This brings us back to the fundamental question: who ought to staff the military services? If our aim is to recruit individuals guided by the "My country, right or wrong" principle, then perhaps it would be just as well to avoid a greater emphasis on educational incentives. On the other hand, if we want at least some of our men and women in uniform to raise questions, disagree on occasion, and perhaps even refuse to follow orders that they hold to be contrary to conscience or international law, then educational incentives--particularly those involving college prior to military service--may be of great value.

It is gratifying that the idea of increased use of educational incentives, which was supported by our earlier work (Johnston and Bachman, 1972) and reinforced by the findings presented here, has also been put forward by Janowitz and Moskos (1974) as one of the approaches for reducing racial (and social class) imbalance in the military. It is fortunate indeed that educational incentives can potentially deal with these problems of race and class while at the same time helping to insure--voluntarily--a mix of "in-and-outers' along with career personnel that is closer to a citizen force, not an ideologically isolated career force.

Footnotes

[1] This section has been adapted largely from Bowers and Bachman (1974) pp. 123-129, and from Johnston and Bachman (1972) pp. 197-198.

[2] Of course, not all those who entered the military with the idea of working their way through college are likely to be permanently lost after their first tour of duty. Some who might otherwise never have been exposed to the military will find that it offers career possibilities that fit in well with their interests and abilities. Needless to say, the capacity to retain such individuals on the basis of their first-hand exposure depends in large measure upon the intrinsic characteristics of work roles in the military.

[3] We have discussed elsewhere a possible approach for offering G.I. Bill benefits in advance, coupled with loans, as a means of paying for college in advance of military service (Johnston and Bachman, 1972); and Janowitz and Moskos (1974) have also suggested mechanisms for accomplishing this.

"Citizen Force" or "Career Force"?

IMPLICATIONS FOR IDEOLOGY IN THE ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY

JERALD G. BACHMAN and JOHN D. BLAIR
University of Michigan

In the years of debate which preceded the return to an all-volunteer staffing of the armed forces, a number of problems or objections were raised. Some questions were concerned with costs, others had to do with whether a sufficient number of volunteers could be obtained, and perhaps the most profound set of issues centered around the societal and political impact of moving to an all-volunteer force. We will discuss below our concern about a "separate military ethos" resulting from a military force made up of career men rather than "citizen soldiers." Such issues and problems were discussed at length by the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force and by others.[1] One of our purposes in the present study has been to tap levels of public awareness and concern over some of these issues. The main purpose, however, has been to show some of the implications for the all-volunteer force if certain

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AUTHORS' NOTE: *The data for this paper were collected by the Survey Research Center and the Center for Research on the Utilization of Scientific Knowledge of the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan. Portions of the research were supported by the Office of Naval Research and the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not represent institutional positions of the Department of the Navy or the Department of the Army. David Bowers, Jerome Johnston, Lloyd Johnston, Patrick O'Malley, and David Segal contributed many ideas and insights.*

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assumptions made by the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force were faulty.

Recently Janowitz and Moskos (1974) demonstrated that the assumptions made by the President's Commission concerning the racial composition of the all-volunteer force were greatly in error.[2] The Commission had expected the racial as well as other aspects of the demographic composition of the all-volunteer force to remain quite similar to that of the "mixed force" made up of a mix of conscripts, draft-motivated volunteers, true volunteers, and a career force of reenlistees.[3] Janowitz and Moskos (1974) presented data on the racial composition of the armed forces that show that a clear racial imbalance (compared to the population as a whole) was developing—contrary to the Commission's expectations.[4]

Our own concern is not with racial imbalance but with the possibility of a "pro-military" ideological imbalance. This imbalance could result from increases in the proportion of career-oriented military personnel under all-volunteer conditions. The President's Commission of 1970 had assumed that the make-up of the all-volunteer force in terms of career-orientation would not differ greatly from that found in the mixed force.[5] For example, it was believed that the turnover rate of first-term enlisted men would be about three-quarters of that found under non-voluntary conditions, i.e., about 65% of first-term enlisted men would not reenlist after their first tour of duty in an all-volunteer force. This would result in only a slightly larger proportion of the total force (48% compared to 40%) consisting of reenlistees which the Commission referred to as the "career force."

Janowitz and Moskos reported that "in fiscal year 1973, the reenlistment rate among first-term Army enlisted men was 52.0% for blacks compared with 35.1% for whites."[6] The point we want to stress here is that even in the fiscal year *preceding* the official start of the all-volunteer force, Army enlisted men who had entered primarily as conscripts or draft-motivated volunteers several years earlier were already reenlisting at the maximum rate the Commission expected would exist in an all-volunteer force. Indeed, among black Army first-term personnel the reenlistment rates considerably exceeded the 35% expected by the President's Commission. Since reenlistment rates clearly affect the overall proportion of reenlistees versus first-termers, we conclude that the President's Commission may have greatly underestimated the relative size of the "career force" which might develop under all-volunteer conditions.

In this paper we will argue that as the proportion of career-oriented men in the all-volunteer force increases, that force will be less likely to match the values, perceptions, and preferences concerning the military held by civilians. To put it another way, our findings suggest that an enlarged proportion of career men will increase the danger of what has been called a "separate military ethos."

RESEARCH FINDINGS[7]

The findings in this paper are based on survey data collected from two samples: (1) a representative national cross-section of 1855 civilians age 16 and older, and (2) a sample of 2522 Navy personnel stratified so as to be representative of major Navy entities (ships and shore stations). Sixteen-page, self-completed questionnaires, identical except for certain personal background measures, were administered to both samples during late 1972 and early 1973.

PUBLIC VIEWS OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

The results from the questionnaires and also from an interview segment administered only to civilians indicated strong majority support for the concept of the all-volunteer force, and relatively little concern about some of the issues which have been raised as potential problems. The nationwide civilian sample supported the all-volunteer approach rather than the draft by nearly a two-to-one margin. There was also very strong support for the higher military pay levels considered to be necessary under a volunteer system.

When asked about issues related to the types of people who would staff the military services, there was a slight tendency for people to favor "citizen-soldiers" over "career men," but the views seemed rather mixed. Civilian responses to open-ended interview items about the all-volunteer force left a dominant impression that most people have not thought much about the question of what kinds of servicemen will, or should, staff an all-volunteer armed force.

The make-up of an all-volunteer force has been of considerable concern to us, however. The findings we will present here are admittedly speculative, but represent an attempt to come to grips with an important question: to what extent are the attitudes found among military men representative of civilian values, perceptions, and preferences concerning the military–and is the answer different for career military men versus non-career men?

Military Views Linked to Career Orientation

We begin by focusing on young Navy men–specifically, first-term enlisted men. We will separate them into two groups of interest to us: those who intended to reenlist and those who did not. Those who planned to reenlist reflected at least some degree of "career orientation." We will also present data from two other groups for comparison purposes. The first group consists of civilian young men age 19-24–the age-mates of first-term enlisted men. The second group consists of later-term Navy enlisted men–the enlisted portion of what the President's Commission called a "career force." One reason for looking at later-term enlisted men is that they constitute the group most likely to be in positions of authority and direct supervision over incoming junior enlisted men. We would expect that, to most first-term enlisted men, it is the more senior enlisted personnel–especially non-commissioned officers–who represent the military establishment and its values.

Figure 1 presents mean scores for first-term enlisted men who did plan to reenlist and for those who did not, as well as for young civilian men and later-term enlisted men.[8] By far the most striking finding, seen across a wide range of our measures, is that the "career-oriented" first-termers were remarkably similar in ideology to their later-term colleagues, with virtually all scores averaging on the "pro-military" side of the ledger. On the other hand, those young men who planned to leave the military were rather similar to their civilian peers in most matters of ideology about the military; both groups tended to be critical–sometimes quite strongly.

While the pattern described above dominates Figure 1, there are some distinctions worth noting. When we compare civilian young men with the first-termers who planned to leave the military, it appears that the first-termers were more critical of the *military organization*–perhaps reflecting their own dissatisfaction and eagerness to leave. The largest and most consistent differences involved the area of *civil-military relations*: the young Navy men who were viewing the military from inside–even though they were planning to leave–saw the role of the military in society as a bit more positive, and were less critical of military spending and influence. Indeed, these Navy men preferred a slight increase in levels of military influence, whereas the opposite was true for the young civilian men, on the average. In a number of other respects, including views about Vietnam



NOTE: Center line shows midpoint on each measure; other lines show ½ S.D. for all civilians on each measure. Measures marked with an asterisk have been reversed; the "pro-military" side of the chart indicates a low score for the measure.

Figure 1: Mean Scores of Civilian Men 19-24 and Three Navy Groups

and amnesty, the non-career-oriented first-termers were indistinguishable from their civilian counterparts.

Turning now to those first-termers who planned to reenlist, it bears emphasizing that in practically every area measured, these career-oriented young men were substantially different from their civilian peers and also from their first-term counterparts who planned to leave the military. The question naturally arises: why did the career-oriented young men in the Navy hold views so clearly different from their civilian age-mates and also their service-mates who planned an early return to civilian life?

Attitude Change or Self-Selection

In our earlier analyses of these data we considered two alternative explanations of the findings outlined above:

(1) During the first tour of duty, those individuals most likely to reenlist may undergo *attitude changes* in a more pro-military direction. This may occur through a process of socialization as a result of exposure to the more experienced Navy men who tend to hold such views, or through exposure to positive experiences in the Navy, or both.

(2) By the time they reach their late teens, some individuals may be more favorable than others in their view of the military services and mission. These differences, which exist prior to enlistment, may be among the factors influencing the *self-selection process* involved in the decision to reenlist.

While the only really adequate test of these two competing explanations would involve a longitudinal design, we felt we could gain some insights by looking separately at first-termers who had served about one year, those who had served two years, and those who had served three or four years. If self-selection accounts for the differences between the attitudes of the career Navy men and others, there should be consistent differences in attitudes between those who did and did not plan on reenlistment–i.e., the differences for those in their first year should be just as large on the average as the differences found for those in their second, third or fourth years of service. On the other hand, if the attitude change explanation is correct, we *might* expect to see smaller differences among those in their first year–assuming that the process of attitude change requires more than a few months to be completed.

Our basic finding was that the differences between first-termers who planned to reenlist, and those who did not, were evident quite early. Those who had served about one year showed differences just as large on the average as those who had served several years longer. This finding is fully consistent with the self-selection explanation–the view that reenlistment is heavily influenced by rather deeply rooted perceptions and ideology related to the military life-style and mission. The alternative explanation, based on attitude changes during the first tour of duty, is not ruled out entirely. Indeed, both explanations could be true to some degree. But whatever the pattern of causation, our analyses in this area demonstrate that it does *not* require years and years of service experience for first-term enlisted men to develop the strongly pro-military attitudes found among later-termers. For those who planned to reenlist, the same attitudes were clearly evident as early as the first year of service.

CAREER FORCE, CITIZEN FORCE, OR MIXED FORCE?

One of the arguments raised in the debate about the all-volunteer force was the danger of a "separate military ethos" brought about by a military force made up largely of career men. The findings summarized above suggest some basis for concern in this area. To the extent that new recruits into an all-volunteer force consist increasingly of the sort of career-oriented personnel we have been studying here, it seems inevitable that the military will indeed grow more separate from civilians—at least when it comes to views about the military and its mission.

In thinking about this problem of ideological representativeness, one can pose two "ideal" or "pure types" of military forces: the "citizen force" and the "career force." These types can be seen as the two ends of a continuum. In other words, the opposite of a "career force" made up primarily of career-oriented personnel would be a "citizen force" made up very largely of "citizen soldiers" (or sailors, etc.) who view their tour of military duty as a temporary activity—a part of their citizenship.

Neither type has existed in pure form in the United States. There has always been a career component of "professionals" in a primary citizen force and a citizen component of "in-and-outers" in a primarily "career force." In particular, it would not be accurate to describe the U.S. military of the recent past as a citizen force. Rather, it was what the President's Commission termed a "mixed force," consisting of some conscripts, some draft-motivated enlistees, and a goodly number of so-called "true volunteers."

In this section of the paper our analysis becomes more speculative. We will attempt to illustrate some implications, for ideology in the military, of different possible locations of the all-volunteer force along the continuum from citizen force to career force. We present data for our total Navy sample—officers as well as enlisted men—as a real-world example of a mixed force. We treat the career-oriented portion of our Navy sample as an example of a career force.[9]

The findings are presented in Figure 2. In this case, we have contrasted the two Navy groups with the mean scores for the total civilian population on each measure. (In other words, the mean scores of the Navy groups have been charted according to the extent to which they *differ* from the total civilian sample. The differences are expressed as proportions of the



NOTE: Center line shows mean scores for all civilians; other lines show ½ S.D. for all civilians on each measure. Measures marked with an asterisk have been reversed; the "pro-military" side of the chart indicates a low score for the measure.

Figure 2: Total Navy and Career Navy Contrasted With Mean Scores of All Civilians

standard deviation for all civilians.) It is worth adding that the total civilian sample was appreciably more favorable to the military than were young men age 19-24; thus, this part of our analysis is focused on how representative the Navy groups are of civilians in general, not just civilian young men.[10]

Comparing the "Mixed Force" and the Public

Figure 2 reveals some interesting things about the aggregate similarities and differences in the values, perceptions, and preferences of the total Navy—our "mixed force"—and civilians as a whole. In evaluating the military organization, the total Navy was virtually identical to the civilian sample in perceptions of job opportunities and fair treatment in the services, held a slightly more positive view of the level of racial and sexual discrimination within the military organization, but showed relatively lower satisfaction with the competence of military leaders and with the concept of unquestioning military obedience.

In terms of the use of military force, the only difference between the total Navy and civilian samples was a higher level of support for military interventionism among Navy men. Attitudes about military supremacy, the Vietnam war, and a My Lai-type situation showed no differences.

When we turn to issues of civil-military relations we see considerable differences between the total Navy and civilian samples. Although the perception of the role of the military was the same, there were great differences in views about the level of money that society should provide for the military. On the other side of the issue, the Navy men were much more likely than civilians to rate the military as having little influence vis-à-vis civilian leaders. There was also more support for high military influence in the Navy sample than among civilians, although this difference was not as great as that dealing with perceptions of actual influence levels. These differences resulted in the view among military men that the influence of the military leaders is very inadequate. There was also more support, among members of the "mixed force," for having the military consist of "career men" rather than citizen soldiers.

These comparisons show that the total Navy in early 1973 was rather similar to civilians as a whole in their views about the military organization and the use of military force. Presumably, the considerable similarity between the total Navy and civilians reflects the "civilianizing" effect of large numbers of non-career enlisted men and officers. The differences that did exist were concentrated primarily in the areas of civil-military relations.

In many ways these findings parallel those concerning veterans and non-veterans.[11] If one leaves the military service with anything, it is a perception that is the opposite of a belief in a "military-industrial complex"—or at least a feeling that the military is a very *junior* partner in such a power elite. We think that this is also a reflection of a differentiation, more pronounced among those civilians who had had personal experience in the military, between attitudes about the military organization and those about the use of military force. The military organization is *not* seen as an autonomous creator of the policies that lead to the use of the military force it makes possible.

Comparing the "Career Force" and the Public

The other comparison available in Figure 2 is that between the public as a whole and our representation of a "career force" as a pure type. As mentioned above, an all-volunteer force could fall anywhere along a continuum from a "citizen force" to a "career force." Where it lies will be determined by the proportion of its members who are career-oriented. Here we are concerned with examining what a force consisting only of career-oriented members would look like in terms of values, perceptions, and preferences concerning the military.

In virtually all the aspects of the military we have examined, the career-oriented portion of the Navy sample was clearly more "pro-military" than the other groups examined. The members of the career military viewed all aspects of the military—military organization, the use of military force, and civil-military relations—very differently than did the population as a whole. This was especially true for civil-military relations, as is shown in Figure 2.

Thus we conclude that, to the extent that an all-volunteer force consists primarily of career-oriented men (and women)—and thus approximates in reality our "career force"—the attitudes found among its members as a whole will be very discrepant from those found among civilians as a whole. If this is the future of the all-volunteer force, it will be considerably less representative in this respect than was the mixed force of the past.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The research summarized here, based on a sampling of Navy men and civilians in late 1972 and early 1973, has shown large and important ideological differences between career servicemen and others—both non-career servicemen and civilians. We think these differences have important implications for the all-volunteer force of the future.

Under present conditions, an all-volunteer force is likely to recruit and retain personnel from only part of the ideological range found in the civilian population. The very individuals who are needed to broaden the ideological balance are probably the least likely to enlist or reenlist. Present conditions in the services are changing, and such changes may help to obtain a representative cross-section of volunteers. But if the nation's leaders value the concept of the citizen soldier or sailor, they would do well to broaden the incentives in ways that are especially attractive to those presently underrepresented among volunteers. And, in spite of the additional costs involved, it would be wise to seek out some kinds of enlistees who are likely to serve for one term only and then return to civilian life.

What Kinds of Recruits and How to Recruit Them?

Career Navymen—and those most likely to become career men—tended to be more *zealous* about the military than their civilian age-mates. This is one of the strongest and most consistent findings in our research. There is much to indicate that these differences were due, at least in part, to processes of selection—the more "pro-military" were likely to reenlist in the Navy. These findings on *reenlistment*, which held true for a Navy cross-section in late 1972, are more and more likely to apply to *first enlistments*, now that we are in an all-volunteer system.

How should military recruiting efforts respond to this finding that its enlistees and especially its career men are likely to come from only a limited ideological range? One approach is to embrace this state of affairs enthusiastically, recognizing that the more pro-military individuals are likely to be less troublesome and more in agreement with traditional military values and practices than some of their less gung ho contemporaries. Indeed, the idea of concentrating recruitment efforts on those most favorably disposed toward the military is one of the specific recommendations in a recent report to the Army that introduced the concept of the "quality man"—an individual who, among other things, says that he places high importance on patriotism, is proud of being an American, would be among the first to defend the country if it were attacked, and is generally more favorable toward military service.[12]

The approach of aiming recruitment efforts toward the more gung ho is understandably tempting to recruiters and perhaps to many others in the military. And it may appear to be successful in the short run. But in our view such a recruiting approach would be unwise in the long run. It would tend to reenforce and heighten the tendencies we have already observed for career military men to be less than fully representative of the cross-section of civilian viewpoints. By strengthening support for some unnecessary and perhaps counterproductive military traditions and practices–or at least reducing resistance to them–this approach could gradually widen the gap between the military and the civilian world. We suspect that this gap would eventually reduce the supply of recruits below an acceptable level. Such a gap would also increase the risk of developing a "separate military ethos."

An alternative approach, and the one we recommend, is to develop recruitment efforts designed to obtain a broader and more fully representative cross-section of individuals among first-termers and also among career personnel in the military. The primary advantage of such an approach is that it tends to avoid the problems and pitfalls mentioned above. An additional advantage is that extending recruiting efforts beyond the more gung ho may help to attract some of our brightest and most ambitious young people to a period of military service. (We have found that pro-military attitudes are somewhat *negatively* related to education, and findings in other studies of young people suggest that those who go to college are more likely to express critical views of the military *in its present form*. Thus an effort to increase recruiting among those presently more cautious about military service is likely to involve some of the most able of our young adults.)

How could the military services go about implementing this approach of seeking a broader and more representative cross-section in its recruits? Two types of strategy may be distinguished, and we recommend both. First, the extrinsic incentives to enlistment–those rewards or inducements which are not directly linked to actual performance in the work role–should be geared toward a broader cross-section of individuals, especially those who have relatively high educational abilities and interests. We will say more about this approach in a moment. The second strategy is to modify intrinsic characteristics of military work roles so as to make them more broadly attractive. Elsewhere we have offered a number of specific recommendations for improving Navy work roles and effectiveness.[13]

Probably the most obvious extrinsic incentive that comes to mind when considering any work role–military or civilian–is pay. The higher the level of pay, the more attractive the work role is assumed to be. In discussions about the feasibility of converting to an all-volunteer force, primary attention was directed to increasing military salaries, and efforts were made to estimate exactly how much money would be required to induce enough men to enlist under volunteer conditions.[14] The recent pay increases were surely a *necessary* condition to the establishment of an all-volunteer military force, but in our view the higher salaries do not constitute *sufficient* conditions—and in some respects the emphasis on pay increases may have led us to overlook other important incentives to military service.

Educational Incentives to Enlistment

One set of incentives which are worth greater attention and emphasis are the educational benefits available to servicemen during and after their tour of duty. Although the young men (and women) bound for college represent a group especially high in ability and ambition, military recruiting policy has to a large degree treated them as unlikely prospects.[15] And in its recent report to the Army, the Opinion Research Corporation advised that, "While college students do not express strong opposition any longer to the military as an institution, enlistment still does not appeal to them. Noncollege men remain the Army's major market."[16] But in that same report it is noted that educators rate "interference with education" as a primary deterrent to military service, and feel that this drawback could be offset by greater emphasis on the GI Bill as a source of support for a college education.

In sum, under present conditions the typical high school student planning for college tends to view military service as an unwise interruption of his educational development. Given no change in present conditions—or, worse yet, given any reduction in educational benefits for veterans—it is probably quite accurate to conclude that noncollege men will remain the primary source of military personnel. But we think it would be unwise to leave present conditions as they are. On the contrary, *we recommend that the educational benefits available to those in service and veterans be retained and enhanced, and that these benefits be publicized more widely.* In particular, we would suggest the establishment of specific "pay your way through college plans" that stress the opportunity to qualify for veterans' benefits, amass substantial savings, and accumulate some college credits during a tour of military service following high school.

But why should the military deliberately seek out individuals who are likely to serve only one term and then go on to college as civilians? Some of the advantages in terms of high ability levels and broader perspectives have been noted above, and these help to balance out the costs of higher turnover among those who enter the military in order to work their way through college. But it should be added that a considerable degree of turnover is necessary and desirable in an organization that has only limited positions of leadership at the top. The "college in exchange for service" formula is a means of attracting able individuals who can learn quickly, serve effectively, and then leave to make room for other fresh recruits. Moreover, high rates of turnover among these individuals would not be a sign of organizational failure, and those who left would not be spending their final years of service frustrated and disillusioned because the military had not lived up to their expectations. We agree with Friedman that some proportion of "in-and-outers" is desirable in the military services, and we view the use of educational incentives as a particularly effective means for ensuring this sort of turnover.[17]

The "college in exchange for service" approach need not require that military service precede college. On the contrary, there would be substantial advantages for some to complete college first and then enter the service. This would help meet military needs for skilled and educated personnel. Moreover, it seems likely that the broadening and liberalizing effects of higher education, plus the maturity of additional years, would make the college graduates less malleable, more confident and self-reliant, and better able to handle responsibilities than those recruited at an earlier stage of education and maturity.[18]

We view the characteristics listed above as distinct advantages to the military services, but this viewpoint is not universally shared. Some military leaders have stated a preference for the young and impressionable high school graduate rather than the older, cautious, more questioning college graduate. This brings us back to the fundamental question: who ought to staff the military services? If our aim is to recruit individuals guided by the "My country, right or wrong" principle, then perhaps it would be just as well to avoid a greater emphasis on educational incentives. On the other hand, if we want at least some of our men and women in uniform to raise questions, disagree on occasion, and perhaps even refuse to follow orders that they hold to be contrary to conscience or international law, then educational incentives—particularly those involving college prior to military service—may be of great value.

It is gratifying that the idea of increased use of educational incentives, which was supported by our earlier work[19] and reinforced by the findings presented here, has also been put forward by Janowitz and Moskos as one of the approaches for reducing racial (and social class) imbalance in the military.[20] It is fortunate indeed that educational incentives can potentially deal with these problems of race and class while at the same time helping to insure—voluntarily—a mix of "in-and-outers" along with career personnel that is closer to a citizen force, not an ideologically isolated career force.

NOTES

1. Sol Tax, ed., *The Draft: A Handbook of Facts and Alternatives* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Jerald Bachman and J. Johnston, "The All Volunteer Force, not whether but what kind?" Psychology Today 5 (October 6, 1972): 113-116, 128; J. Johnston and J. G. Bachman, *Youth in Transition*, Volume V: *Young Men and Military Service* (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 1972); J. G. Bachman, "Values, Preferences and Perceptions Concerning Military Service: Part I" (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 1973); J. G. Bachman, "Values, Preferences, and Perceptions: Part II" (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 1974); David Bowers and Jerald Bachman, *Military Manpower and Modern Values* (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 1974); John D. Blair, "Civil-Military Belief System Among Military Men and Civilians," Ph.D. dissertation in progress, Department of Sociology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, forthcoming.

2. Morris Janowitz and Charles Moskos, Jr., "Racial Composition in the All-Volunteer Force: Policy Alternatives," Armed Forces and Society, 1-1 (Fall 1974): 109-123.

3. U.S. President's Commission, *The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970).

4. Janowitz and Moskos, "Racial Composition."

5. President's Commission, *Report.*

6. Morris Janowitz, "The U.S. Forces and the Zero Draft," Adelphi Papers 94 (1973): 1-30.

7. This paper summarizes findings from several more detailed data analyses: Bachman (1973, 1974), Bowers and Bachman (1974), Blair and Bachman (1975), and Blair (forthcoming). This paper is a shortened version of a paper presented at the Conference on the Social Psychology of Military Service, Chicago, Illinois, April 1975.

8. As a matter of convenience, the measures shown in Figure 1 are organized according to the conceptual categories followed in earlier reports (Bachman 1973, 1974). A more detailed description of the measures, including a listing of items and rules for index construction may be found in Appendix B of Blair and Bachman (1975).

9. Of course, the extent to which an all-volunteer force will empirically approximate a career force is unknown at this time. However, we are presently

replicating this study with a sample from the All Volunteer Army. This should give us some idea of what proportion of current Army personnel fit the definition of "career-oriented" which we have used, and how that compares with our Navy sample where 42% of the enlisted men and 72% of officers, or 46% of the total sample, were "career-oriented." (We have required only a stated intention to reenlist as the minimum definition of career-orientation.)

10. If the end of the bar is more than .10 standard deviation from the middle line for the total Navy or more than .13 standard deviation for the career Navy, it indicates a statistically significant difference between the mean of the Navy group and that of the total civilian sample.

11. J. D. Blair and J. G. Bachman, "The Public View of the Military," paper presented to the Conference on the Social Psychology of Military Service, Chicago, Illinois, April 1975.

12. Opinion Research Corporation, "Attitudes and Motivations Toward Enlistment in the U.S. Army," conducted for N. W. Ayer and Sons, Inc. and the U.S. Army (Princeton, N.J.: Opinion Research Corporation, Inc., 1974).

13. Bowers and Bachman, *Military Manpower*.

14. President's Commission, *Report*.

15. Martin Binkin and J. D. Johnston, "All-Volunteer Armed Forces: Progress, Problems and Prospects," report prepared for the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Ninety-Third Congress, First Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973).

16. Opinion Research Corporation, "Attitudes and Motivations," p. viii.

17. M. Friedman, "Why Not a Volunteer Army?" in Sol Tax, ed., *The Draft: A Handbook of Facts and Alternatives* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967).

18. We have discussed elsewhere a possible approach for offering G.I. Bill benefits in advance, coupled with loans, as a means of paying for college in advance of military service (Johnston and Bachman, 1972. Janowitz and Moskos (1974) have also suggested mechanisms for accomplishing this.

19. Johnston and Bachman, *Youth in Transition*.

20. Janowitz and Moskos, "Racial composition."

EXCERPTS FROM

DEFENSE MANPOWER:

The Keystone of National Security

Report to the President
and the Congress

April 1976

DMC
Defense
Manpower
Commission

THE ALL VOLUNTEER FORCE AND ITS FUTURE

Recognizing that the decade 1976–85 will fully test the concept of a peacetime All Volunteer Force (AVF), the Commission examined the sustainability of an AVF in the context of varying supply and demand conditions. Supply is determined principally by the size of the enlistment population and by the numerous factors that influence individuals in choosing between military service and civilian pursuits. These factors, including changing population trends, civilian job opportunities, current armed forces enlistment standards and the competitiveness of military jobs, were evaluated under three possible scenarios of economic growth which generated various supply situations. The effectiveness of possible responses to potential situations was also assessed.

The Commission also examined the mobilization problems which will arise in time of emergency within the Individual and Standby Reserves and the Selective Service System. Regardless of the sustainability of the AVF in peacetime, there has never been the expectation that volunteers alone can meet emergency military manpower requirements. Thus, another fundamental question facing the Nation concerns our capability to provide additional manpower on a timely basis in the event of national crisis.

From its examination of the sustainability issue, the Commission concludes that:

—The prospects for sustaining a peacetime All Volunteer Force during the next 10 years will be determined basically by the economic situation. Requirements for active force recruits currently projected by the Department of Defense can be satisfied without recourse to changes in recruiting policies and programs if the national economy grows at a moderate or slow pace.

—If rapid economic growth is realized, the supply of recruits will probably not be large enough to support needs of the Services under current policies and programs. However, a range of actions is available which, if implemented, should avert a major recruiting shortfall without resorting to pay increases beyond those required to maintain the current competitive nature of military compensation.

—Reserve recruiting prospects in the next decade are less favorable, although recruit requirements can likely be sustained if slow or even moderate economic growth is realized. Actions are available which could be employed effectively, but these may not prove sufficient to avert major recruiting shortfalls that will likely occur if rapid economic growth is realized, and significant policy changes affecting geographic distribution of the Reserve Force and the Reserve compensation system may be warranted.

In sum, the Commission believes that the sustainability of the AVF is directly linked to the continuance of competitive military compensation and other benefits. Any erosion of this will seriously affect sustainability beyond that projected in this report.

PART I: RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF RECRUITING ACTIVITIES DURING THE AVF YEARS

The factors that determine whether recruiting will be a success are: the number of new recruits, or accessions; the quality of the accessions, both overall and in reference to how well the people recruited fill needs in specific occupational areas; and the impact, if any, of changes in the socioeconomic composition of the force.

Maintaining the force levels is the primary goal of the Service recruiting programs, and during the AVF years the active forces generally have met their accessions goals. This was a solid accomplishment on the part of the active force recruiting programs, but must be placed in the context of shrinking overall force levels and diminishing yearly requirements for volunteer accessions. Thus, as the strength of the active forces was reduced from 3.1 million in FY 1970 to 2.1 million in FY 1975, the yearly accession requirements shrank from 590,000 in FY 1972 to 457,000 in FY 1975, with 422,000 accessions programed for FY 1976.

RACE

Racial composition is reviewed in terms of accessions, in-service population, and distribution. While the term "race" in the context of the armed forces normally includes blacks and other minorities, among which are Spanish-surname, American Indians, and Orientals, this discussion is limited to changes in regard to blacks only. Data on changes in the other minority categories are not readily available.

There was an increase in the percentage of black accessions into the All Volunteer Force during FY 1971–74; the proportion generally fell off in FY 1975. TABLES V–1 through V–3 summarize the changes in enlisted and officer accessions.

TABLE V–1

Black enlisted accessions in the active force, by fiscal year

Service	Percentage of total accessions					
	FY 1964	FY 1970	FY 1972	FY 1973	FY 1974	FY 1975
Army	13	14	15	19	28	23
Navy	5	8	13	11	11	10
Marine Corps	9	15	18	19	22	19
Air Force	9	12	13	14	17	15
Total	11	13	14	16	21	18

SOURCE: Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Equal Opportunity).

TABLE V–2

Black enlisted accessions in Guard and Reserve, by fiscal year

Unit	Percentage of total accessions				
	FY 1971	FY 1972	FY 1973	FY 1974	FY 1975
Army National Guard	1.5	3.0	13	24	26
Army Reserve	1.3	2.0	9	29	42
Naval Reserve	1.4	3.0	6	18	9
Marine Corps Reserve	7.1	27.0	36	27	23
Air National Guard	0.8	2.0	5	26	10
Air Force Reserve	0.7	2.0	9	37	23
Total	1.8	5.0	15	26	28

NOTE: Data were not available for FY 1964.
SOURCE: Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs).

TABLE V–3

Black officer accessions—active forces, by fiscal year

Service	Percentage of total accessions					
	FY 1964	FY 1970	FY 1972	FY 1973	FY 1974	FY 1975
Army	2.4	1.4	2.1	3.4	9.4	7.0
Navy	0.3	NA	2.7	5.2	5.8	6.5
Marine Corps	0.4	2.0	4.4	4.7	6.2	5.3
Air Force	NA	1.4	3.2	5.4	7.0	7.5

SOURCE: Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Equal Opportunity).

Accessions, attrition and reenlistment (retention) rates have changed the black levels within the forces. Overall, during their initial 36 months in service, the attrition rate for blacks was 1.5 percent less than for their white counterparts on a DoD-wide basis. Also, concerning reenlistment rates, blacks in FY 1973 and FY 1974 reenlisted at somewhat higher rates than whites. TABLES V–4 through V–6 summarize the in-service percentages.

TABLE V-4

Black enlisted persons in service—active forces, by calendar year

Service	Percentage of total enlisted persons				
	1964	1970	1972	1973	1974
Army	12	14	20	21	22
Navy	6	5	8	8	8
Marine Corps	9	11	18	18	18
Air Force	10	12	14	14	15
Total	10	11	15	16	16

SOURCE: See TABLE V-3.

TABLE V-5

Black enlisted persons in service—Guard and Reserve, by fiscal year

Unit	Percentage of total enlisted persons				
	FY 1971	FY 1972	FY 1973	FY 1974	FY 1975
Army National Guard	1.2	2.0	3.2	5.6	7.2
Army Reserve	2.2	2.9	5.6	7.2	11.1
Naval Reserve	2.0	3.0	3.5	3.4	4.4
Marine Corps Reserve	3.2	7.4	12.6	11.6	14.1
Air National Guard	1.0	1.4	2.0	2.9	3.8
Air Force Reserve	2.8	3.3	4.2	5.6	8.1
Total	1.7	2.6	4.2	5.6	7.8

NOTE: Data were not available for fiscal year 1964.
SOURCE: See TABLE V-2.

TABLE V-6

Black officers in service—active forces, by calendar year

Service	Percentage of all officers			
	1964	1970	1973	1974
Army	3.3	3.4	4.3	4.6
Navy	0.3	0.7	1.2	1.3
Marine Corps	0.3	1.3	2.2	2.8
Air Force	1.5	1.7	2.0	2.3
Total	1.8	2.5	2.8	3.0

NOTE: Data were not available for 1972.
SOURCE: See TABLE V-3.

The distribution of enlisted blacks among military occupations also has changed, but in general a higher proportion of black enlisted men continue to be found in the combat arms, administrative areas, and service and supply, as has been the case historically. TABLE V-7 summarizes the percentage of blacks among major occupational groups.

TABLE V-7

Percentage of black enlisted persons within major occupational groups, by fiscal year

Occupational Group	Percentage of total occupational group			
	FY 1964	FY 1970	FY 1974	FY 1975
Infantry, gun crews and allied specialists [a]	16.4	15.2	19.3	21.1
Electronics equipment specialists	5.6	5.0	6.0	6.7
Communications and intelligence specialists	6.7	6.3	9.6	12.3
Medical and dental specialists	12.0	10.3	14.3	14.4
Other technical and allied specialists [b]	7.1	6.4	8.9	10.2
Administrative specialists and clerks	10.4	11.2	17.4	20.2
Electrical/mechanical equipment repairmen	7.2	7.4	11.2	12.1
Craftsmen	9.7	8.6	12.9	13.1
Service and supply handlers	17.1	17.3	21.1	21.4
Miscellaneous others	6.2	11.6	16.4	15.8

[a] Total active DoD less Air Force.

[b] Includes photography, drafting, surveying, mapping, weather, music, etc.

SOURCE: See TABLE V-3.

The pattern of enlisted black distribution in the Army varied somewhat from that of the DoD. Occupational groups with the larger proportions of blacks are administrative specialists and clerks, infantry, gun crews and allied specialists, and service and supply handlers. Occupational areas with relatively few blacks are electronics equipment specialists and other technical and allied specialists. There has been a substantial increase in the proportion of blacks among communications and intelligence specialists, medical and dental specialists, and electrical and mechanical equipment repairmen.

In summary, while more blacks currently are serving in the active and Reserve Forces than during the pre-AVF years, the percentage varies among occupational areas. Black enlisted personnel in the active forces continue to be found in greater percentages in service and supply, combat arms, and administrative billets. The numbers of blacks have increased in the National Guard and Reserve, but percentages are much lower than in the active forces. The percentage of black officers continues to remain far below the percentage of black enlisted personnel.

Black Representation

In 1949, blacks comprised 7.5 percent of the enlisted active forces and less than 1 percent of the officer corps. By 1962, the proportion of black enlisted men had reached 9.2 percent (still below the national proportion). Indeed, the proportion of black enlisted men stayed at about the 9 to 10 percent level until the adoption of the AVF concept in 1971-72.

The level of black representation in the National Guard and Reserve has varied greatly before and after the implementation of the AVF. At the end of 1969, slightly more than 1 percent of the National Guard and Reserve were black, even though the President of the United States had for 2 years called the recruitment of blacks "a matter of highest urgency." The proportions of blacks in the National Guard and Reserve increased significantly during the AVF years, with blacks comprising more than 25 percent of accessions in both FY 1974 and FY 1975.

CURRENT PUBLIC DEBATE CONCERNING REPRESENTATION

Despite the fact that the armed forces were not totally representative in the years after World War II, the question of whether they should be representative never caused much concern until the late 1960's, when a combination of events resulted in considerable discussion and debate among legislators, academicians, and others.

The role of the draftee in the Vietnam War first focused public attention on the disproportionate representation then apparent in the ranks of the Army and Marine Corps combat units and in their casualty lists. Through the use of Selective Service deferment or exemption procedures, and by enlisting in the National Guard or Reserve, few college-trained upper-class young men were being assigned to combat units in Vietnam. Conversely, there was a disproportionate number of so-called "poor" and blacks in the combat units. And with high casualty rates, particularly among young blacks, the question was raised concerning representation in the forces.

During the same period, the President directed the Gates Commission to determine how to recruit an All Volunteer Force. That commission studied the question of representation and commented on it in its widely read report. Although the Gates Commission discounted claims that the AVF would become "all black" or dominated by servicemen from low-income backgrounds, its consideration of representational factors in the military, for the first time in recent years, gave an official endorsement to a concern for representation.

Following the Gates Commission report, others in and out of the Government have commented on the issue of representation. Although there have been passing references in most of these comments to geographical, educational, male-female, and, to a greater extent, economic representation, discussion has focused on the level of black representation. This debate was given greater emphasis during the AVF years by the rapid increases in the number of black enlisted accessions into the active and Reserve Forces.

Within the Services, too, the vast majority of comments about representational policy have involved the level of black representation. Some have expressed concern about the increased proportions of blacks while others say they are concerned that some form of policy controls over black accessions and representational levels will be adopted.

ENLISTMENT GUARANTEES, BONUSES, AND OTHER OPTIONS

While the draft was securing adequate manpower for the armed forces, few enlistment incentives or guarantees were needed to attract volunteers. New inductees or enlistees were assigned to satisfy Service requirements. With the advent of the AVF, each Service expanded its special guarantee options to attract volunteers. While the enlistment incentives vary among the active forces, they generally can be classified within the following broad categories: enlistment bonuses for combat arms and certain other specialties; area, station, unit, and location of choice; and specialty training and career field guarantees.

Closely related to enlistment guarantees and options is educational assistance. Educational opportunities for military personnel have been identified by surveys as major attractions for quality accessions. Most important are post-high school programs which include certificate level vocational and technical programs and degree programs from associate to graduate levels. Funding has come from the GI Bill and the DoD Three-Quarters Tuition Assistance programs. The opportunity to receive technical training in the Service which later can be used in the civilian sector also has been a major incentive for young men and women to enlist in the AVF.

The National Guard and Reserve also emphasize options; however, there are fewer options available for Guard and Reserve units than for the active forces. The extension of new initiatives to Reserve Component programs may be needed to attract a higher quality of non-prior service accessions.

Although adjustments would create added management burdens and probable confusion at local recruiting levels, incentives for all segments--active, Guard and Reserve—should be reviewed periodically and adjusted to reflect supply and demand. Such adjustments could well provide significant cost reductions when recruitment becomes easier due to economic conditions, as it did in 1974 and 1975, or because of other factors.

The GI Bill probably was a major reason for the relative recruiting success in the active forces during 1974 and 1975. However, it has been applied to all entering personnel, and it has not been possible to use the benefits as a management tool to attract selected individuals. While the addition of educational benefits to the list of enlistment incentives would increase the costs of the AVF, there would be an overall cost savings to the Government and the taxpayers over the current costs of the universal educational benefits program.

The Commission recommends that:

New enlistment incentives and options should be considered for the National Guard and Reserve programs with a view toward achieving a higher level and quality of non-prior service accessions. Any such incentives should be justified on a sound analytical basis.

All active, Guard and Reserve guarantees and incentives should be adjusted periodically, depending on changes in the market and on the need to attract volunteers at the time.

A Department of Defense-funded educational assistance program should replace the educational benefits provided by the GI Bill. The program should be utilized as a recruiting management tool for both the active and Reserve Forces, with benefits granted only on a selective basis to help meet critical skill needs.

ASSIGNMENTS OF MINORITY PERSONNEL

An analysis of the assignments given minority personnel indicates that both officer and enlisted personnel participate in all occupational areas within the Services. TABLES VI–8 and VI–9 show what percentage of positions in each occupational area is held by minorities.

The tables reflect some variation in the assignments to the highly technical and professional careers and the more routine administrative and supply areas. A high percentage of minority enlisted personnel are assigned to the combat arms area. This

TABLE VI–8

Minority officer assignments (all Services)

Career area	Percentage held by minorities*
Executive management	0.7
Tactical operations	2.5
Intelligence	2.6
Engineering and maintenance	3.1
Scientist and professional	2.0
Medical	2.5
Administrative officers	4.2
Supply and procurement	4.5
Others	2.5

SOURCE: See TABLE VI–7.

TABLE VI–9

Minority enlisted assignments (all Services)

Career area	Percentage held by minorities
Gun crews and allied specialists	21.0
Electrical equipment	6.7
Communications and intelligence	12.3
Medical and dental	14.4
Other technical	10.2
Administrative specialists and clerks	20.2
Electrical/mechanical repairmen	12.1
Craftsmen	13.1
Service and supply	21.4
Miscellaneous	15.8

SOURCE: Manpower Research and Data Center (MARDAC) enlisted master file.

distribution by occupational area is primarily a result of the classification system used by the Services that is based upon standardized tests. The tests have been successful in predicting the success of an individual in the training courses but do not correlate positively with performance on the job because of the many factors that influence job performance. Training courses, however, have a high degree of correlation with the tasks and knowledge required on the job. The fact that the educational or cultural background of many members of minority groups does not permit them to compete equally for assignment in all areas has been used as a basis for conclusions that cultural bias exists in the testing program. This has been identified as a form of institutional discrimination.

Career progression data on the black minority are indicated in

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TABLE VI-10

Officer distribution by grade (all Services)

Grade	Total officers in grade	Percent of all officers	Black officers in grade	Percent of black officers
O-7+	1,183	—	17	—
O-6	14,802	5	237	2.4
O-5	33,278	11	815	9.1
O-4	54,724	21	1,339	14.9
O-3	94,629	32	2,696	29.8
O-2	42,004	14	1,529	16.8
O-1	33,475	11	1,601	17.7
Warrant officer	17,965	6	813	9.0
Total	292,060	100	9,047	100.0

SOURCE: See TABLE VI-7.

TABLE VI-11

Enlisted distribution by grade (all Services)

Grade	Total enlisted men in grade	Percent of all enlisted men	Black enlisted men in grade	Percent of all black enlisted men
E9	13,489	0.7	963	0.3
E8	34,260	1.9	3,645	1.3
E7	121,509	6.7	16,810	5.7
E6	214,975	11.8	29,853	9.9
E5	315,387	17.3	41,770	14.3
E4	410,831	22.5	67,570	23.1
E3	317,705	17.4	57,967	19.8
E2	254,964	14.0	50,842	17.3
E1	141,099	7.7	23,904	8.2

SOURCE: See TABLE VI-9.

TABLE VIII–7

Military estate program and other benefits

[Yes indicates a member or former member or survivor(s) is entitled to the benefit listed, provided the member or former member meet eligibility requirements.]

Benefit	Type of separation or retirement: Involuntary separation	Nondisability retirement	Disability retirement	Reserve retirement	Survivor benefits: Active duty	Survivor benefits: Retired	Voluntary separation
COMPLETELY OR PARTIALLY FUNDED BY DoD	MILITARY ESTATE PROGRAM						
Severance pay	Officers [a]	—	—	—	—	—	No
Disability severance pay	Yes	—	—	—	—	—	N/A
Vested Social Security benefits	Yes	—	—	—	—	—	Yes
Reserve retirement credit	Yes	—	—	—	—	—	Yes
Lifetime annuity CPI adjusted	—	Yes	Yes	Yes [b]	—	—	—
Social Security old age annuity	—	Yes	Yes	Yes	—	—	—
Social Security disability annuity	—	Yes	Yes	Yes	—	—	—
Social Security survivor annuity	—	—	—	—	Yes	Yes	—
Social Security death payment	—	—	—	—	Yes	Yes	—
Medical care, member and dependents	—	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	—
Dental care, member only	—	Yes	Yes	Yes	—	—	—
Commissary, PX, base privileges, etc. [c]	—	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	—
Retired Serviceman's Family Protection Plan (RSFPP)	—	—	—	—	—	Yes	—
Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP)	—	—	—	—	Yes [d]	Yes	—
Death gratuity	—	—	—	—	Yes	Yes [e]	—

TABLE VIII-7 (Continued)

Benefit	Type of separation or retirement: Involuntary separation	Nondisability retirement	Disability retirement	Reserve retirement	Survivor benefits: Active duty	Survivor benefits: Retired	Voluntary separation
MILITARY ESTATE PROGRAM							
Serviceman's group life[e] insurance	—	—	—	—	Yes	—	—
Burial allowance and services in kind	—	—	—	—	Yes	Yes[f]	—
OTHER BENEFITS							
FUNDED BY VETERANS ADMINISTRATION							
Burial (reimbursement, marker, etc.)	Yes	—	—	—	Yes[g]	Yes[g]	Yes
Disability compensation	Yes	Yes[h]	Yes[h]	Yes[h]	—	—	Yes
Pension[i]	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	—	—	Yes
Dental treatment	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	—	—	Yes
Education and training, GI Bill	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	—	—	Yes
Education for certain dependents	Yes	—	—	—	Yes	Yes	Yes
Hospitalization	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	—	—	Yes
Medical care	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	—	—	Yes
Medical care for certain dependents	Yes	—	—	—	Yes	Yes	Yes
Vocational rehabilitation	Yes	—	Yes	—	—	—	Yes
GI loans for homes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Assistance for disabled (modified housing, insurance, etc.)	Yes	—	Yes	—	—	—	Yes
GI life insurance	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	—	—	Yes
Dependency and indemnity compensation (DIC)	Yes[j]	—	—	—	Yes	Yes[j]	Yes[j]
Non-service connected death pension[i]	Yes	—	—	—	—	—	Yes
Job assistance/preference	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	—	—	Yes
FUNDED BY DEPARTMENT OF LABOR							
Unemployment compensation	Yes	Yes[k]	Yes[k]	Yes[k]	—	—	Yes
FUNDED BY FEDERAL RETIREMENT SYSTEMS							
Retirement credit for military service including academy time	Yes	—	—	—	—	—	Yes

all-volunteer Army

a dialogue

I

The Dangers of an All-Volunteer Army

David Syrett and Richard H. Kohn

EVER since Barry Goldwater seriously suggested jettisoning the draft in favor of an all-volunteer Army in 1964, the idea has grown steadily in popularity. No one likes the draft in any form, especially those eligible during an unpopular war, and recent reports of large-scale evasion show that the system, even with a lottery, may be unworkable. Besides, so the argument goes, a volunteer Army is our traditional peacetime force since only in the Cold War have we used a draft to fill up the ranks. Now, with a pay raise for the services and projected cutbacks in the draft and the size of the Army, Congress seems to be accepting an all-volunteer Army without directly considering its consequences.

So far, the opposition has used three basic arguments: that it will not work because it will not attract enough men, that it is too expensive, or, as Senator Edward Kennedy has argued, that it would create an all-professional force that would tempt the Government to be more militaristic in foreign policy. All these points may be valid, but only Senator Kennedy has asked the really key question: Is it a good idea politically?

The Senator fears that an all-volunteer Army would have practically no middle-class youth. The Government would then be likely to suffer far less political attack in committing the Army to battle than if the troops were more representative of the electorate. But this argument is weak because an all-volunteer force would never be sufficient for even a limited war, and military and civilian planners know this. Such an Army would only be a peacetime force. The real danger, which few opponents of the plan have raised, is internal. An all-volunteer Army at this stage might pose a tremendous threat to civilian control of policy and may even make the coup—for the first time in American history—a possibility.

To realize the danger, one must first ask who will make up the enlisted ranks. Senator Kennedy's argument that they will be filled by the poor and by minorities is persuasive. Even if military pay is raised further or educational benefits guaranteed or fast promotion promised, military life is confining enough to discourage young men with other alternatives. The changes in Army life may only be temporary responses to the stresses caused by an unpopular war and the need for enlistments in an antimilitary age. Like similar "reforms" after World War II and Korea, they are not likely to be permanent because they undermine discipline.

An all-volunteer force will more likely go the route of the Marines—"lean and tough." And it will attract men who like that kind of thing. Many will not stay for a career if the economy can provide a job or a place in college. Even the poor black, once he is trained to run the Army's automated battlefield, will be tempted to use his new skills in more lucrative or less-demanding civilian jobs. Those who stay and become the noncommissioned officers—the heart of the Army—will stay because they like the life, accept military ideals, or are loyal to the

This kind of Army would be unlike any in American history . . . . All they will need is a Caesar and a Rubicon.

Army. They will not be staying for the retirement benefits in a country moving toward a guaranteed income and national health insurance.

This kind of Army would be unlike any in American history. For one thing, it would be at least three times the size of the Army before 1940. Before 1940, the volunteer Army was mostly poor whites and immigrants who enlisted out of lack of opportunity or to learn the language and adjust to the United States. If they re-enlisted, it was because they had no choice or wanted the pension. In general, they were a drunken, rowdy, brutal, uneducated lot who often deserted—not the kind of men who would be satisfactory in an all-volunteer Army today.

Like the pre-1940 Army, the all-volunteer force will come from the "lower class." But, today, these men will come from a lower class that is far more urban, more conscious and more alienated from American life, politics and the Government. They will be urban and southern poor and blacks, not farm boys and immigrants who viewed the United States and its institutions favorably. The volunteers who re-enlist and become careerists will be professional soldiers, isolated from civil society and owing allegiance not to country, political party or family, but to service, unit and comrades.

Allegiances such as these can be found in varying intensity not only among such hard-bitten organizations as the French Foreign Legion, but also, as sociological studies have shown, in paramilitary bodies such as the New York City Police Department. All armies have a tendency to change men's allegiance and outlook on life and, at times, to instill in their ranks an attitude which borders on religious mysticism. The all-volunteer Army will be what Donald Duncan implied a few years ago: the "New Legions." All they will need is a Caesar and a Rubicon.

Will they have it? There is evidence that the preconditions for the classic coup in Western society already exist in the United States: social dislocation, rapid and confusing economic and technological change, and uncertain lifestyles and values.

More frightening are some symptoms in the Military Establishment. Ward Just, in his recent book *Military Men*, shows just how distraught certain elements in the officer corps are over Vietnam, how closely some of them are coming to view themselves as the scapegoat for civilian incompetence in the war. Like the French officer corps in Algeria, they feel stabbed in the back.

In a country whose values and attitudes are no longer based on the eternal verities, some in the officer corps are coming to see the Army as the standard—and the preserver—of the true ideals of the Nation. The acceptance of a "sacred mission" is just what led the armies of France and Germany to intervene in domestic politics. If the volunteer Army, which will need less officers, phases out Reserve Officers' Training Corps and depends on West Point and the "Legions" for its officers, the danger may well be greater.

Nearly every scenario of the coup d'etat has included such an alienated officer corps, and the attempt invariably comes in the wake of a particularly unsuccessful or frustrating war. The most serious incident in the history of US civil-military relations came during the Korean War when Douglas MacArthur almost usurped the war's conduct from the President. And what could provoke the action is if, at the same time, the Government came to an accommodation with the Soviets, especially if alienated officers feel the agreement jeopardizes US security and "Communist" elements in the country are on the verge of getting it ratified. A SALT agreement could do to President Nixon what the hypothetical disarmament treaty did to the fictional President in *Seven Days in May*.

What only remains is a Caesar. Probably because he feared competition in a possible bid for re-election, Lyndon Johnson was careful to keep his field commanders generally in the background. All the old heroes—MacArthur, LeMay, the World War II group—are gone. But recent coups in underdeveloped nations have not been by heroes but the faceless juntas of colonels who never even saw combat. No one knows what hero may emerge in some future limited war, or even out of this one. Perhaps 15 years from now, a heroic returnee from the North Vietnamese prisoner of war camps could be the one. If previous wars have produced Presidents and near Presidents, Vietnam could produce a military hero.

The most obvious check against the military playing a large role in US domestic politics is the fact that the majority of junior officers and privates are civilians in uniform. These men would not take part in, nor would they permit, a military coup. But, with a professional Army, it might be a different story. The British Regular Army almost brought civil war to Britain over the Irish question just before World War I. And regular paratroops and Legion units attempted to overthrow De Gaulle because of his Algerian policy.

These are obvious examples of the professional military attempting to influence a nation's domestic politics. However, the intrusion of a professional army into politics is usually more subtle than the staging of a coup. A threat, a hint, a suggestion or a silence on the part of a politically minded army is all that is usually needed to bring the civil authorities to heel. De Gaulle, before he could deal with the Paris student riots, had to go to the headquarters of the French Army in Germany to find out if the generals would support him. In its sphere, the Army would have an iron grip on the Nation just as the New York Police in a recent "job action" held the safety of New York City in their hands.

All of this sounds ridiculous. Our officers are loyal Americans; conditions are not the same in the United States. The American people would not stand for it. And yet these are strange times. The Army faces, for the first time, the psychological stress of something approaching failure in a war, and no one can predict the consequences.

Every study of the national security process in recent years points to increasing civilianization and politicization of the leadership of the Armed Forces. While civilianization undermines the professionalism of the officer corps (the great bulwark of civilian control), on the enlisted and junior officer levels, it acts as an ultimate check against direct military interference in politics. To destroy this civilian influence in a moment of anxiety over a war just ending, and turn the US Army into an all-volunteer force, might be courting disaster.

II

Another View of an All-Volunteer Army

Lieutenant Colonel Harry G. Summers Jr., United States Army

IS THE all-volunteer Army a good idea politically? To some the answer is a resounding no. The reasons given constitute an extension of the devil theory, so popular on many campuses today. This holds that the militaristic devils who dragged an innocent United States into the swamps of Vietnam will, upon their return from Southeast Asia, begin to work their wicked ways on the United States again.

Other all-volunteer Army critics eschew such a simplistic view, but they, in turn, take almost as simplistic a view of the military. They operate from the unspoken assumption that the professional military is a monolith—that there is such a thing as a "military mind."

As long ago as 1960, before the terrible divisions of the Vietnam War, the sociologist Morris Janowitz, in his in-depth study of the US military *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, found that

> *The military profession is not a monolithic power group. A deep split pervades its ranks in respect to its doctrines and viewpoints on foreign affairs, a split which mirrors civilian disagreements.*

If anything, this tendency has increased in the last few years.

TABLE VIII–7 (Continued)

Benefit	Type of separation or retirement: Involuntary separation	Nondisability retirement	Disability retirement	Reserve retirement	Survivor benefits: Active duty	Survivor benefits: Retired	Voluntary separation
	MILITARY ESTATE PROGRAM						
FUNDED BY STATE AND LOCAL JURISDICTIONS							
Retirement credit for military service	Yes [l]	—	—	—	—	—	Yes [l]
Bonuses/tax credit/education/etc.	Yes [m]	Yes [m]	Yes [m]	Yes [m]	Yes [m]	Yes [m]	Yes [m]
PRIVATE SECTOR RETIREMENT CREDIT [n]	—	—	—	—	—	—	Yes

[a] Enlisted members are not entitled to severance payments. (Exception: certain enlisted reservists have qualified.)

[b] Annuity commences at age 60.

[c] Unlimited exchange and commissary store privileges are available to 100 percent disabled veterans, their widows and dependents.

[d] Survivors of members who have achieved retirement eligibility qualify for Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP).

[e] Death gratuity is payable to survivors of member if death is service-connected and occurs within 120 days of retirement.

[f] Member must be a patient at time of retirement and must be in a patient status at time of death.

[g] If DoD burial expense not received.

[h] Disability compensation annuity can be elected by member in lieu of or in combination with but not in addition to retired pay.

[i] Pensions payable to veterans or their survivors are based on need if they meet applicable eligibility standards.

[j] DIC is paid if death is a result of a service-connected disability.

[k] Payment is now made in 28 states. In other states it is paid only if retired pay is less than set standard.

[l] Credit for military service is available in 46 of the 50 States and eligibility varies among states.

[m] Benefits vary among States and are in addition to those provided by the Federal Government.

[n] A majority of the top 50 company retirement plans provide retirement credit for military service if member returns to firm on release from active duty.

It is no more true that all military officers are right-wing fanatics than it is true that all college professors are left-wing radicals. Many, no doubt, on both sides find such stereotypes comforting, but they do little to advance the cause of rational analysis.

What common threads, for example, run through such diverse personalities as General David Shoup and General Curtis LeMay? Where would Generals Maxwell Taylor and James Gavin fit into the picture? Does such a stereotype explain General Omar Bradley, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, strongly endorsing President Truman's limited war policies in Korea by stating publicly that General MacArthur's desire to expand the war to China was "the wrong war, in the wrong place, at the wrong time"?

The critics could profit from a semester at the US Army Command and General Staff College to get back in touch with the real world, and the real military. They would find that the officer corps ranges the political spectrum from left to right, excluding the lunatic fringe at either end (although some embittered Leavenworth instructors would quarrel with that last caveat).

The military is not recruited from Mars; it does not stand outside of American society. Military men learned the same truths from their parents, were exposed to the same childhood influences, attended the same primary schools and high schools (and, in most cases, the same colleges) as their contemporaries in the business and academic worlds. They are no less committed to American ideals than their civilian compatriots. Men are not as malleable as some apparently believe. Studies have shown that even the massive indoctrination campaigns of World War II did little to change men's allegiance and outlook on life. The beliefs inculcated by civilian society for 18 years are not likely to be radically changed by a tour in the Army.

Much is made of the "alienation" within the military growing out of the Vietnam War. While one cannot deny that frustration does exist, a closer examination of this "alienation" would reveal that no single focus for frustration exists. Ward Just, in his excellent examination of today's Army, *Military Men*, found:

> *For the older men, the villains tend to be timorous civilians and the left-wing press; for the younger men, they are the tradition-bound senior generals and the craven press. . . .*

If there is a "stab-in-the-back syndrome"—and I would not agree that there is—it is certainly evident within the military that there is a complete lack of agreement over just who is holding the knife.

Not only do Professors Kohn and Syrett do an injustice to the officer corps, they poor-mouth the enlisted ranks as well. They build a straw man of the pre-World War II Army, a straw man fashioned from the pages of James Jones' *From Here to Eternity*, that bears little resemblance to the facts.

Given the depression of the 1930s, the manpower pool available to the Army was much more than the "scum of the earth enlisted for drink" that they make it out to be. These were the men, after all, who cadred the massive World War II buildup, who furnished a goodly number of the junior officers in the beginning of the war (including the first sergeant in *From Here to Eternity*, if memory serves), and who served as the leaven for the forces that fought World War II. Many of these men served full careers retiring as distinguished senior officers.

I fear that Kohn and Syrett are postulating the problems of the Vietnam War on the pre-World War II Army. Their comments apply not to the enlistees of the Vietnam War, but to the draftees. An analysis of just who was drafted for the Vietnam War would reveal that it was certainly not the sons of the rich, or the upper middle class. They "bought" their way out with college deferments. As a young general in Vietnam sardonically told writer Arthur Hadley, "The young men we are asking to go into action . . . are not McNamara's sons, or Bundy's. I doubt they're yours. . . ."

It has been argued—by Bruno Bettleheim, for example—that much of the dissent against the war was occasioned by guilt feelings of the students who knew that the blacks, the poor and the dispossessed were serving in their stead in Vietnam; that they, the students, who were the most favored of society in terms of wealth and position, were paying the least price to that society. They, therefore, had a moral imperative to find the war illegal, immoral and unjust and, therefore, not "worthy" of their service.

Even without these problems, the draft traditionally has brought in relatively few soldiers from the upper ends of the social and economic spectrum, and vast numbers of the poor and the uneducated. This was true in World War II, as well as during the Korean Conflict. The Regular Army, on the other hand, is concentrated more at the center of the socioeconomic spectrum. There is, after all, a simple solution to the problems of quality control. This simple solution, in use today, is to raise enlistment standards. Today, for example, mostly high school graduates enlist. High school dropouts with unsatisfactory records of behavior are not accepted.

In addition to controlling the input to the Army through tightened enlistment standards, the Army has inbeing a set of internal controls. The Army's Qualitative Management Program includes time-in-service controls to deny re-enlistment to personnel not promoted or recommended for promotion at designated points of time (a system long in effect for the officer corps—and even for the State Department's Foreign Service officers) and includes qualitative screening to identify personnel with the least potential for continued productive service.

Tools to accomplish this include periodic enlisted efficiency reports and military occupational specialty qualification tests. While no one would claim that these controls are perfect, they do indicate that the Army is vitally aware of the problems of quality control.

Clearing away some of the smoke and fury, it is well to look objectively at the Army. The officer corps, with the exception of medical and dental doctors, has always been an all-volunteer force. By the same token, the upper grades of the noncommissioned officer corps has also been all volunteer. At last reports, the Republic has withstood this "all-volunteer" force in good stead.

The real question is raising enough lower grades by enlistment to fill the ranks of the Army. It is not anticipated that all of these men will be career men. Indeed, it is anticipated that the majority will not be career men. With a decent pay scale, with incentives to learn a trade or further their education, the Army cannot only meet its needs for well-qualified soldiers, but it can also provide a useful service to society by returning men better qualified for a place in the civilian job market.

The real target of much criticism, it would appear, is not the all-volunteer Army, but the Army *per se*. As T. R. Fehrenbach found, and reported [illegible] in his masterful study of the Korean War, *This Kind of War*:

> *There was and is no danger of military domination of the nation. The Constitution gave Congress the power of life and death over the military, and they have always accepted the fact. The danger has been the other way around—the liberal society, in its heart, wants not only the domination of the military, but acquiescence of the military toward the liberal view of life. Domination and control society should have. . . . But acquiescence society may not have, if it wants an army worth a damn. By the*

very nature of its mission, the military must maintain a hard and illiberal view of life and the world. Society's purpose is to live; the military's is to stand ready, if need be, to die.

Misconceptions about the nature of the Army are illustrated by fanciful scenarios for a military coup—"Communist" elements in the United States making an accommodation with the Soviets. To be anti-anticommunist, a very popular, almost *de rigeur*, stance in some parts of the intellectual community, one must, of necessity, posit an "anticommunist" to react against. The popular figure is the caricature from "Dr. Strangelove," the blustering, the mindless fanatic who sees a Communist behind every bush.

At the risk of shattering illusions, such individuals are hardly the norm in today's military. It is interesting to note in this regard that President Nixon's advance party to Peking recently was led by Brigadier General Alexander Haig of the US Army.

It is easy to dismiss these distortions; it is harder to deal with the dangers that underlie them—dangers of which military historians should be well aware. As Fehrenbach commented:

> *Without its tough spearmen, Hellenic culture would have had nothing to give the world. It would not have lasted long enough. When Greek culture became so sophisticated that its common men would no longer fight to the death, as at Thermopylae, but became clever and devious, a horde of Roman farm boys overran them. The time came when the descendants of the Macedonians . . . went pale and sick at the sight of the havoc wrought by the Roman* gladius Hispanicus *as it carved its way toward Hellas.*

Aside from becoming pale and sick, what can be done to prevent such a fate overtaking the United States? Alexis de Tocqueville gave the answer in 1835 in his book *Democracy in America:*

> *The remedy for the vices of the Army is not to be found in the Army itself, but in the country. Democratic nations are naturally afraid of disturbances and of despotism; the object is to turn these natural instincts into intelligent, deliberate, and lasting tastes. When men have at last learned to make a peaceful and profitable use of freedom, and have felt its blessings—when they have conceived a manly love of order, and have freely submitted themselves to discipline—these same men, if they follow the profession of arms, bring into it, unconsciously and almost against their will, these same habits and manners. The general spirit of the nation being infused into the spirit peculiar to the Army, tempers the opinions and desires engendered by military life, or represses them by the mighty forces of public opinion.* Teach but the citizens to be educated, orderly, firm, and free, and the soldiers will be disciplined and obedient.

[From the *New Yorker*, November 24, 1975]

A REPORTER AT LARGE

ALL-VOLUNTEER—I

For the rest of this decade, to maintain the active-duty forces of our Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps at approximately their present strength of 2,130,000, about 1,000 volunteers a day—365,000 men and women a year—will be required. No nation in history has attempted to maintain a force of this size without conscription. Yet so far young people have been volunteering for the armed forces at a slightly higher rate than necessary; by June 30, 1975, the end of the second formal year of the experiment with all-volunteer armed forces, which was begun by the Nixon Administration in 1973, the four services' recruiters had signed up 869,000 men and women, an average of 1,190 recruits a day. (The daily average includes Sundays, when most recruiting stations are closed.) A few of these volunteers were returning to military life after an interval as civilians, but the majority had not served before. As the months went by, recruiting became easier, not harder, partly because the recruiters grew more proficient and there were more of them.

At all events, 1,000 recruits a day now appears to be an attainable goal for the foreseeable future. Some considerable number of those who are volunteering now are turning to military service because they cannot find the civilian jobs they want, owing to the recession, but it is wrong to imagine that the services are reduced to taking young people whom everyone else has rejected. Quite to the contrary; the military's qualification standards, which were fairly high when the recession began, have been getting higher while it has lasted. The Department of Defense had hoped for a few thousand more volunteers than it got in 1975, but the "end strength," a number that Congress authorizes, was reduced during the period. End strength is the total on the last day of the fiscal year (ordinarily June 30) of all regulars on active duty, reserves on full-time duty, officer candidates at school, cadets at West Point and the Air Force Academy, and midshipmen at Annapolis. On June 30, 1975, the Army's strength was 784,333. The Army needs nearly half of all the volunteers—209,000 of the 456,000 in 1975—partly because it is the biggest service, but mostly because soldiers remain in service for a shorter average length of time than sailors, airmen, or marines. The Navy had 535,085; the Air Force ended with 612,751; the Marine Corps had 195,951. In the aggregate the all-volunteer forces were within one-tenth of one per cent of the planned end strength.

The Department of Defense takes these end-strength figures very seriously, as it obviously must. Congress takes them seriously, too. Planned end-strength is a crucial consideration in the legislators' minds when Congress annually votes on the money that the Department of Defense has requested. The end-strength numbers have had added significance these past two years: if the recruiters had missed their quotas by a wide margin—say, 100,000—that certainly would have been taken by many people as an indication that the all-volunteer system was not going to succeed. Unfortunately, the recruiting success does not prove that the all-volunteer system *is* going to succeed. Statistically, the recruiting process has been greatly enhanced by the fact that our active-duty strength has been shrinking rapidly since 1968, the Vietnam peak. The total reduction, half of it in the Army, has been 1,420,000 from a high of 3,547,902—or close to forty per cent—including a reduction of 125,000 from June, 1973. Some further reduction is planned for fiscal 1976, subject to congressional approval, but it is not likely to be more than a few thousand. There is formidable budget pressure on the Department of Defense to make do with an even smaller total, but that does not seem likely to fall below, say, 2,120,000 or 2,100,000 in the next few years. It is already 525,000 below our pre-Vietnam total strength, and the pre-Vietnam level has a kind of sanctity as a reference point, based on the idea that we *knew* how many men we needed in the military in those good old days. Also, the total strength of the Soviet Union's active-duty forces is supposed to be about 3,600,000, and a good many Americans are concerned about the fact that Soviet military manpower has risen twenty per cent in the past decade, while ours has diminished. Since our post-Vietnam reduction is in all likelihood approaching an end, it will be some time before our recruiters can relax; they will have to do at least as well during the rest of fiscal 1976 as they did in fiscal 1974 and 1975, and they will have to do well for years to come. Even if they can continue to produce the number of volunteers that the Department of Defense calls for, this may not prove conclusively to all, or to most, Americans that an all-volunteer force is desirable.

The all-volunteer experiment has gone along rather quietly. Most of us, I believe, have put it out of our minds, as if the end of the draft had been such a relief that we hoped we could be spared having to think about military manpower, or as if deterrence strategy and détente combined had made conventional forces obsolete. It is a lot not to think about—in fact, it is too much. The all-volunteer force is very different from the mixed force we fought with in Indo-China. Another, less attractive term for it is "all-professional force." Along with giving up the idea of drafting unwilling young men, we have given up the cadre concept—the idea of maintaining a skeleton force of versatile career servicemen in peacetime, who can train a mobilized citizenry quickly in a national emergency. The active-duty forces we now have, combined with our reserves, are what the military thinks we would need in any emergency that could arise before 1980.

Dozens of questions about the all-volunteer system must still be answered, and many of them are difficult. There are questions about the volunteers' quality: Will they be smart enough and well enough motivated to do their jobs? Volunteers are not accepted until they have taken the Armed Forces Qualification Test. (During the years of the draft, men were inducted first and tested later.) The test is for mental agility and special-skill aptitudes, and scores are ranked from Group I, the highest, down through Group V. Group III is about average for the population as a whole, and anybody who scores in Group III is considered smart enough to learn almost any of the hundreds of jobs that the services require. As a matter of policy, no one who scores in Group V is accepted as a volunteer. The big question, therefore, centers on Group IV volunteers: How many below-average-intelligence recruits should be accepted? Not a great many, obviously. But it is difficult to know where the line should be drawn. There are countless places in the infantry, to take one example, that can be filled perfectly well by men with less than average intelligence who are otherwise well qualified. In any case, the volunteers' test scores so far are higher than the scores of the mixed force—that combination of draftees and volunteers who entered the services in the last year of Selective Service. That is to say, the volunteers' *average* scores are higher, but this reassuring fact has a qualifier: the percentage of new men with below-average scores has decreased considerably, but so has the percentage of new men with above-average scores, in Group I and Group II; the percentage of Group III men, with average and slightly-above-average scores, is very much higher than before, and this accounts for the improvement. So, in the long run, there may be shortages of volunteers for military specialities that require superior intelligence.

When the armed forces talk about "motivation," they mean something different from what private employers mean. In the military, motivation has nothing to do with starting pay, bonuses, or fringe benefits; it has little to do with a desire to get ahead; and it is completely divorced from ideas like patriotism or willingness to fight for one's country. Any one of these might be an incentive to volunteer, but, according to rigid Pentagon definition, "military motivation" is the ability to accept or tolerate military discipline. By this standard, a well-motivated volunteer will learn what he is supposed to learn and do his job adequately without getting into disciplinary trouble—no company punishment, no courts-martial, no AWOLs, no willful disobedience. Experience proves that almost any young man or woman who is well enough motivated in civilian life to have finished high school is well enough motivated—self-disciplined, adaptable, or what you will—in the military sense to finish an enlistment successfully; and, quite logically, the services would like the percentage of volunteers with high-school diplomas to be sizable—preferably from sixty-five to seventy per cent. In 1964, when the recruits were both volunteers and draftees, the percentage of high-school graduates was sixty-eight. In 1975, the over-all percentage was seventy-two. However, ninety-one per cent of the Air Force volunteers in 1975 were high-school graduates, and they pulled up the average substantially. Only sixty-six per cent of the Army's new enlistees had high-school diplomas, and that percentage included 19,000 female recruits, who were required to have diplomas. Only fifty-nine per cent of the Marine Corps volunteers were high-school graduates. Both those percentages were low—in fiscal 1974, Congress passed a law requiring the percentage of new enlistees with high-school diplomas to be no lower than fifty-five—but both the Army and the Marines could point to the fact that their recruiters were steadily doing much better in this regard as the months went by.

Another question, among many who consider the subject, concerns what the Department of Defense terms "representation." It is an article of faith, doubtless with roots deep in the American past, that the armed forces should at least approximate a cross-section of the male population of the United States aged eighteen to forty-two. (That a proper cross-section also includes a meaningful sample of young females is a new idea.) The practical problems just now all concern overrepresentation. The effectiveness of the volunteer system will be subject to doubt if in the long run it attracts a disproportionate number of young people from poor families, a disproportionate number of young blacks, or a disproportionate number of people from, say, the South. (Of the countless other deviations from the cross-section that are possible, none cause nearly as much concern as these three.) Again, to some extent, the first two years results are more reassuring than not. The very poor—to whom a five-thousand-dollar-a-year starting salary, with fringe benefits worth at least half as much again, might be irresistible—are mostly unable to qualify. They fail the physical examination, or they score below the upper half of Group IV on the qualification test and so are almost sure to be excluded, or they have disqualifyingly had local police records. So far, the volunteers have been either very poor nor very rich. The youngest people eligible, without parental consent, are the eighteen-year-olds, and those who have had jobs have earned a little less than their starting military pay; the twenty-year-olds have earned a little more. The 1975 volunteers came from upper-lower- to upper-middle-class families—those whose incomes more or less followed the national pattern of income distribution. Eighteen per cent of them were black, and that figure, though down from the previous year's figure of twenty-one per cent, was still unrepresentatively high; the appropriate figure for the age group would have been thirteen per cent. The actual figure raised the percentage of blacks to fourteen per cent of total enlisted strength, but for just the Army new volunteers were twenty-two per cent black, down from the previous year's twenty-seven per cent. For the past two fiscal years, the Army's total black strength has been twenty per cent. Not even the most ardent champion of representation would say that twenty per cent instead of thirteen per cent is a grievous imbalance. But it is axiomatic that eventually the services become the people they enlist, so the Army's twenty-two per cent figure worries some military-manpower experts. Perhaps it was equally, or more, worrying that blacks were underrepresented in the Army's officer corps. As for geographical representation, the South, as some had feared, did furnish more than its share of the 1975 volunteers, and the Northeast and Middle Atlantic states furnished too few. This did not seriously concern the military, however, because no one section of the country was off the mark in either direction by more than a few percentage points.

Our reserves—the Army National Guard, the Army Reserve, the Naval Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve—of paid part-time servicemen are our complete back-up strength for the active-duty forces. Not all the reserves are ready for immediate duty, but a lot are, and their aggregate strength in June of 1975 was 904,700. In place of a citizen army, we have—including the reserves—a standing professional military force nearly three million strong. It is augmented by about a million civilians who are employed full time by the Department of Defense, mostly at desk jobs, to do work that in many cases uniformed personnel once did. Add them in, and the total number of people in the military establishment is close to four million. For budget purposes, the Department of Defense does exactly that. When Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger suggested that for 1976 the department would need about ninety-eight billion dollars, he expected to spend more than half of the sum—perhaps fifty-five billion—on the personnel costs of his four million full- and part-time employees.

The United States stopped drafting men in December, 1972—six months before the expiration of the President's authority to induct under the Selective Service Act. The official all-volunteer effort began on July 1, 1973, without ceremony. Nothing had been voted on, and no debate had taken place, because no legislation had been introduced. There was little public discussion, either. What attention the press gave the subject was for the most part, pessimistic. I knew that there were a lot of experts on military-manpower problems, including some in the academic world, who had been writing about military service, national service, and the military considered as an institution like any other institution. Wondering what they thought about the zero-level draft, and about the Nixon Administration's enthusiasm for an all-volunteer force, I got in touch with one of the more prominent of the scholars, Professor Morris Janowitz, who teaches sociology at the University of Chicago, and arranged to have dinner with him. I knew him primarily as the author of "The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait," a landmark study, published in 1960, that examines military life from a sociological viewpoint, focussing on the career patterns of American officers. Janowitz emphasizes that the sociology of the military is merely his hobby. By this he means, in part, that urban studies, especially the sociology of Chicago and political sociology, are the subjects of the courses he teaches. (Also, he has been involved for years in working to make the Hyde Park-Kenwood district, bordering the university campus, interracial.) He points out that when he got involved with the sociology of the military as an undergraduate, and then, as he continued—first in the Army, during the Second World War, at the Psychological Warfare Division of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, and then, after the war, as a graduate student at the University of Chicago and as a member of the faculty there—the subject was not quite respectable as an academic specialty. "Not a fit subject" is the way Janowitz puts it. The unspoken assumption apparently was that a young sociologist showing a keen interest in military professionalism might be a militarist of some kind. Janowitz had liked the Army no better than the next man, and he was not in favor of war. He was also highly critical of the Cold War.

Janowitz was born in Paterson, New Jersey, in 1919, to parents of modest income. He remembers how in 1926 armed force was used in Passaic to stop Communist-led strikes at the textile mills. His awareness of the military started then. It was a skeptical interest to start with, but he knew at first hand that violence occurs and is part of the social process in this country. During his tour of duty at SHAEF, as a propaganda analyst and specialist in Wehrmacht morale, Janowitz had interviewed hundreds of German prisoners of war and had amassed an enormous file of material on the German Army. While trying to figure out what kind of Allied propaganda would most discourage German soldiers, Janowitz and the members of his psychological-warfare section came to the conclusion that the Wehrmacht's motivation was not basically ideological. The Wehrmacht fought not for National Socialism but out of what sociologists call primary-group loyalty—a soldier's personal involvement with those in his infantry squad or some correspondingly small military unit. After the war, Janowitz collaborated with a fellow-member of the Chicago faculty, Professor Edward A. Shils, on a paper about the Wehrmacht in the Second World War, which attracted unusual attention here and abroad.

Janowitz, who is also the author of several nonmilitary studies, worked for ten years, with interruptions, to produce "The Professional Soldier," and in that decade military sociology had acquired a little academic acceptance. The ice was cracked, if not broken, by the publication of such books as "The American Soldier," in two volumes, by a consortium of academics led by Samuel A. Stouffer, of Harvard; "The Soldier and the State," by Samuel P. Huntington, also of Harvard; and "Soldiers and Scholars," by John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway, both of Dartmouth. And the most influential books about military strategy were being written not by generals and admirals but by doctors of philosophy, of whom Henry Kissinger, of Harvard, the author of "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy," was prototypal. What was new and exciting about Janowitz's book was his approach to the military as an organizational entity—an institution with an internal structure and an underlying social system that were part of American society and had an impact upon it. Janowitz, by looking at the military as a sociologist should, in effect established a new field of social-science study. Following the international splash the book made, Janowitz got a modest grant from the Russell Sage Foundation, in New York City, and he used it to organize a permanent association of academics interested in the field—the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. Its membership has grown from an original seven to more than six hundred today; besides sociologists, it includes political scientists, economists, anthropologists, historians, psychologists, lawyers, and several social workers. Janowitz remains chairman of the I.U.S., whose only group "policy" is its members' shared belief that an intellectual, objective analysis of military institutions is something worth working toward. The organization, which has put out an occasional newsletter, *The Bulletin*, for quite some time, began to publish an international, interdisciplinary quarterly journal, *Armed Forces and Society*, in the fall of 1974, with the help of a Ford Foundation grant. Its executive editor is Ellen Stern, and such scholars as Raymond Aron, of the Collège de France; S. E. Finer, of Oxford; Jacques Van Doorn, of Erasmus University, Rotterdam; and, of course, Janowitz are on its editorial board.

When I met Janowitz for dinner, I first asked whether the all-volunteer system could be expected to work, hoping he would assure me that it could. Years of thinking that the draft was an abomination made me eager to hear that we were done with it.

Janowitz looked solemn—a characteristic expression. He is tall and thin, with a long, narrow face, to which an expression of patient suffering comes easily. "It's the wrong question," he said. "The all-volunteer force is going to work in the sense that we are going to have it. It will not be a stopgap or a short-term expedient. How good it will be remains to be seen. But the United States is done with conscription—or soon will be. It is almost inconceivable that we will go back to the draft in the foreseeable future—*politically* inconceivable, first of all. It would take some dramatic change in the way international relations seem to be evolving— something that would completely reverse public attitudes toward conscription. I do not think there will be such a change. You see, the all-volunteer-forces idea is not just a gimmick that Nixon thought up to win the 1968 election—although that was part of how it came about. Our military organization is going through a fundamental transformation—ours and the military establishments of most of the Western nations. Great Britain's draft was ended in 1960. Canada has an all-volunteer force. The Netherlands is planning an all-volunteer force. And in nations where there is conscription—France and West Germany, for instance—the trend is toward greater emphasis on volunteer elements within conscript armies. Even in the Soviet Union, the stress is now on volunteer service in the key strategic-weapons commands—especially the naval and rocket forces. Not that the Soviet Union is about to do away with conscription. The advanced, industrialized nations are coming to the end of a historical epoch—the era of the conscripted, mass armed force.

"In the United States, this sort of armed force had its origins in the War of Independence. It was a political and social development, not just a technological one. The revolutionary leaders in America—and in the French Revolution, too—initiated the idea that citizenship involved the right and the duty to bear arms in defense of the nation-state, and, employing such forces, they defeated the post-feudal armies manned by mercenaries. At the same time, on the technological side you had an organizational system created by the increased firepower of infantry and artillery weapons, together with improved communications and transportation for an army and its supplies. By the time of the American Civil War, the mass-armed-force idea was fully developed. It continued, unchallenged and with increasingly destructive power, through the Second World War. Between wars, this country had rather small professional cadres. They worked out plans for mobilization. When war came, those cadres were tremendously expanded, by conscription, into mass forces. We went from fewer than 350,000 men in uniform in 1939 to nearly 4,000,000 in 1942. By 1945, the total was more than 12,000,000. Mass forces were supported by the industrial order, which was also mobilized. The culminating strategy of the mass-force concept was total war. As an ever larger segment of the population became part of the war apparatus, there was a weakening of the distinctions between the military forces and the civilian population. Soldiers and civilians were equally objects of attack—by air power, propaganda, and political warfare. And a reverse process occurred; various 'civilianizing' influences were at work on the military. The new officers were drawn from much more representative social backgrounds than the professional officers had been. There were concentrations of highly skilled civilians in uniform—engineers and economists, for example. To some extent, they undermined the military's traditional forms of authority and command. There was a shift in style, away from giving blunt orders and toward talking things over, like civilians, to make decisions. But in 1945 the mass-armed-force and the mobilization concepts began to decline. The atomic bomb was the technological turning point, although the sociopolitical environment also helped to initiate the change. Of course, epochs do not end tidily on a specific date."

Janowitz said that the decline has continued for many reasons. He mentioned the postwar erosion of nationalism. He said that the moral value of conscript service had also been eroded—that the memory of the Allied military accomplishment of the Second World War, defeating the Axis, had grown dim with time, but that the memory of the war's tremendous destruction had remained vivid. Increased literacy and the increase in the number of young people in the United States and Western Europe attending colleges and universities, he said, had popularized the values associated with internationalism. Students wanted to know why there should be any national armies; they believed that collaboration among nations, not military antagonisms, was the way to solve problems. Then, most recently, the war in Southeast Asia gave a strong emotional base in the United States to popular pacifism, and we saw the most violent anti-militarism in modern American history.

"So the validity of the mass armed force and the effectiveness of our military institutions were called into question," Janowitz said. "Since the military, with the vast resources it was given from 1960 to 1970, was unable to impose our containment policy on Southeast Asia, many Americans were tempted to think the military was not much good. That helped shake the moral worth of conscript service—quite apart from the profound moral unease that Vietnam produced. The draft seemed unnecessary, because the military was ineffective—not to mention undesirable. The public is prepared to support Congress when it spends on the military as a kind of all-purpose insurance policy, but the United States and the political leaders in all the Western nations are pressing—are themselves pressed—to reduce military expenses. And this is becoming true not just in the West. It is an increasing problem for the Soviet Union's leaders, too. The burden of the Russians' military budget, given their standard of living, is appalling. We don't know the exact figure. Our Department of Defense budget is almost seven per cent of our G.N.P., which is high, goodness knows—the highest of any democracy in the world except Israel, which spends more than twenty per cent. More than seven per cent, for a democratic nation that is supposed to be at peace, is hard to imagine politically. The taxpayers wouldn't stand for it. Congress would revolt against it. It's true that an all-volunteer force costs more, man for man, than a mixed force. So the economic pressure is for a smaller force. And, in theory, we can do with a smaller all-volunteer force if the personnel are more competent; there should be less turnover in the lower ranks, a higher percentage of reenlistments, more people who know their jobs. The big question is whether the services will agree to further reductions; they are still trying to get used to the force cuts since Vietnam. There should be additional reductions, I believe. We must maintain our NATO forces, but I don't see a reason for any significant number of ground forces anywhere else in the world. Our minimum total active-duty strength, as I see it, would be a million and three-quarters. I do not expect the Pentagon to see it my way, however—at least, not immediately."

Janowitz, who had been looking grave, almost smiled. "So that's what is happening," he said. "We are in the midst of a process that began more than a quarter of a century ago, and, while the decline of the mass army is fully evident, you will find, as you would expect, that the implications of the change are not altogether clear. My position is that the all-volunteer force requires a fundamental redefinition of the military career—a redefinition that will strengthen its civil-service nature. The Pentagon is not doing much thinking along that line. There are plenty of people down there who agree, more or less, but real innovations of the kind I have in mind get postponed. There are deadline problems—what to do about the Army's shortage of volunteers for the combat arms, and so on and so forth. There are also longer-range problems that cannot be put off. Officer recruitment, for just one example. We need only 20,000 new officers a year, and they are in the pipeline, so to speak. It will be an urgent problem in two or three years. Each reduction in the size of the armed forces has a dampening effect on officer recruitment. Who would choose a profession in which the career and promotion opportunities are dwindling instead of improving? We have far too many high-ranking officers. There is a bunching up—a hump—in the number of Army majors and lieutenant colonels. And we have about twice as many generals and admirals as we need. Well, if you are going to retain the top-quality younger officers who are in mid-career, and if you are going to get younger officers in positions of greater authority—everyone's professed desire—corrective action should be started now. Something has to be done to encourage early retirement of the generals and admirals. Inflation of rank is a related problem, as you would expect. We have major generals doing what brigadier generals should do. I'd recommend a one-rank deflation for all assignments at the general-officer level. Those are details. The problem is that a starting officer needs some reasonable expectation of advancement and promotion. In fact, officer careers need a complete redefinition. That cannot be accomplished overnight."

I did not see Professor Janowitz again for some time, because soon after our dinner he went to England to spend a year at Cambridge. As the Pitt Professor of American History and Institutions and as a Fellow of Peterhouse, Cambridge's oldest college, Janowitz planned to write several papers, attend some academic meetings, and take a look for himself at the British all-volunteer Army. Before we parted, he provided me with a reading list of books and articles, and also with the names of experts who were studying the subject from various points of view. I asked him whether the sociology of the military, perhaps, was on the point of achieving academic respectability, considering all he and his colleagues were doing. "No," said Janowitz. "Its existence is admitted now, but most academic sociologists look on the subject with bleary eyes, still uninterested. They are just not ready for us." He and I agreed that we would talk again after he returned from Europe.

I called on Dr. Albert D. Biderman in his office, at the Bureau of Social Science Research, on M Street, in Washington, one hot midsummer day. Dr. Biderman, who has been with the bureau as a research associate for eighteen years, is a member of the Inter-University Seminar's executive council and is one of Janowitz's old friends. (Both were born in Paterson, both went to New York University, and both took their Ph. D.'s at the University of Chicago. They even look a little bit alike, although Biderman is even thinner than Janowitz; indeed, the only word for Biderman is gaunt.) The bureau is a private, nonprofit organization that mainly does research on contract—usually for the government. It also gets support from various foundations, and from time to time, when its budget allows, it initiates independent research studies of its own. It has done a lot of research on military matters, but it by no means specializes in such research, nor is it associated with any of the services (as the Rand Corporation, for instance, is associated with the Air Force). Biderman's personal interest in military affairs dates back to the Second World War. From 1952 to 1956, he was a social psychologist for the Air Force, studying the problems that arose in connection with our prisoners of war in Korea. Survival training has been another of Biderman's interests, and he has served as a consultant on that subject for the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy. He has done a lot of work on nonmilitary matters for the bureau, and he has also studied problems of military retirement, an item in the annual budget of the Department of Defense which has been growing at a dismaying rate. (Most of Biderman's work on retirement, however, has been for the Department of Labor, the I.U.S., and the Twentieth Century Fund, not for the Department of Defense.)

Biderman told me that he was less than sanguine about the all-volunteer effort. He was, I had learned by then, far from alone. General William C. Westmoreland, who retired as Army Chief of Staff in June, 1972, after preparing for the phase-out of the draft, wrote in response to a reporter's question a year later that he was "not confident" that the all-volunteer method could meet the military-manpower requirements; that same year, Representative F. Edward Hébert, of Louisiana, then chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, and almost invariably a strong supporter of the Department of Defense point of view, told a reporter that he looked on the end of the draft as "a grave mistake" that would soon prove "a disaster;" and even former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, who had once been a robust all-volunteer-force proponent, had expressed uncertainty about the changeover. In January, 1973, testifying before Hébert's committee, Laird had said that "no one at this point in time can guarantee absolutely that the United States can maintain an all-volunteer force for the indefinite future."

Biderman explained that his concern was essentially a philosophical matter: what effect the all-volunteer effort, as it was being carried out, would have on the nation's values, or ethics. "I must warn you that I like to throw some counterbalance against whatever seems to be the prevailing weight of social theory," he said. "The prevailing weight now emphasizes the individual. If you think of the scale of organizations, going from the smallest, most individual, even the most private, all the way up to the global—well, lately the tendency has been to count the more immediate as the more valuable. The individual is considered more important than the neighborhood, the neighborhood more important than the community, and so on. When you get to the nation, it is almost derogated. And as for international organizations!" Biderman held up his hands in a gesture of mock horror. "At other times in our history, our value orientation has been quite the reverse, but, nevertheless, the fashions of individualism, of hedonistic rationality, of localism, and all the rest are really very much in line with the American tradition—or some part of it," he went on. "I have considerable appreciation and empathy for that point of view. But I have to recognize, intellectually, that other orders of organization—remoter, larger, or higher—are very important, and are becoming more so. For example, with increased mobility, locality loses importance to the individual. And any particular person's life has become increasingly dependent on the activities of others, who are becoming more and more remote. That has been the tendency in historical development for millennia. I think somebody has to say, 'Wait a minute.' There are many valuable pursuits that are not distributive, that cannot be organized on a local basis, that cannot be divided up into parcels. There are all the things economists lump together as 'public goods'—a residual category, covering all manner of things that don't have a distinctive market value. Social research, for one. I couldn't possibly deny self-interest, because I live largely out of the government trough, directly or indirectly. For a long time, the sort of thing I do was legitimated—and not only in this country—primarily on the basis of some kind of contribution to national strength vis-à-vis nefarious opponents around the world. Education, for another. We've had a crisis in education, and, I think, a considerable destruction of the values of education by trying to regard it as a *private* value. We have been overemphasizing the idea that people go to school only to improve themselves, rather than to become good citizens, or to carry on the culture, or to pursue other collective goals for the collective good. Yet those goals were the original basis for the support of public education. With that general outlook, I feel we have approached the all-volunteer force with far too little attention to the collective goal. Precious little has been said about defending the nation, or anything of that sort. Instead of national values, the planners were off immediately into job-preference schedules and wage incentives. How much additional pay is required to make military service preferable to other occupations? I think that was a systematic derogation of the communal values. The fact is that this country has got along fairly well, throughout its history, taking care of its military needs and military functions—allocating major resources to them, in fact—because there has been a very high degree of public consensus around defense-and-warfare values. Well, O.K. If you do away with that consensus deliberately, by belittling these particular collective, national values, how is the military to be legitimated? What alternative way is there?"

One answer to that question, I knew from having read several of Biderman's articles and papers, might be a great broadening of the military's function. A few years ago, at one of the I.U.S. meetings, Biderman proposed, in a paper he delivered, that we change the name of the military from the United States Armed Forces to the United States National Service Forces, and that we commit the military, as part of its mission, to coping with all sorts of emergencies and disasters—floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, forest fires, electric-power failures, transportation breakdowns, refugee evacuations, and the like. Biderman argued that it would give the services something heroic to do between wars, and improve their fighting ability, war being an emergency of the most acute kind.

"It was a fundamentally outrageous suggestion," Biderman said to me. "It outraged almost everybody, I mean. A good many people were outraged—or, at least, made uncomfortable—by the assumption that the military can be adapted, and should be adapted, to the social morality and social urgencies of modern civilization; that is, that it can once again become a major vehicle for broad national service. It outraged those who were all in favor of the Peace Corps, the Job Corps, the Neighborhood Youth Corps—you name it. Many of those thinkers considered the military a basic source of evil, forgetting that the organizations they admire are all modelled to some extent on military precedents. I do not see why we should create *new* organizations for such peacetime tasks. So I offended the pacifists, and I offended most of the military, along with their civilian supporters—all those who believe that warfare is the fundamental justification for military institutions—the people-killing business, period. Still, I like it. Up until Hiroshima and Nagasaki, you know, military service was almost the only part of our national life that symbolized collective self-sacrifice for the common good. Almost everything else was highly individualistic—self-serving, in fact. And 'national service' is much more accurate than 'people-killing' as a job description of what most people in the military do most of the time—that is, supply, communicate, organize, build, manage, transport, train, heal. All as applicable to civil needs as to war. Moreover, whenever we get into really big trouble—when the Mississippi River Valley is flooded—we do call on the military on an ad-hoc basis, because the military alone has the available men, machines, and organization. The civilian authorities finally turn to the military, but the military would perform far better—its effectiveness could be multiplied many times—if everyone agreed in advance that such emergencies were the military's job."

Biderman pointed out that demographers expect eighty per cent of our population to be living in urban areas by the year 2000. Our disaster potential increases as our society grows more complex, more interdependent, and physically and geographically more concentrated, he said. That potential is far greater now than it was a generation ago. "The kill-and-casualty factor in all emergencies has been magnified, and we need a corresponding elevation in our capacity for handling emergencies," he went on. "In this day and age, you cannot even pretend that disaster can be handled by voluntary associations like the Red Cross. Yet the Red Cross feels that it is the right mechanism. It has taken over the official role. The Red Cross is one of the many obstacles in the way of my proposal. In every city, the ambulance services are dreadfully disorganized. They always have been; in fact, we are just starting to get some rationality into *any* of our municipal emergency services. Firefighting is extremely archaic and tradition-bound. It would be enormously interesting to see what would happen if the massive logistical, organizational, and manpower resources of the armed forces were applied, with explicit and rationalized planning, to any of these problems. Forest fires, say. If we were to make even a halfhearted effort to mobilize the capacity of our military forces for dropping things from the air, and for coordinating air and ground operations, I suspect that we might be able *to end* the menace of uncontrolled forest fires."

Above all, Biderman's National Service Forces would be expected to cope with violent threats to the nation's existence and to international order. His premise is that organizations that continually perform real work in the real world are better prepared for combat than those that spend most of their time on "make-work and fake-work," in his phrase. "If we got ourselves well organized for the 'routine' crises—'routine' in the sense that you expect them to happen at least every decade or so—we would be very far along toward being able to deal with a peculiar crisis, like nuclear attack," he said. "In the military, as elsewhere, skills develop mostly in the course of doing jobs. And, conversely, all those military virtues, the qualities that trained soldiers are supposed to acquire in their military training, like physical fitness, the ability to live in the field, to accept some physical hardship, the discipline necessary for order and concert in a mass organization, basic knowledge of first aid—all these are just what firefighting, flood-victim rescue, and the rest require. I've wanted to see some such redefinition for a long time, but the all-volunteer force makes it urgent. We are confronted by a paradox. There is no likelihood that we can cut back our conventional forces to any great extent in the near future, no matter how successfully we curb our own tendencies toward adventures like the ones in the Dominican Republic and in Vietnam, and yet there is obvious distaste on the part of a great many young people for the military calling as a way of life. That means—to mention just one of many problems—that the military no longer meets an important need; namely, a 'way out' for those trapped in intolerable life situations as a result of poverty, lack of education, or what have you. The haven is still there. But if it is not very attractive it is not a haven. For a young man who sees the military as immoral because doing violence is its whole justification, enlisting just won't do. I believe that the maintenance of something like the French Foreign Legion—as a safety valve for civilian pressure that has become too great—is an important government function. But it needs to be updated to present-day realities. The National Service Forces could give those kids whose needs are not being met by schools and industry, and who are idealists, a chance to express their idealism. The ecology and the peace movements did it to some extent—taking the young beyond their purely personal concerns to a commitment to a larger cause.

The military could be redefined as a structure that serves the nation, and serves the international community in times of crisis, whether the crisis is made by nature or made by man. We would get away from violence—from death-dealing—as the military's entire justification. We would have to reverse the tendency to ritualize violence. We would have to evolve a new doctrine: we would have to say that the mission of the military is *curbing* violence as a force affecting the destiny of the United States. There you could have a high purpose—the goal of maintaining a peaceful, thuggery-free international order."

A few days after my meeting with Dr. Biderman, I went to the Pentagon to call on Stephen E. Herbits, who was then Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. As I quickly found out, Herbits was passionately in favor of the all-volunteer effort, and was extremely knowledgeable about it. He assured me vigorously that, no matter what I had heard or read, there was no reason that it shouldn't work.

In view of the importance of his job, I was surprised by Herbits' youth. He was thirty-one years old, I learned later, but he looked younger. He was neatly dressed in a cream-colored summer suit of conservative-mod cut. He had curly brown hair worn medium-long, and his cheeks were pink. Speaking in short bursts of carefully chosen words, he reeled off manpower statistics one after another without referring to notes.

Herbits, who comes from Pittsfield, Massachusetts, studied government, economics, and political science at Tufts University, from which he graduated in 1964. He expected to go into the insurance business, but after working with a Boston company as an underwriting assistant he got involved in politics. Although he had never been a Republican, Herbits admired Massachusetts' Attorney General Edward W. Brooke, and in 1966, when Brooke ran for the Senate, Herbits worked in his campaign. After Brooke won the election, Herbits went down to Washington and found a job on the staff of the Wednesday Group, an association of twenty-five Republican members of Congress who study and report on public issues. Herbits was a staff researcher and editorial assistant, and his first assignment, which he received in January of 1967, was to look into the subject of draft reform. The Wednesday Group had already reported on the inequities of the Selective Service System, and quite a few prominent people—including both Adlai Stevenson, in 1956, and Barry Goldwater, in 1964—had suggested all-volunteer forces as an alternative to the draft. Even President Johnson had unenthusiastically expressed some interest in investigating the possibility of phasing out the draft, although not for a decade or so. Johnson, of course, was then enmeshed in the Vietnam war, and the Selective Service System, whatever its shortcomings, allowed him to increase draft calls at will, without additional congressional permission or public fanfare. Johnson's Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, had thrown cold water on suggestions for all-volunteer forces. Among the disadvantages of such a system, McNamara had said, was that it would cost seventeen billion dollars a year; in one speech in Montreal he had rounded the figure off to twenty billion.

Herbits' research convinced him and the Wednesday Group that the only way to correct the draft's inequities was to eliminate the draft, and that the cost argument was specious. It was true that in order to attract volunteers Congress would have to agree to raise the military pay scales, and especially the pay for first-termers—newly enlisted men and women, who were being paid conspicuously less than they would have been for comparable civilian work. It appeared, though, that such pay increases would cost nearer four billion dollars than twenty billion. Herbits believed that the gap between the first-termers' pay and civilian wages amounted to an undeclared tax on the first-termers. He realized, too, that under the existing system there was another cost, which no one was counting. The armed services were wasting billions on training first-termers who quit as soon as they were able, and were also giving advanced technical training to others who quit as soon as they could get more from civilian employers than the military paid. In May, 1957, the Defense Advisory Committee on Professional and Technical Compensation, headed by Ralph Cordiner, the president of General Electric, and appointed by Defense Secretary Charles E. Wilson, had reported that the military-compensation system was unreasonable in that it was based on length of service. Higher salaries that were paid sooner, and included incentive and proficiency pay, could increase technical efficiency to the point where the Department of Defense might save as much as five billion dollars a year, the committee's report said. Cordiner added, in an interview a few months later, that such reforms could permit the draft to be ended. As Herbits dug deeper into the complexities of the subject, one question haunted him above all others: How did Selective Service decide how many man to draft each month? The answer was that the number came from the Department of Defense, which got it from its own Office of Procurement Policy (then headed by Harold Wool). The Office of Procurement

Policy did not feel like telling Herbits how it did its arithmetic. Instead, it provided him with a mountain of charts and statistics, presumably unaware that he had been an insurance analyst. Herbits read and read, and found hidden in that mountain, evidence proving to him that volunteers alone could easily have satisfied the Defense Department's needs—even in 1966, when nearly 340,000 draftees had been called up. Herbits felt that the public was being hoodwinked.

In December of 1966, just before Herbits went to work ferreting out information for the Wednesday Group—specifically, for a five-man "task force" on draft reform, consisting of Representatives Robert T. Stafford, of Vermont; Frank Horton, of New York; Richard S. Schweiker, of Pennsylvania; Garner E. Shriver, of Kansas; and Charles W. Whalen, of Ohio—the University of Chicago, with a Ford Foundation grant, organized a noteworthy four-day conference on Selective Service problems. It was run by Professor Sol Tax, of the Anthropology Department, with the help of Professor Janowitz and several other University of Chicago faculty members, and Professor Roger W. Little, of the Sociology Department of the University of Illinois. They assembled more than a score of authorities of many kinds and various opinions, including Lieutenant General Lewis B. Hershey, director of the Selective Service System (who, unsurprisingly, did not see that much of anything was the matter with it); Senator Edward M. Kennedy, of Massachusetts; Harold Wool, of the Department of Defense; and Margaret Mead, of the American Museum of Natural History. The Chicago conference did not arrive at any formal conclusions, nor had it been expected to, but half a dozen of the conferees, including Janowitz and Biderman, expressed the conviction that the definition of service needed overhaul as badly as the machinery of selection. They wanted to see the definition broadened to include a variety of options—jobs in the Coast Guard, the Public Health Service, the Peace Corps, a police-cadet corps, a national teachers' corps, and so on, and not just in the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps—so that, starting at eighteen or nineteen, practically every eligible young man would perform a national service of some kind for a couple of years. A number of conference participants, going further, declared, for different reasons, that the draft was unnecessary or evil, or both, and should be ended. Professor Milton Friedman, of the University of Chicago's Department of Economics, was among this radical lot—for conservative, marketplace economic reasons. He delivered a brisk, no-nonsense paper entitled "Why Not a Voluntary Army?" and his answer to his own question was simple. The military, he said, could get more than enough volunteers by making a more attractive offer. At a time when a nineteen-year-old white high-school graduate would have earned forty percent less in the military than the average he could expect in a civilian job, Friedman cited estimates that the starting pay for enlisted men would have to be raised from about forty-five dollars a week—a figure that included an estimate of the value of clothing, food, housing, medical care, and various other items furnished in kind—to something like eighty or a hundred, and that the men's living conditions would have to be improved.

In the following months, Friedman continued to write articles in favor of the all-volunteer system, and in May, 1967, with Sanford Gottlieb, executive director of SANE, and a number of other enthusiasts, he helped form the Council for a Volunteer Military. There were quite a few other believers in 1967, including Herbits; a book called "How to End the Draft: The Case for an All-Volunteer Army" was published in November by the Wednesday Group task force, with much of the research provided by the group's staff director, Douglas Bailey, and Herbits. But Friedman's free-market argument was what impressed Richard Nixon, who was getting ready to run for President in 1968. Friedman was associated with the group of men who were advising Nixon on campaign issues, and Nixon realized that the all-volunteer idea had great popular appeal; not only did it promise an end to the draft, which was hated for its own sake and had also become a symbol of our Vietnam involvement, but it was attractive also to those who shared Friedman's concern for preserving the freedom of individuals to serve or not to serve as they saw fit. At Nixon's behest, an all-volunteer plank was included in the Republican Party platform, and in his campaign Nixon promised to move toward the all-volunteer system as soon as he had ended the Vietnam conflict.

In the spring of 1969, although a date for the end of our fighting in Southeast Asia remained elusive, Nixon appointed a fifteen-man commission to develop a detailed plan for moving toward an all-volunteer force. The chairman was

Thomas S. Gates, who had been Secretary of Defense in the last year of the Eisenhower Administration, and the youngest of the commissioners was Stephen Herbits. Herbits had entered Georgetown University Law Center that fall, and he could have been considered a representative of youth, although, having just celebrated his twenty-seventh birthday, he was not concerned about the draft in the same way that younger men were. He was on the commission on his own initiative. In a story in the New York Times he had seen a hint that such a commission might be appointed, and he had conducted a small campaign on his own behalf. "Since I'd spent more than two years studying the subject, and had come to believe that an all-volunteer force was possible, practical, and desirable," Herbits once explained to an interviewer, "I wanted to be able to argue my position forcefully as a commission member." A letter to the White House written by Representative Stafford, which Representatives Horton, Schweiker, Shriver, and Whalen also signed, got Herbits his appointment.

The Gates Commission was expected to plan, not just debate, an all-volunteer force—a point that some of the commissioners did not clearly understand. There were other all-volunteer enthusiasts besides Herbits in the group—W. Allen Wallis, the president of the University of Rochester; Thomas Curtis, a vice-president of Encyclopaedia Britannica; Alan Greenspan, the economic consultant; and Milton Friedman—but Chairman Gates, for one, initially had a few doubts about whether an all-volunteer system would work. So did two former Supreme Allied Commanders of the NATO forces who were also members of the commission—retired Generals Alfred Gruenther and Lauris Norstad. Crawford Greenewalt, chairman of the finance committee of E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Company, questioned the morality of depending on higher pay to make people serve their country, but Friedman kept insisting that underpaying them was worse.

The commission's professional staff, more than forty economists and other social scientists, manpower experts, data processors, and researchers, working under Dean William H. Meckling, of the University of Rochester's Graduate School of Management, compiled the statistical foundation for a final report, two hundred and eleven pages long, supporting an all-volunteer force. When the report was sent to President Nixon, on February 20, 1970, Chairman Gates pointed out in a covering letter, "We unanimously believe that the nation's interests will be better served by an all-volunteer force, supported by an effective standby draft, than by a mixed force of volunteers and conscripts; that steps should be taken promptly to move in this direction; and that the first indispensable step is to remove the present inequity in the pay of men serving their first term in the armed forces."

During the next two and a half years, Herbits, in addition to finishing law school and passing his bar examinations, worked hard to help those who wanted to speed the transition of the all-volunteer force from promise to reality. He had a modicum of influence as a former Gates Commission member, but most of his power came from the job as staff assistant to Representative Stafford, who became Senator Stafford in September, 1971, by gubernatorial appointment, after the death of Senator Winston Prouty. Herbits was a lobbyist for the all-volunteer force, racing around Washington, often in the company of other equally enthusiastic congressional aides, and explaining to anyone who would listen that the Gates Commission's recommendations should be acted on right away. President Nixon did not forget his promise to end the draft, but the indispensable first step—a drastic rise in first-termers' pay—was not accomplished until late in 1971, when Congress raised their minimum monthly salary from a hundred and forty-five dollars to two hundred and eighty-eight dollars. That was only thirteen dollars less than the Gates Commission economists had suggested. At the same time, the Selective Service System was extended for two more years—to June 30, 1973. Though that move disappointed Herbits, he naturally felt that a two-year extension was preferable to a four-year extension, which was what supporters of the draft had hoped for. As the American withdrawal from Southeast Asia continued (the first small troop reductions had taken place in 1969), draft calls were sharply reduced. In theory, as the active-duty forces shrank from just over three million in 1970 to two and a third million in 1972, and additional shrinkage was scheduled, a reduction of draft calls to zero ought not to have been difficult if the four recruiting commands had been doing their all-out best to hunt for volunteers. Up to that point, they had not had to hunt. The Air Force, the Navy, and the Marines were essentially all-volunteer forces already. The Air Force had never needed conscripts; on occasion, the Navy and the Marines had needed some, though never many. But all three had been getting volunteers who were merely avoiding the likelihood of assignment to the Army. Even the Army had been getting masses of draft-motivated volunteers, because volunteering gave them a choice of where in the Army they might serve.

Much of the burden of improving recruiting, in anticipation of the day when the all-volunteer force would become a reality, descended on Roger Kelley, a personnel-management expert, who had gone to the Department of Defense from the Caterpillar Tractor Company, of Peoria, Illinois. As one of nine Assistant Secretaries of Defense, he was in charge of Manpower and Reserve Affairs and was also chairman of the department's Project Volunteer Committee, which had been established in March, 1969, to do what it could to help the services prepare for the transition. Project Volunteer had several hundred million dollars a year to spend on improving recruiting stations, improving living quarters for enlisted personnel, hiring civilians for irritating jobs like kitchen police, increasing educational opportunities for servicemen, and so on. Kelley's particular concern was fair treatment for blacks and other minority-group servicemen and women, and he was especially concerned with the integration of off-base housing. In 1970, Kelley's efforts on the Army's behalf were assisted by two talented officers, Lieutenant General George Forsythe and Colonel Robert Montague, who were working for Chief of Staff Westmoreland along similar lines.

Herbits spent much of 1972, with Senator Stafford's approval, lobbying for various bills in Congress which would help recruiters. He worked for the Armed Forces Enlisted Personnel Bonus Revision Act—a schedule of bonuses for enlistments and reenlistments and incentives for encouraging some specialists, like doctors, to get commissions—which became law in May of 1974. (There was subsequently an attempt to bring back kitchen police, and Herbits helped defeat it.)

The last draft call was issued in December, 1972. All those who favored the draft or distrusted the all-volunteer idea wanted the President's authority to induct to be extended beyond its expiration date of June 30, 1973. The friends of the all-volunteer system, for their part, hoped that the first half of 1973 would show that conscripts were not needed. During this trial-run period, as it happened, the Department of Defense was often leaderless. Secretary of Defense Laird left the Pentagon in January; Elliot Richardson, who took his place, stayed only three months, and left to become Attorney General. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, William P. Clements, actually made most day-to-day decisions for about five months, until James Schlesinger, arriving from the C.I.A., was confirmed by the Senate, on June 28th. Assistant Secretary Kelley returned to the Caterpillar Company in June, and Montague, who was now a brigadier general, and who had been exhorting the recruiting commands, was transferred to a post in which he could practice what he had been preaching: he was made second-in-command of the Army's Recruiting Command, at Fort Sheridan, near Chicago. Meanwhile, President Nixon, true to his second round of campaign promises, had announced, in March, that he would not request a renewal of his authority to induct men. If the services needed more men, Congress would have to go through the full legislative process of subcommittee, committee, and conference-committee, action in order to revive that power. However, the Selective Service System, greatly reduced in size, would continue to register young men as they turned eighteen, just to keep track of their names and addresses.

Before Kelley left the Pentagon, he hired Herbits to work in the office of the Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. It was Herbits' job to assist the Assistant Secretary to assist the Secretary of Defense to make a go of the all-volunteer force; and it was the job of the Secretary of Defense, acting for the President, to make sure that it succeeded. It was also the job of the four service chiefs—General Creighton W. Abrams, Army; Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., Navy; General George S. Brown, Air Force; and General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., Marine Corps—to make sure that it succeeded. Whatever doubts these higher-ups had—and they all had more than Herbits—were not supposed to show.

After Herbits had run through this recent history, he had me sit down in the chair behind his desk, armed himself with a black grease crayon, and made a presentation packed with statistics on the latest recruiting figures. He stood in front of a tall easel that held a pad of kindergarten-sized drawing paper, and as he rattled along he drew graphs, charts, and trend lines, and scrawled numbers. Herbits may have felt slightly defensive about the numbers, which were somewhat less than the department had desired; still, he insisted stoutly that nothing so far could be taken as an indication that the all-volunteer *idea* was wrong. He admitted that there were troubles, and that mistakes had been made, but he seemed certain that various corrections, most of them already begun, would greatly improve the over-all picture within months.

After Herbits had finished his summation, I asked him whether quality was a problem. The services could get whatever numbers of volunteers they wanted if they lowered physical, mental, and moral standards for acceptance, and some critics had maintained that they were sure to do so; indeed, some Army recruiters, not long before, had been caught helping prospects by coaching them for their qualification tests.

"I hate to sound like a Pentagon apologist, but the quality issue has been overblown," Herbits said. "We are getting about the same quality mix that we were when we had the draft. Standards for the physical examinations are the same as they were. Moral standards are the same—essentially, that means checking into a candidate's police record. If he has more against him than six moving-traffic violations in a year, he can't get in unless he gets a special waiver. We are doing well enough with the percentage of high school graduates—the 'motivation' issue. Everybody is after high-school graduates, because ninety-five per cent of them finish their first enlistment successfully, but the truth is that *all* volunteers, whether they have high-school diplomas or not, do pretty, well, provided they are otherwise qualified. Eighty per cent of those who do *not* have high-school diplomas also finish without causing any disciplinary problems. I feel we are making a lot of trouble for ourselves over that fifteen-percentage-point difference. The Army has been trying to get seventy per cent high-school graduates, and missing its numbers, because that's hard. The attempt doesn't make any sense to me. Lots of high-school dropouts score higher on the qualification tests than people who stayed to get their diplomas. Nobody really knows whether a high-aptitude dropout is a good disciplinary risk or not, but he may be. If it turns out that his motivation is poor, the all-volunteer forces can do what was impossible before—send him home quickly with an honorable discharge, by mutual agreement. Sometimes I think that General Abrams has the answer. He can't bear a lot of fiddling around with the quality question 'Give me a man,' he says, 'and I'll make him a soldier.' "

Herbits went on, "There is no problem at present about mental ability. The test scores, on the average, are higher than before. Eighty-eight percent of the enlisted volunteers are in the top three groups; the Army's average is the lowest—something like eighty per cent. That means that the volunteers are considerably smarter than their age group as a whole; if you tested the entire population, not more than seventy per cent would score in Group III or above. Some people are upset because we are not, of course, getting any college graduates at all in the enlisted ranks. They are not volunteering, and the services wouldn't want them if they were. The draft did send college people into the enlisted ranks—men who had the option of training to become officers but didn't take it. Did they make good enlisted men? Certainly. They were very good, but they were overqualified, so they were something of a problem, too. As any personnel expert will tell you, an overqualified employee is likely not only to be dissatisfied himself but to spread dissatisfaction. All the services want college graduates, but they want them as officers, not as enlisted men. But we are not getting dumbbells, and we are not getting the very poor. At least half of the new volunteers were earning as much in civilian life as their starting military pay. Twenty per cent are accepting a *lower* income to enter the services. That's a far cry from the picture in many people's minds."

I asked Herbits whether the high percentage of blacks among the Army volunteers was upsetting the Pentagon—as I had gathered in various quarters that it was.

He said he did not think so. "The percentages look high, but my guess is that after a year or so the percentage of blacks in the Army's enlisted ranks will not be more than a point or two higher than it was at the end of 1973—that is, it will be twenty or twenty-one per cent. I know that we are not going to have an all-black Army. I agree that the armed forces, in a general way, should be a cross-section of the society, but the Army has never set a quota for blacks or any other ethnic group, and I don't think it will. The Army has been an equal-opportunity employer for a long time. Suppose it turns out that under the all-volunteer system the Army's enlisted strength is twenty-five-per-cent black. Is that good or bad? You have to assume that black volunteers have decided for themselves that military service is preferable to their other choices—an opportunity, not a burden. And qualified volunteers make good soldiers because they are qualified. It's that simple. I find the whole issue rather phony. The percentage of blacks in the Navy is unrepresentative in the other direction; it was eight per cent at the end of 1973, and the Navy has worked hard since 1972 to get more blacks."

I asked about geographical representation, and Herbits said, "That, to my mind, is another overblown issue. We're doing a special study on it. The Department of Defense is spending a lot of money on questions it really does not need the answers to, trying to satisfy its critics. I've seen some preliminary figures. They do show that we are getting a higher proportion of volunteers—this is for all the services, not the Army alone—from the South than from anywhere else. Not surprising. The South has a strong military tradition, and a high proportion of the volunteers come from families with a background of military service. On the basis of census figures, you would expect the South to provide thirty-two per cent of the volunteers. It is actually providing thirty-seven per cent. New England and the Middle Atlantic states, which should provide twenty-two per cent, are providing only seventeen per cent. If that is a dramatic problem, I don't understand why. Incidentally, the draft was not perfectly equitable geographically, either. There were too many Southerners and not enough New Englanders then. The volunteers are coming from the same places that the mixed force came from—most of the regional correlations are within a couple of percentage points, state by state. So, to sum it all up, I think that quality will improve, not deteriorate. Recruiting methods have improved. There is a trade-off in that: Standards can be raised, provided you are getting enough volunteers. Standards-changing is still a sore subject. We've done so much fussing with standards that the poor recruiters have hardly known from day to day whether a prospect was qualified or not. It takes a good two months, on the average, from initial contact to swearing in, to recruit a man. To lose one after all that is enough to break a recruiting sergeant's heart. In large perspective, we really don't know what we need. Whatever we need, quality levels get higher all the time—as in the civilian world. There is a smaller and smaller place for unskilled labor, or for men and women who cannot learn skills. Probably no more than ten per cent of enlisted men—perhaps twenty per cent, if you consider the Army by itself—are assigned jobs where only a minimum of technical skill is required. The rest are specialists in electronics, communications, intelligence, administration, clerical work, machine maintenance, and so on. They have to learn something—in many cases, a great deal. Exactly how high an I.Q. is required? It's hard to say. With the famous 'Project 100,000,' in 1966, we showed, by taking in and training that many Group IV men, many of them not high-school graduates, the remarkable extent to which such men could achieve acceptable levels of military job performance. Good training is critically important. A desire to succeed is critically important. The military must not disappoint people who are looking for education and skills. What percentage of your first-term men reenlist? That's a good indication of the state of things. I have only rough figures, but traditionally the percentage for enlistees has been around ten or twelve per cent, with only two or three per cent for draftees. Now we are getting more than twenty-per-cent reenlistments—not among new volunteers, as yet, but among volunteers of two and three years ago. I take that as a favorable sign."

—Bruce Bliven, Jr.

(*This is the first part of a two-part article*)

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A REPORTER AT LARGE

ALL-VOLUNTEER—II

Professor Charles Moskos, Jr., who is chairman of the Department of Sociology at Northwestern University, has made the military enlisted man his specialty. When Moskos was in New York a while ago for a sociologists' conference, I had a long talk with him as part of an investigation I was making into the condition of our armed forces in the wake of the Nixon Administration's momentous policy decision, in the spring of 1973, to dispense with conscription and rely entirely on volunteer manpower. Conversations I had previously had in the Pentagon and elsewhere had indicated that quantitatively the experiment was a success. Its qualitative and social aspects, I had learned in talking with various people—including Professor Morris Janowitz, of the University of Chicago, who is the author of "The Professional Soldier," published in 1960, and preeminent among sociologists of the military—were still being widely debated. Moskos' best-known book, "The American Enlisted Man: The Rank and File in Today's Military," published in 1970, complements "The Professional Soldier." Janowitz was concerned primarily with the patterns of officers' lives and careers; Moskos concentrated on enlisted men and how they fared. I learned that Janowitz had encouraged Moskos in the project, and the two had become good friends.

Moskos had done some research before he started work on his book, having served as an enlisted man from 1956 to 1958 in an Army combat-engineers unit in Germany. He had then been fresh out of Princeton, where he had studied sociology, and he was happier in the Army than he had been at college. Moskos' father was a shoe repairman in Chicago; his parents were Greeks who had emigrated from northern Epirus in what today is Albania. Moskos, as he once expressed it, "had never felt comfortable with the snobbish side of Princeton." He discovered that he could make friends in the engineers outfit with great ease, and he liked the friends he made, none of whom held his Princeton degree against him. As a sociologist of the military, he has made field trips to live, for a few days at a time, with units in many places, including the United States, Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, Germany, Korea, Japan, and Cyprus. In Cyprus, he has been studying the United Nations peacekeeping forces, on and off, since 1969. (His book about the U.N. troops, "Peace Soldiers," will be published this year.) Moskos has a talent for talking with enlisted men and finding out what is on their minds. He is a compact man of medium height, black-haired and vigorous, who speaks in an easy, casual manner, which surprised me slightly, because I had read a good deal of his work, and like most sociology—at least when sociologists are addressing others of their kind—it seems formal and stiff. I knew that he had some doubts about the all-volunteer force, and I asked him what they were.

"One of my big worries is the race thing," Moskos said. "We have a marked polarization between whites and blacks within the context of the services' formal racial integration. It's bad. It predates the zero draft, so I am not saying that the all-volunteer system is the cause, but I am afraid it may make it worse." He said that by the mid-nineteen-fifties, half a dozen years after President Truman issued a historic executive order abolishing segregation in the armed forces, integration was very nearly an accomplished fact—and in that respect the military was far ahead of civilian society. Moskos felt that by the end of the nineteen-sixties an all too brief era of harmonious relations had ended, although integration, of course, remained the formal policy. "Some of the trouble has been well publicized," he said. "The race riots aboard Navy ships, the 'fraggings' in Vietnam, violence between black soldiers and the local people in Korea and West Germany. What may be more significant eventually, though it is not nearly so dramatic, is the sharp rise in race consciousness among the black rank and file. You see it in many things—forms of greeting, like hand-slapping, and the popularity of slave bracelets, and the formation of 'brotherhood' social clubs. Self-imposed, informal black segregation, especially during off-duty hours, is de rigueur as far as the low-ranking black enlisted men are concerned. This is in the context of *no* formal color barrier whatever within the military community—absolutely equal treatment, regardless of race, at swimming pools, barbershops, snack bars, even in housing for dependents off the post. During duty hours, whites and blacks, typically, are working together with little, if any, display of racial animosity. Many white soldiers are working under black superiors. Nevertheless, the off-duty separation is ominous. What haunts commanders is the possibility that black servicemen might feel they owe higher loyalty to each other than to the United States military."

In one way, Moskos said, he thought that the all-volunteer system might work for the better. "There may be less internal turbulence, because no one in the units will be serving under duress," he explained. "That should reduce tensions in general." What worried him was the fact that there had been a steady increase in the proportion of blacks in the Army's combat arms—the infantry, artillery, and armored units—especially in the infantry. "In an ironic sense, it is a step forward," he said. "Within the military, combat personnel are still accorded higher prestige than non-combat soldiers—they are admired but not envied." He was also concerned that, as a corollary to black overrepresentation in the combat units, blacks were underrepresented among technical specialists.

Moskos said he thought that the race problem was much worse in Europe than in the United States, and worst of all in Germany—among our 190,000 NATO ground-force troops there. "I don't want to pretend to know more than I know, or to belittle the hopes and plans of the Seventh Army, our main unit in Germany, to improve things," he said. "But there is no doubt in my mind that a great number of the low-ranking enlisted men there, white and black, are sullen and disaffected from the military system. You know, the sharp cleavage these days is between the short-term, low-ranking enlisted men and the noncoms—especially the senior noncoms—who are making the Army a career. In the Second World War, the enlisted men resented officers. That's completely out of date. These days, the privates call the career noncoms 'lifers,' and the 'lifers,' especially staff sergeants and master sergeants, are their villains. There is a real generation gap, and it coincides largely with whether you drink alcohol or smoke marijuana—whether you are a 'juicer' or a 'head.' Two-thirds of the noncoms are juicers, I'd estimate, and only a minuscule proportion of them also smoke marijuana. More than half, certainly, of the lower-ranking enlisted men use marijuana, and while a lot of them also drink—there is considerable overlap—the individual soldier easily identifies himself, and all the other soldiers he knows, as belonging to one group or the other. Well, the heads and the juicers are split. They feel altogether different about the propriety of using drugs. A good many noncoms are easing up about marijuana. They used to think any drug use was a moral outrage.

"Now some of them see it merely as an effieciency problem. Both heads and juicers regard heroin use—there are very few heroin users—as deviant behavior. Even the few heroin users think so. I am not talking about drugs and alcohol during duty hours; I am talking about what happens after retreat, when the job is done for the day, and the men get back to their barracks. And that is a complicating factor in Europe; the barracks have become of great concern, because the troops don't go out much. For whatever reason, our young soldiers seem to be petrified by foreign culture. They stay in their barracks, turn on their stereos and strobe lights, and smoke dope, in contrast to the troops in the United States. Here, if you smoke you do it off post. With so many men staying in their barracks voluntarily, you get a 'black' barracks or a 'white' barracks, and any barracks can become a tough neighborhood, precisely the way any block in a community can become tough. You get race hooliganism—fighting on the company street, thefts, muggings, all of it. That point has been reached in several instances."

Moskos spoke about the differences between the first-termers who came into the Army while the draft was still in force and the new volunteers. "There is a difference in expectations. The earlier volunteer came in with a rather low-level commitment to the Army, and most of the draftees were not committed at all. They did not expect much and they did not get much, so at least they were not disappointed. They were concerned with being given a clean discharge. Company punishment—Article 15 punishment, which the captain can impose without a court-martial—was a considerable deterrent against breaking the rules. And they were also willing to put up with quite a lot of petty harassment, telling themselves, 'I can get through this.' The new men are coming in with much higher expectations. That's especially true of those who have messed up somehow—have dropped out of school, say. Things have gone wrong, and they see the Army as a second chance: 'I can get a high-school diploma.' 'I can learn a trade.' A good many of the white volunteers join for psychological reasons—looking for a place to gain maturity, or to get away from their mothers, or to travel. Blacks are less concerned about growing-up problems; by eighteen a black has more or less resolved them on his block, if they are resolvable. So the black volunteers are more interested in the instrumental things—education, learning a skill. But in both cases expectations are high. And then if it turns out that all the Army really has for the volunteer is a job washing tanks, or winding reels of telephone wire, he plummets. He has lost again. His morale sinks lower than the old draftee's. The new volunteer also has a shorter fuse on his temper. He does not like to be barked at by the sergeant, and there are still lots of barking sergeants. Article 15 punishment is not enough to deter him. He looks on it as a deal: 'I'll go AWOL for five days, and they'll restrict me to the company for a month. Fair enough.' He isn't even greatly worried about getting a less than honorable discharge—he doesn't think that that would be the end of the world. In fact, though, it is a terrible stigma on the outside—especially for a poor black. By the time he realizes that, it's too late.

"Faced with such changes, some of the senior career noncoms are completely at a loss. They're a conservative force—they are the upholders of the traditional military ideals of soldierly honor and the whole military mystique. They feel that their own prestige and authority have been taken away. They think that most of the Army's innovations—civilians doing kitchen-police duty, for instance—are ruining the institution. Many of them no longer have a personal commitment to the military system; they are simply counting the days to their retirement. If you ask them what the trouble is, they'll answer with the Pentagonese word 'VOLAR'—the volunteer Army. There *are* senior noncoms, and noncoms of all sorts, luckily, who do not feel that way at all—the adapters, I call them. They are not satisfied with the way things are, by any means, but they regard the new men as a challenge, a potentially invigorating force. The adapters enjoy their own military service and think they are getting a lot out of it. They are actively engaged in trying to make the volunteer system work. Well, the Army must, of course, figure out ways and means of moving the many noncoms with attitudes somewhere in the middle—between the traditionalists and the adapters—toward the adapters' end of the spectrum. I see that as a pivotal issue. I may over emphasize the racial problem in the Army in Europe, because that is what I've been studying at first hand. Germany is probably the extreme case, but off-duty separation is the pattern everywhere—in Japan and Korea, although not quite as marked in those two places, and in the United States. I'd say that racism—the American dilemma—is *the* problem in all the services, wherever the troops are."

Moskos pointed out that the Pentagon is well aware of the problem, and is working hard to alleviate it. "I believe the military has gone further in attacking racism than any other institution in our society has," he said. He added that he thought there was "institutional racism" of a kind that was well-nigh unprovable, in spite of the services' formal policy of nondiscrimination. What he called the "danger areas" were promotions, assignments, and punishments. He said that he thought the services were monitoring themselves in an effort to prevent racism from corrupting these decisions—to make sure, for example, that a black soldier did not get ten days' restriction for an offense that would have cost a white soldier only five—but that it was certainly hard to eliminate.

All the services, Moskos reminded me, are teaching race relations in a program that has been worked out by the Defense Race Relations Institute (D.R.R.I.), which was established in 1971, by the Department of Defense, to develop course materials and train course instructors. Almost every member of the armed forces takes the course, which deals with the dynamics of prejudice, examines real incidents that have occurred, and presents some minority-group history—not just black history but the story of Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans, American Indians, Asian-Americans, and the impoverished whites of Appalachia. "It's a fantastic effort," Moskos said. "No organization has ever tried to teach race relations on such a scale. A thousand instructors are trained each year, and they fan out to all the services. In addition to D.R.R.I. programs, nearly every major military installation has a human-relations council, which deals with race problems, among others.

"Officers and a certain number of noncoms in supervisory jobs are now rated in their efficiency reports on how well they are handling race relations within their units," Moskos went on. "That's in dead earnest. A man with a failing mark may not get promoted. He could even lose his command. I am completely in favor of it, and the guys who are into it are tremendously dedicated. I almost hate to say it, but the basic premise—that we can change the racial attitudes of individuals through a teaching program—is not proved. It's too soon to measure results. I've seen considerable opposition to the classes at the company level—real doubts about them, I mean. Company officers are saying, 'If we bring all that up, aren't we just opening old wounds?' The focus on injustices that blacks have suffered in the past is strong, and some white enlisted men simply tune out. Not all of them, but some."

Moskos explained that a surprisingly high percentage of the race-relations-program instructors are black. "There is no reason they shouldn't be black, but that fact alone creates curious problems," he said. "Some of the black soldiers have so little faith in the military system that they question the credibility of a black officer teaching the race-relations course. They think he has gone over to the other side. And then, only time will tell whether a race-relations-program assignment is good or bad for an officer's or a noncom's career. It could go either way. That puzzle does nothing for the instructors' sense of security; they are just hoping they are not in a dead-end slot. I'd like to see some shift in content away from the course's emphasis: away from injustices suffered by blacks and toward positive reasons that military service is good for the black community—good for black health levels, good for black economic opportunity. A central role in the military is, after all, a valuable thing. It provides a partial answer to the nightmares of some black intellectuals about territorial segregation or genocide. As long as the black serviceman is an integral part of the military establishment, those horrors are not going to happen. The most impressive part of D.R.R.I. so far is the sense of purpose of many people who are working on it. Truly amazing. You see that they believe the military is one institution—one of the few—that can improve black opportunity in a significant way. They may be right. When the seventies are done, perhaps we'll all see, to the surprise of some, that the armed forces set the pace."

When Moskos spoke about his hopes for the D.R.R.I. program and for the general success of the all-volunteer forces, he sounded almost, if not quite, as devoted to the all-volunteer-armed-forces concept as Stephen Herbits, a Pentagon manpower expert I had talked to earlier. Yet I remembered, from having read Moskos' writings on the subject, that as recently as two years earlier he had been in favor of a different sort of volunteer national service, which might, as a practical matter, translate into service for perhaps sixty per cent of the young men and women in a given age group—say, from eighteen to twenty-two. Moskos had taken part in a small conference in New York City in the spring of 1971 which he and Janowitz, and the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society—a group founded ten years earlier by Janowitz—had organized, and the Russell Sage Foundation had sponsored. Its subject was "Youth and National Service." About twenty-five educators, social scientists, public officials, and executives of some of the voluntary associations—the National Center for Voluntary Action, the Peace Corps, the Office of Economic Opportunity—met and compared notes on opportunities and possibilities for national and community service of various kinds. Janowitz was the chairman of the meeting. Moskos' paper, entitled "The Social Equivalent of Military Service," argued that if a civilian alternative to military service was to be truly equivalent upper-middle-class young men and women should be required to give up their class privileges for a term of service. The conferees were well aware, as they met, that the country was moving toward an all-volunteer military, yet some of them hoped that, even so, a parallel system of civilian service might be developed. They agreed that it would cost a lot of money. Most of them also agreed, however, that the word "volunteer" means more than a trade for money or immediate self-betterment—that there were a lot of young men and women motivated by, as Janowitz summed it up, "altruistic impulses, common identification, a search for a break in educational routines, personal attachment to a youth movement, or the aspiration to deal with community and national problems." The question was what could be done for them if a term in the armed forces was not what they wanted

During my talk with Moskos, I reminded him of the conference and asked him what had become of his enthusiasm for the broader national-service idea. Moskos replied that he really hadn't changed his mind about it—he had just stopped talking about it, because politically it appeared to be a lost cause. "Since I cannot have my preference, I try to think of ways to make the all-volunteer force work as well as possible," he said. "Morris Janowitz feels much the same way. It is dangerous to generalize about the members of the I.U.S., but I'd guess that more than half of them wish a national-service system of some kind were possible. But they know that almost no one in Congress would vote for it. Consequently, most of them are thinking about ways of improving the all-volunteer forces. That puts us at odds with countless academics—all those who think that anything that makes the military better is a betrayal of higher values. My personal objection to the all-volunteer system is the injustice of it. An all-volunteer force is a form of class privilege. Upper-middle-class kids won't serve in it. What kind of society excuses its most privileged members from defending it? I've managed to compartmentalize that objection in my mind, but I can't resolve it."

So far, the recruiters' greatest success, judging by the rising chartlines for the numbers of volunteers, has been with women. When a commission headed by former Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates was conducting the studies that led to the present all-volunteer system, the possibility that women might make up a substantial proportion of the uniformed forces received little attention—although adding the number of qualified and available young women to the number of qualified and available young men would have more than doubled the total of potential volunteers. Since the Second World War the percentage of women in the armed forces has dropped well below its wartime high of more than two per cent. In 1971, it was only 1.6 per cent.

By the time the all-volunteer experiment began, however, the Department of Defense was contemplating using more women, and using them in a much wider variety of jobs. The objective was to recruit approximately 14,600 during fiscal 1974—in round figures, 6,700 for the Army, 4,000 for the Air Force, 3,700 for the Navy, and one hundred for the Marines. That would have raised the total number of women on active duty from 45,900 at the end of fiscal 1973 to 60,500 twelve months later, which would have amounted to almost three percent of the armed forces. The goal of finding 1,200 women volunteers a month, or forty of the total of 1,000 volunteers a day which the all-volunteer system now requires, seemed optimistic, but it was soon evident, from the number of female applicants who appeared, that each service could easily meet its quota, even though the qualifying standards for women were (and still are) much higher than for men. All the services require women volunteers to be high-school graduates or to pass an equivalency exam. They must also score above the median grade in the obligatory aptitude exam, known as the Armed Forces Qualification Test.

In next to no time, the Department of Defense, delighted to find that at least one aspect of recruiting was easier than it had expected, raised its sights and planned to increase the total number of women to 93,200 by the end of fiscal 1976. Despite difficulties—shortages of barracks space, training facilities, and uniforms—by the end of fiscal 1975 the recruiters were more than a year ahead of the revised plan. There were 97,000 women on active duty, with a further increase to 109,200 planned for the end of fiscal 1976.

Mrs. Nancy Goldman, a research associate in the Center for Social Organization Studies at the University of Chicago, is the ranking academic authority on the role of women in the military. She is a fellow of the I.U.S.; one of the editors of its journal, *Armed Forces and Society;* and she has contributed articles on the subject to the *American Journal of Sociology* and *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.* Mrs. Goldman was graduated from Smith College in 1956 and then studied sociology at the University of Chicago from 1957 to 1959, but she did not get her master's degree until 1971. In the interim, she got married and had two children, and she decided that motherhood took temporary precedence over scholarship. As a sociologist, Mrs. Goldman's interests are not confined to women in the military; she is concerned about the sociology of occupations and professions in general, and in the sociology of sex roles. It is not hard to guess that she has lived some of her research.

I called on Mrs. Goldman at her apartment in Chicago, and we talked in her sunlit living room, filled with paintings and art objects. Mrs. Goldman has a pretty, friendly face and light-brown hair. Her voice is small and her speech precise. She gave Janowitz the credit for having steered her into military sociology. "I wanted a part-time research job in 1971," she said. "Not full-time, because I have a family, and I did not want to get too involved. So I took my thesis to show Morris—my subject was the organizational development and change in what started as a child-welfare agency founded in Chicago in 1899. He said right away that he would like to see some work done on women in the military. I was interested in women's liberation, and he put it in terms I could not resist. When you are thinking about women gaining places in occupations males have dominated, the military is especially interesting. The element of violence . . . Women in combat assignments is a taboo, almost like incest. So he got me started, and got me an appointment. Curiously, I find that the women who are interested in women's lib are among the least likely to volunteer for the military. My four closest women friends are so anti-military I seldom mention the subject. In their cases, the cause had been mostly Vietnam. That's true, I think, of many women—Vietnam and the trend of opinion against regimentation of every kind, against everything associated with military discipline. Perhaps that is levelling off to some extent. When it comes to education and raising children, I think we are getting some backlash, away from permissiveness. Perhaps it will become societal, too. In any case, there is going to be a significant increase in the number of women in the armed forces. The increase is *already* considerable. Just how high the percentage will get in the nineteen-seventies I don't know. At my most optimistic, I can see the possibility—only the possibility—of an increase to ten percent, or more than 200,000 women on active duty. But reason tells me that the ceiling will be closer to five percent. In Great Britain, where they have had trouble for ten years getting as many male volunteers as they want, and where they have increased the percentage of women, the latter are still less than five percent. That influences my estimate. I can see six percent in our Air Force—which seems to be the most ambitious—with the Army and Navy not quite up to that, and the Marines well below it. Averaging out, over-all, to somewhere around five. If my guess turns out to be too conservative, the attitudes of the services will have changed more than I anticipate. There are all kinds of provisos. For instance, you have to maintain a proper proportion of women officers to enlisted women, and you have to keep a proper ratio between one-term, or short-term women volunteers and women who are making the military a full career. But if the Pentagon wanted to raise the proportion of women to the highest possible level, it could be very high."

Mrs. Goldman pointed out to me that eight out of ten military job specialties are open to women; the reasons that twenty per cent are still closed are that by law women cannot be assigned to the Navy's combat aircraft or combat ships, and that as a matter of policy the Army and the Air Force exclude women from combat-oriented specialties. "A specialty may be listed as open, but the chances that a woman will actually get such a job assignment are very low," she explained. "But that doesn't much matter. Seventy-five per cent of the actual jobs in the defense establishment are non-combat jobs, and all of them are really 'open.' That's why 100,000 or so out of more than 2,000,000 doesn't overwhelm me. I don't think that many young women want women's jobs. I think they want the broadest possible range of assignments. The choices actually narrowed after the Second World War. Then women were mostly in nursing or in administrative and clerical assignments, but at least there were some in naval intelligence and in communications. Then there was a time after Korea when it looked as if there might not be any place at all for women in the military or nothing more than a vestigial role. That did not quite happen, but as recently as 1971 ninety per cent of all the enlisted women on duty were either medical and dental specialists or administrative and clerical specialists. Things are much better than that now. Women are repairing airplanes, operating radios, teaching in the military schools. They are serving as doctors, dentists, and veterinarians. They are in the military police, driving trucks, and operating heavy machinery. The Navy is allowing women to fly some types of planes—helicopters, transports, and weather aircraft. Not jets, because they say the physical stamina required is too great.

"It's unreasonable, I'd say, to expect the military to pioneer in changing the role of women," Mrs. Goldman continued. "But in some ways it is ahead of many civilian employers. There is a strong emphasis on equal opportunities for men and women, and equal pay for equal work. There is better job security than in civilian employment. The services will need more women officers, and the Army, Navy, and Air Force Reserve Officers' Training Corps programs have already been opened to limited numbers of women. Having gone to an all-women's college, and assuming that things haven't changed completely, I can't help thinking that a military career ought to sound good to anyone whose mind isn't already entirely closed to the idea of such a career. Officers' salaries now start at eight thousand dollars a year, and there is a very long list of additional benefits, plus long paid vacations. I think almost any college girl would be surprised by the options open to her. There are problems to be solved. The question of marriage and children is a big one—there is a staff meeting on that at the Pentagon every five minutes. It is up to the military to figure out how to make a place for the career servicewoman who wants to get married and have children. The best they've done so far is to rule that women who have children are allowed to remain in the service as long as arrangements are made for the children's care. Unwanted pregnancies are another subject that frightens personnel officers—although the dissemination of birth-control information in the military is much better than in comparable civilian groups. The new generation is prepared for coeducational existence in almost every phase of life. It has been their experience. Except for a few highly specialized units, perhaps, I doubt if the military will be able to differentiate itself sharply from civilian society in this respect—at least, not in the long run. The short run is another question, because many of the high-ranking officers, with complete sincerity, do not want to change their image of the military—heroic and masculine, if not all-masculine. If manpower problems became serious, it would be easier for them to substitute civilians for military personnel—they might be women civilians, but they wouldn't be women in uniform."

Mrs. Goldman looked discouraged by that thought. "But of course," she added with a smile, "all the service academies are going to admit women. They have had contingency plans looking to that day for a long time. It will make a difference—a big difference."

At a meeting of the Inter-University Seminar in October 1973, the two hundred men and women who came to the gathering, in Chicago, were not only from all over the United States but from all over the world—Argentina, Brazil, Canada, England, France, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Korea, Lebanon, the Netherlands, Scotland, and West Germany. More than forty of a total of a hundred and eighty Americans present were military men or government officials, including General Calvert Benedict, deputy commandant of the Army War College; General J. H. Cushman, commandant of the Command and General Staff College (who brought several members of his faculty); and representatives of all the service academies (including the Coast Guard Academy), the National Security Council, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The military men looked just like American college professors, for the most part, because, with one or two exceptions, they were all dressed in civilian clothes. I saw some familiar faces, including those of Janowit[illegible] Moskos, Mrs. Goldman, and Dr. Albert Biderman, another social scientist specializing in military matters, who works at the Bureau of Social Science Research, in Washington. I also recognized Major General Robert G. Gard, Jr., who had just assumed command of Fort Ord, California, and whom I had met earlier at an American Sociological Association meeting.

Gard is a member of the I.U.S., and he attends academic discussions of military matters as often as he can, which has meant two or three times a year in recent years. He is an Army brat, who was born at West Point, in 1928, and was graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1950. After he had served as an artillery battery commander in Korea, the Army sent him to Harvard to study social sciences. For three years, he taught at West Point, and after getting his Ph.D. at Harvard and attending various Army schools he went to the Pentagon as one of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's two military assistants. In 1968 and 1969, Gard served with the 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam, first as division artillery commander and then as the division's chief of staff. By 1971, when he was promoted to brigadier general, he had been awarded twenty-five medals and was one of the most decorated Ph.D.s in the United States Army, but his new assignment—director of Discipline and Drug Policies in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel of the Army, at the Pentagon—sounded like a career breaker. Old soldiers say that officers who are intellectuals can rise so high and no higher, and Gard had already broken through the traditional ceiling which is full colonel. His combat record was impeccable, and he had been to all the right Army schools, but he was undeniably an intellectual—perhaps the Army's prize specimen. Drug abuse was, and remains, an unmanageable problem to the Army; it was a chance for Gard to fail as he had never failed before. Two years later, in 1973, he was promoted to major general, which made him, at forty-five, one of the Army's youngest two-star officers; he had not solved the drug problem, or the discipline problem, by any means, but he had helped greatly to effect a number of reforms in the way officers and noncoms handle men who constantly break the rules. Gard obtained approval to change the name of his own job to Director of Human Resources Development, and his new title summed up the direction in which he hoped the Army would move. He was much pleased by the Fort Ord command—a troop command, not a staff assignment. Fort Ord is a huge complex, with a total population of nearly 70,000, including about 8,000 new volunteers. One of Gard's special interests was "advanced individual training"—the period, after the first seven weeks of basic training, during which a new man begins to learn a specific military skill.

Between seminar sessions—which dealt, among other things, with civilian-military relations and the functions of armed forces in general—I had lunch with Gard. He ordered the chef's salad. "I've lost ten pounds in the last two months," he told me, slapping his trim waistline. "I had to. I didn't dare face the troops otherwise." The General's manner is amiable and calm; he is slightly taller than average; he has sandy hair, cut short; his expression is open, smiling, and cheerful. He has heard a lot of criticism of the military from civilians in recent years, and he is well aware that most critics thinking about the sins of the Army brass have a mental image of a major general that is quite different from the way Gard looks and acts. He does not mind surprising them.

"I'm just beginning to find my way around Fort Ord," Gard said. "I probably shouldn't be here at all. I'm playing hooky. It is fascinating to work with the new volunteers. I suppose I'm on the spot. That is, I've talked an awful lot, and written some, about what the military profession has to do to maintain its traditional values—to my mind, its essential values—and, at the same time, adapt to modern demands. And suddenly I have 8,000 volunteers on my hands, and I'm supposed to *do* it!"

Gard said that he had found Fort Ord's atmosphere a little bit "tight" when he arrived, and that he was doing his best to encourage his men—especially the career noncoms who do much of the teaching—to relax a little. "The volunteers, to be sure, are volunteers, but they are also members of their own generation," he said. "Like everybody—well, nearly everybody—in his late teens or early twenties, they are hostile to large bureaucracies. They hate insensitive administrators. They loathe encumbering procedures. When they encounter an out-of-date policy, they assume—and they're usually right—that apathy and inertia on the part of the people in charge are to blame. They are suspicious of the military. I can remember when an Army career was regarded as a disagreeable occupation, perhaps, but still a wholesome one. A lot of young people, including some volunteers, now almost take it for granted that the military is wasteful, reactionary, oppressive—you name it. Going beyond that, they question the effectiveness of using force as a means of achieving political objectives. That's fine. The problem is that in the absence of a consensus among nations on how to achieve peaceful change it seems inevitable that the United States—all the modern Western societies—will be required to maintain substantial active military forces for quite some time. However, our military establishment has become the largest bureaucracy in the United States; it is prone to bureaucratic ills, no matter how hard it tries to avoid them. To make matters worse, the military must hold to a set of values that are contrary to the values of liberal, civilian society, because part of the military has to be ready to engage in combat. That is its purpose. So the military organization is hierarchical, not egalitarian, and is oriented to the group, not the individual. It stresses discipline and obedience, not freedom of expression. It demands confidence and trust. It requires immediate decision and prompt action, not thorough analysis and extensive debate. It relies on training, simplification, and predictable behavior, not education, sophistication, and empiricism. It offers austerity, not material comforts. *There* is the difficulty. Those concepts are not universally admired, yet every combat soldier and every serviceman who may be required to support combat closely must be imbued with them. At the same time, the thick crust of senseless custom must be cracked wherever that's appropriate."

Gard said he believed that the Army had tended to overemphasize institutional objectives, even unimportant ones, as long as the draft was in effect, and that not enough attention was paid to the impact of that policy on the soldiers. He thought that this was changing. "The organization's effectiveness, as always, has the top priority," he said. "But it is crucially important that the volunteers see their military service as personally rewarding—a continuation, not an interruption, of their personal development. Those two things are completely compatible. I'm fond of the idea that there is a contract, an unwritten contract, between the soldier and the military. The armed services are entitled to expect job proficiency and disciplined behavior; the soldier, in return, is owed respect as a person, satisfying work to do, and the opportunity for individual development. I think it is a reasonable bargain. My rough guess is that at least two-thirds of the new men at Ord are after remedial education or a skill that they can transfer, at some later date, to a civilian occupation. The idea that they are looking for 'permissiveness'—by that I mean toleration of their failures to meet established military standards—is completely wrong. It is the other way around. They want a vigorous, challenging program. The worst thing we could do is fail to give it to them."

The I.U.S. meeting lasted several days, and after the final session Janowitz and I sat down to talk in the living room of his house. I complimented him on the success of the conference, which seemed to me self-evident. Janowitz, who seldom yields to undue enthusiasm, admitted, after some coaxing, that it had gone well. In the next breath, he warned me against thinking that the military establishment listens carefully to academic students of the military. "I get a lot of invitations to speak—at the Air Force Academy, for instance—and so do some of the others. I do a lot of lecturing. That's what I am—I'm a teacher. But sometimes, when I hear myself making the same points, over and over, that I was making ten years ago . . ." Janowitz laughed. "I had a *new* idea not long ago," he said. "My first in months. I wrote an article and some staff officer forwarded it to the general who was then chief of staff. I understand he read it carefully and then wrote on the bottom, 'Snake oil.' "

A moment later, Janowitz's voice did betray enthusiasm. "We *are* getting somewhere," he said. "The I.U.S. is growing steadily. I can imagine meetings like this one held frequently, scattered throughout the country. Scholars in any field have to know what other scholars are doing and thinking, and we are helping them keep in touch with one another. Young people studying the military who are not getting support from their own universities can come to us. We can pat them on the back and say, 'It's legitimate.' The scholarly journals still tend to reject articles on the military, no matter how good they are, but it's nothing like twenty years ago. There has been a very noticeable change in the atmosphere just in the past two years. Suddenly the study of military institutions is relevant. Books are coming in by the dozen from all over the world. 'The Professional Soldier' is selling as well as it did during its early years. Specific recommendations are not important; what matters is that the real problems be posed consistently. The point is not to predict but *to clarify*, so the society can come to terms with the issues."

One clarifying concept in "The Professional Soldier" was Janowitz's idea of "constabulary forces" as a way for our military to regard itself in years to come:

> The use of force in international relations has been so altered that it seems appropriate to speak of constabularly forces, rather than of military forces. The constabulary concept provides a continuity with past military experiences and traditions, but it also offers a basis for the radical adaptation of the profession. The military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory, because it has incorporated a protective military posture.

Janowitz enlarged on the constabulary concept in considerable detail in his book, and he has referred to the idea in many of the papers he has written since. He saw the military establishment, before Vietnam, as involved in a struggle between heroic leaders—warrior types who embodied traditionalism, glory, the martial spirit, and personal valor—and military managers, pragmatists concerned with the scientific and rational conduct of war, and having close links to civilian society. He also noted a third kind of professional, the military technologists. "With the introduction of nuclear weapons and missiles, the military seems to have been almost converted into a giant engineering establishment," he wrote. But technologists were not so likely to hold crucial leadership roles, he felt—or, at least, not unless they developed other skills and changed their outlook. The military managers, Janowitz argued, were becoming more important, although the military actually required a balance among the three types. The model military manager would not displace the heroic leader, but he would "undermine the long-standing traditionalism of the military establishment" and he would "weaken its opposition to technological innovation." Janowitz was urging a rethinking of the entire meaning of the military profession. He still urges it.

"The all-volunteer force is a *professional* force—a self-contained, technically trained force-in-being," Janowitz told me. "We have never had one before. The United States has to confront this issue for the first time in our history: How does a full-time professional military fit into the larger framework of a democratic society? How do these professionals—officers and enlisted men—mesh with civilian life? We are no longer talking about a distinctive, isolated, 'heroic' calling; this is a profession and an occupation, subject to all the vicissitudes of life in any bureaucratic setting. Major reorganizations will have to be made—in military education, in the career systems, in the way personnel are assigned. The profession needs complete redefinition. Otherwise, for the long run the military profession will not attract men and women of the necessary quality. For example, a serious problem that has been given little thought is how to link a military career, seldom longer than twenty years, to a second, civilian career. A considerable number of both officers and enlisted men will continue to serve for six years or less—as many as do now. Their service, essentially, will be an interlude in their civilian life. But a great many will stay twenty years, in order to qualify for a pension. What then? Well, one possibility I'd favor is to redefine military service as the first stage of a two-stage career in public service, with a civil-service job as the second stage. Then an eighteen-year-old could plan his life in terms of a real career. After an enlisted man or woman had completed perhaps three periods of military service successfully, he or she would be qualified for a civil-service job and could transfer to it, with credits toward a pension to be paid on retirement from the second career—and, incidentally, that could be a way to a reform of the military pension system and its appalling costs. Another change that is badly needed is to cut down on the continuous reassignment of personnel from one station to another, which is done to prevent stagnation, to train people for higher command, and to prepare the organization to accept constant change. It made some sense when we were training small, versatile cadres for expansion in case of war. Now the idea is outmoded. It's expensive. It disrupts military effectiveness and solidarity. When service people complain about the military, this endless rotation is one of their major gripes. For the Army, I think we could adopt a modified version of the British regimental structure. That is, each officer and enlisted man would be attached to a basic unit, and he would rotate on assignments within that unit. If he left for staff duty or special schooling, he would be expected to return afterward to his own brigade. The brigade, not the man, would be assigned to overseas duty. But the man would go with it. A home-port concept for the Navy and a home base for the Air Force would be rough equivalents."

In the past, Janowitz went on, most officer recruits have entered military service not by attending one of the service academies but by signing up for R.O.T.C. in college or by attending Officer Candidate Schools after college. In 1970, for instance, only two percent of newly commissioned Army officers were graduates of West Point. Some planning estimates have proposed that, in the future, thirty or thirty-five percent of our officers should start with academy training. Janowitz hopes not. Since he hates the idea that the all-volunteer professional Army may develop into an isolated institution, erecting boundaries between itself and the civilian society, he is not happy about the increase in the size of the academies; he wants the military to be integrated with the society, not separated from it. In the nineteen-sixties, a quarter of the entering cadets at West Point came from career military families; they were the sons of men on active duty or of men who had completed twenty years of service. Many sons of noncommissioned officers were in the entering classes. If one counted cadets with uncles or cousins in the military, the percentage would have been much higher. About a quarter of the students in first-year classes at medical school are sons or daughters of doctors, Janowitz says, but the social isolation of the medical profession doesn't call for quite the same concern. He thinks that father-son succession is probably essential to both the military and the medical professions, but he would nevertheless like to see the Officer Candidate School program, which has dwindled to almost nothing, revived. He would open it to students who had successfully completed their first two college years, and use to advantage the popular impulse to take a break somewhere in the college curriculum. "I'd expect some to go back to college and civilian life after a short-term tour of duty as junior officers," he said. "Others would decide on a military career, and they would be expected to complete work for their college degrees while they were on active duty."

In addition, Janowitz thinks, every college student in the United States should have access to a college R.O.T.C. program, although not necessarily on his or her own campus. He thinks there should be a composite training course in every major metropolitan area, open to students from all the accredited colleges in the vicinity. In a good many cities, he said, that arrangement has already been made informally; he would like to see it formalized, publicized, and extended. Fourteen colleges removed themselves from the R.O.T.C. program during the days of anti-Vietnam agitation, and these included liberal-arts schools in the Northeast like Harvard, Dartmouth, Boston University, Yale, Columbia, and Brown. Those units were replaced by new ones, many of them in the South and Southwest, where the military's social basis was still strong, and where military installations are heavily concentrated. Young officers, no matter where they came from originally, seem to make the most social contacts in the South and Southwest, Janowitz said, and marry more Southern and Southwestern girls; when they retire, it is mostly to the South and Southwest.

"There's a limit to what we call 'representation'—the idea that the military must be a cross-section of the society," Janowitz said. "The armed forces are going to have some selective social characteristics; the goal is to keep the officer corps from becoming *highly* unrepresentative. We want officers with strong loyalties to democratic institutions, who are devoted to civilian control of the military and who are thoroughly professional in their commitments. One assumes that recruitment on a broader democratic base is a way of finding them, but there is no way of proving this. There should be more alternatives to academy attendance—other channels. In two or three years, officer recruitment will be a problem in terms of quality and special skills. The services, especially the Navy, are already short of black officers. Some R.O.T.C. units are primarily black; whether they will produce officers who will stay beyond their obligatory tours of duty remains to be seen. Still, we are getting a stream of officer recruits from urban, daytime universities, many of them in the North; a good many of them are Catholic, and they reach into the lower-middle-class and working-class populations. The academic quality of R.O.T.C. courses has gone up. So there will be some diversity in the future officer corps. I'd like to be sure that there will be enough." Boston University, he added, has asked to have R.O.T.C. back.

I asked Janowitz whether the idea of voluntary national service still interested him. He looked angry. "Of course!" he said. "But it is dead. No one mentions it anymore." Then he corrected himself. "That isn't quite right. The idea will be revived, but it will come in through the back door. We are not going to have a national-service youth agency—no one in Washington is interested in that at all, except a couple of diehards. But the idea of voluntary service is kept alive, in a diffuse way, through a great many organizations, essentially at the state and local levels. Religious groups run local programs, and so do a few municipalities. At the national level, there's ACTION, a federal agency that is a merger of what remains of the Peace Corps and its domestic counterpart, VISTA (Volunteers in Service to America), with several other national volunteer programs. Eventually, piecemeal, we shall get some of what I have advocated. I'm convinced that if voluntary national service had been adopted, the majority of those eligible would have participated, either in military service or parallel civilian service—and the country would have been better served. Right now, it is important that the civilian society should direct the military in redefining its professional outlook. We moved into the all-volunteer force with virtually no national debate; I frequently meet people who still don't realize that we have it. The Congress, the Armed Services Committee, the Gates Commission—everybody dealt with a great transition almost exclusively in terms of monetary, economic incentives. That was the mold, and hardly anyone has broken out of it. But the vitality of the military profession depends on a delicate balance between a special sense of inner-group loyalty and participation in the larger society. This balance is everything. That's one of the reasons that the ideas proposed by Al Biderman for using the military and its facilities for a whole range of national emergencies are so good. He has not suggested a diversion, as some traditionalists argue, from the military's fundamental mission. Handling emergencies *is* our military tradition, but now the emergencies have changed to oil spills, pollution, environmental control, and waste of natural resources.

"Finally, it is enormously important that military personnel take part in civic affairs and public affairs—assuming that their physical rotation is slowed down enough for them to do so. We probably have to continue to keep the military out of partisan politics. In the West German military forces, you know, the idea that an Army man is a civilian in uniform has been pushed so far that active-duty officers and enlisted men are allowed to run for political office, although if they win they must take a leave of absence. We don't want to go that far. But military personnel should certainly serve on local school boards, on public panels, and on advisory committees. They should be in contact with the community in every way, both for reasons of self-respect and as an antidote to social isolation. That's one of the ways our professional military will understand that deterrence—peacekeeping through a military presence—constitutes the modern definition of the heroic role."

BRUCE BLIVEN, JR.

(This is the second part of a two-part article)

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CONTRIBUTORY VESTING AS A VETERANS' EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE ALTERNATIVE

JUNE 23, 1976

The following chart indicates G.I. bill participation by year of separation.

PERCENT OF VETERANS ENTERED TRAINING FROM POST-KOREAN NET SEPARATIONS THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 1975 3/4/

Fiscal Year of Separation	1st FY of eligibility	2nd FY of eligibility	3rd FY of eligibility	4th FY of eligibility	5th FY of eligibility	6th FY of eligibility	7th FY of eligibility	8th FY of eligibility	9th FY of eligibility	Total
Prior to 1965 5/	9.1%	4.8%	3.9%	3.1%	3.5%	3.4%	3.8%	3.6%	4.9%	(40.1)%
1965 5/	12.9	5.9	4.4	3.4	3.6	3.2	3.2	2.8	3.8	(43.4)
1966 5/	15.4	7.1	4.9	3.8	3.9	3.8	3.8	3.2	3.9	(49.7)
1967 5/	9.8	12.4	6.8	4.5	4.3	4.1	4.1	3.9	4.1	(54.0)
1968	11.2	13.7	6.2	5.5	5.1	4.4	4.6	4.8	-	(55.6)
1969	14.3	13.8	7.2	6.3	4.9	4.6	4.7	-	-	(55.7)
1970	15.2	17.2	9.7	6.1	5.5	5.3	-	-	-	(58.9)
1971	18.1	17.3	8.0	6.2	5.4	-	-	-	-	(55.0)
1972	16.0	21.7	9.9	7.5	-	-	-	-	-	(55.1)
1973	16.2	22.1	10.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	(48.5)
1974	17.9	24.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	(42.1)
1975	20.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	(20.8)

3/ Includes no service personnel

4/ Percentages may not add exactly due to rounding.

5/ Trainees shown as entering in FY 1967 include some who entered in June 1966 for the following FY: Prior to 1965 - 1.8%; 1965 - 2.8%; 1966 - 2.8%.

Source: Extracted from various VA publications.

(In Millions of Dollars)

Fiscal Year	Veterans	Service Personnel	Total
1966	--	--	--
1967	$ 247.9	$ 3.8	$ 251.7
1968	421.6	7.2	428.7
1969	607.5	14.8	622.4
1970	911.8	27.0	938.8
1971	1,485.0	36.7	1,521.7
1972	1,764.1	48.3	1,812.4
1973	2,450.7	62.5	2,513.2
1974	2,917.9	87.9	3,005.7
1975	4,058.0	106.7	4,164.1
SUB-TOTAL	$14,864.4	$394.9	$15,258.7
(Prior to FY 1966)	$19,047.4 7/	--	$19,047.4 7/
TOTAL	$33,911.8	$394.9	$34,306.1

Source: Extracted from various VA publications.

7/ Total expenditures for the World War II ($14,526.1) and Korean Conflict ($4,521.4) G.I. Bills.

STUDENT SUPPORT BY AGENCY: FEDERAL OUTLAYS AND NUMBER OF STUDENTS

	Outlays (millions)				Students (thousands)				Share of Total Outlay(Percentage)		
	1975 actual	1976 estimate	TQ estimate	1977 estimate	1975 actual	1976 estimate	TQ estimate	1977 estimate	1975	1976	1977
Undergraduate											
HEW:											
Office of Education	$1,466	$2,060	$ 294	$1,695	$2,403	$ 3,677	$ 1,118	$ 2,872	OE 25.8%	27.8%	28.6%
Social Security Admin.	818	916	260	1,067	496	515	507	577			
Health agencies & Other	43	30	15	8	30	17	17	2			
Veterans Administration	3,079	4,121	726	2,912	1,569	1,952	894	1,329	VA 54.3	55.9	49.1
Defense	192	189	60	185	54	55	58	57			
Justice	35	38	18	18	89	88	47	39			
Other	41	47	9	45	35	24	8	28			
Subtotal, undergraduate	$5,674	7,401	$1,382	$5,930	--	--	--	--			
Graduate:											
HEW:											
National Institutities of Health	$ 125	$ 116	$ 26	$ 105	$ 12	$ 9	$ 10	$ 9			
Office of Education	165	193	44	183	1,059	977	413	858	OE 13.3%	13.9%	15.3%
Other HEW	184	147	45	92	106	59	23	28			
Veterans Administration	400	535	94	379	204	254	116	173	VA 32.3	38.4	31.8
National Science Foundation	11	15	1	17	2	2	--	2			
Defense	340	367	101	405	418	475	143	534			
Other	14	20	6	12	14	15	8	12			
Subtotal, graduate	$1,239	$1,393	$317	$1,193	--	--	--	--	OE 23.6%	25.6%	26.4%
Total 8/	$6,913	$8,794	$1,699	$7,123	--	--	--	--	VA 50.3	52.9	46.2

8/ Student totals not shown because some students receive awards under more than one program.

SOURCE: Information derived from Special Analyses: Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1977, page. 173.

PROJECTIONS OF VETERANS EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS USAGE UNDER "CHAPTER 34"
(Current Program)

Fiscal Year	Number in Training	Number in Higher Learning	Total Outlay	Outlay for Higher Learning
			(in thousands)	
1975 Actual	2,691,566	1,695,575	$4,264,775	$3,206,043
1976 Estimate	3,300,000	2,111,000	5,663,851	4,296,818
TQ*	1,673,000	1,044,000	930,004	719,174
1977	2,737,000	1,713,000	4,650,720	3,483,207
1978	2,517,000		4,275,699	
1979	2,354,000		3,999,336	
1980	2,195,000		3,728,890	
1981	2,025,000		3,440,359	

PROJECTION OF SAVINGS DUE TO G.I. BILL TERMINATION EFFECTIVE, January 1, 1976

	"Would-be" Trainees	Savings
1976	13,400	$ 4.4 million
TQ	13,600	4.0
1977	95,100	91.4
1978	215,000	234.9
1979	352,400	436.8
1980	498,000	668.4
Total	N/A	$1,449.6

* Transition quarter to facilitate new fiscal years.

The biggest savings would occur in 1981 through 1985 which is beyond the scope of the VA projections.

SOURCE: Veterans Administration, Allen Webber, September 22, 1975.

[COPY]

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
Congressional Research Service

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20540

April 20, 1976

Mr. William K. Brehm
Assistant Secretary of Defense
  for Legislative Affairs
Room 3E 822
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Assistant Secretary:

The Senate Veterans Affairs Committee has requested the Congressional Research Service, pursuant to the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 to analyze legislation now being considered which would provide a new program of education benefits for post-Vietnam era veterans, under a contributory vesting program.

In this regard, we need certain technical assistance from the Department of Defense in obtaining raw data. We would appreciate receiving the following information:

(1) Number of new enlistees per annum since the inception of the All-Volunteer forces;

(2) the marital status of the new enlistees;

(3) anticipated average age of the enlistees at the time of their first discharge;

(4) educational level of the new enlistees (broken down by officers and enlisted men); and

(5) anticipated reenlistment rate.

In addition, we would also appreciate your reviewing the enclosed bill (H.R. 13017) and providing us with:

(1) Possible administrative problems faced by the Department of Defense if legislation similar to this were enacted; and

(2) the Department's projections, based on other participatory programs and in-service training programs, of the utilization rate of such a program.

As we are under very strict time constraints, we would appreciate receiving your response no later than May 7, 1976. To facilitate your response and to help answer whatever questions you may have about the proposal or other desired information, please contact Ms. Ilona Rashkow (address and telephone number below) by Monday, April 26, 1976.

Ms. Ilona N. Rashkow
Congressional Research Service
Library of Congress
Washington, D.C. 20540

(426-5885)

Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely yours,

Norman Beckman
Acting Director

Enclosure

GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

11 June 1976

Mr. Norman Beckman
Acting Director
Congressional Research Service
The Library of Congress
Washington, D.C. 20540

Dear Mr. Beckman:

Reference is made to your request for Department of Defense data concerning a new program of education benefits for post-Vietnam era veterans under a contributory vesting program.

The information that follows provides projections of the population size that would be affected by this legislation:

(1) Number of new enlistees per annum that would be required to sustain an All-Volunteer Force of about 2,100,000: 400,000-425,000.

(2) Proportion of new enlistees with dependents: 11%.

(3) Anticipated average age of the enlistees at completion of their initial enlistment: 22.

(4) Educational level of the new enlistees (broken down by officers and enlisted men): The educational level for line (non nurse/medical/legal) officers can be reasonably depicted as four years of college; for enlisted--70% diploma high school graduates.

(5) Anticipated proportion who remain in Service after completion of their initial term of service: 17%.

Following is information in response to paragraph 3 of your letter:

Our best projection, based on other participatory programs and in-Service training programs, of the utilization rate of such a program (reference H.R. 13017) is from 30% to 45% of those enlisting.

As to the item in your request regarding possible administrative problems faced by the Department of Defense if legislation similar to H.R. 13017 were enacted, the military departments have been requested to consider this item and furnish information as deemed pertinent. Upon receipt of this information you will be advised.

Sincerely,

Richard A. Wiley

Richard A. Wiley

[COPY]

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
Congressional Research Service

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20540

April 20, 1976

Mr. F. David Matthews
Secretary of the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare
330 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20201

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Senate Veterans Affairs Committee has requested the Congressional Research Service, pursuant to the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, to analyze legislation now being considered which would provide a new program of education benefits to post-Vietnam era veterans, under a contributory vesting program.

In this regard, we need certain technical assistance from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. We would appreciate your reviewing the enclosed bill (H.R. 13017) and providing us with your views on:

(1) Possible differential incentives to pursue education (compared with the present program);

(2) impact on who would be aided by this program by type of education pursued, background, and financial need;

(3) impact on other federal student assistance programs; and

(4) impact on institutions, their funding, and capacity to maintain programs, and the secondary impact on students' opportunities.

As we are under very strict time constaints, we would appreciate receiving your response no later than May 7, 1976. To facilitate your response and to help answer whatever questions you may have about the proposal or other desired information, please contact Ms. Ilona Rashkow (address and telephone number below) by Monday, April 26, 1976.

Ms. Ilona N. Rashkow
Congressional Research Service
Library of Congress
Washington, D.C. 20540

(426-5885)

Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely yours,

Norman Beckman
Acting Director

Enclosure

THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20201

JUN 15 1976

Mr. Norman Beckman
Acting Director
Congressional Research Service
The Library of Congress
Washington, D.C. 20540

Dear Mr. Beckman:

This is in response to your letter requesting an analysis of H.R. 13017 which would provide a new program of educational benefits to post-Vietnam era veterans.

The enclosed report prepared in the Department should answer your specific inquiries to the extent that we have been able to obtain the information requested.

Please let me know if I can be of further assistance.

Cordially,

Marjorie Lynch
Under Secretary

Enclosure

Report on H.R. 13017 requested by
The Congressional Research Service

H.R. 13017 would establish a program of education assistance for post-Vietnam era veterans. Only general responses to the specific questions raised in the request from the Congressional Research Service are possible inasmuch as this is a program to benefit veterans and the Secretary of Defense is cited in the bill as the individual who would be primarily responsible for its administration. The following observations can be made to the enumerated inquiries.

1. "Possible differential incentives to pursue education (compared with the present program)."

   H.R. 13017 requires that individuals be sufficiently motivated at the outset of their military service to elect to have a withholding made from their earnings for educational purposes. Present law simply provides assistance to veterans automatically after a given period of service. The proposed program could preclude participation by those who do not have sufficient foresight or experience to make realistic educational plans. In addition, the proposal requires a $50 monthly withholding from pay. This requirement could serve as a disincentive to low-income military personnel. Finally, it should be noted that even at full participation (three years of withholdings) the financial benefits would not equal those available under the present system. Obviously, such a program would not provide incentives to pursue postsecondary education equal to those of the existing program.

2. "Impact on who would be aided by this program by type of education pursued, background, and financial need."

   As noted in response to Question 1, the proposal would seem less likely to attract participation by low-income military personnel who might require the $50 a month for subsistence purposes or who might not have sufficient foresight or experience to make realistic educational plans. To the extent that this is true, the bill would not be consistent with efforts to focus Federal assistance on disadvantaged individuals, including those who are veterans. We are unable to assess the impact of the program on individuals by the type of education pursued.

3. "Impact on other Federal student assistance programs."

   To the extent that the bill would tend to reduce the availability of veterans' educational benefits, it would probably increase the demand on other student assistance programs. Currently, one-half of the amount made available to a veteran under the present provisions of title 38 are considered as effective income of the student for the purposes of computing the amount for which an individual is eligible under the Basic Educational Opportunity Grant program in part A-1 of title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965. A reduction in, or the absence of, veterans' benefits will therefore clearly increase entitlements for basic grants. It can be expected that there would be a concomitant increase in requests for other types of Federal student assistance.

4. "Impact on institutions, their funding, and capacity to maintain programs."

   In view of all the other forces affecting the funding for and capacity of institutions, we would be unable to assess what, if any, impact this proposal will have on institutions.

The foregoing comments are intended only as a response to the request of the Congressional Research Service for technical assistance and do not reflect any opinion as to the desirability of the proposed legislation from the standpoint of the Administration's program.

[From the Armed Forces and Society, November 1974]

RACIAL COMPOSITION IN THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

Morris Janowitz, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago.
Charles C. Moskos, Jr., Department of Sociology, Northwestern University.

With the all-volunteer force entering its second year, it becomes more and more appropriate to raise and discuss the implications of the overrepresentation of blacks in the U.S armed forces. This paper seeks to explore alternative strategies for dealing with the long-term trend toward increasing concentration [illegible] the black minority in the military system. Although, of course, the minorities composition of the armed forces includes Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans, American Indians, Asian-Americans, and others, it is the high visibility and significant number of blacks entering the military services which bring them to the central concern of attention. For in the ethnically pluralist society of the United States, race constitutes our country's most fundamental cleavage. If our American society is ever to realize its democratic goals, the direction its race relations take in the armed forces will be a prime factor.

Overrepresentation of blacks in the armed forces, while not yet an issue of national debate, can be defined as a problem from several perspectives. Thus some professional military officers and civilian commentators view a large concentration of blacks as exacerbating race tensions and management problems within the services. A few of these are apprehensive about the internal reliability of such a force. Conversely, others, not only blacks, are distressed over the potential disproportion of black casualties in time of war. This paper, while fully cognizant of these issues, attempts to reformulate the discussion of the racial composition of the military in terms of representativeness of core institutions and political legitimacy. Can a political democracy expect to have a legitimate form of government if its military is not broadly representative of the larger society? Can a military force whose combat units are overweighted with a racial minority have credibility in the world arena? What can be done to deal with the possibility of a concentration of casualties in one segment of society?

TREND DATA

To examine the question of racial composition in the all-volunteer force is to focus on the enlisted personnel of the ground combat units. The trend toward increasing concentration of black personnel is underway in all services and branches, but the crux of the problem rests on the overproportionate number of blacks in the combat arms of the Army and Marine Corps. The experiences of the all-volunteer force to date have not indicated a serious shortfall in qualified entrants in the Air Force, Navy, and noncombatant elements of the ground forces. Indeed, quite the opposite, there remains an underproportionate representation of blacks in most technical military occupations.

Moreover, the expectation that the all-volunteer force would essentially be led by an all white officer corps appears not to be a likely eventuality; although, of course, projection of the racial composition of the officer corps have their marked limitations. It was the case that with the initial advent of the all-volunteer force, the number of blacks entering the officer corps began to decline. In good part this reflected the broadening of opportunities for college-level blacks in the larger society. But the armed forces have engaged in aggressive recruiting of potential black officers including an increase in the number of black cadets in the service academies. The most pronounced trends in minority officer recruitment, however, are in the very marked increase in ROTC programs at predominantly black colleges. In fact, by the academic year 1973-1974, 18% of the cadets in the Army ROTC were black. All in all, there are sufficient grounds to believe that the armed services have instituted programs such as will produce the requisite number of black officers. It seems reasonable to expect the economic and social advantages of ROTC and a short-term military career will persist to a greater extent for blacks than for whites; and that blacks will constitute 5-10% of the newly commissioned officers in all services for the second half of the decade of the 1970s. This is to say that while blacks are still likely to be underrepresented in the officer corps of the foreseeable future—as they were similarily underrepresented during the era of conscription—this deficit will not be to the extent that it will produce a profound racial distortion in the officer representativeness of the all-volunteer force.

We come back then to the root problem—the overproportionate number of blacks in the enlisted levels, especially in the ground combat forces. The "Gates Commission," termed after the chairman of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force, estimated in 1970 that an equilibrium over the short run would be for the total force approximately 15.0% black, and it even projected a decline to 14.1% for the 1980s: "Our research indicated that the [racial] composition of the armed forces will not fundamentally change by ending conscription."[1] As was apparent to many students of the U.S. military establishment during the preparation of the Gates Commission report, there was no sound basis for this projection. Equally unsubstantiated was the Gates Commission estimate that only $2.1 billion in additional pay was required to maintain an all-volunteer force of 2.5 million active-duty personnel. (By 1974 the military force was only 2.1 million and the increase in salary expenditures far exceeded the original cost estimates even without adjustment for the declining manpower quality.) More recent private estimates by Department of Defense officials in the Spring of 1974 anticipate the number of blacks will reach about 20% for the total military manpower strength with a higher figure for the ground forces.

Despite the confident prognostications of the Gates Commission, it ought to have been apparent that there was no effective basis for making definitive manpower estimates on the quantity and composition of the all-volunteer force. At best one can report current trends and offer informed speculations as to the future.

During the period of conscription in the two decades following the Korean War, there was a slow and gradual increase in the proportion of black military personnel, both at the officer and enlisted ranks. As given in Table 1a, the proportion of blacks for all services was 8.0% in 1955, 8.3% in 1962, and 9.8% in 1970. The black concentration was highest—13.5% in 1970—in the enlisted ranks of the Army. The transition to an all-volunteer force, as reported in Table 1b, immediately reflected itself in a sharp increase in the concentration of blacks again especially at the enlisted levels. The overall percentage has risen year by year, from 11.4% in 1971 to 14.9% by the end of the first half of fiscal year 1974 (December, 1973). The overproportionately black distribution was most noticeable in the ground forces where from 1971 to 1974 the number of blacks increased from 14.3% to 19.9% in the Army, and from 11.4% to 17.7% in the Marine Corps. Moreover, by September 1973, 23.6% of all Army infantrymen were black.

TABLE 1a.—BLACKS IN THE ARMED FORCES AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL OFFICER AND ENLISTED PERSONNEL, SELECTED YEARS 1954–70

	All services	Officer	Enlisted
1955	8.0	1.4	9.0
1962	8.3	1.7	9.2
1965	9.5	1.9	10.5
1968	9.3	2.1	10.2
1970	9.8	2.2	11.0

TABLE 1b.—BLACK ENLISTED PERSONNEL AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ENLISTED STRENGTH BY SERVICE, FISCAL YEARS 1971–74

Fiscal year	All services	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
1971	11.4	14.3	5.4	11.4	12.3
1972	12.6	17.0	6.4	13.7	12.6
1973	14.1	18.6	7.7	16.9	13.4
1974 (first half)	14.9	19.9	8.1	17.7	13.8

Source: Department of Defense statistics.

A sharper picture of the changing racial composition of the enlisted ranks can be obtained from Table 2, which presents the figures on the number of blacks among the new volunteers in the military establishment. This table requires comment in two respects. First, it highlights the differing numbers of black personnel acquired by each of the services. Thus, in April 1974, the Army recruited 3,390 new black enlistees contrasted with 840 for the Air Force and 560 for the Navy. Second, the percentage of blacks among those entering the military for the first time in April 1974 reached 27% for the Army, 20% for the Marine Corps, 16% for the Air Force, and only 11% for the Navy. That the April 1974 figures were not atypical is seen by the comparable black percentages for the cumulative period July 1973 to April 1974. Moreover, the indications of growing black concentration at the enlisted levels is compounded by the fact that the reenlistment rates among blacks remains distinctly higher than among whites. Thus in fiscal year 1973, the reenlistment rate among first-term Army enlisted men was 52.0% for blacks compared with 35.1% for whites. The evidence is quite persuasive that the paramount trend in the racial composition of the ground forces since the end of conscription is toward a heavily disproportionate concentration of blacks.

TABLE 2.—BLACK PROPORTIONS OF NEW ENLISTED VOLUNTEERS (NONPRIOR SERVICE)

	April 1974		July 1973-April 1974 (percent)
	Number	Percent	
Army	3,390	27	27
Navy	560	11	10
Marine Corps	300	20	21
Air Force	840	16	16
All services	5,090	21	20

Source: Department of Defense statistics.

In purely statistical terms, one could project a point at which a racial equilibrium would be reached—say, for example, 30% black throughout the ground forces. But such an approach encounters two problems. A 30% black distribution throughout the ground forces would probably not be random; some units would be markedly more black than the overall percentage. Already by the summer of 1974 there were combat units in the ground forces which were upwards of 35% black. Such an equilibrium model also avoids the qualitative issue of "tipping." By tipping we refer to the point at which the proportion of blacks becomes so high that large numbers of whites are no longer prepared to enter the particular service or branch involved. Such an occurrence could be engendered by factors including the perceived status decline of units overproportionately black, or the very real fear of black "hooliganism" on the part of many lower-ranking white enlisted men. It can be expected that the tipping point will operate in a gradual fashion in the military rather than in the dramatic threshold fashion of residential communities. But the end result, nevertheless, could well be a significant diminishment of white recruits for the ground force units involved.

THE SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

We can only surmise as to reasons for the lack of public debate on the racial composition of the all-volunteer force. Undoubtedly, the underlying crisis in political leadership associated with the Watergate scandals and related matters have overshadowed the issue. The academic community, typically opponents of conscription if not of the military system, may perhaps not want to address the question in anticipation of egalitarian arguments to restore the draft. That a generalized racial tolerance accounts for the low concern of the composition of the armed forces seems naive. Indifference is probably the most adequate explanation. In any event, elected officials have almost completely avoided public statements on the problem. Excepting a few news stories and columns, the mass media has also eschewed coverage of the growing concentration of black service personnel. One would have expected that the media with its increased identification with the adversarial role could be expected to oppose conscription when it was operative and, in turn, to be critical of the all-volunteer force when it came into being.

Within the black community, public leaders and elected officials have also generally been indifferent to the issue. In the main, views among black leaders seem to represent a widespread outlook among black adults that the armed forces represent an important source of job opportunities for blacks. Within the black community, moreover, there is a strong feeling that military service is particularly relevant since it appeals to young blacks who have the highest rate of unemployment, and, by implication, the military is seen as a desirable alternative to life on the streets. Only on rare occasions has a black leader raised the issue of the legitimacy of the manpower system which disproportionately recruits from minority races.

The absence of public discussion on the racial make-up of the military is not to say there is a lack of concern within the confines of the defense establishment. But even there the concern is felt more strongly by uniformed personnel rather than civilian officials. And even among military officers discussion on the black concentration in the services is sporadic and muted. A few military officers believe that the point of no return has already been reached in the combat arms of the ground forces; others view the emerging situation with a deep sense of personal frustration. More typical is the attitude: "Yes, we have a problem, but somehow, in some way, a solution will be found." Concurrently, there is some resentment in military circles that Congressmen and Senators will frequently issue pronouncements supporting the all-volunteer concept without making mention of the difficulties the services are encountering. There is a vague sentiment among many military officers that our national legislators voted to end conscription for political reasons, but these same legislators are reluctant to confront the unpopular problems associated with the all-volunteer force.

Nevertheless, the principle of civilian control over the military is so powerful that the general response of the professional military officer has been an unquestioning—almost "can do"—effort to make the all-volunteer system work. Indeed, the response of the military professional could be described as over-professionalism: the uncritical acceptance of a mission without sufficient professional dissent. There has not been a single major statement about the racial composition of the armed forces by a military officer which has raised the fundamental issues involved, nor has there been a single token resignation from active duty on this issue. Instead the military officially has sought to minimize the issue. There has been repeated emphasis on the fact that the armed forces are an equal opportunity employer. There have been repeated statements that racial quotas would probably be unconstitutional and, in any event, would not be considered a policy alternative. Strenuous effort has been focused on the immediate concern to meet enlistment goals, rather than questioning the demographic premises of the all-volunteer force.

By the spring of 1974, however, there were indications that civilian political leaders were beginning to be alert to the dimensions of the racial and ethnic composition of the armed forces. Howard H. Callaway, shortly after becoming Secretary of the Army, boldly and clearly stated the Army goal to recruit from a relatively representative cross-section of the civilian population. In 1973, in the name of quality control, Congress passed legislation requiring 55% of new enlistments to be high school graduates. The Marine Corps was subsequently denied permission by Congress to reduce their educational standards for new enlisted personnel. Also in 1973, the Army implemented for six months a recruiting policy requiring 70% of its new accessions to be high school graduates; but this standard proved to be unrealistic and was dropped in the wake of declining enlistments. It is very important to note, however, that unofficial Army recruitment data show that racial composition has consistently been most balanced among those choosing the shortest possible enlistment tour—two years.

POLICY STRATEGIES

In exploring alternative strategies for dealing with racial imbalance in the armed forces, this paper assumes that national and black leaders will increasingly be forced to confront the implications of the trend toward greater concentration of blacks in the combat arms of the ground forces. It is also assumed that a return to conscription, whatever its merits, will be politically unfeasible in the near future. This is not to assert that racial imbalance in the armed forces will suddenly constitute a dramatic "crisis," but that it will come more and more into the center of public attention. Furthermore, it is posited that the steps required to make the U.S. armed services—and especially the ground forces—effective in their emerging politico-military roles of deterrence and constabulary professionalism are precisely the same steps which will contribute to a resolution of the problems of racial and ethnic imbalance. Put in another way, the disruptive potential of the race issue supplies pressure for internal reform. The character of this needed reform is not embodied in the report of the Gates Commission, which programmed the all-volunteer force by emphasizing visible and competitive monetary compensation. Rather, our approach seeks to specify a series of steps and strategies which deal with the organizational climate and professional integrity of the military as a social institution.

These strategies are also based on the presumption of the constitutional authorities we have consulted who have asserted without reservation that a formal quota limiting the number of blacks would be illegal and unconstitutional. (Though Congressional statutes raising or lowering educational standards will have indirect but important consequences on the proportions of entering black personnel.) But even more pointed, such a quota system ought to be morally objectionable to the citizenry at large as well as an affront to minority groups. It is therefore doubly essential to propose and examine critically a variety of positive steps which aim toward recruitment and maintenance of an all-volunteer force which is broadly representative of the larger society.

Reduction and Stationing of U.S. Forces

The most direct approach to handling racial imbalance would be to reduce the size of the military establishment, and especially to reduce the size of the ground forces. Already the overall size of the all-volunteer force has been reduced to well below that estimated by the Gates Commission. The basic issue is the extent and timing of such reductions and the restraints that operate for an effective foreign policy. A smaller military establishment would have higher educational standards and thereby have less of a concentration of minority group members. It is important to remember that in part the short-term success of the recruitment drives of the Navy and Air Force since the introduction of the all-volunteer force is to some degree related to the reduction in the overall size of these two services. During the same period, the manpower requirements of the ground forces were not reduced; in fact, they were slightly expanded for the next fiscal year, 1975.

The United States is already clearly in a position in which manpower requirements restrain its politico-military posture in Western Europe. It is therefore understandable that a great variety of approaches are being explored to reduce the number of personnel stationed in Western Europe without reducing their presumed military effectiveness. It is striking, however, to note how the numbers of American military personnel abroad have been translated by NATO allies as indicators of the stability and credibility of U.S. intentions. It may well be the case that even small reductions overseas will be seen as the initial step toward longer-term withdrawal. It is also conceivable, however, that with proper restructuring and diplomatic groundwork, force reductions could be accomplished to satisfy the political requirements of Western Europe, e.g., reratification of NATO, new budgetary arrangements, innovative force structures, the establishment of a NATO rear headquarters in the continental United States. Moreover, it is becoming evident that race and strategy are fusing inasmuch as our Western European allies are hardly predisposed to accept an increasingly black ground force as the appropriate instrument of U.S. foreign policy.

In the event of further reductions of total U.S. forces, the almost certain consequence will be that a higher percentage of the American military will be stationed within the United States. This would entail redeployment from the Far East and elsewhere as well as from Western Europe. Until recently it was generally assumed that reduced likelihood of overseas assignments would decrease the attractiveness of a volunteer force with accompanying heavier reliance on minority soldiers. But the evidence to date suggests the reverse is the case.[2] That is, overseas duty—partly as a result of the diminished purchasing power of the dollar, partly less willingness to put up with family disruptions, partly due to changing evaluations of foreign assignments per se—has lost much of its traditional appeal. In other words, the attractiveness of military service for a wider representation of the American population will probably increase to the degree U.S. forces are stationed at home.

Manpower Substitution

Starting as early as the McNamara era, but becoming increasingly pronounced since the advent of the all-volunteer force, more and more uniformed personnel in military occupational slots are being replaced by female uniformed personnel and civilians. This trend will generally work toward more racial balance in the total defense structure. But inasmuch as virtually all of the civilian replacements for formerly uniformed positions will occur in noncombat occupations, such a trend will not by itself directly affect the racial imbalance in the combat ground forces. Indirectly, to the extent that the demand for uniformed personnel is decreased, there could be some shifting in volunteers from noncombat to combat occupations. Thus, it is especially important that civilianization be monitored for its precise impact on the racial composition of uniformed military personnel.

In the case of female military personnel, the all-volunteer force has witnessed an opening up of many positions previously the exclusive preserve of males. Women recruitment goals have changed from the traditional less-than-2% to a projected 6–8% by 1977. But as with the situation of civilianization, the increased reliance on female military personnel is concentrated in the noncombat occupations. Moreover, the proportion of black and other minority women in the Army is slightly higher than the proportion of minority male military personnel—despite the higher education entrance standards required of women as compared to men. In any event, the impact of greater employment of either civilians or female military personnel appears to be limited in terms of alleviating racial imbalance in the ground forces.

Increased Social Cohesion and Organizational Identity

Among the internal organizational reforms required for any viable military establishment is the strengthening of the social cohesion of units. This is especially mandatory for the ground forces. The constant rotation and lack of personal integration decreases the attractiveness of military service and leads to deviant behavior. It is not enough—nor even necessarily true—to assert the problems of soldierly dissatisfaction are issues in their own right. Only by a greater sense of group cohesion and less personnel rotation can the manpower management issues be effectively confronted. It is our strong belief that military life can be made compatible for significant portions of contemporary youth without sacrificing required organizational discipline. Such a proposition implies that organizational change is consistent—indeed, a requirement—of military institutional integrity.

The ground forces have taken the first limited steps in this direction by permitting men to volunteer for specific units of their own choice. This procedure has had some measure of success. The next step would be to permit group recruitment and the handling of training and assignment on a group rather than an individual basis. Another aspect of this approach is to allow individual units directly to recruit more of their own personnel. To some extent this is already being done, but the scope for decentralization is much greater than presently envisioned. Likewise, once assignment to a permanent unit is effected, it is essential to reduce personnel turnover. These internal reforms can be thought of as an effort to develop in American ground combat units a modern equivalent of the British regimental system. Not only would steps in these directions increase soldierly satisfaction and thereby military effectiveness, but, and most important, these developments would in turn lead to an increased ability to recruit more broadly for the all-volunteer force.

Military as an Educational Institution

From the viewpoint of minorities, especially those deprived of effective social advantage in civilian society, the attractiveness of the armed forces is intimately connected with the opportunities which the military offers for education and skill training. From the viewpoint of the military establishment, training is emphasized to recruit manpower and to serve military occupational needs. From the perspective of civil-military relations and the integration of the armed forces into the larger society, however, trained personnel need be seen as a national resource who, to an appropriate degree, ought to be encouraged to return to civilian life. Although the armed services in effect are a vast training institution, military leaders have resisted recognition of this role fearing it would divert their attention from their primary mission. But the pressures of the all-volunteer force have compelled the military to accept this role, albeit reluctantly, and to stress education and training in their recruitment appeals. There remains, nevertheless, a great deal of uncertainty and ambiguity about this task among professional officers. In other words, clearer recognition of the secondary functions of the military in education and skill training should lead to policies which would facilitate the return of trained individuals to civilian society and thereby reduce the racial imbalances within the armed forces, i.e., lowering black reenlistment rates.

Again, certain required organizational changes are evident. These demand further study and even experimentation and can only be tentatively proposed here; for example, alternating unit assignments—especially in the ground combat forces—between field training and purposive civilian training, preseparation assignments where education and skill training would be a primary function, job counseling on the most individual and personalized level. What is important to emphasize here is that usable civilian skills are least likely to be acquired in the ground combat forces, the very units which are overproportionately black. The requirement, therefore, is to open up the ground forces to potential civilian employers including black advancement groups such as the Urban League. To facilitate the training and outward flow of black servicemen, moreover, it would be eminently appropriate to receive budgetary allocations from the Departments of Labor, and Health, Education and Welfare.

More Balanced Recruitment.

The growing racial imbalance in the enlisted ranks of the all-volunteer force is one outcome of the adoption of the monetary incentives advocated by the Gates Commission. Perhaps the ultimate in monetary recruitment has been reached in the "bonus" ($2,500 as of June 1974) used to induce young men to join the ground combat forces. In March 1974, the most recent month for which figures are available, one-third of those who signed up for the combat enlistment bonus were black. That this outcome was not anticipated is surprising in light of conclusive studies which have shown that military earnings for minorities with less than a high school education will exceed their earnings in the civilian labor force.[3] The fact that the all-volunteer force significantly overdraws its membership from America's underclasses simply reflects the tendency of social groups to behave generally in their material self-interest.

It was also true that until recently the military itself followed a recruitment policy not geared to attracting young people oriented toward post-high school education—either technical, vocational, or collegiate. But the military establishment in the Spring of 1974 is moving toward a position which recognizes that an important source of personnel are young people who are prepared to serve in the armed forces—relatively short terms, two to four years—as part of their transition into adult life. Social surveys indicate that one of the most powerful incentives for these persons is not immediate pay, but deferred pay in the form of educational benefits.[4] In this regard, a rough rule of equity might be the exchange of one year of military service for one year of post-high school education.

Recruiting single term enlistments from youth with educational plans beyond high school would obviously make for a more racially representative military constituency. It follows also that the counseling system of American high schools—not just military recruiters—must become alert to the possible civilian educational benefits of military service. Even under the present financial situation, existing G.I. Bill benefits combined with an appropriate fraction of savings from military pay (feasible owing to the military's provision of food and housing) would be enough to enable a recruit to afford two years of post-high school education after two years of military service. It would be more desirable, of course, if this arrangement were made explicit by means of a contract enlistment, i.e., in which the terms of compensation were oriented toward educational benefits rather than monthly pay. The military is favorable to arrangements as outlined here, but the resistance to such programs is difficult to understand except in terms of organizational inertia. One important element in such an arrangement is that the college-bound recruit actually be accepted for admission to a college and his entrance postponed for the period of his military service.

Another variant of linking military service with advanced civilian education could be the establishment of a program in which a college education partly underwritten by the military would precede entry into the armed forces. Such considerations would be particularly relevant for middle-class families for whom the financial costs of a college education are becoming increasingly heavy burdens. Certainly it can be argued that large expenditures will be required to institute such a scholarship program. But it must be remembered that already the present combat enlistment bonus alone could pay the tuition for one year at many of our most expensive private colleges. Also the present financial plight of many colleges is such that they would be very amenable to intermesh their curriculum with a military sponsored scholarship program, e.g., two years of military service between sophomore and junior years. Such a program would coincide with the present trend toward abolishing the lock-step educational system. Also on financial matters, it might be well to consider trading off projected E1-E4 pay increases to fund such a scholarship program—whether pre- or post-service. Another alternative could be granting student loans which would be cancelled upon completion of a specified tour of duty.

In return for such educational benefits—whether contract enlistments, scholarships, or loans—youths would be assigned in whatever capacity required by military manpower needs—most especially, the ground combat forces. Whatever the details of such a civilian educational program, a major outcome would be the reintroduction of white middle-class males into the ground combat forces. Moreover, there would be a concentration of single-term enlistments in the very military occupations where such short enlistments are most practical—the lower ranks of the combat arms. Such an infusion of white middle-class males into the combat arms could also serve to improve the chances for black representation in the more technical and support components of the armed forces. In this way, rectification of racial imbalance in the combat arms would meet the criteria of both practical efficiency and democratic representation.

MILITARY AND NATIONAL PURPOSE

Clearly the impact of the Vietnam War and the difficult clarity of military goals has a negative influence on the climate of recruitment, especially among young men and women from better-educated families. Even though minority groups appear prepared to accept the occupational advantages of military service—both short- and long-term—the broader issue remains the legitimacy of the military for the majority and more advantaged groups. Increased clarity of American foreign and military policy is obviously part of the issue. But the core question inheres in the definitions of the worthwhileness of public—including military—services. A reconstruction of military legitimacy requires normative more than monetary considerations.

We are dealing in point of fact with the modern adaptation of the citizen soldier. It is misleading to regard the all-volunteer military service as a long-term occupation; the vast bulk of military personnel even in the all-volunteer format are and will be single-term servicemen and servicewomen. In the pursuit of alternative modes of entrance into adult roles, the all-volunteer military will directly affect almost 400,000 young people each year. Currently it is in danger of being defined as suitable only for depressed minorities seeking to enter the larger society. We prefer the alternative definition of viewing the all-volunteer force as an appropriate process of entering adult society for a much broader segment of the population. Moreover, the wider the range of definitions of military service—educational, athletic, disaster relief, rescue operations, environmental control, constabulary professionalism—the more broadly representative and racially balanced will such an all-volunteer force be. The power of persuasive normative goals should not be underemphasized in relating the all-volunteer force to the emerging young generation of this nation.

It goes without saying that in the long run the end of black overconcentration in the ground combat forces requires the attainment of effective racial equality and dignity in the larger society. To some extent the armed forces have and will contribute to this goal. But in the immediate future, the basic issue is to prevent the military from becoming a racially distinct enclave.

NOTES

1. The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force (New York: Macmillan, 1970), p. 15.

2. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "Coping in Europe," Army (November 1973), pp. 12–15.

3. Morris Janowitz, "The U.S. Forces and the Zero Draft" Adelphi Paper No. 94 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973); and Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "The Emergent Military," Pacific Sociological Review XVI (April 1973), pp. 255–280.

4. Gary R. Nelson and Catherine Armington, Military and Civilian Earnings Alternatives for Enlisted Men in the Army (Arlington, Va.: Institute for Defense Analysis, 1970); Harley L. Browning, Sally C. Lopreato, and Dudley L. Poston, Jr., "Income and Veterans Status: Variations among Mexican Americans, Blacks, and Anglos," American Sociological Review XXVIII (February 1973), pp. 74–85.

5. Jerome Johnston and Jerald G. Bachman, Young Men and Military Service (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Institute for Social Research, 1972).

[From the Washington Star, Monday, Apr. 19, 1976]

All-Volunteer Doubts

(By Charles Bartlett)

In focusing on billion-dollar bombers and submarines, the defense debate has been overlooking a more critical aspect of national security: the quality and morale of the 2.1 million Americans in uniform.

An attempt to correct the omission has been made by Curtis Tarr's Defense Manpower Commission, a presidential body which somberly warns that the present reliance on an all-volunteer force is far from a certain bet into the future.

The crop of 18-year-old males will shrink by 15 percent in the next 10 years and a rush of economic growth may divert prospective recruits into the embrace of private employment.

The possibility will have an ironic ring for the young now unable to crack the job market. But even today, the Defense Department's recruitment costs are running over $500 million a year. Despite high rates of teenage unemployment, the Navy's special sea-pay incentives (up to $22.50 a month) are not producing enough sailors with all the skills needed to man the ships.

The Tarr Commission does not quarrel with Pentagon claims that the all-volunteer concept has succeeded, but it does make the point that success has been heavily contingent on an expensive string of inducements. The Pentagon is now spending $31.1 billion a year or about $15,000 a head on its uniformed personnel. The generals complain that payroll costs are eating into their weapons purchases.

The necessity to sweeten the inducements will grow if private jobs become more available or military service becomes more unfashionable. Recruiters will want to promise fatter pay and broader benefits. But the pressures upon the services to economize, and their eagerness to acquire more costly weapons, will limit the concessions that can be made to personnel.

There have been 15 military pay increases since 1963 and the basic pay today is nearly doubled. The compensation obviously needs to stay competitive with private employment, but the services need to adapt their pay scales to the going private rates for the special skills they require.

This cannot be accomplished efficiently by legislative action or across-the-board military increases. This is why the commission proposes the creation of an independent board capable of making selective adjustments.

Military retirement pay is far more generous than any civilian system, and its present cost of about $6 billion could grow to $25 billion, or one-quarter of the present defense budget, by the end of the century.

The most costly aspect of military retirement is the individual's access to benefits after 20 years of service. The commission maintains that significant savings would result from extending the service requirement to 30 years for those in non-combat roles.

The Pentagon is going to have to walk a tight line between the enticements needed to attract recruits and the savings necessary to keep personnel costs in proportion. The Tarr Commission is not, for example, sanguine over the administration's plan to stop veterans' educational benefits. Although surprisingly little is known about the motivations of those who volunteer for military service, the desire to get educated at government expense is an obvious incentive.

The volunteer concept is wholly at the mercy of future economic developments. In warning that a period of high private employment will create serious problems for recruiters, and particularly for the reserves, the Tarr Commission makes an impressive argument for keeping the draft in a high state of readiness.

The Soviet Union, after all, relies on conscripts, and a Selective Service System that is allowed to grow rusty in order to save $12 million a year will not be capable of producing a swift mobilization. The initial success of the volunteer concept should not lull the nation into taking its military manpower for granted.

[From the Washington Post, August 20, 1976]

Air Force Recruits Would Shun a Fight

San Antonio, Tex., Aug. 20 (AP).—An Air Force survey of new recruits shows many would rather duck into the clouds than face an enemy in the wild blue yonder.

Asked if, given a choice, they would evacuate a base under attack or stay and fight, 49 per cent said they would battle it out. But 23 per cent said they would not and 28 per cent were not sure.

And, said 37 per cent of the new recruits surveyed at Lackland Air Force Base here last spring, they wouldn't have enlisted if the United States were at war. Lackland is the Air Force's depot for all recruits from across the nation.

The findings are included in a survey of "Basic Airmen's Values and Perceptions of Society—1976," which was taken among 1,000 enlisted men and women.

Air Force officials say the bulk of the survey, conducted earlier this year for the Air Force Military Training Center at Lackland, indicates that today's recruits are the best ever.

However, the survey was not released to the public because, high officials said, they feared some of its findings would be "misconstrued." The Associated Press obtained a copy.

Maj. Gen. John P. Flynn, commander of the Military Training Center and a former prisoner of war in North Vietnam, said the new recruits are "the highest quality generation we've seen in the service yet."

Flynn said the evacuation question was immaterial for enlisted personnel because, "if things were bad enough, they'd be ordered to evacuate."

According to the survey, administered to recruits on their fifth day of basic training, there were areas of "substantial change" from previous studies:

A decline in political activism and an increase in political conservatism.

Increased desire for education, with 71 per cent listing it as an important reason for enlisting.

Increased acceptance of authority and of the work ethic, but financial opportunity and free time are still desired.

Greater acceptance of sexual freedom.

The survey also showed that nearly three-quarters of the recruits believe the benefits of war rarely pay for its losses, even for the victor, and more than half said war is a futile exercise in self-destruction.

Nearly half were not sure or disagreed that free enterprise is the best economic system, and nearly a third said they were not sure democracy is the best form of government. Six per cent said the United States should not go to war under any circumstance.

Of the recruits surveyed, 92 had not completed high school, 767 had completed high school, and 123 had completed at least one year of college. Included were 135 women recruits.

[From the Army Times, May 3, 1976]

Privacy Act "Hiding" Recruits

Nashville.—Army Recruiting Command CG Maj. Gen. Eugene P. Forrester says the Privacy Act is hurting command recruiting efforts.

In an address to the Kiwanis Club of Nashville, Forrester says the act is making it difficult for "us to obtain the names of people for vocational testing in high schools and the necessary follow-up of potential applicants."

The general said the pending loss of the GI Bill education program also would hurt recruiting.

"Surveys indicate that about 10 percent of the non-prior-service male high school graduates who now enlist, would not enlist if the GI Bill were eliminated. This would be a serious blow to recruiting and would have particularly adverse effect on quality," he said.

Excerpts From Statement by Honorable Donald G. Brotzman, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), Before the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Second Session, 94th Congress, Manpower Authorizations, February 5, 1976

PROGRESS IN VOLUNTEER ACTIVE ARMY

To man the force structure we set goals to recruit and train new people in the quantity, quality and skills the Army needs to replace losses. In transitioning from the draft era to the Volunteer Army, we realized that it would not be possible to achieve all these goals simultaneously. In fiscal year 1974, quantity—getting enough to volunteer—was emphasized and achieved. In fiscal year 1975, while keeping pressure on numbers, quality was emphasized and great improvements were made. In fiscal year 1976, we had planned to sustain our quantity achievements, further improve quality, and add emphasis to training, that is to match the skill needs of the Army with the skills volunteered for on a week-by-week basis. Fiscal year 1977 was to be the capstone of the transition period, with the full institutionalization of our ability to sustain the flow of trained replacements in the required quantity, quality and skills.

SUMMARY OF PHASED PLAN

	Fiscal year—			
	1974	1975	1976	1977
Quantity: Nonprior service accessions [1]	182,200	184,700	180,500	177,760
Quality (percent):				
High school diploma graduates	(1)	57.8	65	70
Upper 50 percent mental groups	(2)	57.6	65	65
Skill match: Percent match	(2)	(2)	95	98

[1] Fiscal year 1974 and 1975 actual data, fiscal year 1976 and 1977 from President's budget.

[2] Not available.

Before telling you how we are performing to date in fiscal year 1976 and before giving the forecast for fiscal year 1977, I would like to spend a moment explaining why the quality of recruits is so important. The key is simple. High quality recruits make better soldiers. They are less likely to be discharged during their initial enlistment for trainability, motivational, or disciplinary reasons. This limits the turnover of personnel and minimizes training and replacement costs. It contributes positively to unit readiness and esprit and promotes the image of the Army as a desirable place to serve. The data offer clear proof. High school diploma graduates in the upper mental categories are an almost three to one better risk to serve a full enlistment than a non-high school graduate in the lower mental categories. They are a 2.8 to 1 better courts-martial risk; 2.6 to 1 better absent without leave/desertion risk; and all other measures show similar ratios. When we minimize these risks, we improve the effectiveness of the units of the Army and we avoid the costs of higher replacement rates. A good rule of thumb is that for every five percent increase in high school diploma graduates we reduce our replacement requirements over a three-year period by about three and a half percent.

I might digress a moment to say that the Army's effort to recruit high quality personnel reminds me of a television commercial for a popular automobile accessory, in which a service station manager says "you can pay me now or you can pay me later." Recruiting high quality personnel follows that adage. We pay with the resources and effort which attract high quality personnel now or we pay significantly higher costs later for added separations and replacements and in lower unit readiness.

Excerpts From Report of Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, to the Congress on the Fiscal Year 1977 Budget and Its Implications for the Fiscal Year 1978 Authorization Request and the Fiscal Year 1977–1981 Defense Programs, January 27, 1976

Recent high unemployment rates have helped achieve higher quality entrants. While substantial improvements in civilian employment opportunities could reduce the availability of high school graduates, the ability of the Services to attract and retain a sufficient number of qualified personnel at current strength levels is expected to continue. Longer terms of service and reduced first-term attrition will produce lower annual recruiting objectives which will help in meeting our recruiting goals in an improved employment climate. Analysis of the supply of qualified young people over the next ten years reveals no major problems, and improving public attitudes will have a beneficial impact on both active and Reserve Component recruiting. However, the elimination of the two-year enlistment and the prospective loss of G.I. Bill educational benefits for new enlistees are expected to have an adverse impact on our ability to recruit high-potential personnel, and therefore we must continue to maintain a balanced, well-focused, energetic recruiting program.

EXCERPTS FROM

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 4, 6, 16, 18, AND 23, 1976

PART 3

MANPOWER

(2531)

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STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH T. McCULLEN, JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS; LT. GEN. ROBERT H. BARROW, USMC, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MANPOWER, HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS; ACCOMPANIED BY MAJ. GEN. MICHAEL P. RYAN, USMC, DIRECTOR OF THE MARINE CORPS RESERVE

Mr. McCullen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

We appreciate the opportunity to again appear before the subcommittee to discuss the Marine Corps manpower authorization request for fiscal year 1977.

You have received a formal written statement from us, and rather than summarize that, what I would like to do, with your permission is cover a couple of areas which you have expressed considerable interest in.

As you have noted, the Marine Corps has done a study on the force structure, and in fact at this moment is deeply involved in that. We should complete the study late this month. And at that time we will be able to brief you and other members of the subcommittee on our findings and recommendations.

So as not to preempt that study, I would just like to address your other concerns in my opening remarks, the quality of the force.

QUALITY OF THE FORCE

In looking at the quality of the force, I think the Marine Corps took a long, hard, deep look. It wasn't a narcissistic look, they took off the cosmetics and looked deeply and, in some respects, they didn't like what they saw.

They then took some vigorous immediate action. One of the things that they saw was that graduation from high school is a key indicator of success in the Marine Corps. If you go back over the years and look at the number of high school graduates coming into the Marine Corps you would see the root of some of our problems. In 1974, for example, we brought into the Marine Corps 54 percent high school graduates. That was at a time when the Congress had said that we should bring in 55 percent. We tried to meet that goal, and fell short of it. In attempting to reach that goal, we also fell 15 percent short of our quantitative goal for that year.

In fiscal year 1975 we did meet our quantitative goal, and recruited 59 percent high school graduates. That wasn't enough.

UNAUTHORIZED ABSENCE AND DESERTION

In our study we also took a look at the discipline within the ranks of the corps. We found that our unauthorized absence rate and our desertion rate were entirely too high, and in fact growing. For example, our monthly UA rate in 1969 was 10 per 1,000. And in fiscal year 1975 it rose 2½ times to 24.8 per 1,000 per month. Our desertion rate in 1969 was 3.4 per 1,000 per month. And that rose to 7.7 per 1,000 per month last year.

Obviously we were not proud of that. There was something wrong. We had to take immediate action, and we did.

Senator NUNN. Could you give me those rates again?

Mr. McCULLEN. Yes sir. In 1969 the UA rate was 10 per 1,000 per month. In 1975 it rose to 24.8 per 1,000 per month. Desertions were 3.4 per 1,000 per month and they rose to 7.7 per 1,000 per month.

Senator NUNN. You always use the per month measurement?

Mr. McCULLEN. Yes sir, we have.

Senator NUNN. Everything I have seen has been per year.

Mr. McCULLEN. We have used both.

We had to take rather dramatic action. And I think we have. The first thing we did in this fiscal year was to discharge about 4,000 people who were substandard performers. This housecleaning has had favorable effects within the Corps.

HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE GOAL

We have instituted a program of expeditious discharge which we think will also pay off. Importantly, we have set a requirement—and I underline requirement, it is not a goal—for 67 percent high school graduates in this fiscal year.

If we achieve that level of high school graduates, that will be the highest percentage of high school graduates that we have brought into the Marine Corps in at least 16 years.

In fiscal year 1977 we are shooting even higher. We are going for three out of four marines coming into the corps to be high school graduates. That 75 percent will not include recruits with GED equivalents.

RECRUITING PROGRAM

So, Mr. Chairman, I think in the next fiscal year we will be able to live up to the advertising slogan, we are looking for a few good men. The message is clear from the Commandant that marines will get in step or get out.

How are we doing this year thus far? For the first 6 months we have recruited 72 percent high school graduates. At the same time our UA and desertion rate are down by 27 and 28 percent, respectively. I think this is a pretty good beginning, but that is what it is—only a beginning.

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Mr. McCullen. We are going on the philospohy that quality begets quality. In a sense it is a chicken and egg thing. You bring in the quality people that behave in a quality way. If people are good, and know they are, they will behave that way. And the Marine Corps especially wants that kind of people.

CUT IN RECRUITING EXPENDITURES

I would be misleading you, however, if I didn't express concern that we can continue to recruit this essential quality. In 1976 the number of our recruiters was cut 9 percent by action within the Congress. We were also cut in our recruiting support dollars and our advertising dollars. We were cut in the numbers of bonuses. This is making our goal toward quality, extremely difficult. I think, however, we will make it through this fiscal year and meet the goals that I have indicated.

I question, however, whether we will be able to meet the quality goals in fiscal year 1977 if there are any reductions from the recruiting dollars that we now have programed.

What we need from the subcommittee and the people in the House and the Conference Committee is the support and recognition that the marines are attacking the quality problem.

Personally, I don't think that we have yet proven that we can continue to recruit enough quality people under the All Volunteer Force. I also don't think that our success in quality recruiting during the last 6 months is proof that we can do it indefinitely.

These have been difficult times. In some sense, though, they have been fortunate for the military. Because as we were recruiting people we were also seeing high unemployment rates.

We also saw military pay being raised considerably, making the services a more attractive alternative.

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MANPOWER MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES

QUALITY

As we have stated in the past, we share the concern of Congress that the manpower quality of the Marine Corps must be improved and maintained to ensure a ready, effective force. The main criterion we are using is high school graduation. We believe that although mental group classification is a good indicator of intellectual capability, educational attainment such as high school graduation reveals such important attributes as social maturity, perserverance, desire to succeed, and adapatability to organizational life. Therefore, we have established higher educational standards in Fiscal Year 1976 (67% high school graduates among new recruits) than we attained in Fiscal Year 1975 (59.1%). The Fiscal Year 1977 requirement will be higher still -- 75%. In addition, all other recruits in Fiscal Year 1977 must have completed the tenth grade to be eligible for enlistment.

Through the first six months of this Fiscal Year, we have achieved 101.6% of our active duty recruit quota and 72.5% have been high school graduates or possess the equivalency certificate. Thus far we have recruited 3,025 more high school graduates than in the same period last year. These results bode well for attainment of our Fiscal Year 1977 requirement.

To enhance that probability, we are currently reorganizing the recruiting and training of new Marines to give the recruit depot commanders control over the entire process -- from enlistment to recruit graduation. In addition, individual recruiter accountability will be increased through a quality control information system that will provide timely feedback on the performance in recruit training for each enlistee recruited by an individual recruiter.

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Another important contributor to recruiting success in Fiscal Year 1977 will be the enlistment bonus program. It is a valuable enlistment incentive for high school graduates and for attracting high quality individuals into critically short technical skills. The Fiscal Year 1977 program reflects a 63% reduction from the Fiscal Year 1976 level in new contracts allowed. We request that it not be reduced further.

The cumulative effect of those actions on the total recruiting effort -- reductions in the recruiter force, recruiter support, recruiting advertising and enlistment bonuses -- will make what is now a formidable task much more difficult in an uncertain future.

My discussion of quality improvement up to this point has concentrated only on the upgrading of new recruit quality. We are equally concerned with improving quality and performance in the ranks. We have been taking aggressive action to remove from the ranks those Marines who have demonstrated their unwillingness or inability to meet minimum standards. These standards pertain to job performance as well as other visible indicators of self-discipline, to include physical fitness, weight control and military appearance. These standards must be met by all hands -- not just the majority. This aggressive action has been implemented in part by an expeditious discharge program, which gives to any commander who can convene a special court-martial the authority to discharge substandard Marines. The program is a tool by which commanders can identify and separate troublesome individuals early in their enlistment before they become serious administrative or disciplinary problems. Streamlined procedures are used but legal counsel and appropriate appeal safeguards are part of the program. Only Honorable and General (under Honorable conditions) discharges are awarded under the program. Such action may be taken only after at least six months of service, including a minimum of four months observation of the Marine's performance.

One result of these quality improvement efforts,may be a larger than expected loss of manpower this year and a consequent shortfall in end-strength. We are prepared to accept such an eventuality for the sake of the improved quality that is expected to result.

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STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM K. BREHM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS, ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN AHEARNE, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS, ROBERT J. MURRAY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PLANNING AND REQUIREMENTS, AND WILL HILL TANKERSLEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR RESERVE AFFAIRS

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3. Recruiting and Advertising Programs. The Department's success in meeting strength goals is, to a large extent, the result of vigorous recruiting and advertising programs. It is my view that adjustments to Service recruiting resources should be made to reflect changes in the recruiting market, and should take into consideration changes in recruiting incentives, such as the enlistment bonus, educational opportunities, veteran's benefits, and changes in terms of service. I believe that adjustments should first be made in those resources which can most easily be increased or decreased -- advertising and enlistment bonuses, for example. Changes in the basic recruiting force structure should only be based on the longer term assessment of recruiting requirements and not on shorter term market outlook.

As a result of our own review of the effectiveness of the FY 1975 recruiting programs and changes anticipated for FY 1976, I recommended a 6% reduction in recruiting and advertising resources from that originally requested in the FY 1976 Budget. Congressional action, however, resulted in a reduction of 16%, at a time when other factors began to make recruiting more difficult than before.

While recent high unemployment rates have helped attract higher quality entrants, projected improvement in civilian employment opportunities are expected to reduce the Service's ability to meet their goals for a higher proportion of school graduates. Although there should be a sufficient supply of qualified non-graduates to meet Service needs, it will be more difficult for the Services to meet our objective of reducing first term attrition rates.

In the longer view, our analysis of the supply of qualified young people over the next ten years reveals no major problems, and improving public attitudes will have a beneficial impact on both active and Reserve Component recruiting. However, the elimination of the two-year enlistment and the prospective loss of G.I. Bill educational benefits for new enlistees are expected to have an adverse impact on our ability to recruit high-potential personnel. Therefore, we must continue to maintain a balanced, well-focused, energetic recruiting program.

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ENLISTMENT BONUS

We are cutting back drastically on the enlistment bonuses. In fiscal year 1973 we were just beginning the reenlistment bonus program at a level of about $41 million. In fiscal year 1976, however, we are spending about $72 million for reenlistment bonuses, and we are proposing to cut that down to $29 million in fiscal year 1977.

REENLISTMENT TRAVEL

We have also ended the practice of providing an individual who reenlists with the funds that are equivalent to the price of a trip to the individual's home upon reenlistment. We spent $15 million on this in fiscal year 1973, but we have ended that practice, which we are able to do within our own authority.

Senator SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, if I might ask the Secretary, I talked with a recruiting officer just within the past couple of weeks, and he said they actually had a backlog in his office of people who wanted to enlist, they had no trouble at all meeting his quota.

Now, that is one recruiting noncommissioned officer. Is that a general thing? Are you having difficulty generally meeting it? I commend you on reducing this bonus, but I just wonder, is that a general thing? Are you having difficulty meeting your quota in some instances? Could you just give us a broad indication of how you are meeting the need that we have?

Mr. BREHM. Senator Scott, there are really three variations. One is the variation by service. Another is variation by geographical area. That is to say, it is easier for some services to recruit than others, and it is easier to recruit in some areas of the country than in others. The third variation is that it is more difficult to recruit people in certain skills than in others. The residual program that we have for enlistment bonuses is entirely for the combat arms within the Army and in the highly combat arms and highly technical aviation skills for the Marine Corps. Combat arms are the most difficult skills to fill, and they are also very high density skills, in that we need a lot of people.

Senator SCOTT. But if you didn't have the bonus, could you fill those?

Mr. BREHM. It is conceivable to me that we could meet our quantity requirements. It is not clear to me that we could meet our quality standards. I believe that while we are reducing from $72 to $29 million in this area in one year, that introduces a certain risk, but I think it is an acceptable risk.

3-YEAR ENLISTMENTS

In any case I would be opposed to going to a further reduction until we see how this works out in fiscal year 1977. We have done other things which make recruiting more difficult. As I will point out later, we have eliminated the 2-year enlistment. The minimum enlistment is now 3 years. There is a prospective loss of the GI bill, which is a recruiting incentive. So, we are making it more difficult for the recruiter, and I think we ought to be careful how we program in these initiatives.

Senator Scott. You recommend the loss of the GI bill, do you not?

Mr. Brehm. I do, because I believe it is a terribly expensive way to meet the specific needs of the Defense Department.

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ACCESSION PROGRAM COSTS

Mr. Brehm. $437 million in 1973 on what I would call accession programs: recruiting advertising, recruiting force, and enlistment bonuses.

Senator Nunn. Well, I am wondering how many people were accessed for that $437 million?

Mr. Brehm. I can produce that, and we can calculate a couple of things for the subcommittee, Mr. Chairman. We can show the average cost of bringing an individual into the service and we can show that in constant and current dollars. I would be happy to do that.

[The information follows:]

ACCESSION PROGRAM COSTS

	Fiscal year—				
	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977
Active duty enlisted accessions (nonprior and prior service—in thousands)	[1] 476	424	456	424	429
Costs:					
In millions of current dollars	437	482	566	501	503
In millions of fiscal year 1977 dollars	619	625	652	540	503
Average cost per enlisted accession:					
In current dollars	918	1,137	1,241	1,182	1,172
In fiscal year 1977 dollars	1,300	1,474	1,430	1,274	1,172

[1] Excludes 35,000 inductees.

ENLISTED ACCESSIONS1/
NON-PRIOR SERVICE
MEN AND WOMEN

PERCENT HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES



1/ INCLUDES DRAFTEES

These are the standard charts that show the quality trends within the new accessions for the active services. This shows the percent of high school graduates for all services combined, comparing our FY 1976 experience through November with fiscal year 1975, and also fiscal year 1964, the last year of the peacetime draft.

The remaining bars show the same trends with respect to each service and, as I believe everyone knows, we have had continued improvement in this quality indicator with respect to new accessions, nonprior service men and women coming into the Active Forces.

QUALITY TRENDS IN RECRUITING

I am sure the quality trends have been helped to some degree by the unemployment situation, but, nonetheless, I think that with the improved recruiting techniques that the services have been using we do have a definite improvement compared to fiscal year 1964 or the early years of the transition to the Volunteer Force that will be sustained.

Senator BARTLETT. Do those figures in the three adjoining columns represent increased efficiency in recruiting, or not necessarily?

Mr. BREHM. Yes; they do. In the early stages of the Volunteer Force, the recruiters went to the manpower pools that were most readily available in the sense that the potential recruits were most responsive in terms of volunteering. As we worked our way through the transition and have a more solid base upon which to stand, the recruiting forces have been directed toward high quality, bringing in the maximum number of high school graduates, who do well in the services.

There is no question that there is a learning experience here that has helped the recruiting force and has helped result in the trends you see here. I think that is a big part of it, but I also feel that the economy has had some part in this, too. We cannot separate out which is which.

Senator BARTLETT. You cannot separate that from the techniques used?

Mr. BREHM. It would be difficult for us to do that, yes, sir.

ENLISTED ACCESSIONS[1/]
NON-PRIOR SERVICE
MEN AND WOMEN

MENTAL GROUP DISTRIBUTION
PERCENT IN CATEGORY III AND ABOVE



[1/] INCLUDES DRAFTEES

This is a counterpart chart that shows the experience with respect to mental group distribution of new enlistees. These bars show the percentage who are in the category three-or-better—the average above average categories in these mental groups. We see that the trend for all services, is up. So far in fiscal year 1976, 96 percent are in the average category or above: The Army is now 93 percent; the Navy, 95; the Marine Corps, 98 percent; and the Air Force 99 plus.

Senator BARTLETT. What is the definition of category three?

Mr. BREHM. Category three is average. These categories are defined by scores that are achieved on the entrance examination taken by the recruits. There are a total of five categories. We take no one in category five, the lowest category. We take a few people in category four, which is the below average category. The majority of our people are in category three, but we also have a significant input of category two and category one, which, of course, is necessary to meet the very highest skill requirements that we have.

Senator BARTLETT. What kind of a relationship would IQ have to category three?

Mr. **Brehm**. There is a rough correlation between the results or measurements used in this testing process to IQ. There is a rough correlation.

Senator **Bartlett**. What would that be?

Mr. **Brehm**. Do you mean in terms of 100 on the IQ score corresponding to——

Senator **Bartlett**. What IQ would be considered the breaking point between three and two? I assume three is at a certain point and above, up to another level. What would be the corresponding IQ with the differentiation between three and two, or three and four, rather?

Mr. **Brehm**. As I recall, about 36 percent of those in the general population are in category four or below. I think about 24 percent are in category four alone, if I am not mistaken. Frankly, Senator, I think the best way for me to answer that question is to do it properly in the record and show the break of the percentile scores that show the enlistment tests that we give and how we define the specific categories.

[The information follows:]

MENTAL TEST SCORES OF MALE POPULATION—AGE 19 TO 21

[In percent]

Mental group	Total population	Noncollege population
Above average (I and II)	36	25
Average (III)	37	39
Below average (IV)	20	26
Not eligible (V)	7	10
Total	100	100

Senator **Bartlett**. I am familiar with what you are talking about, but I have never seen a real definition of it.

Mr. **Brehm**. We have that tied down very tightly. I would be glad to provide it.

Senator **Bartlett**. You think some figures on your test might be different from SAT or other tests? It would not have any meaning to me, particularly, but I think the Intelligence Quotient would.

Mr. **Brehm**. We could show you the rough correlation. This test that we give has several purposes, one of which is to find out the aptitude of individuals for military service. It is not strictly an IQ test, but certain questions can be taken out of the battery and used as kind of a mini-IQ test. That is how we make these correlations, and I would be glad to supply that.

[The information follows:]

ARMED SERVICES VOCATIONAL APTITUDE BATTERY

The Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery which is administreed to all applicants for enlistment at the Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations consists of thirteen subtests: General information, numerical operations, attention to detail, word knowledge, arithmetic reasoning, space perception, mathematical knowledge, electronics information, mechanical comprehension, general science, shop information, automotive information, and classification inventory.

Three of these subtests—Word Knowledge, Arithmetic Reasoning and Space Perception, are combined to describe the mental category of incoming recruits. A Mental Category I (percentile score 93-99) roughly corresponds to an IQ of 125 and above; a Category II (percentile score of 65-92), 106-124; a Category III (percentile score of 31-64), 88-105; a Category IV (percentile score of 10-30) 80-87; and a Category V (percentile score 0-9), 79 and below. Current enlistment standards preclude enlistment of anyone below a percentile score of 16 (upper Category IV).

TOTAL FORCE ENLISTED ACCESSIONS QUALITY TRENDS

	HIGH SCHOOL NON-GRADUATES AS PERCENT OF NON-PRIOR SERVICE ACCESSIONS			
	FY 1964	FY 1974	FY 1975	FY 1976 1/
ACTIVE FORCES	32	34	28	21
RESERVE COMPONENTS	N/A	35	31	29

	BELOW AVERAGE MENTAL GROUP AS PERCENT OF NON-PRIOR SERVICE ACCESSIONS			
	FY 1964	FY 1974	FY 1975	FY 1976
ACTIVE FORCES	15	10	6	4
RESERVE COMPONENTS	N/A	28	21	15

1/ 1st SIX MONTHS

This chart compares the trends in the active forces in these two areas with trends in the Reserve components. It is time, I believe, that we tie these two together in a single presentation, because this is an essential part of total force planning. It is good to see what these trends are.

These are what I might term negative indicators. The top part of the chart are high school nongraduates, as a percent of nonprior service total accessions, so the smaller this figure, the better we are doing. The downward trend here is good, and this shows for all services, nonprior service, enlisted exceptions in 1976 so far a level of 21 percent.

Senator BARTLETT. The percentage of graduates, of high school graduates, is that remaining almost the same with the percentage of nongraduates?

Mr. BREHM. These are the nongraduates. The number of graduates is just the inverse of this, so we have 79 percent graduates coming in fiscal year 1976 and 21 percent nongraduates.

Senator BARTLETT. What would affect that chart is if the percentage of high school students not graduating changed.

Mr. BREHM. Oh, within the general population, I see what you mean.

Senator BARTLETT. So, I was asking, has there been such a change?

PROPORTION OF YOUTH GRADUATING FROM HIGH SCHOOL

Mr. BREHM. I do not know the answer to that. We probably have some information on general population trends. My guess is that there would not be sharp differences over the time frame from 1974 to 1976. Actually the proportion of youth graduating from high school has remained fairly constant at about 75 percent since 1968. We do know there are differences with respect to the number of individuals going on to college. There is a definite trend there which we must examine because it affects the number of people available to us.

[The information follows:]

Our examination shows that following a steady rise from the 1940's to the mid-1960's, the proportion of youth graduating from high school has remained fairly constant since 1968. Changes in the proportion entering college have fluctuated much more.

Senator BARTLETT. What was the period of time in which the services had a quota?

Mr. BREHM. A minimum number of high school graduates?

Senator BARTLETT. I am not sure that was a quota, but there was a quota of No. 4 and No. 5, category 4 and 5.

QUOTA FOR HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES

Mr. BREHM. We had two quotas during the fiscal year 1974. I believe it was a minimum of 55 percent high school graduates, and a maximum of 18 percent category 4. That existed for the 1 fiscal year.

Senator BARTFETT. 1974 was the only year?

Mr. BREHM. Yes, sir, and we have been exceeding those in all services since that time. For the Reserve components, we had a relatively high intake of high school nongraduates among the nonprior service accessions. The subcommittee should keep in mind an earlier chart showed that nonprior service people represent, perhaps, 25 to 30 percent of the total accessions into the Reserve components, the others being veterans, prior service personnel. Nevertheless, this is a high percentage, even within the non-prior-service group, and I want to bring it down. As you can see, the Reserve components have been able to make a marked improvement and have reduced the number of nongraduates to 29 percent.

(Note: This 29 percent does not include high school seniors since most go on to graduate.) That trend is definitely in the right direction but it is something we need to continue to improve upon.

In the same sense, this is the percentage of Service accessions that are in the below average mental group. Again, this is a negative indicator, and as this number goes down, that is the direction we want it to go. For the Active Forces, we are now down to a level of 4 percent in fiscal year 1976, which is certainly an all time low.

MENTAL CATEGORY CONTENT OF RESERVE COMPONENTS

For the Reserve components, we were taking in 28 percent category four personnel in fiscal year 1974, as they were getting into the transition to the volunteer force within the non-prior-service accessions. That has now reduced that to a level of 15 percent, which is a very remarkable accomplishment and obviously one which we applaud. But, just as we must keep our eye on the high school graduate situation, we have to keep our eye on the mental category content of the Reserve components.

BLACK REPRESENTATION WITHIN THE ENLISTED FORCE



This is, in effect, a photograph of the representation of blacks within the total enlisted force. It shows that last September, about 16 percent of the Active Forces were black, numbering about 295,000 personnel. That was up from 11 percent in December of 1970. In the Army, it is at about 23 percent, and it appears to me we have about stabilized at that level because the Army recruits now are coming in at about the rate of 23 percent, which is down from 27 or 28 percent of the year before. I would not look for any marked change in the Army. The Navy seems to be stabilizing at about 8 percent. This may come up a little bit. The Marine Corps is at about 18 percent, and the Air Force is at around 15 percent. The representation within the population as a whole is about 13 percent for ages 17 to 20. So you can see the relationship of the service experience to the general population. I might add that within such work force areas as building trades, industrial programs such as automobile manufacturing, the representation of blacks is about 21 or 22 percent, which is not far from the Army's experience. So I do not think there are any surprises here, but, in any case, the situation does seem to be stabilized.

We are continuing to increase relatively the representation of women within the military services. We have a plan for the end of this fiscal year for about 109,000, just over 5 percent of the total Active Force to be women. By end fiscal year 1978 we are planning a level of about 130,000, which would be just over 6 percent.

REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN WITHIN TOTAL MILITARY STRENGTH

(END OF FISCAL YEAR)

	NUMBER IN SERVICE (000)				
	ACTUAL			PLAN	
	FY 1971	FY 1974	FY 1975	FY 1976	FY 1978
ARMY	16.9	30.7	42.3	45.2	52.7
NAVY	8.8	17.0	21.2	24.3	24.8
MARINE CORPS	2.3	2.7	3.2	2.9	3.1
AIR FORCE	14.8	24.2	30.2	36.8	50.1
TOTAL DOD	42.8	74.7	96.9	109.2	130.7
PERCENT OF TOTAL	1.6	3.5	4.6	5.2	6.2[1]

[1] BASED ON PLANNED FY 1976 END STRENGTH

WOMEN IN MILITARY SERVICE

Last year we furnished the Senate, at their request, an analysis of geographic representations throughout the country. This is an update of one of the charts that we provided in that report last year. It shows that within these broad, geographical areas, our enlistments, are really very close to the population representation as a whole, as you can see just by looking at the figures here. I thought it would be useful to have this in the record. Of course, this is a very gross aggregation, breaking up the country into just five geographical areas, but it does show that we are within that level generally representative.

Mr. Chairman, this is also an update of a part of that study from last year, and this chart has to do with what our requirement looks like in the future, reaching out to 1990, and what we are going to have to do to be able to meet our requirements as we see them now. To be specific, in fiscal year 1976, our total non-prior-service accessions are around 400,000. We expect to have about 31,000 women within that group, leaving a requirement of 368,000 for male entrants. The total number of 18-year-old males in the population is over 2 million, but of that group, those who would be qualified and available for military service—meaning they are not in college—would be down just over 1 million. We require, and are getting this year, 34 percent of that age group. That is the familiar factor of getting 1 out of 3. This is what the Active Forces need. The Reserve component requirements are on top of that.

Senator NUNN. The percentage of total required, 17 percent?

NON PRIOR SERVICE ENLISTED ACCESSION PROJECTIONS FY 1976-1990

(000'S)

	FY 1976	FY 1980	FY 1985	FY 1990
NON PRIOR SERVICE ACCESSIONS				
TOTAL	399	400	390	390
WOMEN (PLANNED)	31	40	40	40
MEN (REQUIRED)	368	360	350	350
TOTAL 18-YEAR-OLD MALES IN POPULATION	2,132	2,139	1,847	1,911
QUALIFIED AND AVAILABLE 18-YEAR-OLDS *	1,080	1,093	896	940
PERCENT OF TOTAL REQUIRED	17%	17%	19%	18%
PERCENT OF QUALIFIED AND AVAILABLE REQUIRED	34%	33%	39%	37%

* ELIMINATES MENTALLY/PHYSICALLY INELIGIBLE; THOSE IN MENTAL AND PENAL INSTITUTIONS, ETC; AND FULL TIME COLLEGE STUDENTS

NON PRIOR SERVICE ACCESSIONS

Mr. Brehm. Seventeen percent is the figure of our requirement compared to the total number of 18-year olds, but out of that group that is qualified and available to us, not in college, we must have 34 percent.

Senator Nunn. Does that count Active and Reserves?

Mr. Brehm. This is just active. The Reserve requirements are on top of this, and would add another 60,000 or 70,000 accessions, so that would increase the requirement by about 6 percentage points. We are getting for the Total Force about 40 percent of those who are qualified and available right now.

PROJECTION OF ENLISTMENTS AT VARIABLE UNEMPLOYMENT LEVELS

Senator Nunn. Have you done a study projecting what would happen if you had, say, 5 percent unemployment instead of 8 percent unemployment, and if all of your cost restraint initiatives this year, and whatever is required in the future, were passed by Congress, and what the effect of either or both of those items would be on the picture?

Mr. Brehm. We have, of course, already experienced the situation where unemployment was low. It was low when we went into the Volunteer Force, and, with the pay levels we had at that time, we were getting roughly, one out of three of our target population.

Senator Nunn. But at that time you were getting a large number of non-high-school graduates, too.

Mr. BREHM. We were getting a higher proportion than we are now, but at the same time, we were also getting more high school graduates than we were in fiscal year 1964, so it compared favorably with the draft peacetime environment. Now, for the second part of your question, what will happen with the restraints that we are proposing with respect to the growth in manpower costs? I am really not prepared to say. I think we simply have to continue to monitor the situation very closely. I think we will have plenty of warning if we start to get into trouble because we would begin to see a tail-off probably in the quality. That would be one of the first things that would show up. We watch these things on a monthly or even weekly basis to see the trends.

As we project this situation out to fiscal year 1980, we find at that time, assuming the same size Active Force of roughly 2.1 million, our requirement will go up to 39 percent, because there will be fewer people in the eligible population group. That is a fairly significant increase, and we are going to have to watch the situation as we move into that time frame, assuming everything else is the same. That seems to be the peak year in terms of the percentage. After that, it begins to drop off a little.

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STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD G. BROTZMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS, ACCOMPANIED BY LT. GEN. HAROLD G. MOORE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL, AND LT. GEN. JOHN W. VESSEY, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS AND PLANS

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Senator NUNN. Why don't you go ahead. I read your statement and I'll be going over it again. I'll let you go ahead and proceed with your statement, and I'll be back.

Secretary BROZTMAN. All right, fine. I'll just go ahead and read this.

TRANSITION FROM DRAFT TO VOLUNTEER ARMY

In transitioning from the draft to the Volunteer Army, we realized that it would not be possible to achieve all of our goals of recruiting and training new people in the quantity, quality, and skills needed simultaneously. In fiscal year 1974, quantity, that is, getting enough people to volunteer, was emphasized and achieved. In fiscal year 1975, while keeping pressure on numbers, quality was emphasized and great improvements were made. In fiscal year 1976, we had planned to sustain our quantity achievements, further improve quality, and more precisely to match the skill needs of the Army with the skills volunteered for on a week-by-week basis. We set weekly goals so that we could more closely identify those that we needed to recruit, and match them with seats in the training base. And I might say parenthetically, this initiative is working very well. Fiscal year 1977 was to be the capstone of the transition period, with the full institutionalization of our ability to sustain the flow of trained replacements in the required quantity, quality, and skills.

What is our progress in fiscal year 1976 to date, and what is the forecast?

QUANTITY AND QUALITY OBJECTIVES

In fiscal year 1976 it is our belief that we can achieve our quantity objective of 180,500 non-prior service male and females. We will, however, fall short of our quality objectives during fiscal year 1976. For high school diploma graduates, we have established a goal of 65 percent. Based upon current trends, we estimate that we will achieve at the end of the fiscal year 57 to 58 percent high school diploma graduates. In mental categories I–IIIA, another area of quality measurement, the so-called 50 percentile group of the population, current trends indicate that we will be at between 52 and 54 percent versus our goal of 65 percent. Our quality achievement was high early in the fiscal year, significantly higher than for the same period in fiscal year 1975; but has fallen off in recent months, as shown on page 1633 of my statement for the record.

We have made an analysis to determine why this occurred. The analysis indicates that it is attributable primarily to these reasons: the elimination of the unit canvasser program; the elimination of the 10-percent recruiter overstrength; termination of the 2-year enlistment option; the constraint on enlistment bonus funds; reduction in recruiting support; the decrease in unemployment; and high production goals.

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Mr. Sullivan. General Moore, does your 1977 budget correct this trend? In other words, are the resources you are requesting in the 1977 budget adequate to meet your recruiting goals in terms of quantity and quality?

General Moore. We hope they will be, but it's going to be a problem. We are going to do the best we can with the resources we are asking for.

Mr. Sullivan. At what point would you, as the Deputy Chief of Staff of Personnel in the Army, recommend that the size of the Army be smaller in order to obtain higher quality personnel? As I understand it now, you are simply saying you are falling short of your quality goals by some 6 or 7 percentage points. At what point would that cause you to decide that you really needed to have higher quality personnel?

General Moore. I have not heard any expressions within the Army staff of going to the alternative of recommending decreases in the size of the Army due to not achieving the quality goals set. I don't think we will be doing that.

Mr. Sullivan. Well, at some point, now, it seems the quality goals are indicative of the kind of people that you need to get into the Army to run a high quality ready force, skilled people, technical people, and so forth.

Now, what you are saying here is that you are not meeting those goals. Perhaps you are not falling short enough to say, "Well, that is going to create a problem."

QUALITY PERSONNEL AND SIZE OF ARMY

My question is, at what point does the difference between your quality objective and your achievement for quality bring you to the conclusion that you want to stop taking in lower quality people, and thereby shrink the size of the Army?

General MOORE. I have not heard of any analysis at all of that possibility. I think the size of the Army is more based on the security needs of the country. I am confident that the Army will make do with the quality we do achieve, just as it always has in the past.

Secretary BROTZMAN. If I may elaborate on that.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Yes, sir.

Secretary BROTZMAN. The one point as we analyze this problem—when I say "we", the Congress and those of us who have this responsibility—the one point we all will have to remember is the reason for quality is not necessarily just to have a lot of bright people carrying out these functions, it is because this is a cost effective way to go.

We know, Mr. Sullivan, that the way for us to squander the resources that we get from the Congress, that are derived from the good people back home that pay taxes, the way for us to squander that is to let quality get down so low that we have these terrific loss rates. You are well aware that, if we get our quality down in nonhigh school graduates, our Absent Without Leave—AWOL—rate and our desertion rate, and all these things go up almost three times as much. This then means we have to use the resources to go out to get more people to replace our losses. So, it's kind of an endless cycle.

I know that I am not adding anything to the record that you don't understand very well. But there are those who sometimes think we just want to have smart people. We want the bright people, that's true, and they do add to our function; but basically getting quality is a way for us to utilize our resources wisely.

These are all things we look at all the time. We are analyzing them, and I don't know where the cutoff point would be. But I would think before we would cut the size of the Army, Mr. Sullivan, I know what I would do. I'll come over here and I'll tell the chairman how important it is to either reprogram funds for enlistment bonuses, if we are having a hard time in the combat arms. I'll come over and fully disclose these matters to the Congress before I would ever think of possibly increasing the risk to the security of this country.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Would that include a recommendation to go back to the draft?

ALL VOLUNTEER ARMY

Secretary BROTZMAN. In some kind of a descending order I would recommend it, if I thought that was what had to be done. But at this point, if I might just sum up on this point, I think that the All Volunteer Army is working. I don't know where former Secretary Callaway got the word, but he said that it's "fragile" now. That is probably a good term, probably it is fragile, but we are trying to institutionalize it. We have a darned good recruiting system.

I just got back from the U.S. Army Recruiting Command. We have some of the finest people in that command you could find. They are high on the DAMPL—Department of the Army Master Priority List—and it's a good place to be; it's prestigious; they are enthused about their jobs; they are working hard to make their goals.

We will provide for the record, Mr. Sullivan, an answer to your question specifically.

Mr. SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

(The information follows:)

The Army goal is to meet its military end strength with the right quality and quantity mix of people. The Army does not intend to recommend a reduction in end strength in order to protect high quality goals. The Army's force of 24 divisions needs to be supported for operational and national security reasons. This means an Active Army end strength of 790,000 and a Reserve Component end strength of 691,000. If quality becomes a real problem, we will approach the Congress and lay out what would be required to maintain our force levels at the desired quality.

Secretary BROTZMAN. We possibly have covered the next part of this statement because it talks about looking forward to the fiscal year 1977 budget request. And I talk about what a reduction will do, that it will relate to shortfalls in the quality objectives; and particularly we have to be careful of our combat arms enlistments because that is the cutting edge of the Army.

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GOAL FOR HIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMA GRADUATES

Your goal for high school diploma graduates was 65 percent in fiscal year 1976; and right now, based on current trends, your statement indicates you will have a yearend result of 57 to 58 percent high school diploma graduates. In all but category IV, you were trying to have 65 percent in I through IIIA?

Secretary BROTZMAN. Yes; I through IIIB, that's 90 percent. IIIB actually would be about 25 percent of that. I through IIIA is, the other 65 percent.

Senator NUNN. And you are going to fall short of that by 54 percent in that area?

Secretary BROTZMAN. No. About 55 to 57 percent will be in mental category I—IIIA.

Senator NUNN. Have you released this, or is that the first information to come out on this? The reason I wondered is this is the first I have seen it.

Secretary BROTZMAN. I think that has been published. I'm not sure, Mr. Chairman, but if the Chief of Staff's testimony didn't supply the answer; it was probably one of the things supplied for the record. These do correlate exactly with his.

Senator **Nunn**. How long have you known about this? Is it something that was totally unanticipated? Did it catch you by surprise?

Secretary **Brotzman**. No; I'm not totally surprised because from my experience I do know there is a direct correlation between some of these factors that are set forth on page 1617, and quality success. Make no mistake about it.

I should say, you asked me what have we done about it. Well, we have tried to express our concern in the proper way and the proper channels; and we tried to make our case as effectively as we could, while understanding the budget constraints. We are going to try to continue to make this thing work. But I think if we didn't point this out to this distinguished committee, we would be remiss in our duty.

Senator **Nunn**. I agree with you. I think we are all trying to work toward the same goal, and this ought to be pointed out, no doubt about it. This is important.

Secretary **Brotzman**. One of the questions Mr. Sullivan did ask—and it was a good one—was if we could assign our projected losses to different factors.

Senator **Nunn**. That is the question I wanted to ask.

Secretary **Brotzman**. We don't have that broken down exactly, Mr. Chairman, we will try to do the best we can for the record.

Senator **Nunn**. Just guess at it, so we get something in the record on the breakdown. The decrease in unemployment, how much do you think that has affected it; is that one of the most important factors?

Secretary **Brotzman**. No; I think that is one of the least important. I don't think this is one of the larger factors because we have a good recruiting command, but if you cut back on the numbers of recruiters, cut out the 2-year enlistment option while trying for a larger percentage of 4-year enlistments, it makes recruiting tougher.

RECRUITING DIFFICULTIES

But all of these things have an effect. When you are out trying to recruit a young man for a combat arms slot, for example, all of these cause resistance in him, combat arms being the most difficult, as the chairman knows, because there we don't have the carryover to a civilian occupation. So, we have to work harder to get these people that we need; that is the heart of our whole operation.

Senator **Nunn**. What about the high production goal? When you are talking about a high production goal, are you talking about numbers, or quality; or are you talking about a combination?

Secretary **Brotzman**. Goals, generically. I just mentioned, one is to go to a higher percentage of 4-year enlistments.

Another one I pointed out to you, which no doubt makes it more work, is trying to recruit on a weekly basis. Formerly we had monthly goals, and the recruiting staff, or recruiting function would go out to recruit for a monthly goal. But now because we send people weekly to the various training schools, we actually recruit now on a weekly goal basis. Our training base, I can report to the chairman, is about 95 percent filled right now, whereas formerly we only would have our training base filled to the extent of 75 percent.

For the first time in a long time, we are filling our seats for cooks, MOS 94 Bravo. We never had enough cooks, but now we are getting our training seats filled, and we do it through this technique. It saves money because we don't have vacancies in the training seats, and we fit our recruiting to the training command capabilities.

RECRUITING TRENDS

Senator **Nunn**. Have you made any kind of estimates on whether these trends are going to change in fiscal year 1977, or whether you are going to drop your goals?

Secretary **Brotzman**. Well, this is a subject which is under discussion right now, Mr. Chairman, at the highest levels. I would say to you that I think we should not drop our goals. I don't want to make goals unrealistic, realizing you can get them so far out of sync that goals can become meaningless. But nevertheless, rather than to have a sharp reduction in our goals, I would prefer to keep them up high, so we have something to shoot at. In any event, the point of our discussion is that projected quality decreases are caused by a complex interrelationship of the many factors we have been discussing of which decreasing unemployment is one of lesser relative importance.

That is just my personal opinion, I would invite General Moore to comment on that.

General **Moore**. I agree with that.

Secretary **Brotzman**. You agree with it?

General **Moore**. Yes.

Secretary **Brotzman**. We never really talked about it in detail.

General **Moore**. I have heard no discussions of reducing the quality goals, and we will do our best to achieve them.

Senator **Nunn**. Could you furnish for the record a breakdown of, for instance, the allocation once you get beyond category IIIA? In other words, how much of it falls in IIIB, IV, and so forth?

Secretary **Brotzman**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Nunn**. Do you know, offhand, how much, in fiscal 1976, you are going to have in category IV?

Secretary **Brotzman**. I think we can come up with that answer right now, but I think it's going to be under 10 percent for category IV, Mr. Chairman; and I would say that our category IIIB will be roughly 30 to 35 percent; and then the rest will be in categories I through IIIA.

Senator **Nunn**. You can supply that for the record, if you want to.

General **Moore**. I can give you some specific information, sir, on non-prior-service achievement as of the 9th of February. This is preliminary data. Category IV at about 7 percent; and 57 percent on category I and IIIA. High school diploma graduates, 61.2 percent. And we are at 99.1 percent of the number that we projected to be recruited by this time of the year.

Senator **Nunn**. Is that based on where you are right now, or is that where you think you will be at the end of this fiscal year?

General **Moore**. That is as of the 9th of February, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Nunn**. So, this projection we have on page 1614 would carry us below each one of those, and that indicates the trends are such that your reading is going to get worse.

General **Moore**. The trend is down, yes, sir.

Secretary **Brotzman**. Mr. Chairman, there is in my statement here—and I don't have the page—we have that plotted so you can see what we think will happen on a seasonal basis.

Senator NUNN. That's all right, as long as we have it.

Secretary BROTZMAN. It is in here, and it shows where we were last year, where we are this year, and where we expect to be as we move on through the cycle to the end of the fiscal year.

Senator NUNN. Are these goals the same goals you had in fiscal year 1975, or have you upgraded them?

Secretary BROTZMAN. The goals were increased.

Senator NUNN. What were your goals, for instance, in 1975 on high school graduates?

Secretary BROTZMAN. I think we had either 60, or 65 percent, but we included our equivalencies at that juncture. We had the General Educational Development—GED—included with high school graduates.

Senator NUNN. Could you break out for us on a chart how the goals have changed?

Secretary BROTZMAN. Yes, sir, we will make a comparison.

[The information follows:]

QUALITY GOALS, FISCAL YEARS 1974-76 FOR NPS ACCESSIONS



Senator NUNN. It seems to me at some point you will have to decide whether you are going to give up quality or give up numbers, if those trends continue. Have you gotten to that point yet?

Secretary BROTZMAN. We were discussing it a little bit earlier, and I don't think the Army has a position on that at this point.

Senator NUNN. Are you alarmed enough, though, that you think it is going to be discussed within the next few weeks or months?

Secretary BROTZMAN. Well, I am sure that all of these things will be discussed, yes, sir.

Senator **Nunn**. It seems to me you've got to give up quality, or you've got to give up numbers and, really, come up with a recommendation. Maybe there are some other in between options.

Secretary **Brotzman**. I don't know. We think we can make this work, obviously, but we have to consider all kinds of different options. As I have indicated when the Senator was out of the room, we have to analyze this. The problem with reduction of quality is like the frog trying to jump out of the well because the lower the quality, the more costs we incur.

Senator **Nunn**. In other areas?

HIGH LOSS RATES FOR NON-HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE ACCESSIONS

Secretary **Brotzman**. Yes. Because our loss rates are so much higher. Loss rates for non-high school graduate accessions are about two times higher in basic training than high school diploma graduates. And so, what we do, we just continually lose people and have to go out and spend money to get a person back in to replace the individual we lost.

Senator **Nunn**. What about some of these causes, for instance the 10-percent recruiter overstrength which terminated; the termination of the 2-year enlistment; constraint on enlistment bonus funds; and reduction of recruiting support? Have you, in fiscal 1977 requested any change in those areas, any of them? Are you requesting additional recruiters' funds?

Secretary **Brotzman**. We have tried.

Senator **Nunn**. Is it in the budget?

Secretary **Brotzman**. We tried, as I said. We tried, but didn't prevail; that is the overall budget constraint problem that we are suffering under. We are over here today to support the budget, obviously because we don't want to get below that. We tried to make our case as effectively as we could in all of these particular areas.

Senator **Nunn**. So, even if Congress didn't cut anything out of the 1977 budget, there wouldn't be any real change in any of these things you named.

Secretary **Brotzman**. No, sir.

Senator **Nunn**. So, assuming the budget went through as it is, we really have rather limited options, if we are talking about the context of this year. Either quality is going to continue to go down, unless you find some solution to this, or strength is going to go down. Isn't that right?

Secretary **Brotzman**. Well, we feel, as I tried to indicate here, we feel the quality is going to go down the rest of this year.

Senator **Nunn**. With no changes for 1977, based on this budget?

Secretary **Brotzman**. That is true.

General **Moore**. We will make the quantity.

Senator **Nunn**. You will make the quantity?

General **Moore**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Nunn**. Well, then you must have decided that the quantity is more important than the quality. If you are going to make the quantity and are not going to make the quality, it seems to me, that you already have decided that total strength is more important than quality, otherwise you would drop your total strength down and let the quality come up.

END STRENGTH PRIORITY

General MOORE. This gets back to the operational requirements and the security needs of the country. We will bring in enough people to have the Army at the end strength as authorized by the Congress.

Senator NUNN. Does that mean that a deliberate decision has been made that quality will be second in terms of priority; numbers first, and quality second?

General MOORE. I would say that is a fair statement, yes, sir. We have to have the people in the Army to perform our missions; to make do with the quality we get; and attempt to get the best quality we can.

Senator NUNN. Have you had any increase in discipline problems that have been reflected yet, based on the lack of, or the declining quality?

Secretary BROTZMAN. It hasn't shown up yet, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NUNN. Are you worried about it?

Secretary BROTZMAN. You bet. As quality changes, we have to look at all of these things.

DISCIPLINE PROBLEMS RELATED TO DECLINING QUALITY

Senator NUNN. All the testimony in the past year or two, and everything we have heard from the Marine Corps indicates there is a direct relationship between the number of high school graduates and the discipline problem.

Secretary BROTZMAN. Yes, sir, it just hasn't happened yet as far as the Army is concerned.

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The prepared statement of Assistant Secretary Donald G. Brotzman, and questions submitted for the record, will be inserted at this point.

[The prepared statement follows:]

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Recruitment and Reenlistment

In these times of constrained resources, we are confronted with the question "Why does the Army spend substantial sums of money in recruiting and training new accessions, while at the same time turning away soldiers who are desirous of reenlisting?" The answer is, the enlisted force consists of two parts--first term and career content and the Army cannot afford to let every first term soldier who wants to reenlist do so and thereby increase the career content. There are a number of important reasons for this. First and foremost, as opposed to waste, it would cost more if the career portion of the enlisted force were allowed to increase in an uncontrolled manner. These increased costs would be in the categories of pay and allowances, longevity, housing, and retirement. These costs would exceed the recruiting and training costs incurred from new accessions. We have compared two enlisted forces of the same size and grade structure, but with one having a 5% greater career content through reenlistments than the other. The force with the greater career content costs about $50 million more annually. Thus, if we substantially increase the career force, the Army would price itself out of business.

There are other reasons, just as important, for reenlisting only those we need.

o We need a balance between youth, stamina and physical ability on one hand and experience and knowledge on the other. The Army's mission is ground combat and that must remain predominant. The peacetime Army is also a wartime Army and wars are fought on the ground by vigorous young men.

o The Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) leadership is selected from the career portion of the enlisted force, who are those soldiers serving on their first or subsequent reenlistment. We must therefore establish high reenlistment eligibility criteria and controls to preclude soldiers of lower quality moving into and diluting the quality of our NCO Corps.

o In order to retain quality soldiers, there must be an opportunity for advancement. Increasing the career content would result in fewer promotions. Those that would be made, would occur significantly later in a soldier's career. The challenge for advancement would be missing for the quality soldier we want to see make the Army a career.

We feel that our current reenlistment policies are sound. They provide for a quality Army with the best balance between procurement of new quality accessions and retention of quality career soldiers. The content of the enlisted force as of 31 December 1975 was 43% career and 57% first term. The objective is a career content of 45% and a first term content of 55%. We are moving toward that objective. In order to sustain and maintain the quality of the career force, we are reenlisting first term soldiers at a ratio of one to three eligibles.

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ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR NUNN

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Senator Nunn. Mr. Secretary, your statement raises concern as to the ability of the All-Volunteer Army to attract and retain high quality personnel in both the short and long term. On page 1632 you say that the Army will fall significantly short of its quality objectives during FY 1976. This is a problem which has only appeared in recent months. In your view, will this problem increase significantly if the economic picture brightens in the upcoming months? What is being done in the FY 1977 Budget request to see that this does not become a problem?

Secretary Brotzman. The quality of individuals entering the Army today is high, but not as high as we would desire at this time in order to meet established FY 1976 quality goals by the end of the year. Analysis of the recent difficulty in meeting quality goals, indicates it is due to a combined effect of elimination of the unit canvasser program; elimination of the 10% recruiter overstrength; termination of the two-year enlistment option; constraints on enlistment bonus funds; reductions in recruiting support; and high production goals all of which are occurring in a time of decreasing unemployment.

In the past, as unemployment rose, it undoubtedly inclined many towards military service; however, the impact of the changing economy could never be measured with confidence due to the complexity and ever changing nature of other variables such as those described above. If unemployment continues to decrease, the Army will certainly face the reversed effect of a greater challenge in attracting its numerical and quality requirements as competition with industry and other Services becomes keener. We estimate that an improved employment rate will be one of the lesser factors in the quality decrease we will experience in FY 1976.

There are several items included in the FY 1977 Budget request which will help sustain recruiting efforts during the initial period of any potential difficulty. An increase of $9.4 million in advertising will help compensate for previous budget reductions and generate more leads which may become accessions. To permit better followup on those increased leads, the budget includes an additional $2.9 million to provide greater mobility to the recruiting force through increased vehicle mileage. Another $1.5 million will permit the Professional Development Program to enhance recruiter effectiveness by introducing innovative sales and management techniques and thus enable recruiters to more effectively "sell" the Army to quality applicants and leads.

In an environment of limited resources, the interdependency of the Army's military personnel programs require reasoned judgment in developing a viable balanced program. We have, therefore, structured this budget based on our best estimates of what the FY 1977 recruiting environment will be and on the known capabilities of our experienced and professional recruiting force. Our recruiters and managers are definitely going to monitor the validity of earlier estimates and the effects of recruiting progress if they prove excessively inaccurate. The magnitude of quality decrease or numerical shortfalls, if any, will bear heavily on our actions in the future.

Senator Nunn. What have been the trends over the past few years in the number of Army military personnel accessions by Mental Category? What are the objectives for these categories in FY 1977?

Secretary Brotzman. In measuring the quality of our enlistees by mental category, we look at two groupings: Mental Category I–IIIa (the upper 50th percentile of the population) and Mental Category IV (the lowest acceptable level for enlistment—10th to 30th percentile). The trends in these two groupings over the past few years are shown in the tables below and indicate maintaining the improvement in Category I–IIIa and continued improvement in Category IV. Our goals for FY 77 have not been finalized but will probably be around 65% Category I–IIIa and a 10% ceiling in Category IV.

NONPRIOR SERVICE (NPS) MALE (FISCAL YEARS)

Month	Mental category I–IIIa			Mental category IV		
	1974	1975	1976 [1]	1974	1975	1976 [1]
July	41.1	46.0	55.9	31.3	19.8	6.8
August	49.6	46.3	56.2	19.8	20.1	7.3
September	51.0	47.8	52.9	19.3	17.9	7.8
October	48.2	49.9	52.9	19.8	12.7	7.0
November	47.2	52.5	49.4	17.7	[2] 7.6	7.5
December	48.3	53.6	51.6	17.2	7.3	7.6
January	51.5	55.3	49.8	16.7	5.8	8.4
February	49.6	56.4		17.4	5.7	
March	50.1	59.5		16.6	4.7	
April	47.3	59.6		18.2	4.8	
May	45.5	57.7		20.0	6.5	
June	46.9	58.2		19.5	6.8	
Fiscal year	48.1	52.7	[3] (52.6)	19.4	11.2	[3] (7.5)

[1] Preliminary data.

[2] Category IV NHSG ineligible effective Nov. 1, 1974.

[3] Fiscal year to date (Jan. 31, 1976).

NPS TOTAL (FISCAL YEARS)[1]

Month	Mental category I–IIIa			Mental category IV		
	1974	1975	1976 [2]	1974	1975	1976 [2]
July	44.6	51.7	60.3	29.4	17.7	6.1
August	53.1	52.5	60.3	18.4	17.8	6.6
September	54.7	53.6	56.9	17.9	15.9	7.2
October	52.7	55.6	57.6	18.1	11.3	6.3
November	51.9	57.6	54.9	16.5	6.8	6.7
December	51.3	59.0	55.9	16.2	6.4	6.9
January	56.2	59.9	54.9	15.1	5.2	7.5
February	54.1	60.8		15.9	5.1	
March	54.6	63.9		15.1	4.1	
April	52.5	63.8		16.4	4.3	
May	51.2	61.8		17.9	5.8	
June	51.8	61.3		17.7	6.2	
Fiscal year	52.5	57.6	[3] (57.2)	17.8	10.0	[3] (6.8)

[1] NPS females: 100 percent category I–IIIa; 0 percent category IV.

[2] Preliminary data.

[3] Fiscal year to date (Jan. 31, 1976).

Senator NUNN. Mr. Secretary, on page 1643 of your statement you stated that the Army's objective is a career personnel content of 45% and a first term content of 55%. A recent study by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center suggests that under the all-volunteer system there is some drift towards greater proportions of military personnel who plan a career in the Armed Forces, heightening the likelihood of a "separate military ethos." Do you see any evidence of such a trend? Would you consider such a trend a problem? Why or why not? Does the objective of a 45% career personnel content in the enlisted forces increase the possibility of such a trend? How does this career force objective compare with past levels of career personnel in the enlisted force?

Secretary BROTZMAN. Senator Nunn, I have not seen any evidence of a trend toward a "separate military ethos" resulting from the change to an all-volunteer system. The Army has always sought to attract and retain the maximum number of qualified career soldiers. At no time in our 200 year history has the Army developed an allegiance other than to the country. Although more enlisted members are selecting the Army as a career, it must be remembered that in doing so, they, like career soldiers of the draft era, dedicate themselves to serving their country and accepting a way of life far different from that of most persons.

In accepting the Army as an institution having a service-oriented way of life vis-a-vis a "working place," career soldiers (enlisted and officer) of all grades as well as first-term enlistees and initial-tour officers give up a degree of control over their own lives and become dependent upon their leaders, both military and civilian, to provide for them. I would consider an increasing trend toward a separatist military to be a problem if the military services, especially the Army, are not recognized, respected and supported as an American institution by the vast majority of our citizens. To allow the Army to become isolated from the public for which it is dedicated to serve, I believe, would be detrimental to our national interest. I do not believe that the career force objective of 45% increases the possibility of a trend toward a "separate military ethos." By bringing in 150–180 thousand new accessions each year, we will maintain a force that will still be representative of the American society and will continue to need broad public respect and support as an American institution. Our enlisted career force is defined as those soldiers who have completed three or more years of service. The table below compares our objective career force with past levels. While the career content percentage is increasing, the absolute number of careerists is not changing significantly.

ARMY ENLISTED CAREER FORCE

	Fiscal year—				
	1970	1973	1974	1975	OBJ force
Total enlisted strength	1, 153, 013	681, 972	674, 466	678, 324	680, 000
Career force strength	267, 559	255, 841	255, 497	273, 795	306, 520
Percent	23. 2	37. 5	37. 9	40. 4	45. 1

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Senator NUNN. Please provide the following information on reenlistments:

(1) What are the Army's projected reenlistment rates for FY 1977?

(2) What were these rates for the past five years?

(3) What percentage of those reenlisting were receiving reenlistment bonuses in each year?

(4) What is the planned change in the Army reenlistment bonus program for FY 1977?

(5) What trends do you foresee in reenlistment rates?

Secretary BROTZMAN. For FY 77, the projected first term and career reenlistment rate is 35 and 70 percent, respectively, of the number of soldiers that will be eligible to reenlist. These rates equate to 27,800 first term and 45,100 career immediate reenlistments.

The adjusted reenlistment rates for the last five years are as shown below:

Fiscal year—	1st term (Regular Army) reenlistment rates	Career reenlistment rates	Total (Regular Army)
1971	16. 7	58. 5	30. 5
1972	13. 3	45. 4	22. 2
1973	[1] 37. 0	62. 4	48. 9
1974	28. 8	72. 4	47. 4
1975	36. 7	72. 8	50. 3

[1] The unusually high reenlistment rate for 1st termers in fiscal year 1973 was caused by the early release in fiscal year 1972 of those soldiers who did not contemplate reenlisting.

The percentage of reenlistees receiving bonuses:

Type of bonus	Fiscal year— 1971	1972	1973	1974	1975[1]
Regular reenlistment[2]	77.4	76.0	81.4	68.4	55.9
Variable selective reenlistment[3]	20.9	17.6	22.8	20.5	19.7

[1] Except for fiscal year 1975, VRB recipients are also included within RRB percentages.

[2] Regular reenlistment bonus (RRB) being phased out per provisions of Public Law 92–277. Only those on active duty on June 1, 1974 are eligible for RRB. Phase out should be completed by fiscal year 1980.

[3] Variable reenlistment bonus (VRB) superseded by selective reenlistment bonus (SRB) June 1, 1974.

In comparsion with the initial fiscal year 1976 Selective Reenlistment Bonus program, the fiscal year 1977 program will be reduced from 147 to 99 skills. As you know, the dollar value of the bonus is in part dependent upon the essentiality and the degree of shortfall being experienced in a particular skill. In that regard, it is significant to note that there has been a definite shift in the number of skills that will qualify for the higher bonus award. The fiscal year 1976 program had 46 skills in the aforementioned category while the fiscal year 1977 program will reflect only 16. The fiscal year 1977 program will be announced on 1 June 1976.

Through January FY 76, the first term and career adjusted reenlistment rate is 32.0 and 71.2 percent, respectively, as compared to 36.7 and 72.8 percent during FY 75. The decrease in the first term reenlistment rate is greatly attributable to a revision in the reenlistment policy which changed the eligibility point from 21 months time in service to 90 days to ETS. As the effects of this policy change diminish, the first term reenlistment rate is expected to increase and approach a stable rate of 37 percent. The career reenlistment rate is expected to remain around 70 percent.

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EXCERPTS FROM

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 24, MARCH 1, 8, 12, 19, 1976

PART 7

MANPOWER

(2563)

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSEPH T. MCCULLEN, JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

* * * * * * *

The reversal of this downward trend in active Navy manpower is significant. It will present new challenges to us in the management of our manpower and personnel programs. For the first time we will be faced with increasing manpower requirements in the All-Volunteer Force environment.

The readiness of our operating forces is neither better, nor worse, than the numbers and quality of its people. Readiness depends on having enough people of the necessary skills and experience to operate the ships, aircraft and weapons systems in the fleet.

* * * * * * *

I would be deluding both you and myself if I stated that the outlook for the AVF is without problems and that continued success is absolutely assured. We have acknowledged that our recruiting success has been assisted, in part, by a sluggish economy, and of the relatively high unemployment rate.

This may have also motivated some to reenlist rather than face a difficult labor market on the outside. How attractive a military career will be when the economy returns to full strength remains to be seen and will be the ultimate test of the All-Volunteer concept. You may be assured that we are watching for indicators that will give us a clearer view into the future.

* * * * * * *

There are two possible indicators that direct our attention. First although we continue to get a sufficient number of recruits there is concern that after a long rise, recruiting is leveling off and becoming more difficult. In five of the past six months Navy has barely met its objectives, whereas in previous months goals were easily met or exceeded. This may be an indicator of the influence of the economic upturn or it may partially result from an imposed reduction this year in recruiters.

I am concerned with this trend because of the impact it might have on our ability to increase accessions during FY 1977. Accession requirements are projected to approximately 36,000 in FYTQ and 117,000 in FY 1977. Thus, monthly average accession requirements will rise from the current 8,800 level to 12,000 per month in FYTQ and 9,800 in FY1977. The combination of increased accession requirements in FY1977 together with the probability of a tougher recruiting climate make it imperative that the manpower and funds budgeted for recruiting in FY 1977 be approved.

Having gone through a period where reenlistment rates have been on the rise, last summer the retention rate curve flattened out. There are more recent indicators that the rate is declining. Again, this may be the result of the economic upturn. It may also be the solidifying of a perception in the fleet of progressive erosion of personal benefits.

* * * * * * *

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH T. McCULLEN, JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS ACCOMPANIED BY: VICE ADM. JAMES D. WATKINS, CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL; VICE ADM. PIERRE N. CHARBONNET, CHIEF OF NAVAL RESERVE; VICE ADM. DONALD L. CUSTIS, SURGEON GENERAL OF THE NAVY; REAR ADM. STANLEY S. FINE, DIRECTOR OF BUDGET AND REPORTS; AND REAR ADM. CLEO N. MITCHELL, JR., DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NAVAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING

* * * * * * *

BENEFIT CUTBACKS IMPACT ON QUALITY RECRUITING

Mr. McCULLEN. I would like to amplify my last point. I think that we have reached the point in cutting back on benefits where we may be seeing some impact on our ability to recruit in an All-Volunteer Force. Five of the last 6 months the Navy has barely met or fell short of its recruiting goal.

Senator NUNN. Numberwise?

Mr. McCULLEN. Yes, sir. Our quality remains high, but as we look into fiscal year 1977, when we increase from recruiting about 8,800 people per month, as we are currently doing, to 12,000 people per month during the transition quarter and then to about 10,000 per month during fiscal year 1977, I do not know that we can continue to attract the quality that we need, especially if the economy continues to improve.

I also note that our retention rate in the Navy has flattened out, if, in fact, it has not decreased. In recent months, as the economy improves, and perhaps as a result of this perception of the erosion of benefits, we are seeing some downturns in our percentage.

* * * * * * *

2566

UNITED STATES
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE

Problems Resulting From Management Practices In Recruiting, Training, And Using Non-High-School Graduates And Category IV Personnel

About half a million personnel in the armed services are non-high-school graduates and/or Category IV (low-aptitude) personnel. This report identifies problems concerning the recruitment, training, and use of these personnel which appear to be attributable to management practices. It also discusses educational programs and opportunities for these personnel. Alternatives are suggested to resolve these problems and reduce economic and human costs.

FPCD-76-24

JAN. 12, 1976

676

2567

UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

FEDERAL PERSONNEL AND
COMPENSATION DIVISION

B-146890

The Honorable
The Secretary of Defense

Dear Mr. Secretary:

This report discusses problems resulting from management practices in recruiting, training, and using non-high-school graduates and Category IV personnel. The information in this report was informally discussed with members of your staff.

We invite your attention to the fact that this report contains recommendations to you which are set forth on page 25. As you know, section 236 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 requires the head of a Federal agency to submit a written statement on action taken on our recommendations to the House and Senate Committees on Government Operations not later than 60 days after the date of the report and to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations with the agency's first request for appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of the report.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen, House and Senate Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Government Operations, and to the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We are also sending copies to the Secretaries of the military services and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

Sincerely yours,

H. L. Krieger
Director

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ABBREVIATIONS

DOD	Department of Defense
GAO	General Accounting Office
OJT	on-the-job training

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
REPORT TO THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN
RECRUITING, TRAINING, AND
USING NON-HIGH-SCHOOL GRADUATES
AND CATEGORY IV PERSONNEL
Department of Defense

DIGEST

As of June 30, 1974, almost half a million military servicemen were non-high-school graduates and Category IV (low-aptitude) personnel. This group has been experiencing noticeably higher rates of disciplinary actions and administrative discharges than other personnel.

GAO found that the military services do not have a directed policy for training and using non-high-school graduates and Category IV personnel. From the data collected, we also identified a series of management practices that may be contributing to the problems we noted. They included

--alleged recruiting irregularities (see p. 12),

--training and assignment promises perceived as made but not honored (see p. 10),

--underuse of skills and training (see p. 16), and

--lack of encouragement to participate in educational programs (see p. 18).

We compared the relationship of these questionable management practices to several performance indicators and found that

--many men were claiming that they spent little or no time doing the work for which they were trained,

--participation in education programs was low compared to the interest expressed in educational incentives, and

--there were undesirable effects associated with underuse and lack of training in the form of lower individual performance and retention of personnel in the service.

High rates of disciplinary action and administrative discharges adversely affect the operational capability of the military services. They are also costly from a monetary as well as human standpoint. To improve management of recruiting, training, use, and education of non-high-school graduates and Category IV personnel, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense require each service Secretary to implement specific policies and practices for these personnel. Particular consideration should be given to:

--Strengthening and monitoring controls aimed at insuring compliance with entrance screening procedures.

--Policies governing the assignment of first-term personnel to advanced or on-the-job training to insure that servicemen receive opportunities for skill training commensurate with their ability and that such training is optimally used.

--Educational programs and related policies to insure that servicemen with low educational attainments are encouraged and provided appropriate opportunities to increase their education.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

As of June 30, 1974, the combined number of non-high-school graduates and Category IV (low-aptitude) enlisted personnel totaled almost half a million men, comprising over 25 percent of the Department of Defense's (DOD's) total enlisted force.

NON-HIGH-
SCHOOL GRADUATES AND CATEGORY IV
PERSONNEL IN THE ARMED FORCES
JUNE 30, 1974

	Number	Percent
Army	240,968	36
Navy	102,935	22
Marine Corps	64,806	38
Air Force	85,246	17
Total	493,955	27

There is evidence that the services have been experiencing management problems with the above categories of enlisted personnel. For example

--several studies showed that non-high-school graduates are more likely than high school graduates to receive some kind of disciplinary action and

--discharges for unsuitable behavior among non-high school graduates have increased from 28 percent in fiscal year 1971 to 46 percent in fiscal year 1974. (In contrast, discharges for unsuitable behavior for high school graduates was approximately 6 percent in fiscal year 1971 and 15 percent in fiscal year 1974.)

SCOPE

The objective of our survey was to identify and assess management policies, practices, and programs which may be contributing to the above problems. We limited our approach to personnel who were in their first enlistment, had completed recruit training, and were assigned to operational units at the following locations.

Army

Fort Eustis, Va.

Navy

Naval Station, Norfolk, Va.

USS AMERICA

USS KENNEDY

Naval Amphibious Base, Norfolk, Va.

Marine Corps

Camp Lejeune, N. C.

Air Force

Langley Air Force Base, Va.

We considered it important to obtain information directly from the enlisted personnel. A questionnaire was developed to obtain information concerning their experiences with and opinions about recruitment, training, assignments, use, and educational programs. The questionnaire consisted of items dealing with the individual's general background, military training, current job, past assignments, reenlistment plans, educational program experiences, knowledge and receipt of choices or promises at enlistment, and recruiting experiences.

Each military service provided a computer listing of first-term enlisted men who were non-high school graduates, and/or Category IV, and assigned to installations included in our survey. From these listings, a statistical random sample was taken of 1,184 enlisted men. The sample size was computed to provide credible results from which valid conclusions could be drawn. The table on the next page lists the populations, sample sizes, and completed questionnaires for each military service.

The questionnaires were pretested in December 1974 and administered in group sittings by GAO personnel from January through March 1975. Respondents were interviewed after completing the questionnaire to clarify and elaborate on some of their responses.

	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	Total
Population	1,357	1,921	11,448	305	15,031
Sample size	310	326	373	175	1,184
Questionnaires completed (note a)	205	212	214	122	753

a/Excludes servicemen on leave, absent without official leave, transferred, discharged, or otherwise unreachable.

We also obtained:

--Information from the personnel records of 424 respondents to corroborate questionnaire responses, as well as relevant data on the individual's mental category, disciplinary actions, enlistment contract terms, etc.

--Information from the commanders of 738 respondents, consisting of the commander's assessment of (1) whether the respondent was in the job for which he was trained, (2) the respondent's performance, (3) the need for additional training, and (4) whether the respondent would be recommended for reenlistment.

All of the above steps were taken to insure a balanced presentation of data and views concerning the management problems discussed in this report.

CHAPTER 2

CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENT POPULATION

We found that the men in our sample

- —entered the service at a fairly young age,
- —had generally completed less than 11 years of education,
- —entered the service primarily for education and training,
- —had enlistment terms ranging from 2 to 6 years,
- —averaged about 18 months in their current assignment,
- —generally did not intend to reenlist, and
- —were assigned to the lower skill military specialities.

Following are detailed comparisons by service groups of each of the above characteristics.

AGE AT ENLISTMENT

Most of the men in the sample were quite young when they enlisted — about 66 percent were 18 years of age or younger. Comparisons by service follow.

AGE AT ENLISTMENT



The mean age at time of enlistment shows less difference between services than appears in the above distribution. By service the mean age of the sample groups was:

Service	Mean age at enlistment
Army	18.7
Navy	18.5
Marine Corps	18.6
Air Force	19.0

In short, there do not appear to be any practical differences between services which would tend to invalidate comparisons on the basis of age factors.

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AT ENLISTMENT

We found major differences among the services in the proportion of non-high school graduates vs high school graduates at enlistment. Non-high school graduates accounted for 90 percent of the Marine Corps sample and 48 percent of the Air Force sample. The high showing of the Air Force is partially caused by the fact that a person who is in mental Category IV must be a high school graduate to enlist. Comparisons of educational level at enlistment by service follow.

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AT ENLISTMENT



Those persons in the sample who had not graduated from high school before enlisting were asked why. In order of frequency of response, the reasons given were:

- —Economic
- —Lack of interest
- —Social and family problems
- —To enlist in military service
- —Academic
- —Disciplinary problems

There were no discernible differences in frequency of reasons among the different services.

REASONS STATED FOR ENLISTING IN THE MILITARY

We were interested in determining what motivated these men to enlist in a military service. Since we recognized that an individual may have had more than one reason for enlisting, we asked all the individuals in the respondent groups to state whether or not each of the six incentives shown below was important in their decision to enlist. The results were:

DISTRIBUTION OF REASONS



As may be noted above, there were no major differences between service groups in the reasons stated for enlisting. In each service group, the opportunity to learn a skill and the opportunity to increase education were the primary reasons stated for enlisting. Because one of the major reasons for not graduating from high school was economic, it would seem that compensation would be a major reason to enlist. We found, however, that cash bonuses, pay, and benefits when accumulated as a single grouping, received the fewest responses.

ENLISTMENT TERMS

The enlistment terms varied between the sample groups, especially between the Army and the Air Force. The Army sample had the shortest average enlistment term of 2.7 years, the Navy and Marine Corps had 3.5 years, and the Air Force sample had the longest, 4.3 years. Those in the Army sample had enlisted under 2- and 3-year terms, while those in the Air Force sample had 4- and 6-year terms. The percent distribution of enlistment terms, by sample group, is shown below.

DISTRIBUTION OF ENLISTMENT TERMS

Obligation	Army	Navy	Marines	Air Force
2 years	34%	5%	12%	--%
3 years	65%	55%	31%	--%
4 years	1%	35%	57%	85%
6 years	—	5%	—	15%
	100%	100%	100%	100%

The sample groups differed in the average number of months of military service, the Army had 15.8, the Navy had 23.4, the Marine Corps had 24.4, while the Air Force had the greatest number of months of active duty at 26.9.

TIME IN PRESENT ASSIGNMENT

Our sample data shows that the Army group had been in their current job the shortest amount of time while the Air Force and Marine Corps groups had been in their job the longest. Comparisons by service follow.

TIME IN PRESENT ASSIGNMENT



By service groups, the average assignment duration was:

	Months
Army	12.4
Navy	20.9
Marine Corps	16.5
Air Force	20.0

It should be noted that average assignment duration is directly related to enlistment term. Therefore, it is to be expected that lowest average assignment duration would manifest itself in the Army group whereas the longest would be the Air Force group.

REENLISTMENT INTENT

The percent of men who expressed intent to reenlist varied considerably among the services. The Navy had the lowest percent of persons indicating reenlistment intent and the Air Force the highest. Comparison by service group follows.

DISTRIBUTION OF REENLISTMENT INTENT



MILITARY OCCUPATIONS

The military occupations represented by those in our sample is a function of the types of training and assignments afforded this category of personnel, the nature of the activities done at the installations sampled, and the mission of each of the services. The most common jobs of personnel in our sample were found to be:

ARMY
--Seaman
--Cargo handler
--Supply clerk

MARINE CORPS
--Combat arms
--Driver
--Supply clerk

NAVY
--Airman
--Seaman
--Fireman

AIR FORCE
--Aviation mechanic
--Administration
--Military police

CHAPTER 3

RECRUITING EXPERIENCES

Several conditions surfaced in our data reflecting on the services' recruitment practices. A large percent of the sample claimed to have lacked information on which to make their decisions at enlistment. Many indicated that (1) recruiters encouraged them to omit information at enlistment or (2) they received assistance on the mental examination.

PERCEIVED LACK OF INFORMATION AT ENLISTMENT

About 60 percent of the enlisted men we sampled stated they had little information on options available to them at enlistment. The following chart shows the response on knowledge of available options at enlistment.

KNOWLEDGE OF CHOICES AVAILABLE AT ENTRY



Many believed they were at a disadvantage and may not have obtained the best assignment available. This perceived lack of information surfaced in the responses of all service groups, with the Navy group reporting the least knowledge and the Air Force group reporting the most. We could not verify these contentions with official records. We did, however, attempt to increase the credibility through discussions with the servicemen. Based on these discussions, we believe that they genuinely felt they had been treated unfairly.

CONTRACTUAL PROMISES MADE AND HONORED

Overall, the Army group had the highest proportion receiving promises of a specific choice at entry, while the Marine Corps had the lowest proportion receiving specific promises. Choice of training program was the most common type of promise made, followed by choice of duty station and specific unit, respectively.

The extent to which these written contractual promises were made and honored for each service group is shown in the following table.

Promises Made and Choices Received

	Army	Navy	Marines	Air Force
Percent promised a specific choice	76	65	45	57
Receipt of choices contracted for at entry:				
Received choice	82	68	69	71
Received related option	15	14	17	16
Received unrelated option	3	18	14	13

NONCONTRACTUAL PROMISES PERCEIVED AS MADE AND EXTENT PERCEIVED AS NOT HONORED

Many men sampled thought that the military services did not honor all of the promises made to them at recruitment. These were noncontractual, unrecorded promises.

For example, an individual desiring to enlist as an automotive mechanic was told that he would get that field but was actually enlisted in the mechanical field. He received training in cargo handling and was working as a loadmaster, which is in the general mechanical area.

More than half of those servicemen in the Navy and Marine Corps who felt that promises had been made to them, did not feel the promises had been kept.



PERCENT OF PERSONS WHO BELIEVE PROMISES WERE NOT KEPT

ALLEGED RECRUITING IRREGULARITIES

Twenty percent of our sample said they had been told by their recruiters to omit derogatory information from their applications. They said they were told to omit information about

- --police records,
- --adverse medical history,
- --adverse education data, and
- --drug use.

Eleven percent said they had received assistance in taking preenlistment examinations. Recruiters allegedly

- --provided study materials,
- --gave practice tests,
- --allowed applicants to take tests more than once, or
- --provided answers or other assistance.

The following table shows the number and percent, by service, of alleged instances of omission of information and assistance received:

		Told to omit information		Received Assistance	
	Respondents	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Army	205	40	20	15	7
Navy	212	45	21	18	9
Marine Corps	122	9	7	1	1
Air Force	214	54	26	49	23
Total	753	148	20	83	11

We will soon issue a more detailed report that deals extensively with above and other recruiting irregularities which represent a subversion of the procedures devised to screen out potential enlistees with a low probability of successfully completing a tour of enlistment. In commenting on a draft of that report by letter dated December 3, 1975, the Secretary of Defense advised us that programs are underway to correct and improve recruiting irregularities and shortcomings, some of which have been discussed above.

CHAPTER 4

TRAINING, ASSIGNMENT, AND USE

The military services do not have a directed policy for training and using non-high-school graduates and Category IV personnel. Neither the individual's educational level nor his mental category determines the training he will receive. Training assignments are primarily determined by the results of aptitude tests administered early in the individual's military career. The general policy is that enlisted men receive recruit training and then advanced training in the field of their aptitude or on-the-job training (OJT).

RECEIPT OF ADVANCED TRAINING

Twenty-three percent of those sampled said they had received neither formal advanced training nor OJT. They had been in their respective services from 5 to 56 months, with an average of 23 months. This seems to have been ample time for advanced training or OJT to have been started or completed. The foregoing circumstance was most prevalent in the Navy group where 42 percent had received neither formal advanced training nor OJT.

DISTRIBUTION OF TRAINING



Our data indicates that except for the Navy, all of the other services seem to have provided high levels of training opportunities for their personnel.

ASSIGNMENTS

About 85 percent of our sample who had received advanced training reported being assigned to the job for which they were trained or a related job. The following chart shows the percent of men in each service group who indicated they were assigned as trained. As noted below, the Army group showed the greatest percentage assigned to jobs unrelated to their training.

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ASSIGNMENTS (note a)



[a] Does not include the 23 percent who did not receive any skill or technical training.

USE OF SKILLS

The skills and training of some enlisted personnel were only partially used. Of those in our sample who received some advanced training or OJT, 40 percent stated that they spent little or no time on the job doing the type of work for which they were trained. The following chart shows those responses by service.

AMOUNT OF TIME WORKING AS TRAINED



We found a large amount of dissatisfaction among the men we sampled concerning the way their current assignment used their military skills and training. Forty-seven percent of the Navy group indicated dissatisfaction, followed by the Army (39 percent), Air Force (34 percent), and Marine Corps (27 percent). In our opinion, these are unacceptably high levels of dissatisfaction and seem attributable to assignment and use practices.

CHAPTER 5

PARTICIPANTS IN EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS

Several DOD studies have found a positive relationship between educational attainment and military job performance. These studies indicate that the higher the individual's educational attainment, the less likely he is to fail in military training or to encounter military disciplinary problems. Aside from the positive effects within the military, educational upgrading also has a favorable effect upon the individual's postservice earnings.

Four-fifths of our sample stated that the opportunity to increase their education was an important factor in their decision to enlist. We were interested in determining if these individuals were following through and enrolling in education programs and if their commanding officers and supervisors were encouraging or assisting them.

PARTICIPANTS WHO ACTUALLY ENROLLED IN AN EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM

Although 82 percent of the sample said they enlisted with the idea of improving their education, 47 percent said they had not participated in an educational program. The percent of men participating in educational programs in each service is shown in the following chart.

PERCENT PARTICIPATING IN EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS



Most of those participating in educational activities were enrolled in some type of high school completion program, with a few taking reading training, training in a civilian skill, or college courses.

The high degree of interest in education at time of enlistment and subsequent lower participation rates raises the question of why so many did not take advantage of any of the education programs. For those specifying a reason for nonparticipation, inability to get time off from military duties was most frequently cited. The following table shows the reasons why and percentages of those men who had not participated in an educational program since entering the military.

Reasons for Nonparticipation in Educational Programs By Service

Reason	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
	(percent)			
Did not want any more education	5	4	-	5
Did not like classes	8	4	5	7
Courses were not available at duty station	5	6	2	-
Did not know these programs existed	8	21	7	2
Could not get time off	25	24	30	31
Unspecified	49	41	56	55
Total	100	100	100	100

It is perplexing that, although a series of reasons were given, the largest proportion could not specifically define their reasons for nonparticipation.

ENCOURAGEMENT TO PARTICIPATE IN AN EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM

Enlisted men in our sample stated that they had received very little encouragement from their military organization to participate in an educational program. The following table shows how the sample group perceived the encouragement from officers and noncommissioned officers in their unit and from the Base Education Office.

Perceptions of Encouragement to Participate in Educational Programs

	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force
Amount of encouragement to increase education received from:				
Officers in unit				
A lot	15	6	12	4
Some	34	26	37	24
None	51	68	51	71
NCO's in unit				
A lot	18	5	10	11
Some	33	26	38	36
None	49	69	52	54
Education Office				
A lot	24	4	8	23
Some	35	18	32	54
None	41	78	60	23

The above table shows that these men, who should be the prime candidates for the military educational programs, perceived very little encouragement to participate.

CHAPTER 6

POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED IN PRACTICES OF RECRUITING, TRAINING, AND USING NON-HIGH-SCHOOL GRADUATES AND CATEGORY IV PERSONNEL

This report identifies several problem areas in the management of non-high-school graduates and Category IV personnel. We noted problems in recruiting, training, using, and educational program participation. This chapter explores the possible consequences of these problems by examining their relationship to several performance indicators, such as

- --commander's rating the individual's performance,
- --commander's recommendation concerning the individual's reenlistment eligibility,
- --incidence of disciplinary actions, and
- --individual's stated reenlistment intent.

These interrelationships have been analyzed in the aggregate, across the four services, in the interest of greater validity.

EFFECT OF RECRUITING PRACTICES ON SERVICE PERFORMANCE

A number of alleged irregular recruiting incidents were noted that could cause problems. As noted in chapter 3, the alleged incidents took the form of assistance on the mental qualification examination or encouragement to withhold prejudicial information. In assessing the degree to which these alleged instances of recruiting irregularities exist in the total population, it is important to note that our sample consists only of "survivors" (i.e., those still on active duty). Since these criteria are included in the screening process, we assume that those enlistees who do not meet minimal mental standards or who have physical defects or a police record are less likely to successfully complete their military service. Consequently, recruiting irregularities could possibly be more prevalent than the sample data indicates.

Appendix I, part A, shows the relationship between receipt of assistance on the aptitude test and a number of performance indicators.

Compared to those men who did not receive assistance, those who did were

- --more likely to be seen by their commanders as performing unsatisfactorily,
- --less likely to be recommended for reenlistment, and
- --more likely to have incurred some type of disciplinary action.

A similar relationship was found between receipt of advice to omit derogatory information and performance assessment and reenlistment recommendations. Again, those who acknowledged recruitment irregularities were more likely to receive an unfavorable performance rating and less likely to be recommended for reenlistment (see app. I, pt. B).

The perception of unkept promises was also found to be negatively related to performance criteria (see app. I, pt. C). Those men who believed that the military had not honored its promises were

- --more likely to be rated as unsatisfactory performers,
- --less likely to be recommended for reenlistment, and
- --less likely to express favorable reenlistment intent.

Although there is no way of confirming or refuting the claims of these men, we were convinced through our interviews that many genuinely believed they had been misled.

EFFECT OF TRAINING AND UTILIZATION PRACTICES ON SERVICE PERFORMANCE

Analysis of responses on training and use disclosed a large proportion of men reporting they were in a job other than the one they were trained for. A high degree of partial use was evident, with many indicating they spent little or no time doing the tasks for which they were trained. In addition, they expressed considerable dissatisfaction with the way they were used.

There was a consistent negative relationship between perceptions of use and underuse and the performance indicators. Appendix I, part D, shows that those men who perceived themselves to be misassigned were more likely to be judged as performing unsatisfactorily by their commanders. Also, they were less likely to express favorable reenlistment intent.

Partial use was found also to have a negative relationship to performance (see app. I, pt. E). Those men who indicated they spent little or no time doing tasks for which they were trained were

- --more likely to be seen as performing unsatisfactorily,
- --more likely to have been subject to some kind of disciplinary action,
- --less likely to be recommended for reenlistment, and
- --less likely to indicate favorable reenlistment intentions.

Appendix I, part F, shows the relationship of satisfaction with skill use to performance. Dissatisfaction with the way in which the individual's job uses his military skills and training was associated with

- --unsatisfactory performance,
- --receipt of disciplinary action(s),
- --unfavorable reenlistment recommendation, and
- --unfavorable reenlistment intent.

Obviously putting a man in a job for which he was not trained would put him at a disadvantage in comparison with those who were trained for the job and could lead to unfavorable reenlistment recommendation. Also, failure to assign a man to the job for which he was trained may lead to dissatisfaction and, consequently, to unfavorable reenlistment intent.

EFFECT OF EDUCATIONAL PARTICIPATION ON SERVICE PERFORMANCE

Studies conducted by DOD and the Military Departments have shown that an individual's educational level is directly related to his performance. It has been shown that the higher the individual's educational level

--the higher the pay grade he is likely to achieve,

--the less likely he is to fail training,

--the higher his class standing in training courses is likely to be, and

--the less likely he is to have disciplinary problems.

In our sample, the lack of a high school diploma was also found to be associated with performance deficiencies. More non-high-school graduates were rated unsatisfactory than high school graduates, fewer non-high-school graduates were recommended for reenlistment than high school graduates, and more non-high-school graduates incurred some type of disciplinary action than high school graduates. (See app. I, pt. G.)

Non-high-school graduates who participated in the General Educational Development or some other type of education program were more likely to receive a satisfactory rating and be recommended for reenlistment. (See app. I, pts. H and J.)

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

There are about half a million non-high-school graduates and Category IV enlisted men in the armed services, comprising approximately 25 percent of the enlisted strength.

This group has experienced significantly higher rates of disciplinary actions and administrative discharges than other personnel. This results in higher cost and adversely affects operational capability. In addition, it imposes human costs upon the individuals involved.

Our survey has focused on a number of management-generated problems in the recruiting, training, use, and education of non-high-school graduates and Category IV personnel. We believe they merit management attention and corrective action.

We found what we consider to be an unexpectedly high number of alleged instances of recruiting irregularities. These irregularities consisted of recruiters giving assistance on preenlistment examinations and encouraging enlistees to omit certain facts pertaining to education, health, and police records.

The desire to learn a skill or trade was the most frequently cited reason for enlistment in each of the services, except the Marine Corps where it was second to educational opportunity. Nevertheless, over two-fifths of the Navy group reported they had received no formal training or OJT. This represents a serious denial of the expectations of a great number of enlistees. The Navy group also had the highest proportion indicating dissatisfaction with their job and the lowest proportion reporting favorable reenlistment intent. It follows then that failure to satisfy servicemen's expectations of training opportunities may have adverse consequences.

We believe that every serviceman should be given the opportunity to receive specialized job training commensurate with his ability and the needs of the military services. This is especially necessary for those who would otherwise have no such opportunity.

The Army had the shortest average contract period, the shortest average number of months for each assignment, and the highest proportion of personnel receiving their choice of unit, location, or training. Because the Army had its personnel on the average only 2.7 years and allowed over three-fourths some choice in determining their assignment at the time of enlistment, it could be forced to either misassign personnel or break promises subsequent to enlistment. These management practices bear upon the facts that the Army had

- --the lowest proportion of men assigned to the job for which they were trained and
- --the highest proportion of men spending little or no time working as trained.

The change to longer enlistment terms could mitigate some but not all of this problem.

Across the services, it was shown that there were undesirable effects associated with the lack of training and underuse in the form of lower performance and retention. We feel the services should pay particular attention to the interrelationships among recruitment, training, and use practices to resolve the problems described in this report.

Non-high-school graduates and low-aptitude personnel should be a prime target for educational upgrading. We found that the opportunity for increased education ranked either first or second as a stated enlistment incentive. However, participation in education programs was low in comparison to the interest expressed in educational incentives. The primary reasons indicated by nonparticipants for their failure to enroll were inability to get time off and lack of information on the programs. Additionally, the servicemen perceived very little encouragement to participate in these educational programs. Given the benefits of educational upgrading to both the service and the individual, steps should be taken to increase participation of non-high-school graduates and Category IV personnel in these programs.

RECOMMENDATIONS

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense require each service secretary to review the management of non-high-school graduates and Category IV personnel in the interest of improving their performance and as a benefit to themselves. Improved management of recruiting, training, use, and education are areas demonstrated in this report which merit the service secretaries' attention.

We suggest that particular consideration be given to:

--Strengthening and monitoring controls aimed at insuring compliance with entrance screening procedures. (Additional specific recommendations concerning recruiting policies and practices will be made in forthcoming comprehensive reports on recruiting operations.)

--Policies governing the assignment of first-term personnel to advanced training or OJT to insure that they receive the opportunity for skill training commensurate with their ability and that such training is optimally used.

--Educational programs and related policies to insure that servicemen with low educational attainments are encouraged and provided appropriate opportunity to increase their education.

We believe that these recommendations and areas of consideration should provide management direction which can go a long way to resolving costly problems.

Part A

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RECEIPT OF HELP ON MENTAL TEST AND INDICATORS OF PERFORMANCE

	Received help on test	Did not receive help on test
Commander's assessment of performance:		
Satisfactory	72%	84%
Unsatisfactory	28	16
Commander's reenlistment recommendation:		
Recommended	56	73
Not recommended	44	27
Receipt of disciplinary action(s) (note a):		
No	39	51
Yes	61	49

a/Includes only those respondents whose personnel records were examined.

Part B

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ADVICE TO WITHHOLD PREJUDICIAL INFORMATION AND INDICATORS OF PERFORMANCE

	Advised to withhold information	Not advised to withhold information
Commander's assessment of performance:		
Satisfactory	76%	84%
Unsatisfactory	24	16
Commander's reenlistment recommendation:		
Recommended	64	73
Not recommended	36	27

Part C

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERCEPTION OF UNKEPT PROMISES AND INDICATORS OF PERFORMANCE (note a)

	Feel that military has not kept promises	Feel that military has kept promises
Commander's assessment of performance:		
Satisfactory	79%	85%
Unsatisfactory	21	15
Commander's reenlistment recommendation:		
Recommended	62	77
Not recommended	38	23
Individual's stated reenlistment intent:		
Favorable	29	61
Unfavorable	71	39

a/Includes only those respondents who believe that promises were made to them at the time they were enlisting.

Part D

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL'S ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT UTILIZATION AND INDICATORS OF PERFORMANCE

	Working in job for which trained	Working in related job	Working in different job
Commander's assessment of performance:			
Satisfactory	86%	81%	77%
Unsatisfactory	14	19	23
Commander's reenlistment recommendation:			
Recommended	77	69	57
Not recommended	23	31	43
Individual's stated reenlistment intent:			
Favorable	19	32	32
Unfavorable	81	68	68

Part E

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN [illegible] AND INDICATORS OF PERFORMANCE

	Amount of time on the job spent during the time in work for which trained: All, almost all, or most of the time	Some, almost none, or none of the time
Commander's assessment of performance:		
Satisfactory	84%	76%
Unsatisfactory	16	24
Commander's reenlistment recommendation:		
Recommended	74	65
Not recommended	26	35
Receipt of disciplinary action(s) (note a):		
No	56	47
Yes	44	53
Individual's stated reenlistment intent:		
Favorable	41	[illegible]
Unfavorable	59	[illegible]

a/Includes only those respondents whose personnel records were examined.

Part F

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SATISFACTION WITH SKILLS ON JOB AND INDICATORS OF PERFORMANCE

	Satisfied with the way job uses skills	Dissatisfied with the way job uses skills
Commander's assessment of performance:		
Satisfactory	88%	77%
Unsatisfactory	12	23
Commander's reenlistment recommendation:		
Recommended	75	63
Not recommended	25	37
Receipt of disciplinary action(s) (note a):		
No	53	60
Yes	47	40
Individual's stated reenlistment intent:		
Favorable	61	19
Unfavorable	39	[illegible]

a/Includes only those respondents whose personnel records were examined.

Part G

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EDUCATION LEVEL AND INDICATORS OF PERFORMANCE

	Non-high school graduates	High school graduates
Commander's assessment of performance:		
Satisfactory	81%	85%
Unsatisfactory	19	15
Commander's reenlistment recommendation:		
Recommended	58	71
Not recommended	42	29
Receipt of disciplinary action(s) (note a):		
No	43	65
Yes	57	35

a/Includes only those respondents whose personnel records were examined.

Part H

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RECEIPT OF GED AND INDICATORS OF PERFORMANCE

	Receipt of GED: Yes	No
Commander's assessment of performance:		
Satisfactory	85%	79%
Unsatisfactory	15	21
Commander's reenlistment recommendation:		
Recommended	74	65
Not recommended	26	35

a/Includes only those respondents who were non-high school graduates at entry?

Part I

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PARTICIPATION IN SOME TYPE OF EDUCATION PROGRAM AND INDICATORS OF PERFORMANCE (note a)

	Participated in some type of education program	Did not participate in some type of education program
Commander's assessment of performance:		
Satisfactory	85%	82%
Unsatisfactory	15	18
Commander's reenlistment recommendation:		
Recommended	72	62
Not recommended	28	38

a/Includes only those respondents who were non-high school graduates at entry.

QUESTIONNAIRE INTRODUCTION

We are from the Norfolk Regional Office of the U.S. General Accounting Office. Our job is to provide Congress with information concerning the operation of Federal and military programs. We are currently studying the ways in which the military services assign and use their personnel. In order to do this, we need your help. The purpose of this questionnaire is to get information on your assignments and your opinions about them.

The questionnaire has been kept fairly short so that we would not have to take up too much of your time. Since it is short, we may have to contact you again to get more information. For this reason, we are asking you to put your name and social security number on the questionnaire. However, you can be assured that your answers to these questions will be kept strictly confidential and will not be seen by anyone in the Army/Navy/Marine Corps/Air Force.

This questionnaire is also being given to servicemen in each of the other three branches of the military. Since there may be differences between the services on the meaning of some of the questions, we are going to explain what we mean by certain terms:

1. When the questionnaire asks about your "primary military specialty code," what is meant is your military occupational specialty or MOS/Naval Enlisted Classification, NEC or Rating/Air Force Specialty Code or AFSC.

2. The questions asking about your "job" refer to the work you are actually doing. This might be different from the military specialty designation of the position to which you are assigned. That is, if you are assigned as a truck driver but you spend most of your time doing something else, we want to know what you are actually doing.
3. When we ask about the number of "assignments" you have had, we are referring to assignments and reassignments which involved either a PCS move or a change of unit. Do not count assignments to school or TDY assignments.
4. In the question about "on-the-job training (OJT)," we mean an assignment where you are being taught to perform a job while you are actually working on that job.

Now, please turn to the cover of the questionnaire and read the instructions printed there..

(READ INSTRUCTIONS)

You should answer all questions. Some of the questions, which may not apply to you, have an answer marked "not applicable."

Again, let me assure you that nobody outside of our Office will see your answers. Thank you very much for assisting us. Please begin.

SURVEY OF ASSIGNMENT AND UTILIZATION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

The General Accounting Office is conducting a survey to get information on how the military services assign and use their personnel. The purpose of this questionnaire is to get your personal feelings, experiences, and opinions about your assignments. You can be assured that your answers will be treated confidentially and will not affect you in any way.

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

1. Be sure to answer all questions.
2. Read all of the possible choices for each question before you choose your answer.
3. You may use either pen or pencil.
4. Some of the questions have several answers from which you can choose. When you have chosen your answer, place an X mark on the appropriate line as shown.

   __X__ my answer

   _____ not my answer
5. On other questions, we have left room for you to write in your answer.
6. After you have finished, please take your questionnaire to a survey administrator.

1. Name ______________________________

2. Social Security Number ______________________________

3. What is your age to the nearest birthday? ____________

4. What is your pay grade?

_____ E1
_____ E2
_____ E3
_____ E4
_____ E5

5. What enlistment are you in?

_____ First
_____ First, but I have already reenlisted for a second
_____ Second or later enlistment

6. What is the highest grade of school you had completed when you entered the military?

_____ 8th grade or less
_____ 9th grade
_____ 10th grade
_____ 11th grade
_____ 12th grade - high school graduate
_____ GED high school equivalency

7. If you did not graduate from high school before you entered the service, what was your main reason for leaving school?

_____Check here if you graduated before coming in.

____

____

____

8. Since entering the service, have you received GED high school equivalency?

_____ Yes
_____ No

9. What is your job called? (For example: Clerk-typist, supply clerk, aviation mechanic, etc.)

____

10. What kind of things do you do during an average work day?

____

____

____

11. Have you gone to any training schools (A.I.T.) since you finished basic training?

_____ No
_____ Yes

12. What training programs or service skill schools have you gone to since basic training? (For example: cooks school, parachute training, aviation mechanics school, etc.)

_____ Check here if you have not received any training

Name of School	How Many Weeks
________________________	__________________
________________________	__________________
________________________	__________________

13. Are you currently working in the job for which you were trained?

_____ Not applicable, I haven't received any training
_____ Yes
_____ No, but I am working in a related job
_____ No, I am working a completely different job

14. Are you currently receiving formal on-the-job training (OJT)?

_____ Yes
_____ No

15. How long have you been working in your current job?

_____ Less than 3 months
_____ 3-6 months
_____ 7-12 months
_____ 13-18 months
_____ 19 months or more

16. How much of the time on your job do you spend doing the kind of work you were trained for?

_____ Not applicable, I did not receive any training
_____ All or almost all the time
_____ Most of the time
_____ Some of the time
_____ None or almost none of the time

17. How satisfied are you with the way your current job uses your military skills and training?

_____ Very satisfied
_____ A little satisfied
_____ A little dissatisfied
_____ Very dissatisfied

18. How many assignments have you had since completing basic or advanced training?

_____ This is my first assignment
_____ This is my second assignment
_____ This is my third assignment
_____ This is my fourth or later assignment

19. How many of your assignments have been in the kind of job you were trained for?

_____ Not applicable, I haven't received any training
_____ None
_____ 1
_____ 2
_____ 3
_____ 4 or more

20. Do you plan to reenlist?

_____ Definitely will reenlist
_____ Not sure, but probably will reenlist
_____ Not sure, but probably will not reenlist
_____ Definitely will not reenlist

21. Since you joined the service, have you been in any of the following education programs? (Mark one answer for each.)

A. High school completion (GED, PREP, other)? Yes____ No____

B. Reading training? Yes____ No____

C. Courses to train you in a skill for a civilian job? Yes____ No____

D. College courses Yes____ No____

E. Other (please explain) Yes____ No____

____

____

____

____

22. If you have not been in any of the education programs listed above in question 21, what is your main reason? (Mark only one.)

_____ Not applicable, I have been in an education program
_____ I don't want any more education
_____ I don't like classes
_____ No courses were available at my station
_____ I didn't know these programs existed
_____ I couldn't get the time off
_____ Other (please explain)__________________

____

____

23. How much encouragement to increase your education have you received from each of the following? (Mark one answer for each.)

	None	Some	A lot
A. Officers in my unit	_____	_____	_____
B. NCOs in my unit	_____	_____	_____
C. Base education office	_____	_____	_____

24. Mark whether or not each of the following was important in your decision to enter the service? (Mark one answer for each.)

	Important	Not Important
A. Opportunity to learn a skill or trade	______	______
B. Opportunity to increase my education	______	______
C. Opportunity to serve my country	______	______
D. Opportunity to travel and see new places	______	______
E. The pay and benefits	______	______
F. Opportunity to get a cash bonus	______	______

25. At the time you signed your enlistment papers, how much information did you have on what choices were open to you?

______ A lot
______ Some
______ Very little

26. When you were enlisting, were you promised or told that you would be assigned to the unit of your choice?

______ No
______ Yes, before I signed up
______ Yes, after I signed up

27. When you were enlisting, were you promised or told that you would be assigned to the duty station of your choice?

______ No
______ Yes, before I signed up
______ Yes, after I signed up

28. When you were enlisting, were you promised or told that you would be assigned to the training program of your choice?

______ No
______ Yes, before I signed up
______ Yes, after I signed up

29. When you enlisted, did you sign a contract for a specific specialty skill, unit, or duty station?

_____ No
_____ Yes, and I received my choice
_____ Yes, and I received something close to my choice
_____ Yes, but I did not receive my choice

30. Overall, do you feel the military has kept the promises made to you when you were enlisting?

_____ Not applicable, no promises were made to me
_____ Yes
_____ No

31. Where did you first take the mental test to see if you could get into the service?

_____ In a school
_____ In the recruiter's office
_____ At an AFEES examining center or induction station
_____ At a military base
_____ From a Mobile Examining Team (MET)
_____ Other (please explain)_____________________

____

____

____

_____ I don't remember

32. Did you receive any practice sessions or help in reading or taking the test?

_____ Yes
_____ No

33. Did your recruiter tell you that if you put certain information on your forms you might not get into the military?

_____ Yes
_____ No

34. What is your primary military specialty code? (MOS, NEC, Pating, AFSC)_____________________________

35. Total months in service?_____________________________

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS
RESPONSIBLE FOR ADMINISTERING
ACTIVITIES DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT

	Tenure of office	
	From	To
DOD		
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:		
Donald H. Rumsfeld	Nov. 1975	Present
James R. Schlesinger	July 1973	Nov. 1975
William P. Clements (acting)	May 1973	July 1973
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE:		
William P. Clements	Jan. 1973	Present
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS):		Present
William K. Brehm	Sept. 1973	Aug. 1973
Carl W. Clewlow (acting)	June 1973	
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY		
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:		
Martin R. Hoffmann	Aug. 1975	Present
Norman R. Augustine (acting)	July 1975	Aug. 1975
Howard H. Callaway	May 1973	July 1975
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS):		
Donald G. Brotzman	Mar. 1975	Present
M. David Lowe	Feb. 1974	Jan. 1975
Carl S. Wallace	Mar. 1973	Jan. 1974
CHIEF OF STAFF		
Gen. Fred C. Weyand	Sept. 1974	Present
Gen. Creighton W. Abrams	Oct. 1972	Sept. 1974
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY		
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:		
J. William Middendorf II	Apr. 1974	Present
John W. Warner	May 1972	Apr. 1974

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (cont.)

	Tenure of office From	To
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS):		
Joseph T. McCullen, Jr.	Sept. 1973	Present
James E. Johnson	June 1971	Sept. 1973
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS:		
Adm. James L. Holloway III	July 1974	Present
Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.	July 1970	July 1974
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS:		
Gen. Louis H. Wilson	July 1975	Present
Gen. Robert E. Cushman, Jr.	Jan. 1972	June 1975

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

	Tenure of office From	To
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE:		
Thomas C. Reed	Dec. 1975	Present
John L. McLucas	May 1973	Dec. 1975
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS):		
David P. Taylor	June 1974	Present
James P. Goode (acting)	June 1973	June 1974
CHIEF OF STAFF:		
Gen. David Jones	Aug. 1974	Present
Gen. George S. Brown	Aug. 1973	July 1974
Gen. John D. Ryan	Aug. 1969	Aug. 1973

EXCERPTS FROM

REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

An Assessment Of All-Volunteer Force Recruits

Department of Defense

According to Defense Department data, the quality of recruits during the first full year of the all-volunteer force probably has not decreased. However, GAO questions the reliability of some of the data.

The services used eight different selection and aptitude classification tests. A common selection and classification test and common aptitude areas composed of common composites would facilitate interservices quality comparsions and allow applicants to qualify for other services without further testing. Defense began using a common test on January 1, 1976, and agreed to establish a time frame for common composites if their feasibility can be established.

FPCD-75-170

COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

AN ASSESSMENT OF ALL-VOLUNTEER
FORCE RECRUITS
Department of Defense

DIGEST

Due principally to the dedicated efforts of the recruiting commands, the Department of Defense has essentially met the services' strength goals without any appreciable drop in quality in fiscal year 1974, the first full year of operation under the all-volunteer force concept. Recruiting successes during fiscal year 1975 were even better, but were probably helped by depressed economic conditions.

Department of Defense reports show that the personnel recruited into the all-volunteer force, when compared to their counterparts who either volunteered or were inducted into the services in a previous year (fiscal year 1964) and during the Vietnam War (fiscal year 1969), were of higher quality by some standards and lower by others, with no apparent preponderance in either direction.

Using traditional quality measures, GAO found a slight decline in the number of enlistees both with high school diplomas and with scores above or below average on the military aptitude test. There was a moderate increase in the number of enlistees with average tests scores. GAO also found evidence that Defense may overstate quality in its reports. (See pp. 6 to 12.)

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Responding to increasing public pressure to abolish the draft, President Nixon appointed a commission in February 1969, chaired by former Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates, to investigate alternatives. In April 1970, the Gates Commission recommended that the draft be abolished by July 1, 1971, in favor of an all-volunteer force (AVF). This recommendation was accepted by the President; however, its implementation was deferred until July 1, 1973, to allow time for a more orderly conversion.

The AVF concept involved the transition from a military force recruited primarily through conscription or the threat of conscription to one recruited on a purely volunteer basis. Since the decision to convert was made, debate both in the Congress and throughout the Nation has centered on the military services' ability to attract sufficient quantity and quality of personnel.

The term quantity needs no explanation. On the other hand, quality is not a simple concept. Quality is measured in terms of moral, physical, and mental attributes--the three characteristics used by the services to determine a recruit's enlistment eligibility. As the AVF has been a reality for more than 2 years, the quantity and quality of personnel recruited by the services in an all-volunteer environment can be measured. Furthermore, these results can be compared with those of the draft era. We have performed a review to assess the efforts of the services to recruit an AVF in sufficient quantity and quality.

This report includes the results of our review of the services' ability to recruit mentally qualified personnel. Aspects of our review regarding the moral and physical qualifications of personnel recruited into the AVF are being reported separately.[1]

The Selective Service Act of 1948 prohibited any person to be inducted into the armed forces unless and until he is found physically and mentally fit for training and service under standards prescribed by the Secretary of Defense. In 1950, the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) was adopted for use in determining the mental enlistment eligibility of personnel for all of the services. A 1951 amendment to the Selective Service Act of 1948 provided that an individual was mentally fit for induction in the services if he attained a percentile score of 10 points on the AFQT. The common service AFQT was the only test used to determine a recruit's mental eligibility from 1951 until 1958. From 1958 to 1973 recruits scoring in category IV on the AFQT were required to pass supplementary aptitude tests to be eligible for military service.

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[1] "Improving the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Recruiting," FPCD-75-169.

AFQT percentile scores are grouped to form mental categories which are used to measure the overall quality of enlistments, to make cross-service comparisons, and to observe historical trends. The mental categories and the related AFQT scoring range are shown below.

Mental categories	Scoring range
I	93-100
II	65-92
III A	50-64
III B	31-49
IV A	21-30
IV B	10-20
V (unacceptable)	9 and below

In 1972, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) authorized the services to use mental tests of their choice to determine a recruit's enlistment eligibility, provided the scores of these tests could be converted to AFQT percentile scores. As a result, the AFQT was abandoned as a common test to mentally qualify recruits. The Army, Navy, and Air Force began using tests of their choice in 1973. The Marine Corps continued using the AFQT until July 1, 1974, when it adopted the test used by the Air Force.

The Congress imposed quality stipulations of education levels and mental categories on the military services in the 1974 Department of Defense (DOD) Appropriation Act. The act reads:

> "None of the funds in this Act shall be available for the enlistment or pay of non-prior service personnel during fiscal year 1974 when the enlistment will cause the percentage of non-high school graduate enlistments of the services concerned to exceed 45 per centum or the mental category IV enlistments to exceed 18 per centum

of the total non-prior service enlistments for the entire fiscal year."

The Defense Supplemental Appropriation Authorization Act approved June 8, 1974, removed the restriction on enlistment of non-high school graduates because the Army and Marine Corps were unable to meet recruiting goals. The 1975 DOD Appropriation Authorization Act permits the Secretaries of the military services to use high school graduation as an enlistment criterion, but does not prohibit enlisting nongraduates to meet strength goals. The 18-percent restriction on enlistment of mental category IV personnel remained in effect.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

We have reviewed various aspects of the military services' recruiting efforts in connection with the all-volunteer force. Also, Senators George McGovern and James Abourezk asked us to look into certain recruiting improprieties. Due to the complexity of the review, we have prepared four reports, as follows: 1) "Overview of Military Recruiting Activities," FPCD-75-171, 2) "Improving Effectiveness and Efficiency of Recruiting," FPCD-75-169, 3) "Advertising for Military Recruiting: How Effective Is It?" FPCD-75-168, and 4) this report, which concerns quantity and quality of enlistees and mental testing procedures of the services.

We contrasted the quality level of fiscal year 1974 recruits as shown by DOD records with the quality of recruits from earlier periods to evaluate AVF recruitment. We chose to use 5-year intervals to define trends in quality. Hence, our comparison points are fiscal year 1964, before the Vietnam War, and fiscal year 1969, during the Vietnam War; in both, the draft was used. We reviewed the mental testing practices of the services and the efforts taken to develop and adopt a common mental test to be used by all of the services to classify recruits in mental categories. We also reviewed some aspects of DOD's high school recruiting and testing program whereby students who are potential recruits are tested to determine whether they are mentally qualified for military service.

Our review included work at the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the headquarters, intermediate commands, and recruiting offices of each military service. We also visited selected Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Stations, reviewed applicable public laws and regulations, and talked with officials responsible for recruiting and enlisting of personnel in each service. In addition, selected high school officials throughout the United States were asked their opinion of DOD's high school recruiting and testing program and the military services in general. Recruits are grouped into three basic categories, i.e., prior-service personnel, nonprior-service females and nonprior-service males. The review was limited to nonprior-service males because:

- --This category comprised 86 percent of all fiscal year 1974 recruits.
- --The recruiting objective for this category was the most difficult to achieve.

CHAPTER 2

QUANTITY AND MENTAL QUALITY OF THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

The military services essentially met their strength and recruiting goals for the first full year of operation under the all-volunteer force concept. These goals were achieved without any appreciable drop in quality, although we did obtain some evidence which casts doubt on the quality statistics reported. (See our report "Improving the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Recruiting," FPCD-75-169.) In our opinion, the overall effort to recruit sufficient qualified enlistees in the first year of the AVF has been successful, due principally to the dedicated efforts of the recruiting commands.

Although our fieldwork was completed well before the end of fiscal 1975, we noted that the second year appears to have been even more successful. All of the services have raised their recruiting standards in an effort to further improve quality. The success in 1975 was probably helped by depressed economic conditions but also by improved recruiting proficiency. However, as shown in this and the accompanying reports, we believe the cost of this effort can be reduced considerably, and steps can be taken to improve the effectiveness of the recruiting effort and the reliability of reported data.

QUANTITY

The planned aggregate military strength as of the end of fiscal year 1974 was 2,174,000. The actual strength level achieved was 2,162,000, or 99 percent of planned strength. Planned and actual yearend strength levels for each service as reported by DOD are shown below.

	Planned	Actual
Air Force	645,000	644,000
Army	782,000	783,000
Marine Corps	196,000	189,000
Navy	551,000	546,000
Total	2,174,000	2,162,000

Since its actual strength was 99.8 percent of that planned, the Air Force considers that it achieved its yearend strength goal. The Navy actually exceeded its fiscal year 1974 recruiting objective by about 3 percent; the shortfall was attributed to manpower-accounting deficiencies.

During the year, the services enlisted 412,847 volunteers, about 96 percent of their total recruiting objective. They achieved about 95 percent of their recruiting objective for nonprior-service males, about 106 percent of their objective for nonprior-service females and about 112 percent of their objective for prior-service personnel. Nonprior-service male recruiting results by service for fiscal year 1974 are shown below.

	Objective	Actual	Percent of objective
Air Force	65,330	65,723	100.1
Army	184,200	166,798	90.6
Marine Corps	51,800	46,634	90.0
Navy (note a)	72,465	74,539	102.9
All services	373,795	353,694	94.6

[a] The statistics also include active duty reservists.

The Army and Marine Corps attributed their recruiting shortfall to the legal requirement that at least 55 percent of recruits be high school graduates. The Army further attributed its shortfall to the legal limitation that mental-category-IV personnel may not exceed 18 percent of the total recruited.

Despite falling short of their 1974 recruiting objectives, the services were less than 1 percent short of their planned yearend strength. This may be attributed to a reduction in planned strength levels from 2,252,000 at the end of fiscal 1973 to 2,174,000 at the end of fiscal 1974. Furthermore, the services experienced higher personnel retention rates than expected and recruiting objectives for prior-service personnel and nonprior-service females were exceeded.

QUALITY

Qualitative standards are more numerous and less clear-cut than quantitative standards. One of the most used and emphasized quality standards is the mental category derived from selection and classification tests given all new personnel. The AFQT was the primary selection test used during the draft era. However, in the all-volunteer environment the services are no longer required to give the AFQT. They are using more comprehensive selection and classification tests to determine enlistment eligibility, guarantees, and assignments. The scores from these tests are statistically convertible to AFQT percentile scores.

On the basis of their AFQT percentile scores, service applicants are divided into five mental categories, I through V, in order of decreasing scores. Category III is average. Test scores below 10 (mental category V) legally disqualify an individual for military service induction.

Distribution by mental category of nonprior-service males enlisted by the services during fiscal 1974 is shown in chart 1.

Chart 1

	Categories			
	I	II	III	IV
	(percent)			
Air Force	4.5	38.7	56.2	0.6
Army	1.9	22.8	55.9	19.4
Marine Corps	2.5	30.0	59.7	7.8
Navy	2.4	33.0	61.0	3.6
All services	2.8	31.1	58.2	7.9

We compared the above results for the first year of the AVF, to that achieved during two draft years--fiscal 1964, before the Vietnam War, and fiscal 1969, during the Vietnam War. These comparisons show that quality levels fluctuated among the four categories. The following series of charts illustrates the comparative quality levels achieved by the services during the three time periods selected.

A decrease in the number of mental category I personnel has occurred, as shown in chart 2. This trend may indicate a reduced quality level under the AVF. However, there has been a concurrent downswing in the number of mental category IV personnel enlisting under the AVF, as shown in chart 3.

CHART 2

NON-PRIOR SERVICE MALE PERSONNEL COMPRISING
MENTAL CATEGORY I



CHART 3

NON-PRIOR SERVICE MALE PERSONNEL COMPRISING
MENTAL CATEGORY IV



[a] During the Viet Nam buildup, the services were required to meet directed quotas for category IV accessions. "Project 100,000," a program for expanding the manpower pool to include more men with marginal abilities, was instituted in 1966 and quotas continued to be used until the passage of Public Law 92-204 on December 18, 1971, which prohibited their use.

The declining percentage of recruits in categories I and IV has caused a proportionate expansion in the percentage of recruits in the midlevel mental categories, as illustrated in chart 4.

CHART 4

NON-PRIOR SERVICE MALE PERSONNEL COMPRISING MENTAL CATEGORIES II AND III



Chart 5 shows that in the highest quality levels, mental categories I and II, the services experienced a percentage loss in fiscal year 1974 larger than those of fiscal years 1964 and 1969. Chart 6 shows the corresponding rise in the percentage of mental category III personnel.

CHART 5

NON–PRIOR SERVICE MALE PERSONNEL
COMPRISING MENTAL CATEGORIES I AND II



CHART 6

NON–PRIOR SERVICE MALE PERSONNEL
COMPRISING MENTAL CATEGORY III



Since the percentage of mental category I and II personnel has decreased, it is apparent that part of the increase in percentage of mental category III personnel during fiscal 1974 is attributable to that decrease as well as the decrease in the enlistment of mental category IV personnel shown in chart 3.

Reliability of reported mental quality

The data in the above charts was reported by the recruiting commands. As shown in our report titled "Improving the Effectiveness and Efficiency of Recruiting" (FPCD-75-169), there are differences between test results reported by the recruiting commands and retest results reported by processing centers or training stations. The Navy and Marine Corps retests showed some statistically significant differences. In general, the recruiting data shows a higher percentage of scores falling in mental category IV than do the tests at the time of enlistment.

There are factors that could have biased these results, such as the different mental attitudes of the recruits, the fact that the biggest differences were based on the results of different tests, and the potential for compromising the test at the time of recruitment as discussed in the above-mentioned report, and some downward trend may be statistically inevitable. However, because retest results were generally lower, we believe the mental quality reported by DOD may be overstated. When they became aware of the situation, DOD officials took immediate steps to improve control over the mental testing at the time of enlistment and are exploring other actions. We believe the actions taken and planned should correct the problem.

Educational level

According to DOD, a high school diploma is an indicator of an individual's motivation and discipline. Non-high school graduates (those who do not possess a high school diploma or the equivalent) tend to have more discipline problems, higher retraining rates, and a higher percentage of early discharges. For example, a report prepared for the Army and issued in April 1974 states that the probability of an Army volunteer with 8 years of education or less being found unsuitable during the first 18 months of service is 48 percent, while the probability for a high school graduate is only 8 percent.

In a report to the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Assistant Secretary of Defense

(Manpower and Reserve Affairs) stated that 66 percent of all fiscal year 1974 nonprior-service male recruits were high school graduates upon entry into the military as compared with 64 percent in the civilian labor force between 16 and 24, the ages of enlistment. Statistics by service are shown in chart 7.

CHART 7

PERCENTAGE OF NON-PRIOR SERVICE PERSONNEL RECRUITED DURING FISCAL YEAR 1974 WHO WERE HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATES



The fact that about 85 percent of all enlisted personnel in the services are high school graduates, when compared with the recruit percentages shown above, indicates that many individuals take advantage of inservice educational opportunities.

EFFORTS BY THE SERVICES TO IMPROVE RECRUITING RESULTS

DOD allows each service to establish its own mental criteria for enlistment. During most of fiscal year 1974, the services were legally allowed to enlist no more than 18 percent mental category IV personnel and no more than 45 percent non-high school graduates. The high school graduate requirement was eliminated in June 1974, yet the services retained high quality enlistment standards. In addition, the services have implemented several programs to improve quantity and mental quality of recruits.

Quantity

While the Air Force and Navy successfully met their recruiting quantity goals, the Army and Marine Corps did not. The reasons usually cited for these disparities include the "glamour" of the Air Force and Navy, the greater applicability to civilian jobs of their technical training, and the greater physical exertion and likelihood of combat assignment in the Army and Marine Corps.

Various proposals have been made and some implemented to avoid enlistment shortfalls:

--Reduction of active-duty military strength.

--Conversion of military personnel positions to civilian positions.

--Recruitment of more women.

--Passage of legislation providing enlistment and reenlistment bonuses for a wide variety of skills.

--Modification of intelligence and educational minimum requirements to permit more capable non-high school graduates and more recruits with lower mental test scores to enter the services.

Quality

Service quality requirements are governed by the enlistment test score minimum each service has established. Since the advent of the AVF, all the services have raised their enlistment criteria. Although the minimum legally acceptable AFQT percentile score for inductees is 10, none of the services will enlist personnel scoring less than 21. Furthermore, the Air Force, Navy, and Army will accept only those mental category IV personnel who are high school graduates.

The Air Force has the most stringent enlistment criteria of all the services. The recruitment of mental category IV personnel is limited to 45 per month, nongraduates of high school must score in the first two mental categories to be accepted. Twice during the first 6 months of fiscal year 1975, the Air Force tightened its enlistment criteria by increasing its minimum acceptable test scores.

The Army is also gradually tightening its enlistment criteria and has implemented several new programs to improve the quality recruits. The Army established a fiscal year 1975 goal of limiting mental category IV accessions to 18 percent, the same as the fiscal year 1974 ceiling. This percentage was further restricted in September 1974 to 15 and again in October 1974 to 12 for the remainder of the year. In addition, the service has established a fiscal year 1975 goal of limiting the enlistment of non-high school graduates to 42 percent.

The Army has instituted a trainee discharge program to screen out enlistees who demonstrate a lack of motivation, discipline, or aptitude for Army life within the first 6 months of enlistment. Another program has been implemented to identify and discharge individuals from the Army during the 6th through the 36th month of service who are unable to adjust to military life and perform their duties as expected of the average soldier. (See our report to the Secretary of Defense, "Urgent Need for a Department of Defense Marginal Performer Discharge Program," April 23, 1975, FPCD-75-152.) Other programs, including one to assist enlistees in obtaining college credits, have been initiated to attract high quality enlistees.

The Marine Corps has also taken steps to improve the quality of personnel recruited. It has limited the enlistment of mental category IV personnel to 2 years and 10 percent and by a requirement that they achieve certain aptitude scores.

At the request of The Senate Armed Services Committee, the Marine Corps reported on the quality and quantity of personnel and the mission and structure of the Corps in December of 1975. The report acknowledged the fact that the overall quality had been falling, causing discipline problems and increased drug use and desertion.

As a result, the Marine Corps has taken action to recruit better enlistees. Enlistment standards have been raised by reducing the number of equivalency certificates accepted as substitutes for high school graduation and by requiring 67 percent of all fiscal year 1976 recruits and 75 percent of all fiscal year 1977 recruits to be high school graduates. The Marine Corps has also begun a program to speed up discharges for marginal and substandard performers. Through these efforts, the Marine Corps has realized improvement. During the first 5 months of fiscal year 1976, unauthorized absence and desertion rates dropped.

To improve the quality of Navy recruits, a program was established early in 1973 by the Navy Recruiting Command to look for weaknesses in recruit applicant screening procedures which permitted marginal performers to qualify for enlistment. The Navy has also required that 90 percent of its nonprior-service enlistments achieve entrance test scores that would qualify them for admission to its technical schools.

CONCLUSIONS

At the end of fiscal year 1974, the services' actual strength was within 1 percent of that planned. During the year they reached about 96 percent of their recruiting objectives.

In comparing the quality of AVF personnel to their counterparts who either volunteered or were drafted into the services in fiscal year 1964 and fiscal year 1969, the quality of nonprior-service males recruited during fiscal year 1974 was higher by some standards and lower by others. The tendency has been a modest decline in the proportion of enlistees with above average test scores, a moderate increase in the proportion of enlistees with average test scores, and a steady decline in the percentage of recruits scoring below average. However, some of the data may be overstated. The services have tightened their enlistment criteria. Additionally, programs have been instituted to attract more highly qualified personnel and to discharge those unsuited to military life. All things considered, the quality of recruits under the AVF concept probably has not decreased.

We believe that these results represent a very good first-year effort by the services and DOD, and there are clear indications of further improvement. Our recommendations for improving the operational and management controls over testing are contained in our report on "Improving Effectiveness and Efficiency of Recruiting" (FPCD-75-169).

EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS AND THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

by

Charles C. Moskos, Jr.
Northwestern University

Morris Janowitz
University of Chicago

The all-volunteer force raises issues beyond sheer numbers of personnel. The dominant rationale — as most clearly espoused in The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force[1] — is to redefine the armed forces toward an occupational model. The basic premise in this approach is that enlisted personnel will be recruited into the military on the basis of monetary inducements competitive with the prevailing market-place economy. Perhaps the ultimate in monetary recruitment has been reached in the "bonus" used to induce young men to join the ground combat forces. Such an occupational model detracts from the ideal that military service ought be broadly representative of the larger constituency and that such service ought to carry with it values of civic responsibility and national service.

The arguments against the occupational model of the armed forces are manifold and persuasive. The legitimacy and social esteem of the military is linked with notions of citizenship obligation in the contemporary context of American democracy. Reliance on market-place forces results in an overconcentration of youth from lower socio-educational levels and racial minorities in the combat arms and in menial positions and a concomitant underrepresentation of these groups in skilled and technical positions. A military whose self-definition is anchored in occupational rather than service values will be less resistant to trade unionism. Most important, there is evidence that a military whose fighting component does not contain significant numbers of more advantaged groups will be weakened in combat effectiveness.[2]

Concretely, we are concerned with how to persuade a representative cross section of American young men to serve in the enlisted ranks of the ground combat arms. For despite the temporary improvement in the recruitment situation resulting from the 1974-75 downturn in the economy, the ability of the military to attract qualified personnel for the ground combat arms continues to remain problematic.

There is a set of data sources which bear upon the factors motivating young people to enlist in the services, and, after entry, the likelihood of their becoming effective soldiers.[3] The salient findings can be summarized as follows:

(1) Since the end of the draft upwards of a third of Army and Marine Corps male accessions do not possess a civilian high school diploma. This is well over double the proportion of non-high school graduates in the population at large for the relevant age group.

(2) A staggering number of new accessions in the ground forces do not serve their full enlistment. The loss rate in the Army for fiscal year 1974 approached forty per cent!

(3) All data dramatically and consistently show that service personnel with high school diplomas — compared to non-high school graduates —

are much more likely to complete their enlistments, have fewer disciplinary problems, and be more effective in job performance. In point of fact, high school graduation is a better predictor of soldierly success than mental group level. This is true regardless of racial background.

(4) Army recruitment figures for 1973-74 (when such a policy was in effect) show that short terms of enlistment — two years of active duty — were most attractive to high school graduates. Qualitative evidence indicates the large majority of these two-year enlistments were college bound youth.

(5) GI Bill seekers view education in academic, not vocational, terms.

(6) Approximately 15 per cent of high school accessions into the enlisted ranks of the all-volunteer force will be depleted if the GI Bill were to be terminated. GI Bill termination would most affect recruitment into the ground forces and have least effect on the Navy and Air Force.

The conclusion to be drawn from these findings is that highly qualified youth are potential service entrants, providing educational benefits are offered and a short-term enlistment is available. Recruiting single-term enlistment from youth with educational plans beyond high school would obviously make for a more effective and socially representative enlisted force than is presently the case.

It is to be remembered that even under the present GI Bill, educational benefits combined with an appropriate savings from military pay are enough to enable a recruit to afford several years of post-high school education after one term of military service. It would be advantageous if this arrangement were made more explicit by means of a contract enlistment, i.e., in which the terms of compensation were oriented toward educational benefits rather than monthly pay. A desirable feature in such an arrangement would be a system in which contributions by service personnel would be matched by funds paid by the Veterans' Administration. An alternative format for administering such a contributory scheme would be to have the young person's deferred compensation and the government contribution turned over to a national educational foundation. Also, it might be well to consider trading off projected pay increases resulting from promotions in rank to fund such educational benefits.

In return for such educational benefits, youths would be assigned in whatever capacity was required by military manpower needs. In all likelihood this would mean assignment to the ground combat arms. Indeed, both financial constraints and social equity suggest that if budgetary realities were to limit GI Bill eligibility, then educational benefits ought be reserved for those serving in the combat arms or other military occupational specialties which are patently not related to civilian transferable skills. Such a policy coupled with a two-year enlistment would also have the merit of concentrating short enlistments in the very military occupations where such enlistments are most practical — the lower ranks of the combat arms and assignments of a manual nature.

To sum up, a program maintaining the principle of the GI Bill linked with the option of short enlistments is an intrinsic condition for a viable military system in the post-conscription era. Such a program would match civilian educational benefits with prescribed active-duty needs. In this way, the all-volunteer force would be able to meet the standards of both demonstrable efficiency and democratic tradition.

NOTES

1. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970.

2. Paul L. Savage and Richard A. Gabriel, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the American Army," Armed Forces and Society 2 (Spring, 1976): 340-376; Charles W. Brown and Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "The American Volunteer Soldier: Will He Fight?", Military Review 56 (June, 1976):8-17.

3. In addition to data collected by the services dealing with active-duty personnel, the following studies are also relevant. Jerome Johnston and Jerald G. Bachman, Young Men and Military Service (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Institute for Social Research, 1972); Management Sciences Group, HumRRO, Educational Benefits Analysis, Special Report SR-ED-75-25 (Alexandria, Va.: Human Resources Research Organization, 1975).

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON D C 20301

MANPOWER AND
RESERVE AFFAIRS
(Planning and
Requirements)

November 12, 1975

Honorable William A. Steiger
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Steiger:

The following information is provided in response to your letter of September 30, 1975, concerning impact on the Department of Defense of terminating the G.I. Bill, and confirms the information provided by my staff via telephone on October 6. It is organized to respond to each of your four questions.

1. Impact

a. Quantity. Under current recruiting conditions and assuming Congress restores most of the recruiting and advertising funds recently deleted by the House Appropriations Committee, all of the Services expect to achieve their numerical recruiting goals. There appears to be a sufficiently large queue of non-high school graduates and high school graduates with below-average mental scores to offset the expected losses of above-average high school graduates created by termination of the G.I. Bill educational benefits. The question is one of quality, not quantity.

b. Quality

(1) Educational Level. It is difficult to come to firm judgments on the impact of termination, since we have had little comparable experience of maintaining a large force without either the draft or the G.I. Bill. Using surveys and regression analysis we estimate that the Army would suffer a reduction in high school graduate accessions of about ten percentage points if the G.I. Bill were terminated, from about 60% to about 50% of total accessions. The Army goal is at least 65% high school graduate

AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL 1776-1976 accessions. The other Services would experience similar reductions in their pools of high school graduate, potential recruits; but their queues are sufficient to absorb most of the impact.

(2) Test Scores. Using entrance test scores or corresponding high school grades as a measure of mental capability and thus quality, the adverse impact of termination of the G.I. Bill would be greatest among the brighter youth. For example, we would experience a loss of about 10% in mental groups I and II or those with mostly A and B grades in high school and a loss of about 7% among the average mental group III recruits who receive mostly B and C grades in high school. These losses would be offset by additional recruits who did not complete high school or who are in the lower mental groups on the test scores.

(3) Socioeconomic Characteristics. G.I. Bill termination will tend to make the Services somewhat less representative of the society as a whole. We expect about one-third fewer recruits from those youth who expect to eventually attend college. They will be replaced by slightly larger percentages of those who have below average high school grades or did not complete high school. The result will be a decrease in accessions from middle class white suburban families and an increase in accessions of minorities and other youth from the inner city. Even considering the extreme limits of our loss estimates, the forces will still be within acceptable ranges of socioeconomic representation. We do not expect significant changes in accessions from the various sections of the country.

2. Five Year Drop in Potential Recruits. As stated above, the Department expects to be able to meet numerical requirements, even without a G.I. Bill, assuming we are provided with sufficient recruiting and advertising funds, although the educational level may be lower than preferred. The pool of potential recruits, youth ages 18 to 23, is expected to remain essentially constant over the next five years and then gradually reduce as the lower birth rates of the mid-1960s begin to take effect.

3. Substitute Programs. As men and women enter the Service without G.I. Bill eligibility, we expect to expand the current in-service educational programs. Initially we will concentrate on the high school completion and remedial training, which have been funded by the Veterans Administration under the Predischarge Education Program (PREP). DoD will

need to assume this program as soon as PREP is terminated. It is expected to cost about $25M per year and will require some modification of the current restricting language in the Defense Appropriations Act. DoD-funded advanced education will be expanded over the next five years from the current level of about $85M to about $200M as the percentage of personnel in the Services not eligible for the G.I. Bill increases. This represents a transfer of the current VA in-service program to Defense. At present, there are no plans for a post-service program.

4. DoD Position. The Department of Defense supports the President in recommending that the educational benefits under the G.I. Bill be terminated. We would like to have an effective date which will be at least 30 days after enactment, and would like to see the date of contract rather than the date of active duty be used to determine benefit eligibility. This will allow the government to provide the benefits in effect at the time of contract for those individuals who have enlisted in the Delayed Entry Program and have assumed a six-year military obligation, but who will not come on active duty until after the effective date of termination.

It is noted that on October 6, 1975, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 9576 which would terminate the G.I. Bill educational benefits effective January 1, 1976.

Sincerely,

Robert J. Murray

Robert J. Murray
Deputy Assistant Secretary